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ABSTRACT 
Early approaches in engineering safety were based on deterministic concepts, 
according to which, safety was assured by making conservative assumptions in the 
design of industrial systems, as well as through the use of safety factors, based on 
engineering judgement. 
Recent safety app~oaches are based on probabilistic concepts, in reliability techniques 
and accident consequence modelling, according to which safety is defmed in terms of 
probabilities or frequency of failures and severity of consequences. These two items 
compose the basis for the evaluation of industrial risks. 
Risk assessment techniques are particularly relevant for those working offshore, who 
are exposed full-time to several different hazards from process equipment, risers or 
blow-outs, ship collisions, helicopter accidents, extreme weather, etc. 
At present, there are several sophisticated techniques, models and software already 
developed, that can be used in probabilistic risk analysis. However, general criteria for 
the acceptability of estimated risks have not been suitably developed, although several 
attempts have been made, and the question: "How safe is safe enough?" still remains 
without an appropriate answer. 
Within this context, this Thesis presents a brief description of techniques and models 
presently used for risk evaluation, as well as legislation concerning risk tolerability 
criteria and other proposed safety targets. Regarding the establishment of global 
safety criteria for offshore oil units, the focus of this work will be the development of 
a risk and reliability allocation methodology to achieve them. 
From data collected from more than thirty Brazilian offshore oil units, some of them 
operating for more then ten years, individual risk values for offshore employees are 
going to be calculated. 
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Based on these values, obtained for the individual risk, and on a quantitative risk 
assessment performed for a Brazilian Floating Production Storage Offioading vessel, a 
risk and re1iabilit~ allocation methodology will be proposed. This methodology 
provides a feasible" model to allocate reliability and risk criteria for the main safety 
functions of an offshore unit in a self-consistent manner. It provides a method for 
design engineers to establish minimum reliability levels for the safety systems of an 
industrial facility, in order to achieve safety targets previously dermed for it. 
The application of a risk and reliability allocation model to the problem of setting 
criteria for a range of hazardous scenarios presented in the operation of an offshore 
oil production unit is a novel approach. 
It is hope that the proposed methodology can contribute to a wider discussion about 
the establishment of a global measure for the evaluation of safety performance of 
offshore oil units. 
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SYMBOLS AND NOTATION 
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complexity). 
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Factor for module complexity. 
Test-independent failure probability for FrO-failures. These are not 
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Management cost 
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Benefit obtained in tenns of averted fatalities due to the installation of 
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Component cost (hardware) 
Cost of necessary additional equipment 
Management cost 
Vendor management and engineering cost 
Contractor management and engineering cost 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Life is full of uncertainties and the simple fact that we are alive submits us to different 
types of risk during our daily activities. 
As Benjamin Franklin has pointed out (letters 1789, Reid l ): 1n this world nothing can 
be said to be certain, except death and taxes'. 
The acceptance of risks is a part of 'common sense' as is the rejection of unacceptable 
risks. However, the general principles that guide the acceptance of risks are a complex 
matter, which is being researched in different areas like engineering, psychology, 
sociology, toxicology, etc. In the same way, the determination of acceptable risks is a 
controversy task. Some risks are clearly 'accepted without a deeper knowledge about 
them, some known risks are accepted because it is believed that they can not be 
reduced or avoided, while other risks are 'accepted' or 'tolerated' because of their 
perceived benefits. 
Therefore, it is possible to have an idea of the complexity and range of the matter we 
are going to discuss. 
In order to provide a general view of the context, in which the acceptability of risks is 
inserted, we are going to present briefly, some current trends related to the SUbject, 
which are possible to be distinguished in the present scenario. 
Mitchell1, mentions that the first school of thought (Starr] is one of its members) sees 
the acceptance of risks as a technical decision, in which the comparison of the 
expected number of fatalities per year, for different industrial activities, provides the 
basis for the decision about the acceptability of risks by society, and for the 
establishment of priorities in decision-making processes. The basic principles and 
methods, which guide the development of such comparisons and decision bases, 
include 'revealed preferences'; risk comparison tables and risk decision analyses, 
which are usually composed by cost-benefit analyses. This approach aims to establish 
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acceptable levels of risk that could be quantified, taking into consideration a series of 
different hazards and local features. 
Other schools of thought (Fishhoff et al.·, Kahneman et al.s, Slovic et al.') see the 
acceptability of risk as a problem of decision making, which involves technical and 
psychological dimensions. One of these lines is based on heuristics, in psychometric 
studies of individuals among different groups, in order to establish differences in the 
perception of risks, through qualitative dimensions. Mitchell2 mentions that other 
schools (Ruckeshaus 1984, Thomas, 1986) expanded this concept, inserting in the 
acceptability risk approach, new topics like confidence, equality and social justice, in 
order to defme the acceptable risk as a societal-political confronts between options, in 
which risk to health is only one of the items that should be considered. 
Unfortunately, the basic principles that should be followed for risk assessment studies 
are difficult to identify and there is no simple way to ensure that a decision based on 
risk assessment is 'correct' (Reidt). This had partially led to a lack of confidence in 
decisions concerning risks, on the part of decision-makers and on the part of those 
affected by the decision. 
Several industrial activities involve risks, including risks to life, risks of 
unserviciability, risks to environment and fmancial risks. 
Many of those risks can be reduced through the use of suitable design procedures, 
safe work practices and operating procedures, but some residual risks still remain and 
sometimes can not be avoided. 
There is a wide range of engineering standards that establish procedures to be 
followed in the design and operation of industrial installations, in order to assure 
acceptable levels of risk to workers, to general public and to industrial owners. These 
standards were introduced to provide a basis for dealing with a multitude of tasks and 
hazards, and often it is necessary to analyse them carefully before applying them 
without restrictions. 
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Present regulations usually prescribe procedures for the design, construction and 
operation of industrial installations based on past experience. Engineers have had a lot 
of success in establishing standards that were well accepted by the community and 
they became responsible for ensuring that those standards will be improved or refmed, 
in order to follow technological evolution. Many engineers and scientists have beeR 
dedicating their efforts to the development of models that can describe the behaviour 
of physical systems and releases of toxic or flammable chemical materials. This has 
contributed a lot to the improvement of risk assessment techniques. 
At the moment there is an increasingly demand toward the use of formal safety 
assessment as part of the effort to improve the level of safety for industrial workers 
and to reduce the costs involved on major industrial accidents. 
Also due to a wider awareness of environmental problems. there is a special interest in 
the improvement and use of risk assessment techniques, as well as in the establishment 
of explicit acceptability criteria. that can contribute to safety of industrial installations 
and to decision- making processes related to risk. 
Recently published offshore legislation in several countries (including Great Britain. 
Norway. Netherlands) requires the use of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) 
techniques. 
Early approaches to engineering safety were based on deterministic concepts. 
according to which safety was assured by making some conservative assumptions in 
the design of industrial systems, as well as through the use of safety factors, based on 
engineering judgement. Recent safety approaches are based on probabilistic concepts, 
in reliability techniques and consequence modelling, according to which safety is 
defmed in terms of acceptable probabilities or frequencies of failures and severity of 
consequences. These two items will form the basis for the evaluation of industrial 
risks. 
AIChP defines risk analysis as: The development of a quantitative estimate of risk 
based on engineering evaluation and mathematical techniques for combining 
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estimotes of incident consequences and frequencies'. Therefore, risk assessment 
techniques are based in the presumption that risks can be represented in terms of 
probabilities of failure and the seriousness of possible outcomes of risk producing 
processes. 
Techniques for safety assessment are particular relevant for those working offshore, 
once they are exposed fun-time to several different hazards, as for example releases of 
hydrocarbons from process equipment, risers or blow-outs, ship collisions, 
helicopters' accidents, falling objects, extreme weather, etc. 
The quantitative risk assessment technique is today in widespread use in the offshore 
industry, as wen as in nuclear and chemical industries, being applied to fundamental 
questions of conceptual design and detailed engineering design. It also subsides 
decisions concerning layouts and locations of industrial installations. 
Quantitative risk assessment provides a tool for the engineer to quantify risk and 
analyse risk reduction strategies. Individual contributors to the overall risk can be 
identified and prioritised. A range of risk reduction measures can be applied to the 
major hazards and assessed, using cost-benefit analysis. 
The recognition of quantitative risk assessment as an important decision-support 
technique in offshore industry has developed over a considerable length of time. The 
publication of Uuidelines for Safety Evaluation of Platfonn Conceptual Design', in 
1981 by Norwegian Petroleum Directorate', has introduced the use of quantitative 
risk assessment in offshore installations. The publication of this methodology had a 
major impact on the design concepts in Norwegian sector of North Sea and has 
strongly influenced the perfonnance of quantitative risk assessment studies and 
offshore legislation in other countries. 
At present, there is a trend in offshore safety legislation to adopt the setting of safety 
objectives as the prime means of regulation and corporate safety management, rather 
than the prescription of the means of achievement. This radical change in safety 
regulations is in the line with the philosophy of the Health and Safety Executive of 
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UK that places a strong emphasis on operators to reduce risk to a level that is 'as low 
as reasonable practicable' (ALARP). 
Quantitative risk assessment techniques can be used as a part of a safety management 
program providing a logical structure within which design and operation decisions can 
be taken as weD asperfonnance measures. 
Therefore, there are several sophisticated techniques, models and softwares already 
developed that can be used in probabilistic risk analysis. However, the establishment 
of general criteria that contributes to the acceptability of estimated risks has not been 
suitably developed, although several attempts have been made, and the question: 
How safe is safe enough?' still remains without an appropriate answer (today there is 
currents that ask: How fair is safe enough?). 
Reidt mentions that the societal acceptance of technological risks is a very important 
task in decision-making processes. This subject has widely been researched and there 
is a lot of literature already available about it, which evolution has been very fast. 
There was a stimulus for the development of research in this area due to controversies 
associated with the employment of complex technologies, including the detennination 
of the location of nuclear industries, deposit of dangerous waste, the use of chemical 
toxic materials, etc. Such controversies have highlighted the urgent need of 
govenunental measures to face the problem, despite the uncertainties associated with 
the available scientifIC methods, and the diffICulties to obtain an agreement in public 
opinion within democratic decision-making processes. 
As Reidt remarks, the establishment of clear acceptability criteria can be useful to 
govenunental authorities, as they could verify the methods and results obtained from 
risk assessment studies. It would also provide a satisfactory way to control risks, in a 
societal point of view, without undue regulatory complications. Engineers would also 
be happy to count with a weD and clearly established acceptability criteria, so that they 
could take 'correct' decisions and demonstrate compliance with regulatory 
requirements. The society as a whole body would have benefits, as it could have a 
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wider control, based on the established criteria, over the risks to which it is submitted, 
as well as it could require the execution of the suitable legislation. 
The technology of determination of risks is controversy in itself, and there is a great 
need of the establishment of acceptable references, as a basis for the use of 
probabilistic risk assessment methods, in order to subside risk management and 
engineering regulations. 
From a technological point of view, the existent quantitative methods of risk 
assessment and acceptability criteria might appear to be sufficient for the purposes of 
risk assessment and regulations. The determination of acceptable risks, however, 
depends also on the judgement of values by society, which can not be standardised. 
In the UK, the use of acceptable risks as a guiding principle was criticised by Lord 
Layfield, who chaired the public inquiry into the Sizewell B nuclear plant (Pidgeon et 
al.'). He suggested that the phrase tolerable risk would better reflect the seriousness 
of the task. Health and Safety Executive produced a report, as a result of Sir LayfIeld 
inquiry, where the concept of \olerability' or \olerable' risk is dermed as following 
(Pidgeon et al.'): 
Tolerability does not mean acceptllbility. It refers to the willingness to live with a 
risk to secure some benefits and in the confidence that it is being properly controlled. 
To tolerate a risk means that we do not regard it as negligible or something we might 
ignore. but rather as something we need to keep under review and reduce still further 
if and as we can'. (HSE 1988a, p.l). 
Therefore, according to this approach, risks should be monitored, the benefIts should 
be balanced and the risks should be, wherever possible, reduced to a level 'as low as 
reasonably practicable' (ALARP principle). 
This approach emphasises the need of safety measures to face residual risks, as well as 
potential accidents that could be detected during the design of industrial installations. 
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It also emphasises the importance of the communication of risks, regarding public 
tolerability to certain technologies. 
Anyway, we can conclude that the acceptability or tolerability of risks should not be a 
variable previously determined, to be imposed to public or workers in decision-
making processes, but the product of these processes. Risks should be continuously 
controUed by different societal actors (public, industry, environmental authorities) in a 
dynamic process, in order to have the industrial activity systematically evaluated (or 
re-evaluated) against several criteria or methods. 
Quantitative risk assessment techniques provide a powerful tool for the engineer to 
evaluate risks and analyse risk reduction strategies. It provides safety insights and the 
identification of the vulnerabilities of any industrial facility. Individual contributors to 
the overall risk can be identified and prioritised. 
1.1 Objective of the Thesis 
This Thesis presents a methodology for allocating risk and reliability between various 
safety functions of an offshore oil production unit. It intends to contribute to risk and 
safety decision making processes, establishing reference values or safety criteria (in 
terms of individual risk to workers and maximum tolerable frequency of impairment to 
Iemporary Safety Refuge) to safety functions existent in any offshore unit, based on 
quantitative risk assessments previously performed. 
It will be of interest for design engineers and maybe for policy makers, for insurance 
purposes or for any other parties involved with risk and reliability. 
The methodology presented in this 1besis provides a way of evaluating the global 
safety of an industrial facility. It provides a method for design engineers to establish 
minimum reliability levels for safety functions of an industrial facility, in order to 
achieve safety targets previously defined. It is a tool for evaluating how much will be 
gained in terms of individual or societal risk, or in terms of other safety targets (as for 
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example, the maximum frequency of impainnent of accidental events to a specific 
place in the facility) when improving the availability of safety functions. As a 
consequence, it allows the analyst to evaluate the feasibility of achieving these 
proposed safety targets. 
The methodology proposed in this work provides a wider insight through the unit's 
safety that is not usually obtained with common risk assessment approaches. 
Quantitative risk assessment is a fundamental element for the allocation model 
presented in this work. The cost element is another essential component, one it also 
plays a fundamental role in the whole picture involved in risk decision-making 
processes. It will be carefully taken into account in the methodology proposed here. 
This Thesis is also an attempt to explore others aspects of the potential role that risk 
assessment may play as a safety or management tool. The presented methodology 
requires that the analyst go through the very nature of quantitative risk assessment, 
through the process of delineating and quantifying all accident sequences and 
computing availability and risk indices toward the target lines. 
On the basis of this context, this Thesis is going to present the current 'state of art' in 
terms of the evaluation of risks of offshore oil platforms, regarding legislation, 
techniques and models presently used for that. 
It will present individual risk criteria for offshore employees, based on data collected 
from more than thirty Brazilian offshore oil units. 
Based on a quantitative risk assessment performed for a Brazilian Floating Production 
Oil Storage Oftloading vessel and using the allocation model proposed, unavailability 
values are going to be calculated for the vessel's main safety systems, in other to 
achieve the best global safety levels for the installation, considering costs and safety 
targets previously defmed. 
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It is hope that these reference values and the proposed methodology can contribute to 
a wider discussion about the establishment of a global measure for the evaluation of 
the safety performance of offshore oil facilities, as well as about the way for the 
achievement of the safety targets defmed. 
1.2. Thesis Organisation 
This Thesis will present in its second chapter an overview of the offshore legislation 
concerning risk assessment, frequencies of impairment to safety functions and the 
establishment of safety goals, applied or recommended in countries like Great Britain, 
Norway and Netherlands. Different risk acceptability or tolerability criteria adopted in 
different countries will be described in this chapter. 
In the third chapter we will present the main topics. which compose the methodology 
for the evaluation of risks of offshore oil units, based on techniques and models 
currently used in quantitative risk assessment studies. 
In chapter four we will describe the model proposed for the allocation of risk and 
reliability in detail, which comprises the presentation of the expressions of the average 
societal risk and of the average individual risk as a function of safety systems' 
availability or unavailability variables. as well as a reliability prediction model and a 
lifecycle cost model. 
In chapter five we will present the allocation model application, as well as the results 
obtained from it in terms of unavailability or availability values for the FPSO's safety 
systems, regarding the optimisation of individual risk and cost expression. This 
chapter includes the presentation of Fatal Accident Rates (FAR values) and individual 
risk values for offshore oil Brazilian's workers. Therefore. data collected from more 
than thirty offshore oil facilities, which operate in Campos Basin (Brazil) will be 
presented. 
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In chapter six, an analysis of the main conclusions derived from the model application 
will be performed and a discussion about the results will be presented. 
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2. Offshore Legislation Concerning Risk Assessment 
1.1 General 
The history of occurrence of major accidents and the publicity associated with them 
has shown that they are a fundamental contributor factor to the evolution process of 
standards and regulations, as well as to the implementation of new requisitions or 
revision of old ones. They also constitute a strong appeal to a wider commitment from 
governmental authorities and society. 
The occurrence of some major accidents in Europe during the 1970s, like the one 
which took place in Seveso, Italy, in 1976. where a release of dioxin resulted in an 
unwanted and widespread contamination, led to a recognition of differing standards of 
control over industrial activities within the European Community (EC). This led the 
EC Commission to prepare a Directive on major industrial accident hazards. 
Since the publication of Seveso Directive, in 1982, several laws were issued 
concerning to risk management in process industry and quantitative risk criteria were 
proposed in several European countries. 
Therefore, in the 80's decade, there was an increasingly trend for the introduction of 
risk assessment techniques in a more systematic way. 
In the USA, several hazard identification techniques have been being employed, 
specially HAZOP. and also some quantitative risk techniques. Some American states 
have already stated regulations, which require the use of quantitative risk analysis 
from their process industry. 
Table 3.1 illustrates some "current national practices" requested when a new 
enterprise is trying to obtain an operation licence (for non-nuclear onshore 
installations) . 
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In this section, we will present a brief description of the most significant aspects of the 
current offshore legislation applied in countries like Great Britain, Norway and 
Netherlands. 
2.2 Offshore Current Legislation 
2.2.1 Norway 
The Norwegian document named "Guidelines for Safety Evaluation of Platform 
Design", issued in 1981, by Norwegian Petroleum Directorate', and had introduced 
several concepts for the implementation of risk analysis, which have formed the basis 
for performing risk analysis in Norwegian petroleum activities and also in other 
countries. 
These guidelines were extensively discussed and applied in offshore industry. They 
were only applied for safety ev'aluation and analysis of a completed platform in the 
operational phase (OsladI3). 
The NPD Guidelines presented several concepts that were followed by industry when 
performing offshore risk assessment studies. Therefore, the main concepts used in this 
document are going to be described below, as they played a significant role in 
offshore risk assessment area and also to provide a better understanding about the 
causes that led them to be later reviewed and replaced by a new regulation issued by 
NPD14 in 1991, based on the experience acquired after the implementation of them in 
1981. 
Definitions (NPD'): 
"Accident: an unwanted incident or condition which is not assumed to occur during 
normal operation. and which can cause significant damage unless it is taken into 
consideration during design. " 
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Country InstaUation Hazard Partial 
Classification Identification Quantification 
Belgium Yes Mandatory Sometimes 
Canada· No No Rare 
Denmark Yes Mandatory Rare 
Finland Yes Mandatory Sometimes 
France Yes Mandatory Frequent 
Germany Yes Mandatory Sometimes 
Greece Yes Mandatory Uncommon 
Italy Yes Mandatory Uncommon 
Japan Yes Mandatory Rare 
Luxemb Yes Mandatory Uncommon 
ourg 
Netherla Yes Mandatory Frequent 
nds 
NSW Yes Yes Yes 
New Yes Uncommon Uncommon 
Zealand 
Norway Yes Mandatory Sometimes 
Sweden Yes Mandatory Uncommon 
Swiss Yes Mandatory Sometimes 
Great Yes Mandatory Frequent 
Britain 
USA Yes Yes Yes 
. . . rH . Table 2.2.1.1 Current National Practices (CaSSidy ) 
* National level 
Probabilistic Quantified 
Evaluation Objectives 
No No 
Some No 
Some Some cases 
Some Some cases 
Rare Occasional 
No Occasional 
No No 
No No 
Rare No 
No No 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Some No 
Some Some cases 
No No 
Some Some cases 
Some Some cases 
Some No 
Accidental event: an accident in combination with other conditions (e.g., weather 
conditions) which can affect the accidental effect. 
Design accidental event (DAE's): accidental event, which is the basis for the design 
evaluation to satisfy the acceptance criteria, outlined in chapter 5 (of the NPD 
Guidelines) 
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Design accidental effect: effect of the design accidental event expressed in terms of 
heat flux, impact force and energy, acceleration etc., which is the basis for safety 
evaluations ". 
In the section 4.1.2 of the NPD Guidelines 7 we fmd: 
"The aim of the safety evaluation is to establish acceptable safety in compliance with 
given criteria. The intention is not to include calculation of residual risk (RAE's) (i.e. 
probability and consequences of accidents which still may occur)". 
Regarding the type of event that should be considered, the same document presents a 
Jist of them, that should be taken into consideration where relevant (NPD7, section 
4.1.3.): 
" 
- Blow-out 
- Fire 
- Explosion and similar incidents 
- Falling objects 
- Ship and helicopter collisions 
- Earthquakes 
- Other possible relevant types of accidents 
- Extreme weather conditions 
- Relevant combinations of these accidents". 
In its section 4.1.4.: 
"The accidents mentioned in section 4.1.3 may follow from primary failures. for 
example: blow-outs, fracture in riser pipes. etc. These primary failures do not 
require individual consideration as long as the resulting effect is accounted for an 
accident under section 4.1.3. ". 
And in section 4.2.1: 
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"For the section that are relevant to the acceptance criteria outlined in chapter 5, the 
licensee should specify a set of design accidental events, In principle, the design 
accidental events shall be the most unfavourable situations relative to the acceptance 
criteria". 
Regarding the acceptance criteria NPD Guidelines presents the following figure 
(section 4.2.2): 
"In practical terms, it may be considered necessary to exclude the most improbable 
accidental events from the analysis. However, the total probability of occun'ence of 
each type of excluded situation should not by best available estimate exceed 10-4 
per year for any of the main functions specified in 5.2, 5.5 and 5.6. " 
In sections 5.1.5.2. 5.5 and 5.6. the Guidelines presents the acceptance criteria 
described below: 
5.1. "The platform design must be such that a design accidental event does not 
impose a danger to personnel outside the immediate vicinity of the accident". 
5.2. "Section 5.1. Can be considered satisfied by complying with the following 
criteria: 
a) At least one escape way from central positions which may be subjected to an 
accident, shaU normaUy be intact for at least one hour during a design 
accidental event; 
b) Shelter areas shaU be intllCt during a calculated accidental event untU safe 
evacuation is possible; 
c) Depending on the platform type, function and location, when exposed to the 
design accidental event, the main support structure must maintain its load 
carrying capacity lor a specified time It. 
As we have mentioned, after the experience acquired with the implementation of these 
guidelines, NP014 have revised and replaced them for the new regulations, named 
"The Regulations concerning implementation and use of risk analysis in petroleum 
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activities with guidelines". which entered into force in 1991. These new regulations 
are applicable to all phases of an offshore enterprise and also for planning. 
implementation. use and updating of risk analysis. 
A key point in the new Regulations is that the operators shall establish safety 
objectives for their activities. As mentioned by Olstadl3: "The safety objective is 
meant to be ideal goals, which ensure a dynamic safety evolution and promotion". 
The new Regulations also requires that the operator defme risk acceptance criteria for 
the activities. where the risk is related to loss of human life. personnel injury. damage 
to environment and loss of assets and fmancial interests. In its chapter IV. section II 
the NPD regulation14 states: 
"The operator shall define acceptance criteria for risk in the· activities. The 
acceptance criteria shall be defined before a risk analysis is carried out. " 
The results of risk analysis studies should then be compared with the acceptance 
criteria that has been previously established. in order to decide if the calculated risk 
level is deemed acceptable or whether risk reducing measures should be implemented. 
following the ALARP criteria. 
The new NPD Regulations are based on the new principles of safety management 
that uses overall goals to be achieved. using risk assessment studies and defining an 
acceptability criterion. The safety objectives to be established define long and short-
tenn goals for safety. while the acceptance criterion is used to define the limits of 
acceptability for risks at a defined moment (Osltad13). 
Some of the definitions used in the 1981 NPD Guidelines were replaced by others in 
new regUlations. Some of them are described below. as they also have changed "the 
approach" of offshore risk assessment studies. 
As we can observe in the defmitions presented in NPD Guidelines of 1981. the 
concepts of Design Accidental Events (DAE's) and Residual Accidental Events 
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(RAE's) formed the bases for many risk assessment methodologies presented to 
authorities as safety cases, These terms have been replaced by one single term in the 
new NPD Regulations14, which is named "Dimensioning Accidental Event". Its 
definition is given l?elow (NPD): 
'J\n accidental event which according to defined acceptance criteria represents an 
unacceptable risk, and which consequently serves as a basis for the design and 
operation of installations and otherwise for the implementation of the activities" 
The NPD new Regulations14 also states in its chapter IV, section 16, named "Risk 
reducing measures" the following: 
"Risk reducing measures shall be implemented for each defined dimensioning 
accidental event so that: 
a) Personnel outside the immediate vicinity of the accident are not injured, 
b) Evacuation, on and from the installation can be carried out in a safe and 
organised manner, 
c) Personnel can remain safe in one or more areas on or in conjunction with the 
installation, until safety evacuation is expected to be carried out, 
d) Control rooms and any other areas of importance to combat an accidental event 
remain operative until safety evacuation is expected to be carried OUI, 
e) External assistance can be received and carried oul effectively, 
f) Damage to the environment as a resull of oil spillage is avoided". 
And in the same section: 
"Probability reducing measures sludl, to extent as possible, be given priority over 
conseque"ces reducing measures." 
There are other aspects in NPD Regulations14 concerning acceptability criteria that 
may be pointed out (section II): 
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"The acceptance criteria express the level of risk deemed acceptable by the operator 
for a given period or phase of the activities. The need for risk reducing measures is 
assessed 
With reference to the acceptance criteria, which must consequently be defined before 
the implementation of a risk analysis" 
And in item Til 12: "The acceptance criteria may be defined both in quantitative or 
qualitative terms, depending inter alia on the mode of expression of risk". " ... When 
quantitative acceptance criteria are used, clearly define limits for their application 
must be stipulated". " ... When qualitative acceptance criteria are used, the condition 
for their application should be similarly defined". 
Regarding the presentation of qualitative criteria, Olstad13 presents the following 
example shown in figure 3.1. This example shows a matrix, which grades 
qualitatively, probabilities and consequences in order to obtain a ranking of risks. 
What it is possible to observe,' from different uses of the terms published by NPD 
Guidelines 7, is that there was an effort by industry, to interpret or to adapt the 
definitions employed in these Guidelines. in order to use them in risk assessment 
studies that should be presented to authorities. As the defmitions of the terms were 
not clear in this document. there were different interpretations of the concepts 
proposed, all over the industry. 
In Great Britain and Netherlands, the present legislation concerning offshore risk 
assessment is strongly influenced by Norwegian regulations, as we will show in the 
next sections. 
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Probability 
Abreviations and Symbols: 
N = Negligible 
L= Low 
M = Moderate 
H = High 
S = Severe 
C = Catastrophic 
H 
MI--_+--_ 
L 
N 
N M S C 
Consequences 
• = Unnaceptable 
o = Acceptable after evaluation 
o = Acceptable 
Figure 2.2.2.1. - Acceptance Criteria in Risk Analysis ( Olstad) 
It is also worth mentioning, that there is a recent standard named NS-5814, published 
by Norsk StandardlS in 1991, which intends to be a guideline for the planning, 
execution and use of risk analysis. 
2.2.2.Great Britain 
The most frequently applied techniques in the UK sector in the 1980's were HAZOP 
and Fault Tree Analysis, which were employed to specific isolated cases. Prior to the 
Piper Alpha disaster, it was not common to fmd full risk analysis performed in UK 
platform sector (Cox16). Since this disaster, few full risk assessment studies have 
been performed for UK platforms, but these studies have not been published. 
After the occurrence of the Piper Alpha explosion in an offshore installation in 1988, 
which took 167 lives, a public inquiry was established and conducted by Lord Cullen. 
The Lord Cullen report resulted in several recommendations which were incorporated 
in British offshore regulations and were consolidated in a publication, named "A 
Guide to the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations", issued in 1992, by 
Health and Safety Executivel7 (HSE). These recommendations were influenced by 
HSC/E's18 experience of regulating major hazards onshore under the Control of 
Industrial Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1984 (CIMAH). 
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CIMAH regulations were implemented in Great Britain as a result of Seveso 
Directive. They require the demonstration of safe operation and certain installations 
were also required to submit a safety report to HSE. The safety report intends to be 
the way through which manufacturers demonstrate to themselves the safety of their 
activities, but it also serves as a basis for the regulation of major hazard activities 
(HSEl8). 
The acceptability criterion of risks which is being adopted by offshore oil industry in 
Great Britain follows the recommendations proposed by HSEl9 document named 
"The tolerability of risk from nuclear power stations", which describes the framework 
on which risk control is based. This framework reflects long established approaches, 
not only in UK practises but also more generally expressed views such as those of the 
International Commission on Radiological protection (ICRP) in 1977 and the report 
of the Royal Society Working Group on Risk Assessment20. These documents state 
that having assessed or estimated a risk, it is necessary to determine: 
(a) Whether a given risk is so great or the outcome so unacceptable that it must be 
refused altogether, or 
(b) Whether the risk is, or has been made, so small that no further precaution is 
necessary, 
(c) If a risk falls between these two states, that it has been reduced to the lowest level 
practicable, bearing in mind the benefits flowing from its acceptance, and taking into 
account the costs of any further reduction. The injunction laid down in safety law is 
that risk must be reduced so far as reasonably practicable, or to a level which is "as 
low as reasonably practicable" (the ALARP principle). 
Figure 2.2.2.1 illustrates the ALARP principle. 
The HSE Guidelinesl7 in the section 'Risk assessment: broad objectives and 
methodology' states the main elements of demonstration required in a safety case: 
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" 
(a) A description of hazards identified as having the potential to cause a major 
accident (including reference to actions taken to eliminate or minimise such 
hazards); 
(b) Evaluation of the lilcelihood that the major hazards will be realised, and of the 
potential consequences (including references to preventive measures in place and 
their assessed effectiveness); 
(c) Evaluation of the risks to persons from the consequences of major accidents 
(including reference to protective measures and their assessed effectiveness); 
(d) In the light of previous stages, confirmation that the risk to persons described 
under (c) is as low as is reasonably practicable; or a description and evaluation of 
proposed additional preventive and protective measures which will reduce risks to 
required level; 
(e) Description of time scales for implementing any such remedial measures, and of 
temporary safeguards to be applied in the interim". 
The HSE Guidelines17 in its paragraph 109, item b the following: 
.. Design events: The duty holder should show that the design events on which the 
demonstration is based would not cause the loss of integrity of any of the following: 
(i) the passability of at least one access route to temporary refuge from each 
potentially manned location on the installation; 
(ii) A minimum complement of embarkation points and TEMPSC specified for 
personnel taking temporary refuge; and 
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Unacceptable risk 
( the risk can not under no 
circumstances be 
justificated ) 
ALARP REGION 
( the risk is acceptable 
if some other advantage 
is desirable) 
ACCEPTABLE REGION 
( Not necessary to include 
detailed studies to demonstrate 
the ALARP principle) 
Acceptable only if the decrease of 
risk is impossible or if the 
expenses alltogether is out of 
proportion to the decrease of risk 
Acceptable only if the expenses 
will exceed the decrease of risk 
Negligible risk 
Figure 2.2.2.1 - Risk Level and ALARP Principle ( OLF) 
(iii) The passability of at least one evacuation route to each of these embarkation 
points". 
Taking into consideration the results of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) , this 
document requires a demonstration in the safety case, that the performance standards 
established for temporary refuge, etc., will reduce risks to person to as low as 
reasonably practicable, regarding the measures adopted to prevent and reduce the 
effects of major accidents. According to HSE Guidelines17, paragraph 116: 
"This requires estimation by QRA of the frequency of 'extreme events ' together with 
those 'design events ' where (e.g. because of unanticipated component failure or 
human error) the Temporary Safety Refuge (TSR) system fails to maintain its 
integrity for the full period assumed in the design; 
And in its paragraph 117: "In keeping with the concept of maximum tolerable risk, 
HSE will look for a demonstration that the frequency with which accidental events 
will result in loss of integrity of temporary refuge, within the minimum endurance 
time stated in the safety case, does not exceed the order of 1 in 1,000 a year. Risk 
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should be reduced to a lower level wherever this is reasonably practicable; where the 
risk is close to 1 to 1,000 a year, there should be convincing arguments presented 
that it is not practicable to reduce it further". 
Quantitative risk assessment techniques are going to be required for all existing and 
new platforms in UK. According to Cox16, HSFJOSD estimates that the cost of 
Safety Cases involved in each of the 100 ftxed platforms, which will require 
retrospective assessment, is at 1 million pounds. For the mobile units the cost will be 
around 150,000 pounds each. 
Lord Cullen's recommendations following the Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha 
disaster paved the way for a completely new safety regime offshore. The Industry has 
implemented all his recommendations. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has 
replaced the old prescriptive regulations with new goal-setting regulations that set 
objectives. The duty holder determines the most appropriate safety measures to 
reduce risks to as low as reasonably practicable. 
The cornerstone of the new regime is the Safety Case for each installation that the 
Duty Holder must prepare and have accepted by the HSE. An essential ingredient of 
the Safety Case is the involvement of the workforce. Operators have made great 
progress in tapping this valuable resource for experience, knowledge and ideas and 
has created a comprehensive system of Safety Committees covering every installation. 
The Industry view is that goal-setting Regulations should be supported by non-mandatory 
guidance preferably created by the Industry itself through its associations such as 
UKOOA These assist Operators when setting their own standards of performance that, 
proWled they followed the guideline, would be based on "good practice" as defined by the 
Industry. This approach is entirely consistent with Lord Cullen's recommendations. 
Where Industry Guidelines are in place and serving their intended purpose there should be 
no need for the HSE to issue its own Technical Guidance in support of the Regulations. 
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The influence of Lord Cullen's recommendations has spread beyond the UK A meeting 
of the International Labour Organisation in Geneva in 1993 concluded that the first 
priority of the ILO was "to promote the adoption on a world-wide basis of the principle of 
Self-regulDtion based on Safety Management Systems within a framework of goal-settint 
regulations, and full workforce involvement at national and company level in safety 
maners in the Offshore Petroleum Industry". 
The benefits of these dramatic changes are now being realised. The risk of another major 
accKlent is lower, probably by as much as an order of magnitude. This was confinned by 
the Interim Evaluation of the Safety Case Regulations carried out by HSE in 1995, which 
concluded that there is evidence of a substantial reduction in risk. 
There has been a steady fall in the frequency of reported injuries. In 1994195 injuries 
resulting in three or more days off work fell to less than half of the level in 1989/90,· the 
year after Piper Alpha. The frequency of serious injuries has been more resistant to 
improvement but did fall significantly in the year 1993/94 and 1994195 to a level 40% 
lower than in 1989. 
In conclusion, the Industry is improving safety offshore. The Safety Case philosophy is 
working. The new goal-setting Regulations will consolidate the regime and encourage 
Operators to achieve their aims for continuous improvement. Lord Cullen, in his 
painstaking analysis of the evidence given to him. made recommendations that are exerting 
a powerful influence throughout the worki. The Offshore Industry has implemented his 
recommendations and is beginning to experience real and tangible improvements in safety 
offshore. "Good safety is good business" is more than a slogan, it is a fact. 
The Motiyation for Change 
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In his report published in November 1990, Lord Cullen set the scene for a completely 
new safety regime offshore. His 106 detailed recommendations covered every aspect 
of offshore safety. Three of them in particular provided the motivation for the change 
from the old prescriptive regulations of the past to the goal-setting regulations that 
are in place today. Lord Cullen recommended that: 
• The administration of offshore safety should be transferred from the Department of 
Energy (DEn) to the HSE. 
• The present array of detailed prescriptive regulations should be revoked and 
replaced with goal-setting regulations. 
• The Operator should be required by regulation to submit to the regulatory body a 
Safety Case in respect of each of its instal1ations. 
In making these recommendations, Lord Cullen paved the way for the Offshore 
Industry to be regulated according to the principles established by Lord RObens in 
1971 and which were gradually being adopted by the HSE in formulating new 
regulations onshore. Lord Robens pointed out that it was impractical for regulations 
to prescribe precisely what safety precautions should be taken in any given situation 
and therefore safety would be enhanced if the Regulator set safety objectives, leaving 
the determination of the detailed precautions to the Duty Holder. Where appropriate 
the Regulator and/or the industry concerned would publish guidance to assist Duty 
Holders to achieve the goals set by the regUlations. 
The Old Style Regulatory Regime 
To fully appreciate the change that has taken place in the Offshore Industry, it is 
necessary to understand the previous regime and why it did not deliver the high 
standard of safety that was its objective. 
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Under the former UK regulatory system, there was potential for confusion by 
Operators in dealing with the various authorities that administered the regulations. 
For example, the sections of the Health & Safety at Work Act (HSWA) 1974, which 
were applied offshore were administered by the DEn under an agency agreement 
granted by the Health & Safety Commission (HSC), which administered the HSW A 
on behalf of the Pepartment of Employment. The regulations, made under the 
Mineral Workings Act, covering active rae-fighting, life saving appliances and 
standby vessels were administered by the Department of Transport (DoT) under an 
agency agreement granted by the DEn. The certification of the installation as fit-for-
purpose was carried out by independent Certifying Authorities (CAs) on behalf of the 
DEn. Finally, DEn Inspectors carried out offshore inspections themselves. 
These complex administrative relationships are illustrated in Figure 2.2.2.2. 
This complex web of surveys and inspections was supported by Guidance Notes, then 
in their 4th Edition, which laid down quite prescriptive methods for designing and 
equipping offshore installations. Although these Guidance Notes were revised from 
time to time, they tended to inhibit duty holders from seeking innovative solutions to 
design, construction and operating problems. 
Lord Cullen recommended that in place of this complex control of the regulatory 
system there should be a single regulatory body for offshore safety, and that this 
should be the HSE. In response to this recommendation, a new Offshore Safety 
Division of the HSE was formed which took over the administration of offshore safety 
on I April 1991. 
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UK Offshore Regulatory System 
(Pre-Lord Cullen's Report) 
SECRETARY OF STATE SECRETARY OF STATE 
for EMPLOYMENT 
Ad 1971 Heahh & Safet at Work Ad 1974 
~~~----.-~~~~~ 
Ageacy Agreement Health & Safety 
Direct 
Inspection 
Offshore 
Commission 
Inspection & Survey 
Figure 2.2.2.2 - UK - OfT shore Regulatory System 
Goal-Setting Regulations 
Lord Cullen recommended also that the Construction & Survey Regulations, the Fire-
Fighting Equipment Regulations, the Life Saving Appliances Regulations and the 
Emergency Procedures Regulations should be revoked and replaced by goal-setting 
Regulations. Operators should be encouraged to specify the standards that they will 
use to comply with the goals established by these new regulations. For a given 
installation compliance may be demonstrated by reference to such standards, the terms 
of guidance notes and what is shown by safety assessments. 
This approach to safety regulations is completely in accord with the evidence given by 
UKOOA at the Piper Alpha Public Inquiry. 
The New Goal-Setting Regime 
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The goal-setting regulations recommended by Lord Cullen are now in place and the 
architecture of the new regulations is illustrated in Figure 2. The contrast with the 
past is very evident. 
• All the health and safety regulations that apply to offshore installations, pipelines and 
wells are made under the HSW A and are administered by the HSE; so there is no 
longer scope for Operators to be confused by having to deal with more than one 
regulatory authority. 
• The Safety Case is the primary engine demonstrating that major hazards are identified 
and risks reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). It is also a vehicle 
for demonstrating compliance with the other regulations. The Safety Management 
System ensures that the organisation, resources, roles and responsibilities are suitable 
and are documented, understood, carried out and subjected to audit. 
• The Safety Case embraces every hazard that could cause a major accident. It is a 
holistic approach that leaves no gaps, unlike the former regime in which pipelines and 
risers were not subject to the independent survey for the Certificate of Fitness. The 
system of certification, which was carried out by the CAs appointed by the Secretary 
of State, has been replaced by a system of verification by independent and competent 
persons, appointed by the duty holder, of safety-critical elements identified by the 
Duty Holder using the Safety Case. 
Direct inspection of particular items by Inspectors from the DEn or DoT has been 
replaced by comprehensive audits by HSE to ensure that the Duty Holder is operating 
in accordance with the systems and procedures described in the Safety Case. HSE 
has issued Improvement Notices to Operators who have failed to operate their 
installation according to their own procedures as described in the Safety Case. 
This approach places the whole responsibility for safety on the duty holder where it 
belongs. It motivates the duty holder to focus on major hazards, on safety-critical 
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elements and on systems and procedures that ensure that the safety goals are achieved 
and risks are ALARP. 
It is important to recognise that the lack of prescriptive standards in the new goal-
setting regulations does not mean that duty holders can adopt unsuitable safety 
practices. In an Industry that uses heavy equipment to produce and transport oil and 
gas at high pressure, there are many hazards that have to be managed safely. In a 
goal-setting regime, duty holders must identify these hazards, eliminate them by good 
design if possible; otherwise by selecting appropriate materials and procedures reduce 
the risk that the hazard presents to ALARP. 
This is an onerous responsibility. No longer can duty holders take shelter behind a 
prescriptive regulation that sets a standard that may not be suitable for the particular 
circumstances. Instead a safety assessment must be made, taking into account all the 
local circumstances, and the risk reduced to ALARP. The advantage to the duty 
holder is that there is no restriction on the way in which the risk is reduced. This 
flexibility paves the way for the introduction of new technology and innovative 
solutions. 
Workforce Inyolvement 
An essential ingredient of the Safety Case holistic approach is the involvement of the 
workforce including non-technical support workers, technicians, operators, 
supervisors and managers. Operators have worked hard and made great progress in 
tapping this valuable resource for its experience, knowledge and ideas. Although 
some aspects of safe design such as structural integrity, which requires complex 
engineering analysis and quantitative risk analysis, are not easily understood or 
accessible to the majority of the workforce, there are many safety issues which are 
The identification of hazards likely to cause fIre and explosion and the preparation and 
testing of emergency procedures are examples where the workforce on site is well 
placed to participate in the creation of the Safety Case. 
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The Offshore Industry has created a comprehensive system of safety committees. On 
every offshore installation. safety representatives are elected by groups of no more 
than 40 of their fellow workers to represent their interests and concerns. These safety 
representatives are automatically members of safety committees that meet regularly 
and discuss all aspects of safety. Safety representatives are trained to undertake their 
role. which includes an understanding of safety legislation. the identification of 
potential safety hazards and the representation of safety issues and concerns to the 
management and their constituents. 
All these changes have brought about a cultural shift in attitudes towards safety. A 
safe place of work can only be created through Management Systems that ensure a 
partnership between good design. suitable equipment and safe operating practices 
carried out by a workforce that is fully aware of safety issues and understands their 
role. The offshore industry has made tremendous progress in introducing and 
encouraging safe attitudes through an increasing involvement of its workforce. 
The Role of Guidance 
The Industry view is that goal-setting Regulations should be supported by non-mandatory 
guidance preferably created by the Industry itself through its associations such as 
UKOOA These assist Operators when setting their own standards of perfonnance that. 
provided they followed the guideline. would be based on "good practice" as defined by the 
Industry. This approach is entirely consistent with Lord Cullen's recommendations. 
Lord Cullen recognised the value of Guidance in supporting goal-setting Regulations. His 
Recommendation 17 made it cJear that Guidance should give non-mandatory advice on 
one or more methods of achieving such objectives. without prescribing any particular 
method as a minimum to be taken in default of an acceptable alternative. He also 
supported Industry-published guidelines in. for example. Recommendation 101 where he 
said that drills and exercises should be carried out in accordance with UKOOA Guidelines. 
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UKOOA Guidelines set out what is widely heki to be good practice. The cunent UKOOA 
Publications List includes over thirty guidelines on matters directly related to offshore 
safety. These publications play an important role in helping Operators and contractors to 
assess their own systems and operations and to amend them if they wish. Although they 
are non-mandatory, compliance with them is usually accepted by HSE Inspectors as 
evidence that safe working practices are being followed. 
Industry Guideline ': also assist Operators and contractors to comply with the goals set out 
in Regulations. Where Industry Guidelines are in place and serving their intended purpose 
there is no need for the HSE to issue its own Technical Guidance in support of the 
Regulations. The advantage of Industry taking responsibility for these Guidelines is 
twofold. 
First, by "owning" the Guidelines Industry becomes more committed to their use. Second, 
they can be more easily and quickly updated. 
The HSE is receptive to this view and has encouraged and supported the industry in its 
work to expand the range of "good practice" guidelines. 
From the Industry point of view it is recognised that such Guidelines will have greater 
credibility if they are broadly based and include input from and reviews by the HSE and the 
workforce. 
World-wide InOuence of Lord CuDen '5 Recommendations 
In 1993, in Geneva, a tripartite meeting of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) discussed safety issues relating to work on offshore petroleum installations, in 
particular the lessons learned from Piper Alpha and Lord Cullen's Report. Employer, 
Trade Union and RegUlatory representatives from fIfteen countries took part. The 
meeting concluded that the fIrst priority of the ILO was .. to promote the adoption on 
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a world-wide basis of the principle of self-regulation based on Safety Management 
Systems within a framework of goal-setting regulations, and full workforce 
involvement at national and company level in safety maNers in the Offshore 
Petroleum Industry. " 
Self-regulation by lndustry means that the community, through its safety regulatory 
agencies, will set the safety goals. Industry will create the Safety Management 
Systems to achieve the goals using means, which best match, the requirements of the 
individual installation at its particular location. 
When this important principle is followed all over the world it will help to create a 
working environment in which oil companies, most of which are multi-national in 
scope, will be able to harmonise their Safety Management Systems, thereby reducing 
the potential for disparity between different countries in their operations and in tum 
their safety performance. 
This move towards the adoption of Lord Cullen's recommendations on a world-wide 
basis is very evident from the content of papers presented at international conferences. 
The theme of one of the Safety Sessions at the SPE International Conference on 
Health, Safety and Environment in New Orleans in June 1996, was "Sustaining Global 
Progress". 
One of the papers presented described how the Azerbaijan International Operating 
Company had developed a formal health, safety and environmental management 
system and a structured Safety Case for a large Caspian Sea project. These 
procedures were adopted to ensure that risks were properly identified and controlled 
against a regulatory framework that is complex, fragmented and prescriptive. 
The Benefits of Goal-Setting 
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As the Safety Case Regulations only came into effect in 1993 and the last of the goal-
setting Regulations, covering the Design and Construction of Installations, came into 
force on 30 June 1996, it is still too early to judge the full effect of the new regime. 
On the other hand, Regulations only provide a framework for the Industry, they do 
not achieve improved safety. Only the Industry itself can do this and, since Piper 
Alpha, the Industry has been busy implementing safety improvements. Immediately 
after the disaster and before Lord Cullen's Public Inquiry was convened a number of 
safety improvements were initiated. 
Offshore Safety Initiatives 
• Central training register established 
• Permit to work system improved 
• Emergency shut-down valves re-Iocated 
• Subsea isolation systems installed 
• Smoke hazard mitigated 
• Evacuation and escape systems assessed and improved 
• Formal safety assessments initiated 
In every case these initiatives proved to be in tune with Lord Cullen's 
recommendations. 
By the end of November 1993, just three years after Lord Cullen published his report, 
the Offshore Industry had implemented the 48 recommendations that required action 
by Industry. This included the submission over 200 Safety Cases to HSE. 
In parallel with this huge effort, UKOOA working with the International Association 
of Drilling Contractors (North Sea Chapter) (IADC) , The British Rig Owners 
Association (BROA), The British Chemical Engineering Contractors Association 
(BCECA), The International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) and The 
Offshore Contractors Association (OCA) published new Industry Guidelines on a 
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wide range of safety related sUbjects. They describe Industry good practice and also 
assist Operators and contractors to achieve the objectives of the new goal-setting 
regulations. 
The Industry is committed to the principle of continuous improvement and believes the 
Safety Case proWles the ideal vehicle to foster improvements. Nevertheless, whenever the 
impact of the Safety Case System is discussed a number of key questions are often raised: 
• Is the Safety Case achieving the aims and aspirations of Industry -: Is it working? 
• Has the Safety Case significantly reduced the risk of major accidents? 
• A lot of money, time and effort is being spent to improve safety - is this being reflected 
in fewer accidents and injuries, and therefore lower costs? 
The risk of major accident is lower, probably by as much as an order of magnitude. 
This was confinned by the Interim Evaluation of the Safety Case Regulations carried out 
by HSE in 1995, which concluded that there is evidence of a substantial reduction in risk. 
Offshore Accident and Injury statistics are published by the Offshore Safety Division of 
HSE. 
These are illustrated in the bar chart in Figure 3 for the years 1988/89 to 1994195. 
The validity of the HSE data has been chal1enged by some academics who make the 
somewhat surprising claim that safety offshore has worsened since Piper Alpha and the 
implementation of Lord Cullen's recommendations. Earlier this year UK()()A 
commissioned a study by Envirorunent & Resource Technology Ud (ERn associated 
with Heriot-Watt University. The objective of the study was to provide an independent 
view as to the credibility of published information on accident and injury statistics. In 
compiling these data ERT used information supplied by the HSE, and, as to numbers of 
employees, the Grampian Region and the Inland Revenue. 
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The result of the study is superimposed on the HSE published data. The two lines. which 
appear from years 199213 - 199415 represent differing methods of estimating the numbers 
employed offshore. The very close correlation between the ERT analysis and the HSE 
data confinns the industry's confidence in the infonnation published by the HSE. 
Since Piper Alpha in 1988. there has been a steady drop in the frequency of all reported 
injuries. This welcome trend is evidence that the Management Systems are working to 
achieve a continuous improvement in safety performance as measured by lost time injuries. 
In 1994195. there were 270 injuries that resulted in 3 days or more off work. Over half 
(148) of these were caused by slips. trips and falls and handling materials. A further 42 
were caused by lifting and crane operations and use of hand tools. The complete 
breakdown is shown below: 
Over the same period there has been a slower reduction in the frequency of fatalities and 
serious injuries. although there was a welcome drop in 1993194 and 1994195. 
In 1994195 there was one fatality and 41 serious injuries. the main causes of which are 
summarised below. 
Serious injuries are potential fatalities. In other words an accident that results in serious 
injury could. with a change in the circumstances. have instead resulted in a fatality. 
This is why they are investigated and the causes analysed carefully. It is significant that no 
serious injury resulted from a fire or explosion, the prevention of which is subject to 
intense analysis in the Safety Case. 
The focus of attention on major accident prevention in the Safety Case has reduced the 
frequency of serious injury. but the common everyday mishaps listed above still occur. It is 
in this area where real progress can be made by using management systems that involve 
the workforce in identifying workplace hazards and assessing the risk of accidents. 
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Over 3-Day Injuries 
Aprill994-March 1995 
Slips. trips. falls 90 
Handling materials 58 
Lifting and Crane operations 22 
Use of hand tools 20 
Use of machinery 10 
Diving related 5 
Loss of containment 5 
Others 60 
Total 270 
Practical guidance can be extremely effective in preventing these all too common accidents 
and a recent initiative by the Offshore Contractors Association in publishing a new g~e 
("'Offshore Access Scaffolding Guidance") aimed at reducing offshore scaffolding 
accidents will make an important contribution to improved safety. 
The Offshore Industry is continually striving for continuous improvement and in this quest 
is often critical of its own achievements. Sometimes, however, it is instructive to take a 
broader view. If the safety perfonnance of the oil and gas exploration and production 
sector is compared with other industries there is every reason for the Industry to take pride 
in its achievements. 
In the 1994195 Annual Report of the HSC, which includes injury statistics for all 
industries, the Offshore Oil & Gas Industry compares very well indeed. 
1be basis of these statistics is different to those provided by the Offshore Safety Division 
of HSE, in that the HSC statistics include accidents occurring to all persons involved in the 
Offshore Industry, ie. those working offshore and in onshore offices of Operators in the 
same way as is done for other industries. 
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Serious Injuries 
April 1994 - March 1995 
Slips, trips, falls 12 
Lifting, Handling, Cranes 10 
Handling goods and materials 3 
Falling objects 3 
Diving related 3 
Use of machinery 3 
Mooring 3 
Sea Transpon 3 
Use of hand tool 1 
Other 1 
* Fatalities Total 42 
The all-injury frequency is lower than that for coal mines railways, metal manufacturing, 
water supply, construction, and the onshore chemicals and oil refining sectors. A similar 
picture emerges from reports of fatal and major injuries. 
This perfonnance is more impressive than it seems because, offshore, every injury inside 
the 500m-safety zone is counted. irrespective of the employer. Boats, helicopters, divers 
and contractors of all disciplines are included. This is not the case for other industries. 
In conclusion, it is reasonable to claim that the Industry is improving safety offshore. The 
Safety Case philosophy is working and the new goal-setting regulations will consolidate 
the regime and encourage Operators and contractors working together to achieve their 
aims for continuous improvement. 
Lord Cullen, in his painstaking analysis of the evidence given to him. made 
recommendations that are exerting a powerful influence throughout the world. The 
Offshore Industry has implemented his recommendations and is beginning to experience 
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real and tangible improvements in safety offshore. Good safety is good business is more 
than a slogan. it is a fact. 
2.2.3. Netherl~ 
In Netherlands. there are three ministries that are responsible for major hazards: 
• VROM - Ministry of Housing. Spatial Planning and Environment. responsible for 
environment policy and safety of people outside major hazard sites and for the 
overall co-ordination of policy on major hazards 
• SWZ - Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. responsible for major hazards 
and policy affecting the safety of people within establishments. 
• BiZA - Ministry of Interior. responsible for emergency planning and response and 
for the general safety of citizens. 
In 1992. VROM22,13 issued two documents. which provides a guide to be used for 
the presentation of offshore safety cases (for new and old installations) to Dutch 
authorities. Some of its most important aspects are going to be described further in 
this section. 
The documents mentioned above. provide a guide for the preparation of safety case, 
regarding the conceptual phase of the design. the engineering phase, where a 
complete quantitative risk assessment applies. and some recommendations to be 
followed during operational and abandonment phases of an oil platform. Concerning 
the conceptual phase. the document in it s chapter "Concept Safety Evaluation" 
presents the following: 
"Based on the conceptual design, this evaluation should assess the design, layout 
and peTjormance of safety critical systems. It should identify the type, likelihood and 
consequences of potential accident hazards, together with possible combinations of 
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such events. Possible interactions with other facilities or systems installed and 
measures to mitigate them. should also be examined". 
"It should be verified, subject to a number of findings and recommendations, that 
these hazards have a sufficiently low probability of" 
a. Loss of life 
b. Loss of assets 
c. Loss of production 
d. Damage to the environment". 
Regarding the acceptance criteria (Dutch Department of Mines22,23): 
"Minimum acceptance criteria for major hazards should be identified during the 
conceptual design. Calculations should be based on an individual potential loss of 
life per year (8760 hrs)". 
"The evaluation and "Failure mode, effect and criteria analysis" will result in the 
minimum acceptance criteria, e.g.: 
a. At least one escape route and the available usable duration period should be 
given. 
b. The duration period that the control room/accommodation remain intact should 
be given 
c. The duration period that the suppon structure must maintain its load carrying 
should be given. 
d. The potential accident hazard areas should be segregated to enable effective 
control measures. 
e. Essential safety control functions are to be located within the control room". 
In the same section, the Dutch document requests the operator to deftne the 
qualitative technique employed to identify hazards and to evaluate the probability of 
accident hazards and mitigation factors. 
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In the chapter named "Risk Assessment", where a complete quantitative risk 
assessment should be developed, the Dutch documents11,l3 describe the acceptance 
criteria as following: 
"Different acceptance criteria are in existence. For example, the endurance of a TSR 
during a calamity, the availability of escape routes and life saving appliances, the 
availability of detection and means of control (Emergency shut-down systems 
(ESD's). etc.). Also more generally. risk criteria as individual risk and group risk. In 
first instance the acceptance criteria will be defined by the mining enterprise. and 
such should be stated in the safety case". 
"The authorities should interpret these with certain flexibility. On the other hand. 
they will press the mining enterprises to use acceptance criteria which will improve 
the level of safety and as a result. will reduce the possibilities and consequences of 
major accidents". 
The last document concerning quantitative risk assessment studies, issued in 1997 
(Jones), establishes the following: 
• That the operators require a permit to function issued by the provincial or 
municipal authorities. Two safety reports are required. One for on-site safety 
which is sent to Ministry SZW Inspectorate for assessment. The other for off-site 
safety is assessed by provincial and municipal staff. The off-site safety report 
differently from the on-site report, must give quantitative risk data, looking 
carefully at the requisite - risk. contours. 
• Emergency response is considered primarily as responsibility of the site operator, 
at least for the initial on-site response in the event of an emergency. 
The following requirements should be presented in on-site safety report: 
(a) the classification of hazards is required, using the methodology set out by a 
Guideline published by SZW; 
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(b) The hazard rating assessment is carried out by the manufacturer (or consultant 
acting on his behalf); 
(c) There are no requirements for QRA data; 
(d) Evaluation by SWZ is therefore on a qualitative basis. If assessment of some 
specifIC element in the process require a more in depth study, a QRA could be 
required. 
The off-site safety report must contain the following: 
The owner of the establishment must submit an external report covering: 
(a) qualitative aspects that must include: 
• description of plant and process sites; 
• description of preventive measures and safety management system. 
(b) quantitative data: that must give the results of the quantitative risk assessment 
study (QRA), expressed both as risk contours and as a graphical representation of 
societal risk in form of F-N curves. A quantitative assessment of risks to the 
aquatic environment is also requested. 
The safety report must be renewed every five years. 
The relevant QRA figures are the following: 
Individual Risk 
Maximum Permissible Risk New Situations: 1O·6/yr 
Existing Situations: 10·5/yr 
Societal Risk (for establishments) 
Directional Value > 10 deaths 10·5/yr 
> 100 deaths 1O·7/yr 
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I > I ()()() deaths 
For an Individual Risk value (lR) > 1O-5/yr, immediate measures are required to 
correct the situation. 
For risks in the range of 1O-5/yr and lO-6/yr, measures are required to reduce risks as 
far as possible through technical means (As Low As Reasonably Achievable -
ALARA). The basis of ALARA is "best available technology". VROM interprets 
"reasonable", as following: 
(a) The economic situation in the sector and the state of the art in that sector. The 
economic situation in an establishment is not a factor. 
(b) Where the maximum IR value is exceeded, greater levels of control are required 
even though the costs may be substantial; 
(c) Where the perceived risk is high, e.g. nuclear, compared with more accepted risk, 
e.g. LPG, the authorities will take less account of the cost of controls. 
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3. Current Approaches to Quantitative Risk Assessment of Offshore 
Units 
3.1. General 
As we have discussed before, risk analysis is used to predict the behaviour of a system 
in abnormal circumstances, estimating the probabilities associated with accidents and 
their consequences. It is a methodology where the experience and knowledge will be 
systematically utiF.lied to this prediction, which must be based on future operation and 
environmental conditions. It involves a lot of uncertainty, as the operational 
conditions will never be known in detail with complete certainty. 
As the European Federation of Chemical Engineering14 (EFCE) mentions, risk 
analysis can be summarised by three questions: 
1. What can go wrong? 
2.What are the effects and consequences? 
3.How often will it happen? 
There are several different and useful qualitative techniques already developed and 
employed in industry, that identify and qualitatively evaluate "what can go wrong". 
The answer to this question may reveal some aspects of the installation that may 
deserve further analysis. To achieve a complete risk analysis it is necessary to answer 
the other two questions. 
In this section we intend to outline the current techniques utilised to evaluate risks, 
with a special emphasis in the description of the topics involved in a methodology for 
evaluating risks of offshore oil platforms, taking into consideration the particular 
characteristics presented by offshore enterprises. 
3.2. Offshore Units Description 
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It is usually common to refer to offshore oil units on the basis of their principal 
products: oil and gas. Therefore, it is possible to refer to them as units of gas or of oil 
and gas. 
In the majority of cases, in offshore units, gas will be produced as a sub product, and 
in many times it wiU be burned in the flare. 
In a gas production unit there will be suitable treatment systems, designed to 
dehydrate the gas, which will be recovered to be used in gas lift injection systems or 
recovered and sent to be processed. 
There are several types of offshore units: mobile platforms, fIxed platforms, vessels 
and Aoating Production Storage Offloading vessels (FPSO), which will be the focus 
of the model presented in this Thesis. 
Mobile units (platforms) are usually employed in drilling exploration and in advanced 
production. Mobile units can be classilled as following: 
· Jack-up platforms 
· Semi-submersible platforms 
· Drilling ships or drilling barges 
Mobile units are usually used for drilling purposes. In Brazil several mobiles are 
converted to production platforms. 
Fixed platforms are mainly used for production purposes and further development of 
oil fields. 
Fires and explosions is the major contributor to the global risk of offshore units, as 
many studies have shown (Peterson et al.Z5). There is an unlimited set of possible 
sources of fIres and explosions leading to different magnitudes of consequences, 
ranging from small pool fifes to full scale blowouts. 
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Platforms can also be categorised in manned and unmanned platforms Risky activities 
usually take place on manned platforms, which are employed for drilling of new wells 
(production well) and for maintenance of wells (wirelining and workover). 
The Aoating Production Storage Oflloading units have been recently adopted by 
PETROBRAs and it can be described as a vesseL which processes and stores gas and 
oil, or in other words, it is a tank vesseL where a process plant has been installed. A 
brief description of the FPSO under study is provided below. 
3.3.Quantified Risk Assessment Methodology for Offshore Units 
The use of risk analysis in offshore oil enterprises should be a continuous and 
consistent process that can provide a valuable support for project safety management. 
As a continuous process, risk analysis can and should be employed in different phases 
of an offshore enterprise: in the feasibility phase, in the concept phase, in basic design 
(also known as pre-engineering phase) and in detailed engineering design. 
The suitability of techniques to be employed in each case, and the depths of study 
depend on the availability of the information and documents already issued by the 
project team in each phase. A cost-benefit approach will certainly prove that, the best 
results will be obtained, when risk analysis is performed in earlier stages of a project, 
where the modifications to be implemented are much simpler. 
Offshore oil platforms present some specific features. In this section, we will briefly 
list current techniques that can be used during the basic design (pre-engineering) and 
detailed design of an offshore oil platform. 
3.3.1. Quantitative Risk Assessment Procedure 
The methodology described here, to be used for offshore quantitative risk assessment 
is basically based on currents approaches presented by AIChEz" by EngelhardZl, in a 
TNO report and by Andersen et aI.Z', in a SINTEF report. The following steps are 
proposed: 
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A. QRA definition 
B. System description and inventory of basic data 
C. Identification of hazards 
D. Inventory of protective measures employed (active and passive protection) 
E. Selection of incident, incident outcomes and incident outcome cases 
F. Consequence estimation 
G. Frequency estimation 
H. Risk evaluation 
A.QRA Definition converts user requirement into study goals and objectives. Risk 
measures and risk presentation formats are chosen finalising a scope of work for the 
QRA. The depth of the study is selected based on specific objectives and resources 
available. The need for special studies (the evaluation of domino effects, protective 
system unavailability, etc.) is also considered. 
B. System Description and Inventory of basic data 
These two items are related to the compilation of all process/systems information 
needed to perform a risk analysis. So, it should require process and flow diagrams, 
piping and instrumentation diagrams, weather and environmental data, material data, 
layout drawings, operating and maintenance procedures, etc. 
For the risk analyst it is very important to have a complete survey of all material 
processed or produced in the installation, as well as the necessary data related to 
technical equipment. 
C. Identification of Hazards 
C.I. Identification of initiating incidents/events: 
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This step is fundamental for the overall quality of the analysis. Generally the initiating 
events of offshore platforms fall under the following types: 
· Releases of hydrocarbons from process equipment 
· Blow-outs 
· Releases from risers 
· Utility System Failures 
· Failures during construction 
· Dropped objects 
· Helicopter accidents 
· Ship collisions 
· Structural Failures 
· Environmental loads. 
These initiating events can vary in size and intensity. Quantitative Risk Assessment 
analyses only the most representative effects. In carrying out a QRA. the above list of 
events may be expanded into a much longer and detailed list, which should be made 
per platform. Typically, several hundred initiating events might be found. 
The capability of producing damage is mainly due to (Andersen et al.Z6): 
· Thermal effects 
· Over pressures (explosions) 
· Fragments and missiles 
C.I.I. Identiftcation techniques 
There are several techniques employed by industry for the identification of hazards, 
initiating events and incidents. 
Some of these techniques are HAZOP, FMEA, What-If, Preliminary Hazards 
Analysis, Engineering Checklists, Fault Tree Analysis, etc. 
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Another way of obtaining a list of incidents is to consider possible leaks and major 
releases from fractures of all process pipelines and vessels. In this approach it is very 
important to include all piperwork and vessels in direct communication, since they 
may share a significant inventory that can not be isolated in an emergency. 
Some of the most commonly used identification techniques are mentioned below and 
can be found in suitable literature (AIChE. Lees. etc.): 
C.I.I.I. Hazard and OperabiUty Studies (HAZOP) 
C.I.1.2.Hazard indices 
C.I.I.3.Acddent statistics 
C.l.l.4. "What Ir' analysis 
C.I.I.S. Checklists 
C.I.I.6. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
C.I.I.7. FMEA 
C.I.I.S. Fault tree analysis 
C.t.t.9. Event tree 
C.t.I.IO.Cause-consequence analysis 
D. Inventory or Protective Measures 
Protective measures are very important to limit the effects of accidents. Therefore, it 
is necessary to obtain information about passive and active protective measures when 
modelling the consequences of an incident. A brief description of passive and active 
protective measures used in the FPSO under analysis was presented in the FPSO 
description's section (section 3.2.1). 
E. Selection 
The purpose of selection is to reduce the number of incident outcome cases to a 
manageable size. without neglecting any significant incidents or incident outcomes. 
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E.l. Selection of incidents/events 
The purpose when generating a list of incidents/events is to select a minimum number 
that can represent the incidents that were enumerated, satisfying the requirements of 
the study. 
The risk analyst should review the initial list and exclude the incidents that are too 
small for concern, producing a revised list. It is also important to group very similar 
or redundant incidents. Then, this list should be reduced by grouping similar incidents 
into subset!}, and when possible, replacing each subset with a single equivalent 
incident. This can be achieved by considering similar inventories. compositions, 
discharge rates and discharge locations. 
This process can be made much easier through the use of ranking tecl)niques. AIChE%7 
proposes that the selection of incidents should include contributions from each class 
of incidents, as described in table 3.3.1.1. Then, an allocation of these incidents into 
the three classes presented in this table shall be performed as a ranking technique. 
Further rankings can be achieved, within each of the incident classes proposed, as for 
example preliminary ranking criteria, based on the severity of hazards. 
There are various techniques that can be used for ranking purposes. One of them is 
called Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), which is equivalent to 
a FMEA, but also includes a criticality analysis. It consists basically of the modes in 
which equipment could fail the resulting effects and of the estimation of failure 
probabilities. 
It is very useful to construct, and it has been being used currently, a criticality matrix 
which provides a way of comparing each failure mode or incident with others taking 
into consideration the severity or severity category and the probability of occurrence. 
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Localised Incident 
Localised effect zone, limited to a single plant area (e.g. pump fIre, small toxic release) 
Major Incident 
Medium effect zone, limited site boundaries (e.g., major fIre, small explosion) 
Catastrophic Incident 
Large effect zone, off site effects on the surrounding community (e.g., major explosion, 
large toxic release) 
Table 3.3.1.1 Classes of Incidents (AIChE17) 
The Military Standard - MIL-STD-1629Al9, since 1977, has proposed the use of this 
type of matrix. 
There are many companies that perform a FMENFMECA or some type of this 
technique, for the selection or ranking of incidents under different forms. It is 
common to fInd some columns included or excluded in the worksheets used for this 
purpose. 
Failures or incidents that have unacceptable criticality ranking levels should be re-
evaluated and are the most likely candidates for the implementation of mitigating 
measures. 
An example of a criticality matrix to be used in risk assessment studies of offshore 
platforms is provided in a report issued by The Royal Norwegian Council for 
Scientiflc and Industrial Research (Jensen et a1.3O). This report presents a matrix with 
a risk classifIcation, as shown in fIgure 3.3.1.1 and also in guide table 3.3.1.2 
As another example, we can mention Engen et a1.3I ., in a SINTEF report. They also 
propose the use of a matrix for ranking purposes, as not all failures that have been 
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identified are equally important, as some present very low frequency or very low 
severity. 
Consequences: Event severity group A,B C 
A is the most severe 
Return periods, years 
Probabilities: Probable less than 100 
Reasonable Probable between 100-104 
Remote between 104-107 
Extremely Remote above 107 
Risk Orders: Combination of consequences and probabilities, according to matrix 
presented in figure3. 
Risk Notations: Human risk to human life 
Pollution risk to environment 
Economic risk to property 
Table 3.3.1.2 - Risk Classification (Jensen et al.30) 
The matrix proposed by Engen et al.31 For a preliminary criticality evaluation of a 
well system is based on frequency grading and severity grades, as shown respectively 
in tables 3.3.1.3 and 3.3.1.4. 
The setting of frequency numbers, as Engen et a1.31 Mention, is based on information 
from articles reporting equipment failures, from discussions with users and suppliers 
of the equipment and from technical evaluation of equipment. 
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As in other matrices, there will be an intermediary area, where it is not absolutely 
defined if a failure should be considered critical. Engen et at 31 propose the use of a 
detectability grading (shown in table 3.3.1.5) and the introduction of two rules, which 
may be used for this intermediary area: 
" 
1. If the severity number is 4, the abnormal loads created will be analysed to 
establish whether they affect a component or subsystem, acting as a safety back up 
for the failed part. If so, it will be regarded as critical, and vice-versa. 
2. In the rest of the cases, it is the detectability that wiLL be used as a criterion. If the 
developing failure is difficult or impossible to detect it will be regarded as critical. ". 
Frequency 
{per year) 
Probable 
10E-2 
Reasonably 
Probable 
10E-4 
Remote 
10E-7 
Extremely 
• 
. .. 
c B A 
• = First order risks 
• = Second order risks 
D = Third order risks 
o = Fourth order risks 
( most severe ) 
Undersired 
Events 
Figure 3.3.1.1 - Risk Classification ( Jensen et aL ) 
It is also common to use a ranking technique that consists of excluding some incident 
below a specified value. If we consider hole sizes for several items of process 
equipment, we can consider a cut-off value for loss of containment of material events, 
establishing an arbitrary value to analyse a smaller range of hole sizes. For example, 
for process pipework, we can choose a full-bore rupture and 10 % of the full-bore 
rupture. 
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A more accurate approach would request that the importance of the minimum 
incident size be evaluated by consequence techniques. 
Practical Meaning of Approximate absolute Grade 
main groups frequency (events! well-
year) 
Never known to have 10-8 1 
happened before 10-7 2 
Very seldom, known 10-6 3 
happened once or twice 10-5 4 
before 
Seldom, but likely to 10-4 5 
happen during a field life- 10-3 6 
time 
Frequent, likely to happen 10-2 7 
during a well life-time 10-1 8 
Very frequent, likely to 1 9 
happen more than once a 10 10 
"well-year" 
Table 3.3.1.3 - Frequency Grading (Engen et al.31) 
Engelhard18 presents a table (table 3.3.1.6.7) that shows a relationship between hole 
sizes and pipelines' diameters. which has been used by TNO in quantitative risk 
assessment studies of offshore platforms. According to this table, it is stated that a 
full bore rupture will not occur in pipelines with a diameter of more than 6 inches. 
E.2. Selection of Incident Outcomes 
The majority of offshore accidents are sequences of unwanted incidents (escalation of 
events). That is why offshore design is conceived with multiple safety functions that 
shall prevent accidents. However, some single incidents may also lead to accidents. 
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On this basis, risk analysis will, to a great extent, consist of the identification and 
quantification of possible sequence of incidents that may lead to damage. 
PracncalAieaning Grade 
Negligible or no effect Calculated (known) 1 
Anticipated 2 
Abnormal loads on other Designed for or calculated 3 
components Not calculated 4 
Need immediate corrective Maintenance 5 
action to avoid further Work-over 6 
development of failure 
One barrier left before loss Equipment Barrier 7 
of control Operational Barrier 8 
Loss of control Minor leakage 9 
Major leakage 10 
Table 3.3.1.4 - Severity Grading (Engen et al.31) 
The selection of possible incident outcomes should be done for each one of the 
incidents selected in the revised incident list, described in the previous item. The risk 
analyst should determine for each incident, which are the possible incident outcomes 
developed. 
The usual technique employed to represent all the possible outcomes is the event tree. 
Figure 3.3.1.2 illustrates an example of event tree. It is possible to find more complex 
event trees used to represent the complicated and often interrelated possible incident 
outcomes that can result from an incident. 
An event tree should be made for each module of the platform. Active and passive 
protection, as well as the time aspect, should be considered in the scenariqs in 
connection with possible escalation of effects. On this basis, it is possible to make a 
selection of the most relevant or serious incidents. Engelhard18 mentions that it is 
important to investigate whether each initiating event can take place at a number of 
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different places in the same module, and whether this would change the incident 
outcome or scenario. 
PracncalAieaning Grade 
Good detection, continuously or frequent 1 
monitoring/testing 
Difficult detection indications, may be 2 
overlooked or misinterpreted 
No detection because methods do not 3 
exist, or methods are not approved 
No detection because of the short 4 
developing interval compared to interval 
between tests 
No detection because no warning or 5 
indication exists 
Table 3.3.1.5- Detectabllity grading (Engen et al.31) 
Pipe diameter Hole Size (equivalent diameter) 
< 6 inches Leak 1 inch 
Total rupture pipeline diameter 
6-12 inches Leak 1 inch 
Large leak 32% of pipeline diameter 
~ 12 inches Leak 2 inches 
Large leak 32% of pipeline diameter 
Table 3.3.1.6 - Hole sizes of pipelines and pipeline connections of vessels 
(Engelhardlll) 
There are other fundamental points that should be taken into account when analysing 
incident outcomes, like the probability of ignition, the intensity and duration of gas 
cloud explosions, duration of fires, etc. 
Ignition 
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When representing a loss-of-containment of a hazardous substance, event trees take 
into consideration the probabilities of an immediate or delayed ignition of the leak and 
also the probabilities of failure of detection, isolation and blow down systems. 
EngelhardZl describes the result of immediate and delayed ignitions, as following: 
. Immediate ignition: 
Type of fires: jet fIre or pool fire. Jet fires can be classified as jets colliding against 
walls, resulting in a diffuse flame; and jet frres without collision . 
. Delayed ignition: 
In the case of gas releases in confmed areas, a delayed ignition may cause an 
explosion of the gas cloud, followed by a frre. In open areas, there will be a major 
likelihood of the occurrence of frres, without the generation of over pressure shock 
waves. 
Each of the outcomes resulting from an ignited leak (explosions, pool fIres, and jet 
fires) can result in escalation within or beyond the module where the leakage 
occurred. The probability of a local escalation and the time delay before this occurs 
depend on the nature of the incident (flash-fIre, deflagration, pool frre, etc.), which 
causes the escalation and on the effectiveness of safety protective systems provided in 
the module. 
The probability of ignition depends also on whether the leak occurs in a classifIed or 
in an unclassified module. In classified areas we shall have smaller probabilities of 
ignition, as ignition sources (like open flames, electrical sparks, etc.) should not be 
present, although the suitable equipment used in those areas may fail, causing ignition. 
Possible escapes of hydrocarbon from classifIed areas to unclassified areas (other 
modules) should be considered. 
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Rupture Unobstructed Immediate Neutral Delayed 
pellne PI 
R upture 
release Ignilion weather Ignition 
, , i i 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
I 
FJ.IUn! 3.3.1.1 - PipeHne Risk Assessment Method: Event Tree 
(Crossland et al.31) 
E.3. Selection of Incident Outcome Cases 
Consequences 
Fireball & Jel 
Jet/ Trench fire 
No Ignition 
Fireball &Jel 
flashFlrdJet 
No Ignilion 
Flasfire & Jet 
No Ignition 
Jet fire 
Jet fire 
No Ignition 
Jet/Trench 
Aashflre & Jet 
No Ignition 
Aashflre & Jet 
No Ignition 
As we have discussed before, each incident outcome can generate one or more 
incident outcome cases. In order to distinguish each case from the others it is 
necessary to characterise them numerically, utilising specific parameters. 
One of the ways to distinguish an incident outcome case from other is the prevailing 
weather. Therefore it is necessary to consider several parameters as wind speed, 
atmospheric stability, humidity, atmospheric temperature, etc. 
The risk analyst after identifying all the parameters that affect the incident outcomes 
should choose a range of values for each parameter and create discrete values within 
each range. 
That is a manner of avoiding the multiplication of number of cases to be studied. It is 
also possible to use sensitivity methods to analyse the importance of each selected 
parameter, evaluating its impact on calculations. 
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F. Consequence Estimation 
The purpose of this section will be to present a brief description of models currently 
available and used in consequence estimation. 
The available liter~ture related to consequence and effect models is very wide. Most 
of the models presented in this section are based on TN()33 (Yellow Book), on 
AIChEZ7 and on European Federation of Chemical Engineeriogl4• AIChEZ7 also 
mentions the following references: Lees (1980), Rinjmond Public Authority (1982), 
Mecklenburgh (1985), Warren Centre (1986), and Marshall (1987), and others 
publications from the American Institute of Chemical Engineers. 
It is important to highlight that there are several available computer programs in the 
market, developed for consequence and effects modelling. They can provide suitable 
support for risk analysts. Regarding specifically the offshore area, it is important to 
point out that improvement of models, which are suitable to simulate hydrocarbon 
leakages in enclosed or partially enclosed modules, has been widely improved in the 
past five years. Now, it is possible to fmd softwares that can help the risk analyst to 
simulate the time-dependency of leaks and some important factors, allowing that the 
rate at which the leak consequence decays and the effects of protective systems 
(emergency shut down and blow down systems, fire and gas detection systems, 
ventilation systems) be considered in consequence models. Softwares like the OHRA 
Tool Kit (developed by DNVffechnica) and PLATO (developed by Four Elements 
Ltd -UK) can be very useful to offshore risk assessment studies. There are also 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) models, which are now being frequently used, 
as Phoenics (Cham), Fluent (Fluent), etc. 
The primary components in consequence estimation are source and dispersion models, 
fife and explosion models, vulnerability models and also mitigation factors. 
Source and dispersion models provide quantitative information on source rates and 
dispersion of vapour clouds to some concentration levels. Fire and explosion models 
convert this information on the cloud for flammable releases, into potential hazards, 
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such as thermal radiation and explosion over pressures. Vulnerability models convert 
these incident specific results into effects on people (injury or death) and on 
structures. 
Through the use of consequence modelling, it is also possible to determine the 
dimensions of the area, which is going to be affected as a result of the occurrence of 
fIres, caused by the ignition of gas or oil leakage's. 
Additional refmement can also be obtained by the application of mitigation factors, 
such as sheltering or evacuation, which tend to reduce the magnitude of potential 
effects in real accidents. 
The following physical models are considered in quantitative risk assessment studies, 
and their description can be found in AIChE, Lees, TNO Books, etc.: 
F.l. Source and dispersion models 
F.l.l. Discharge rate (or Outflow) models (See Note*) 
F.1.1.1. Gas Outftow 
F.l.1.2. Liquid Outftow 
F.1.1.3. Two-Phase Outftow 
F.1.2. Flash and Evaporation 
F.l.2.1. Flash Evaporation and droplets fonnation 
F.t.3. Dispersion Models 
F.1.3.1. Momentum jets 
F.l.3.2. Dense gas dispersion models 
F .2. Explosions and Fires 
F.2.1. Unconfined Vapour Cloud 
F.2.2. Physical Explosion 
F.2.3. Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) and Fire Ball 
F.2.4. Confined Explosion 
F. 2.S.Pool Fire and Jet Fire 
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Blowdown and emergency shut-down systems play a very important role in limiting 
the material amount (inventory) that can be released in an incident. 
Usually in offshore units, there are fire and gas detectors spread all around the 
platform, so that they will actuate shutdown systems that will reduce the amount of 
gas released and duration of leaks or fires. Those detectors also activate deluge 
systems to fight fifes and also to cool process equipment. Fire fighting and safety 
equipment is distributed all over the platform. 
Available Computer Codes 
There are several available computer codes that can be used to consequence 
modelling. Some of them are listed below: 
CHARM (Radian Corporation); DEGADIS (US Coast Guard); EAHAP (Energy 
Analysts); HASTE (ERT Inc.); SLAB (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory); 
TRACE (SAFER Corporation); WHAZAN (Technic a International); EFFECTS 
(TNO); PHAST (DNV); OHRA Tool Kit; PLATO (Four Elements Ltd.); REAGAS 
(TNO); CLICHE (British Gas); FLACS (Christian Michael Institute); VENTEX 
(Shell); Phoenix (Cham); Fluent (Fluent), Flowtran (ANSIs), etc. 
F.3.Vulnerability Models 
As we have described in the previous section, physical models provide possible 
outcomes resulting from a release of a hazardous material: dispersion models provide 
concentration or doses of dispersed vapour; UVCE and flash fife models, physical 
explosion models, BLEVE and fireball models, confined explosion models, pool and 
jet fife models, all the estimated shock wave over pressures, fragment velocities 
orland radiant flux. All of them are based in the assumption that the severity of 
outcome depends on the distance from the source of release. 
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After these estimations are performed, it is necessary to evaluate the consequences of 
these outcomes. Some risk assessment studies are interested in estimating the effects 
on physical properties (buildings, structures) and others in estimating the effects on 
human beings. In the case where an analysis of the consequences to physical 
properties is the object of study, the target will be monetary losses. In the other case, 
it will be the number of deaths or injuries. The majority of risk assessment studies deal 
with damage to structures or buildings and exposures to flammable of toxic 
substances leading to death or injury. In order to compare different damages, it is 
important to have the same comparison criteria, and it is common to use fatalities as 
the predominant reference for evaluating the effects of thermal radiation, toxic doses 
and blast over pressures. 
It is possible to determine the effects on human beings or structures directly, using 
effect models, based on predetermined criteria, as for example, the concentration 
exposure of a toxic substance resulting in death. In fact, these consequences do not 
have a form of a discrete function, but they may fit in a probability distribution 
function. 
The Pro bit method (probability unit method), which is a statistical method, provides 
as AIChEZ7 mentions, a time-dependent correlation between any variable that has a 
probabilistic outcome that can be represented by a normal distribution. It is possible to 
assess toxic effects through the establishment of a toxic dose (concentration per unit 
time) and the percentage of persons affected by this toxic dose. The Probit method 
can also be applied to thermal and explosion effects. The Pro bit method is a useful 
method to estimate the number of deaths caused by the incident outcomes selected, 
which will then be compared with an acceptability target. 
Effect models can be found in suitable literature (AIChE, Lees, TNO Books). The 
most common ones are listed below: 
F.3.1. Toxic gas effects (toxic criteria currently used, are ERPG's, IDHL, EEGLs and 
SPEGLs, TLVs and STELs, PELs, TDXS and Pro bit functions) 
F.Z. Thennal etYects (thermal criteria) 
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F.3.3. Explosion effects (prediction of the impact of blast over pressure and projectile 
on people and objects) 
G. Frequency Estimation 
The techniques used to calculate frequencies of failures are based on system reliability 
theory. 
Sometimes it is possible to address a probability value to an incident, based on 
available historical data. For example the number of recorded incidents can be divided 
by the exposure period (e.g. plant-years, pipeline mile-years) in order to obtain a 
failure estimation. 
When you deal with system failure probabilities, where a system is supposed to be 
composed of some components, it is necessary to utilise reliability techniques in order 
to obtain values for the reliability or availability of the system. 
This section will present a brief description of the basic concepts involved in reliability 
theory and the associated techniques currently used. 
G.t. Reliability analysis basic concepts 
The probability of failure as a function of time can be defmed by (Kapur34) 
P (t $1) = F(t), td?O 
Where t is a random variable denoting the failure time. Then F(t) is the probability 
that the system will fail by time 1. In other words, F(t) is the failure distribution 
function, also known as the unreliability function. 
Reliability can be defmed as: tIthe probability that a system wUl perform its 
intended junction at a certain time t, under specifr.ed conditions". Therefore, we 
can write (Kapurl4): 
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R (t) = 1 - F (t) = P ( t > t) 
Where R (t) is the reliability function. 
If the time to failure random variable t has a density functionf (t), then: 
, -
R(t)=l-F(t)= - j f(r)dr = j f(r)dr 
o , 
For example, if the time to failure is described by an exponential density function, then 
where: 
f(t) = .!.e-'/B , 
6 
t~, e > 0 
e = Expected value of the random variable commonly termed MTBF (mean time 
between failures) 
And this will lead to a reliability function defined by: 
- 1 -r dr 
R(t)=j- e B 
,8 
Where: 
A = Failure rate; A = 1/8 
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Or if considering a Weilbull distribution where the failure distribution is described by: 
, t~O, 8> O,P>O 
Where: 
~ = Weibull shape parameter or slope 
Then the reliability function is: 
Therefore, given a particular failure density function or distribution function, the 
reliability function can be found directly. 
Availability definition- A(t): "Probability that a component or system be 
operational in a certain time t". 
This defInition is related with the concept of instantaneous availability. Another very 
useful concept is the one related with the average availability in a certain time interval 
T, which can be given by the following expression: 
1 T 
Aav, (T)=-J A(t)dt 
To 
For a component or system that can present only two possible states, operating or 
failed, it is possible to derme the unavailability Q(t) as following: 
Q(t) = 1- A(t) 
For repairable components with constant failure rates and repair rates, the 
instantaneous availability can be given by the following expression: 
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And, 
A Q-=-A+jJ 
It is possible to observe that the average availability assumes the assintotic (or limit) 
value as T increases. Regarding that the repair rate J..l is equal to lIaverage repair time 
(<1), we can rewrite the above equation as following: 
Q .. = AO 
l+AO" 
As usually A<1 «1, it is possible to write: 
Q- :AO 
Another very useful expression for Qoo can be written as following regarding that A = 
IIMTIF and J..l = IIMTIR, and replacing these terms in the mentioned equation: 
MTl'R 
Q- MTl'F + MTl'R 
Time out of operation 
Total time 
Table 3.3.1.7 illustrates some values of failure rates. 
The most common techniques used for the evaluation of failure frequencies, which are 
essentially based on reliability theory and can be found in classic reliability literature, 
are listed below: 
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G.l. Fault Tree Analysis 
G.2. Event Trees 
G.3. Markov Processes 
G.4. Common Cause Failure Analysis 
G.S. Human Error Analysis 
Type of equipment Failure mode 
Process Piping 
< 3 inch. small leak 
large leak 
>3inch. small leak 
large leak 
Pressure vessel small leak 
large leak 
Valve seal failure 
Failure frequency 
1 E-5/m.year 
1 E-6/m.year 
1 E-6/m.year 
1 E-7/m.year 
1 E-41year 
1 E-5/year 
1.E-2/year 
Table 3.3.1.7 - Failure rates of equipment (Pietersen et al.3!) 
H. Evaluation of Risks 
. Leakage 
1 inch 
As the Royal SocietylO defines in the Study Group Report - Risk Assessment, risk 
evaluation is: 
" ... The complex process of determining the significance or value of the identified 
hazards and estimated risks to those concerned with or affected by the decision". 
Therefore, risk evaluation involves the evaluation of the results of the probabilistic 
risk analyses with regard to the postulated risk acceptance criteria. So, it is necessary 
to have an acceptability criterion established, as well as a trade-off between perceived 
risks and perceived benefits. 
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In this section we will briefly describe some of the acceptability criteria currently used 
for the evaluation of risks. 
H.l. Acceptability Criteria Currently Used 
H.1.1. General 
According to the document named "Guidelines for Establishing Acceptance Criteria 
for Risk Analysis" published in 1992, by The Norwegian Oil Industry Association21 
(OLF), the acceptance criteria can dermed as following: 
"Criteria used to express an acceptable risk level in the activities, e.g., a term for the 
limit of the risk that the operator will accept in his activities". 
According to the up to date European regulations, the operator should defme the 
acceptance risk criteria for his activities before the risk analysis is performed. 
Therefore, the acceptance criteria should be established according with the operator's 
own safety targets and then, be submitted to authorities. 
Risk assessment studies can be performed in different levels of detail, as well as it can 
be performed in different phases of a project, so that the acceptance criteria will be 
defmed according to the depth of the study carried out and to the level of accuracy 
required. Therefore, sometimes it is enough to derme qualitative criteria, as for 
example, the matrix we have shown earlier in this work. 
As we have already mentioned, as a result of Layfield inquiry, the UK Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) issued a report in which tolerable risk is defmed as following 
(Pidgeonet al'): 
"Tolerability does not mean acceptability. It refers to live with a risk to secure 
cenain benefits and in the confidence that it is being properly controlled. To tolerate 
a risk means that we do not regard it as negligible or something we might ignore but 
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rather as something we need to keep under review and reduce still further if and as 
we can" 
By introducing this definition HSE intends that the tolerability concept leads the 
industrial risks to be continuously monitored, evaluated against possible benefits and 
reduced wherever possible to a level "as low as reasonable practicable". This concept 
implies that individuals, group of individuals or society who must undertake risks due 
to industrial activities, may be granted a role in decision-making processes about risks. 
In this respect, as Pidgeon et al.· mention, HSE is correct in stating that 'the 
judgement on what is tolerable is not a scientific but a political matter: 
Therefore, we can conclude that the acceptability or tolerability criteria should not be 
imposed to people, but should be established as a result of an interactive and 
democratic process between experts and the individuals or group of individuals, who 
should undertake the risks in question. 
H.l.2. Types of acceptability criteria 
The acceptability criteria can be expressed in different ways. A distinction should be 
made between the following types of criteria currently used: 
· Risk Comparison 
· Risk matrix 
· Potential Loss of Life (PLL) 
· Fatal Accident Rate 
· Individual Risk Criteria 
· Societal Risk 
· Risk related to main safety functions 
H.l.2.1. Risk Comparison 
The risk comparison approach involves the comparison with risk levels associated 
with several hazards, for which risk statistics are available. 
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It is often assumed that the risk comparison, when used in risk evaluation should 
include comparison with "acceptable risk levels". Therefore, it is assumed that 
acceptable (or unacceptable) risk levels can be determined taking into account risk 
statistics for existing (accepted) risks (RekJl). 
Typical estimates of deaths associated with numerous types of hazards are shown in 
table 3.3.1.8. 
It is often assumed that the acceptability of risks depends on particular factors 
(associated benefits, etc.) only for intermediate risks (between l(}6/year and 1 (}3/year). 
In order to account for the societal impact of multiple fatalities caused by a single 
event, the risks associated with multiple fatalities have been ~ompared using 
frequency-consequence curves that will be presented later in this chapter. 
Public attitudes have shown an especially strong aversion to risks associated with 
multiple fatalities and catastrophes. Several researchers have attempted to describe 
risk aversion by equating N lives lost simultaneously with Nm lives lost individually (m 
>1). 
8.1.2.2. Risk Matrix 
If the risk analysis is performed to such a level that it is possible to categorise 
qualitatively or quantify probabilities and consequences (severity of consequences), 
the acceptability criteria can be presented on the basis of a matrix model, as was 
shown in figure 3.3.1.1. 
The matrix model can be used in a qualitative way and in a quantitative way. As it is 
possible to observe the matrix model can be used to derme a qualitative or a semi-
qualitative acceptability criterion through the use of categories of frequency and 
consequences, such as "seldom", "great", "catastrophic". 
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The intennediate region of the matrix, as well as the ALARP region, where the risk 
should be reduced as much as reasonable practicable, is usually evaluated through the 
perfonnance of a :cost-effectiveness or cost- benefit analysis, techniques that are 
going to be presented ahead. 
H.l.2.3. Potential Loss of Life (PLL) 
According to OLP) document, the potential loss of life (PLL)is the average number 
of fatalities per year (or other relevant time unit). It is a long-tenn average number of 
fatalities per unit of time that takes into account the number of personnel on board 
the installation. 
Cause Risk (x 10-6 p.a.) 
Natural hazards (US) 
hurricanes (1901-1972) 0,4 
tornadoes (1953-1971) 0,4 
lightning (1969) 0,5 
earthquakes 2 
General Accidents (US 1969) 
railway travel 4 
electrocution 6 
air travel 9 
water transport 9 
road accidents 300 
Offshore oil and gas (1967-1968) 1650 
Deep sea fishing (1959-1968) 2800 
Sports 
cave exploration (US, 1970-1978) 45 
glider flying (US, 1970-1978) 400 
scuba diving (US, 1970-1978) 420 
Table 3.3.1.8· Risk Statistics for People Exposed to Various Hazards (Reid) 
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The potential loss of life (PLL) is a useful measure to compare different design 
options within a given platfonn, including the analysis of the reduction of manned 
levels in the installation, in order to decrease the number of employees exposed to 
offshore risks. 
H.l.2.4. Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) 
The Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) is a measure that has been used for occupational risks, 
originally for the chemical industry. It was previously known as Fatal Accident 
Frequency Rate (FAFR). 
FAR is defmed as following (JoneslIChemE37): 
"Is the number of deaths that have occurred or are predicted to occur in a defined 
group, in a given environment, during 10 8 hours of total exposure". 
FAR can be interpreted for workers as the number of deaths per 1000 people involved 
in an activity during the working lifetime of lOS hours (Kletz31). FAR can be expressed 
by the equation: 
FAR = Number of deaths x 1(}8/ Total working hOUTS 
For weekly paid workers in the chemical industry the FAR is about 4 (the same as the 
average for all activities covered by the UK Factories Act). This is composed by 
(Kletz31): 
. Ordinary industrial risks (e.g., falling downstairs or getting run over): 2; 
. Chemical risks (e.g., fIre, toxic release or spillage of corrosive chemical): 2. 
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Therefore, Kletz31 mentions that if we are sure that all chemical risks have been 
identifIed, we can say that a man doing his job in a chemical industry, should not be 
exposed to a FAR greater than 2. Therefore, if this is not the case, there should be an 
effort to reduce or eliminate, as a matter of priority, the risks in new or existing plants 
in order to reduce the FAR value. In Table 3.3.1.9 some figures are presented for 
FAR's in UK industries (K1etz31) 
Pettersen et a1. J4 mention that the risk analyses performed for Statfjord platforms A, B 
and C concluded that FAR values for these platforms were respectively 21, 17 and 
15,5 and now, they are identifying and implementing cots-effective reducing measures 
to meet acceptance criteria. 
H.l.2.S. Individual Risk 
This is one of the most widely used expressions, as well mentioned by Crossland 
(Crossland et al.3l). 
Individual risk can be defmed as (JonesllChemE37): 
"The frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of 
harm from the realisation of specified hazards". 
In other words we can say that the individual risk can be defmed as the likelihood that 
an individual, located in the vicinity of a potential hazard installation, may suffer 
damage during a year. resulting from the occurrence of accidents in this installation. 
Individual risks have been usually expressed through curves, which connect points of 
equal risk levels. Those curves are called individual risk contours. Figure 5 illustrates 
one of those curves. 
When utilising individual risk values, care should be taken to assure that these values 
are calculated taking into account a "typical" or "homogeneous" group of individuals, 
because it is possible to fmd a wide variation between popUlation, depending on their 
habits and on the vulnerability they present to damage. The HSFlHSC40 recommends 
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mother with babies who spends most time at home, implying that one could assume, 
in a simplified approach, that she would be present 100% of the time. 
It is possible to convert FAR to individual risk (or average individual risk) through a 
simple expression: 
Individual Risk = FAR x working hours per yearll ()8 
Table 3.3.1.11 illustrates figures concerning to individual risk criteria adopted in 
some countries. 
FAR Risk per person per year 
Offshore oil and gas 82 165 x 10-5 
Deep sea fishing 44 88 x 10-5 
Coal mining 10 20 x 10-5 
Construction 7,5 17,5 x 10-5 
Shipbuilding and marine 5,25 10,5 x 10-5 
engineering 
Chemical and allied 4,25 8,5 x 10-5 
industries 
All premises covered by =4 =8 x 10-5 
the Factories Act 
All manufacturing industry 1,15 2,3 x 10-5 
Vehicle manufacture 0,75 1,5 x 10-5 
Clothing manufacture 0,25 0,5 x 10-5 
Table 3.3.1.9· FAR's for Some UK Industries 1974·1978 (Kletz38) 
H.l.2.6. Societal Risk 
96 
Although we can establish an individual risk criterion, under certain circumstances, it 
may be necessary to evaluate societal risks. 
Consider, for example, a shopping centre located near a potential hazard installation. 
In this case, even if an individual is exposed to risk during short periods of time, the 
risk of a catastrophe involving multiple deaths will always be present. That is also the 
case of the transport of dangerous substances, where a leak of a chemical product 
could result in major consequences. 
Therefore, it is possible to observe that an individual could be submitted to low (or 
relatively low) levels of risks, but the probability of occurrence of a catastrophe 
would be present and should be a matter of concern to authorities. 
Authority Intolerable Risk Negligible Risk 
(per year) (per year) 
VROM-Netherlands 10-6 10-8 
(new installations) 
VROM-Netherlands 10-5 10-8 
(existing installations or 
combined installations) 
EPA, Australia 10-5 10-6 
(new installations) 
UK, HSE (nuclear) 10-4 10-6 
HSFlUK 10-5 10-6 
(new houses) 
Hong Kong 10-5 -
(new installations) 
NSW 10-6 
(new installations) 
Table 3.3.1.10 - Published Risk Criteria (Cassidyll) 
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HSClHSE40 mentions another aspect that recommends the utilisation of societal risk 
criteria. This aspect refers to the additional public repugnance against events that 
cause roughly 100 or 1,000 victims at once. This repugnance is much higher to this 
kind of events than to others that cause the same number of victims but during some 
period of time. In literature this feature is called "risk aversion" (or "differential risk 
aversion") and societal risks allow this feature to be taken into account. HSClHSE40 
recommends that, in the case that risk aversion be taken into consideration, it should 
be shown explicitly. 
The societal risk can be defined as following (JoneslIChemE37): 
"The relationship between frequency and the number of persons suffering from a 
specified level of harm in a given population from the realisation of specified 
hazards". 
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At present, societal risks are represented through F-N curves, also known as 
"Complementary Cumulative Distribution Curve". 
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The F-N curves provide the expected frequency of the occurrence of accidents 
associated with n or more deaths. Figure 3.3.1.3 illustrates one of these curves. 
Figures 3.3.1.4. and 3.3.1.5 provide societal risk criteria proposed. 
8.1.2.7. Risk related to main safety functions 
The risk to main safety functions is related to the traditional safety concept analysis. 
This approach is concerned with the integrity and ability that structures, shelter areas, 
escape ways and emergency systems present to withstand or survive severe accident 
conditions, in order to assure personnel's evacuation. Therefore, this criterion 
comprises, for example, the endurance of the temporary safety refuge (TSR) during a 
calamity, the availability of escape routes and life saving appliances, the availability of 
detection and means of control (emergency shut down -ESD and blowdown 
systems),etc. 
In Chapter 2, we have presented some of these criteria used in Great Britain, Norway 
and Netherlands. 
Just to remember one example of this type of criteria, we will transcribe again, as 
mentioned in section 11.2, the 1981 NPD Guidelines' acceptance criteria, the text 
presented in its sections 5.1, 5.2, 5.5 and 5.6: 
Section 5.1. "The platform design must be such that a design accidental event does 
not impose a danger to personnel outside the immediate vicinity of the accident". 
Section 5.2. "Section 5.1. can be considered satisfied by complying with the 
following criteria: 
a) at least one escape way from central positions which may be subjected to an 
accident, shaU normally be intact for at least one hour during a design accidental 
event; 
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b) shelter areas shall be intact during a calculated accidental event until safe 
evacuatWn is possible; 
c) depending on the platform type, functwn and locatwn, wheiJ exposed to the 
design accidental event, the main support structure must maintain its load 
carrying capacity Jor a specifJed time". 
As another example we can mention agam HSE Guidelines l7 which requires a 
demonstration in the safety case, that the performance standards established for 
temporary refuge, etc., will reduce risks to person to as low as reasonably practicable, 
regarding the measures adopted to prevent and reduce the effects of major accidents. 
According to HSE Guidelines 11 , paragraph 116: 
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"This requires estimation by QRA of the frequency of 'extreme events ' together with 
those 'design events ' where (e.g. because of unanticipated component failure or 
human error) the Temporary Safety Refuge (TSR) system fails to maintain its 
integrity for the full period assumed in the design; 
As we have also presented in before, a frequency figure of lQ-4/year appeared in the 
1981 NPD Guidelines', section rn.2.2, as following: 
"In practical terms, it may be considered necessary to exclude the most improbable 
accidental events from the analysis. However, the total probability of OCCU"ence of 
each type of excluded situation should not by best availllble estimate exceed 1 {)-4 
per year for any of the main functions specified in 5.2, 5.5 and 5.6. " 
HSE Guidelines17, also presents a figure related to the maximum tolerable' frequency 
with which accidental events will result in loss of TSR's integrity, as following: 
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"In keeping with the concept of maximum tolerable risk, HSE will look for a 
demonstration that the frequency with which accidental events will result in loss of 
integrity of temporary refuge, within the minimum endurance time stated in the 
safety case, does not exceed the order of 1 in 1,000 a year. Risk should be reduced to 
a lower level wherever this is reasonably practicable; where the risk is close to 1 to 
1,000 a year, there should be convincing arguments presented that it is not 
practicable to reduce it further". 
When applying quantitative risk assessment (QRA) techniques to decision making 
processes, the relative importance of different risk parameters (such as individual or 
societal risk, risks to workers or to public, costs of damage to plants or houses) can 
vary widely, depending on the specific numerical results obtained in each studied case. 
Below the "tolerable" individual risk limit and above the negligible level, it will still be 
necessary to demonstrate that the activity will be developed in an "optimum" safety 
level, so that the residual risks would be kept in a level: "as low as reasonable 
practicable" (ALARP). In the same way, for existing installations which are already 
accepted by the community, the ALARP principle should also be applied. 
Inside this intermediate region, for the determination of what is really reasonable, or 
to decide how much should be additionally spent in safety is where some techniques 
are useful. A brief description of the theory concerning cost-effectiveness and cost-
benefit analyses, as well as of the methods involved in the valuation of life are going 
to be provided below. 
H.l.3. Cost-EtTectiveness 
Whereas the risk comparison approach is based in the assumption that the 
acceptability of risks depends mainly on the estimated level of risk, the cost-
effectiveness approach to risk evaluation is based on the assumption that the 
acceptability of risks depends primarily on the cost to reduce the risk. For life 
threatening risks, the cost-effectiveness of risk reduction is related with the marginal 
cost of saving a life. 
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It is possible to make comparisons between the marginal costs of saving lives for 
several life-saving procedures, assuming that the various costs and lives saved are 
comparable. Such comparisons have revealed that procedures used to save particular 
lives (i.e. search and rescue procedures) generally involve higher marginal costs than 
procedures used to save statistical lives (e.g., road safety procedures) (Reid!). 
Obviously, private and public expenditure on safety is not strongly based on the cost-
effectiveness of risk reduction (as assessed by' methods of probabilistic risk 
assessment) . 
System analysts and economists of American federal agencies (as the American 
Defence Department) fIrst developed the techniques for this type of approach. 
The costs involved in damages are very difficult to evaluate specially the costs of 
human life therefore an alternative methodology was developed in order to avoid the 
use of an explicit value for human life. This approach is based on a direct comparison 
between the costs of control devices and the risk reduction to health, generally 
expressed as the number of deaths or injuries, and the associated protection level. 
Therefore, the cost-effectiveness relationship is seen as a particular way for the 
evaluation and presentation of control devices that can be effective for reducing risks 
to people and environment. 
The fIrst step of the methodology consists on: 1) analysing all possible measures that 
can be used to protect individuals from potential hazard activities; 2) quantifying these 
measures in terms of total costs involved in their implementation and operation; 3) 
evaluating the risk reduction obtained, expressed in terms of avoided damage to 
health. The second step consists on choosing between several possible alternatives, 
the most cost-effective ones. 
The last step consists on presenting the protective actions that may be taken, in order 
to help to identify, within a decision making process, the best possible ways to 
allocate resources. 
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Figure 3.3.1.6 shows a cost-effectiveness curve. For each particular cost, the curve 
shows the maximum risk reduction achieved. 
The horizontal axis in figure 3.3.1.6 represents the cumulative cost. The vertical axis 
represents the residual cost. The level of reference, in the vertical axis corresponds to 
the maximum residual cost, without any special control inserted. The first measure A 
is the most cost-effective: the relationship cost/risk reduction C (A)IE (A) is the 
smaller one. The subsequent measures B, C, D are shown in an increasing order, 
regarding the relation cost/risk reduction. 
Each point of the curve corresponds to a protection level, defined by the measures or 
actions associated with this point and with the precedent measures or actions in the 
curve. Each protection level is also economically effective, i.e., it is not either possible 
to find any other set of protective measures that would be more effective to the 
associated cumulative cost, neither find another set of protective measures that 
D 
C 
TOTAL COST (C) 
Figure 3.3.16 - Cost - Effectiveness Risk Reduction Curves. 
Curves A, a, C, 0 are Protection Actions to Improvements Effectiveness 
( INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY) 
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would involve less cost and that imply in the achievement of a better residual risk level 
than this. 
Therefore, once all the points shown in the curve are cost-effective, it is possible to 
determine the most efficient set of protective measures that may be selected in a 
specific case, as well as the minimum amount of money that may be spent, under a 
certain restriction regarding the residual risk. 
8.1.4. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
When applying quantitative risk assessment (QRA) techniques to decision making 
processes, the relative importance of different risk parameters (such as individual or 
societal risk, risks to workers or to public, costs of damage to plants or houses) can 
vary widely, depending on the specific numerical results obtained in each studied case. 
According to Heishman·· the principles nowadays employed in QRA studies are based 
on principles implemented by the International Commission on Radiological 
Protection (ICRP) in 1977. That Commission has introduced the concept that the 
protection levels from radiation should be increased until the cost of this additional 
improvement clearly exceeds the associated reduction in the inducted radiation. In this 
point the exposition would have achieved a point "as low as reasonably achievable" -
ALARA Later the Royal Society Study Group, in 1983, has issued a report named 
"Regulatory Process and Control Strategy", which included the following items: 
" 
(a) An upper limit of risk which should not be exceeded for any individual; 
(b) Further control so far as is reasonably practicable, making allowance if possible, 
for aversions to the higher levels of risk or detriment; and 
(c) A cut-off in the deployment of resources blow some level of exposure or detriment 
judged trivial". 
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After the publication of this report some responses have arose, related to the use of 
the acceptability criteria proposed, and variations of this criterion were adopted in 
countries like Netherlands, Great Britain and Australia. 
Some authors point out that the establishment of maximum levels of individual risk is 
a legitimate way of restricting the exposition of certain groups of persons to industrial 
risks, avoiding inequalities in costs' distribution and societal benefits associated with 
industrial activities. 
Other authors believe that it would be wrong to limit risks to society, without 
considering the societal benefits that a certain industry is able to generate, alleging 
that a rigid imposition of societal risk limits would address a disproportional weight to 
quantitative considerations about risks. It could neglect other important factors to 
qecision making processes, sometimes imposing incorrect restrictions to industrial 
developments. 
The direct extension of the principles proposed by ICRP to an acceptability criterion 
of risks provides a basis to the discussion about the development of new industrial 
enterprises, allowing the performance of a balance between new jobs and benefits to 
economy versus specific potential hazards, public perception of risks, etc., without 
disregarding the restrictions related to the calculated societal risks. 
However, below the "tolerable" individual risk limit and, above the negligible level, it 
will still be necessary to demonstrate that the activity will be developed in an 
"optimum" safety level, so that the residual risks would be kept in a level: "as low as 
reasonable practicable" (ALARP, figure 2.2.2.1). In the same way, for existing 
installations, which are already accepted by the community, the ALARP principle 
should also be applied. 
Inside this intermediate region, for the determination of what is really reasonable, or 
to decide how much should be additionally spent in safety, is where the cost-benefit 
analyses is useful and where it is increasingly being adopted. 
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The purpose of cost-benefit analyses is to make a balance between the implementation 
of additional protective measures and the associated benefits, regarding risk reduction 
related to economical losses and lives lost, providing a basis for the allocation of 
resources. However, it requires the judgement of values, including the assignment of 
monetary values to life, or to each "statistical fatality averted". 
If the risk reduction values exceed the costs of proposed safety measures, a direct 
economic benefit will be achieved due to the implementation of these measures. In 
other cases, the residual costs will be counterpoised to the reduction obtained in 
societal risk levels. providing a measure to prioritise the cost-effectiveness of the 
presented options, in terms of the associated expenses related to "statistical fatalities 
averted". 
In order to apply the above concepts in cost-effectiveness approaches that take into 
consideration the ALARP principle, it is necessary to compare risk reduction 
measures with appropriate monetary valuations for risk reduction, expressing them in 
terms of pounds (or other coin) per "statistical fatality averted". 
This is the analytical frame to determine the optimum protection level that is supposed 
to keep the residual risks to a level "as low as reasonable practicable" (ALARP). 
However, it is very important to point out that cost-benefit analyses involve the 
judgement and assignment of complex values, which include the estimation of the 
value of life in monetary terms and also the evaluation of other cost components. We 
will briefly discuss the valuation of life in the section presented below. 
H.1.S. Valuation of Life 
The assignment of a monetary value to life (defmed as the expenditure one might 
justify averting statistical fatality) is not a new task to economists. In the end of 
century XVII, Sir William Petty (Fleishman·l ) calculated the economic losses to 
England due to the war, addressing a value to the loss of lives. 
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Two approaches are the most commonly used: 'human capital' and 'willingness to 
pay'. 
The 'human capital' approach assumes that the economic value of a human life, and 
therefore, the loss that an individual death represents to economy, consists on 
discounting the expected future earnings of this individual. Other calculations, that 
take into account the victim suffering and privations for the victim's family sometimes 
complement this type of calculation. 
This method has been adopted by Governmental bodies in UK, including Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE), that utilises, as a guide line, the current value of 200,000 
pounds per "statistical fatality averted". 
An improvement of this method consists on discounting the losses imposed to other 
persons, due to the death of an individual. This method is sometimes referred as "net 
productivity" (in order to distinguish from the former, which is called "gross 
productivity"). 
Although the 'human capital' approach provides a basis for quantification, it does not 
take into account preferences of people at risk. Besides it, if we interpret this method, 
we can observe that what is implicit in it, is that what is important to society is just 
what this society wins or loses after the death of one of its members. In this point of 
view, the death of an individual whose contribution was negative, would bring a 
benefit to society, in such a manner that the lives of young and elderly or retired 
people, will be worthless, and this is a very perverse and absurd assumption! 
In response to these imperfections, economists attempted to develop other methods, 
keeping the basic principles of the traditional cost-benefit analysis. 
One of these methods is named "willingness to pay" and is based on the willingness to 
pay that an individual presents to risk decreases, or in other words, the compensation 
he requires risk increases. 
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According to HSE", the evaluations of values of life based on empirical studies are 
subjected to a wide variation, and their results are difficult to interpret. Anyway, it is 
usually considered that these evaluations result in higher values than the ones resulting 
from 'human capital' approach, and that they are of one order of magnitude higher. 
Therefore, this implies that the value of life would be about some millions of pounds .. 
The HSE "mentions that the Britain societal context has led the National Radiological 
Protective Board, in Britain, to develop an explicit'reference to be utilised in cost-
benefit analyses. Recently, a multiplier factor (from 1 to 15) has been applied to the 
basic valuation obtained from the 'human capital' approach. implying in a range from 
200.000 to 3,000,000 pounds per "statistical health effect averted", as an increasing 
function of individual dose (risk) levels. 
It is also considered that, besides the individual aversion to risks, the society is also 
"risk-averse", and that it seems to react more strongly to large losses of lives, which 
present a low frequency of occurrence, than to frequent losses which present smaller 
consequences. Therefore, there are some proposals that intend to address a higher 
weight to low frequent events that involve major consequences, by applying a 
function that reflects this weight. This function will attempt to reflect that N lives that 
are lost simultaneously, would be Nm more important than the lost of one life, where m 
> 1. The merit of this type of approach, which attempts to enclosure public 
perception, is considered questionable. 
Fleishman·' concludes that monetary valuation range between 500,000 to 5,000,000 
pounds, per "statistical fatality averted", would be adequately broad to encompass 
considerations such as economic methodologies. individual and societal aversion and 
gross disproportion when applying cost-benefit analysis to the interpretation of 
ALARP principle. 
It is possible to suppose that other cost-benefits evaluations concerning to safety, 
could be directly accounted. However, that is not the case. For example. one of the 
potential consequences of major industrial accidents is the loss of a good image and 
reputation, especially when the industry is prosecuted and some management errors 
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are found. This type of adverse publicity and loss of credibility have a strong impact 
to public, being difficult to account it quantitatively. 
Other economic costs related to serious accident occurrences, such as direct repair 
costs, production losses due to shut-down periods, and the economic costs of 
protective measures, are in principle more tangible in monetary terms, although their 
quantification is often complex. 
However, even in the case of direct costs, an accurate defInition or reference basis for 
addressing those· costs are SUbjected to judgements and opened to different 
interpretations. It is usually recommended that each case be analysed carefully, 
regarding its specific context. 
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4. Model Description 
4.1. Introduction 
The approach presented in this Thesis comprises the evaluation of safety systems 
availability, costs ,involved in the improvement of those systems, as well as the 
evaluation of the costs associated with incurred loss of lives, income and assets in an 
interactive way. 
For standard plants and for new design concepts this methodology can be used to 
optimise safety and economics. For facilities that have been already operating, the 
reallocation of reliability and risks can be applied, regarding the following aspects 
(Cho et al.~: a) it should be done on a plant-by plant basis; b) it will present cost and 
physical limitations. 
Cost limitations are obvious, once any suggested modification could imply in an extra 
capital investment and in additional operational costs. Physical limitations have also to 
be considered since you may have to introduce passive protection or maybe change 
lay-outs in order to achieve the safety levels recommended from the analysis which, 
depending on the enterprise design stage, can be not cost-effective. 
Those points should be considered when analysing any unit. In the other hand, the 
presented methodology can be useful to have a "safety overview" of the installation, 
once it provides an evaluation of how far the installation is, in terms of risk levels or 
safety levels, from the established safety targets. It can also be useful to evaluate 
operational practices. 
The result of the proposed approach is presented in terms of information related to 
costs, risk and maximum tolerable frequencies of impairment to the main safety 
functions of a particular unit design. It is presented as a function of the availability of 
its safety systems, components and structure. Additionally, the methodology 
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presented in this Thesis provides information about alternative design configurations 
and operational practices. 
This work confIrms the technical feasibility of allocating reliability and risk in a self-
consistent way. It addresses values of availability to safety systems like fIre and gas 
detection systems, pressure sensors and blockage systems (actuation valves). 
4.2. Objective 
The objective of the model to be developed in this Thesis is (Cho et al.G ): 
(I) To propose a feasible model to allocate reliability and risk criteria for the main 
safety functions of an offshore unit in a self-consistent manner. This model will 
provide a method for evaluating the global safety of an industrial facility regarding 
aspects as safety design configurations (passive and active protection) and 
operation procedures (test and maintenance). It will provide a method for design 
engineers to establish minimum reliability levels for safety functions in order to 
achieve safety targets previously defmed. 
(2) To apply the proposed methodology, through numerical examples. 
(3) To evaluate the generated results, identifying the vulnerabilities and performing a 
sensitive analysis, with the variation of the goal setting values. 
(4) To demonstrate if it is possible or not to achieve the proposed criteria for the 
specifIc installation, providing a detailed look of the unit design in terms of the 
reliability of safety functions and the adequacy of active and passive protection. 
The model is flexible, in such a way that it allows the analyst to include other variables 
that were not included in this study, such as the probability of a successful or 
unsuccessful sheltering, probability of a successful or unsuccessful evacuation, etc., as 
it will be presented ahead. 
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This model allows the analyst to propose his own safety goals and evaluate if it is 
feasible to reach them, based on design or operational targets. The fact that you can 
achieve other goal levels, e.g. availability goals for the safety functions, from top level 
goals (individual risk criterion) is an important task, once it provides a better 
understanding of the safety importance of each one of the various safety systems and 
the respective cost-effectiveness improvements. 
The approach presented in this Thesis will then be a problem of determining the 
optimum design configuration for safety functions of an offshore unit, considering 
simultaneously the risk measures and costs. 
In essence, the approach will be to determine the "optimum design" of the plant in 
terms of safety, considering simultaneously the established global measure and the 
costs to achieve it. 
The optimum design will be the one that presents the best result considering the 
achievement of different reliability levels for the safety systems, which in our case will 
be given be in terms of different Safety Integrity Levels (ISA), together with the 
satisfaction of the constraints of the problem and a cost balance. 
The essential elements of the analysis presented here are (Cho et al.~): 
(1) the establishment of a global measure of unit's safety performance (top level 
safety indices, which in our case will be the individual risk to offshore workers and 
the maximum tolerable frequency of impairment to the main safety functions of 
the FPSO) and "objective functions" (that will be the cost function which is going 
to be minimised); 
(2) a model for relating the global measure of plant's safety performance to specific 
set of measures of plant performance (the availability of safety systems, which will 
compose the "decision variables"); 
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(3) a method for allocating values to these specific measures of the unit safety 
performance (availability of safety functions) in order to optimise the plant design 
and satisfy the global measures established. 
In this work, the frrst element mentioned above will consist of a set of two 
components: a proposed individual risk criterion for Brazilian offshore workers, 
which will be calculated based on data collected in Brazilian Oil Company 
(Petro bras) , which as a monopolist company (until the data of calculation) is far 
representative of the Brazilian offshore oil production "universe"; and of the 
maximum tolerable frequency of impairment to the main safety functions, which value 
is based on NPD and HSE Guidelines, as mentioned on chapter 2. 
Therefore, the frrst step of the analysis will be to collect data related to fatalities 
occurred in oil platforms (including workers from PETROBRAs and from others 
companies, who work for PETROBRAS). After obtaining this data, it is possible to 
calculate the associated "fatal Accident Rate" (FAR) and the Average Individual Risk 
(AIR). 
It is important to highlight that the values presented in this work should not be 
regarded as prescriptive safety criteria or prescriptive safety goals. They may be taken 
as proposed reference values to be studied, compared and traded-off by decision-
makers. The individual risk was calculated for the specific case of Brazilian offshore 
units, although the values obtained are very compatible with other values presented 
world wide for individual risks. 
We suppose that the reference values proposed here can be perfectly understood by 
policy-level decision makers and we hope that they can serve as a contribution to a 
wider debate in risk assessment arena. 
4.3. Methodology Development 
4.3.1. General 
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The ftrst step in a decision making process is to establish the objectives that should be 
satisfted and to defme an attribute or measure of effectiveness. An attribute provides a 
quantitative measurement of the degree to which the corresponding objective has been 
achieved. In this Thesis the following attributes are considered: 
1. Cost 
2. Individual Risk 
3. Frequency of Impairment to main safety functions (impairment to the Temporary 
Safety Refuge (TSR), escape routes and to structure) 
The second and third attributes represent the "safety goals" to be achieved. The 
discussion about ftgures related to individual risks and the frequency of impairment to 
main safety functions, as well as new policies concerning risk assessment were 
described in chapter 2. 
The ftrst attribute included is also essential, once it is not possible to forget the cost 
effectiveness of the choices we have to make. As mentioned earlier in this work, 
precluding the economic dimension involved in this task would reduce our problem to 
a vague problem that is the classic one expressed by the question: How safe is safe 
enough? Lacking the economic dimension to try to answer this question would lead to 
decisions that neglect practical considerations, and are not supported by a consistent 
basis, once the whole frame of the losses incurred due to failures would not be 
considered. Besides this, if there is no constraints to achieve the various reliability 
levels we would choose "perfect systems", with the maximum availability and lowest 
related consequences in case of failure. Obviously there are constraints, since for each 
reliability or risk level improvement you would have a respective additional 
expenditure of resources, as well as technological limitations to achieve a 100% 
system availability or a zero industrial residual risk. 
Therefore, the element cost appears as a mediator, as an element to promote a 
reasonable balance between mathematical and technological solutions and what is 
really feasible to achieve. The cost function presented in this work will also include 
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several economic loss components included in an accident scenario. They are going to 
be described in section 4.3.7. 
4.3.2. Facility's Model 
Quantitative risk assessment models can provide a comprehensive description of the 
relationship between the unavailability of the unit's safety systems and the associated 
undesirable consequences. 
Event trees methodology is the one utilised in quantitative risk assessments to model 
the sequence of events that occurs in any accident, with the corresponding 
unavailability values of safety systems, failure probabilities and probabilities associated 
with weather conditions, wind direction, etc. 
The methodology proposed in this Thesis has to be developed based on a quantitative 
risk assessment study previously performed for the industrial unit under analysis. 
In typical quantitative risk assessment studies, for each identified scenario (selected 
after the performance of a detailed preliminary risk analysis (PHA», event trees are 
traced in order to determine the accident scenarios to be analysed. Then, the related 
consequences are modelled, and the physical effects! vulnerability are evaluated. 
Finally, the average societal and individual risks are calculated. 
As it is possible to observe from examples shown in Appendix I - figures A.1.1 to 
A.I.32, for each initiator event, there is a related event tree. For each one of the 
initiator events, there are several related accident scenarios identified by the code ID 
in the event tree. 
We can observe from these figures (as from other event trees), 
availability/unavailability values are addressed to protection systems (PSL' s and 
valves, for example), to gas and fire detection systems, as it could be to any other 
safety system (as for example, blow-down systems, etc.) that should be taken into 
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account, in order to suitably simulate the sequence of events that leads to accident 
scenarios. 
For each one of the identified accident scenarios shown in Appendix 1- figures Al.l 
to Al.32, we will still have, what we will call from now on in this Thesis, the 
associated phenomenological event. tree. This phenomenological event tree will 
comprise different ignition probabilities (different ignition points), different wind 
velocities, different jet directions, etc. Figure figures Al.33 in Appendix 1 provides 
an example of an event tree traced for the quantitative risk assessment, where the 
weather conditions and others probabilities are shown. 
Ordinary softwares make all the mentioned calculations and generate the results. They 
include the probability of fatalities, the average population which is in each specific 
position (area), the associated average societal risk, and then the total (the sum) 
average societal risk associated with this specific scenario. 
The model presented in this Thesis considers that the unit's safety consists of the 
interconnection of a number of "elements" characterised by a certain reliability level. 
In fact they will address availability or unavailability values to safety systems and 
could also be used to address probability values to failures of active and passive 
components, to failures of components to attend when demanded, to human errors, to 
operation and evacuation procedures, etc. 
Therefore, utilising the quantitative risk assessment results, an expression can be 
produced for the societal risk and for the associated individual risk expression, 
imposing variables that replace the availability values addressed to safety systems. The 
average individual risk expression is obtained by dividing the total average societal 
risk of the facility (which is the sum of all average societal risk values calculated for 
each accident scenario) by the facility's population. 
4.3.2.1. Model's Expression 
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According to the event tree shown in figure 4.3.2.1.1, it is possible observe that an 
expression for the Average Societal Risk (ASR) can be obtained as following: 
AVSR = /lm11 Ph 11 Pb11PanY11 + /lm12 Ph12Pb12PanY12+ /lm13PhI3Pb13Pany13+ ............ + 
/ Imlk PhlkPbl! Panyu: + / 2m21 Ph21 Pb21PanY21+ /2m22 Ph 22 Pb22 Pany 22 + 
/ 2m23 Ph23Pb23PanY23 + ..................... +./ 2m2! Ph 2lPb2lcPany21c + .................... + 
fi mJl PhilPbil PanYil + ......... + fi miK PhiKPbiK PanyiK 
Where the definitions of each one of the parameters used in the expression are defmed 
below. 
Expressing the societal risk in matrix formalism we would have: 
Let fiCi = 1,2, .... I)denote the frequency of the ith accident initiator event. The 
following row vector can be defmed: 
/ = [Jl,/2, .... ,fl}lXI vector 
Let mij denote functions of the unavailability of safety functions, i.e., 
mij = f (XI, X~, ..... , x.). The following diagonal Unavailability Matrix M can be 
defmed: 
ml) 0 Q .......... O 
0 m~) 0 0 M= :1 X J , where j = 1,2, ... ,k 
M M M M 
0 0 0 m/j 
The terms mij will be composed by the product of all unavailability or availability 
values of safety systems represented in the event trees. 
Let now suppose that given an initiator event Ii, given the unavailability of safety 
functions mij, we will have a probability pij, which will be called phenomenological 
probability. This probability will aggregate all the probabilities that appear in an event 
tree, as for example: probability of ignition, probability of hav~g specific weather 
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conditions, etc., and which will contribute to defme the jth branch result of an event 
tree (the jth physical effect). Therefore, the following diagonal Phenomenoiocicai 
Matrix Ph can be defined: 
o 
Ph = M 
o o 
OA 0 
: J X S matrix, where 
o p/j 
Now supposing that we have a given initiator event, the unavailability of safety 
functions mij, and a phenomenological probability pij, we will have a certain 
probability of fatalities (given by Pro bit functions), resulting from the jth physical 
effect, obtained as a result of a branch in an event tree. Then, we can defme a diagonal 
Prohit Matrix Ph, which will be composed by probabilities ph/js, obtained from 
Probit functions, multiplied by numbers (real) eljs, which represents the average 
population present at the moment the effect is manifested, as following: 
Pb= 
phljc1j 
o 
o 
o 
pb2jc2j 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
ph/elj 
:SxZ 
Let now defme a column vector Pany which represents any other probability that is 
desirable to add to the expression presented, as for example, the probability of an 
unsuccessful sheltering or the probability of a successful evacuation. This column 
vector Pany will be defmed as following: 
Pany = [Panyl,Pany2, ...... PanyzT 
Finally, given these defmitions, it can be shown that the expression for the individual 
risk is given by: 
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k 
ASR = IfMPbPany (4.3.2.1) 
j=l 
mJl PhJl PbJl PanYJI 
Ph 12 Pb12 
Ph lk Pblk PanYlk 
Ph21 Pb21 PanY21 
/2 Ph 22 Pb22 PanY22 
mil Phil PbIl PanYIl 
fI Ph 12 Pb12 PanYI2 
Figure 4.3.2.1.1· Event Tree Used in the Model's 
Societal Risk Expression 
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Considering the expression given above and based in a quantitative risk assessment 
previously performed, the model proposed in this work will comprise the following 
steps: 
(a) for each considered initiator event and the related societal risk calculated, 
variables are imposed to the availability/unavailability values associated with the 
safety systems considered in each branch. Therefore, the societal risk associated 
with the specific initiator event, the specific mij term (the product of the 
unavailability/availability variables) determined for each branch of the event tree 
and the related probabilities, will be expressed as a function of the safety systems' 
unavailability /availability variables; 
(b) the sum of the terms mentioned above, associated with all the branches of all 
traced event trees, and expressed as a function of different 
unavailability/availability variables, will provide the total societal risk expression, 
evaluated for the facility under analysis; 
(c) The total societal risk expressed in terms of safety systems' 
unavailability/availability variables will then be divided by the unit's population, 
and the individual risk expression will be obtained; 
(d) The total individual risk expression (which is expressed as a function of safety 
systems' unavailability/availability variables) will then be optimised, considering 
the safety targets previously defmed (in our case, the individual risk criterion and 
maximum frequency of impairment of accidental events to main safety systems of 
an offshore oil production installation) and the costs associated with the 
availability improvement of these safety systems. 
The reliability prediction model as well as the cost model used in the methodology 
proposed in this work are going to be presented below. 
4.3.3. Decision Space 
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The next step of the proposed methodology will be to defme the set of all the 
alternatives to be evaluated - the decision space. The generation of these alternatives 
should be based on alternative design configurations for the safety systems to be 
adopted for the facility under study. For each one of the safety systems, different 
configurations have to be proposed and the respective availability values should be 
calculated. Therefore, in this work, the decision space will be composed by discrete 
values. 
Mathematically, the decision space is the set of all technologically feasible realisations 
of the vector ~, where the dimensionality of ~ is equal to the number n, of the decision 
variables xi. Discrete design configuration unavailability values will be represented by 
discrete points x}, where j is the r permutation of the various discrete values of xi's. 
4.3.4. Reliability Prediction Model 
4.3.4.1. Introduction 
When designing safety shut-down systems there is generally a conflict between MJ.fnl 
and production re~ularitl', in other words for several safety systems, as for example 
for fIre and gas detection systems; there is a conflict between safety and the amount of 
false alarms. 
When evaluating loss of safety, the failure mode Fail To Operate (FTO) is 
considered. The measure of reliability, that is used to quantify loss of safety, 1S 
Critical SareO' Unavailabilio' (CSU), which can be defmed as following (SINTEP"): 
"The probability that the safety system is not in operation, i.e. will not 
automatically carry out a successful shut-down on the occurrence of an 
abnormal operating condition. " 
When evaluating loss of production, the failure mode Spurious Operation (sO) is 
considered. The measure of reliability that is used to quantify loss of production, is 
Spurious Trip Rate (STR)' which can be defmed as following (SINTEP"): 
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" The number of nuisance activation of the safety systems per unit time, i. e. 
shut-downs which are activated without the presence of an abnormal 
operating condition. " 
This section presents the necessary steps for calculating the Critical Safety 
Unavailability (CSU) and Spurious Trip Rate (STR) of various configurations of 
safety systems based on SINTEF Reliability Prediction Handbook (SINTEP'). 
4.3.4.2. General Assumptions and Limitations 
The following assumptions were considered in this work, as recommended by 
SINTEF handbook (SINTEF-) for reliability calculations: 
• All failures occur according to the exponential model, i.e., all modules have 
constant failure rates; 
• The unavailability of the safety shut-down systems due to repair or functional 
testing of system modules is not considered when quantifying loss of safety; 
• Trip events that are introduced deliberately, because maintenance/test 
activities are to be carried out, are not included when quantifying loss of 
production. 
• The critical safety unavailability of the system is obtained by summing the 
critical safety unavailability of each (set of redundant) module(s); 
• Multiple failures of non-identical modules are ignored; 
• The likelihood of an event causing simultaneous failures of non-identical 
modules is very low when compared to the likelihood of an event causing identical 
modules to fail simultaneously (SINTEF-). 
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4.3.4.2.1. Assumptions for Approximate Formulas 
SINTEF handbook (SINTEF-) presents approximate reliability block diagrams and 
formulas to be used for reliability prediction when the assumptions listed below are 
valid. It is highlighted that if those assumptions do not apply, exact reliability block 
diagrams and formulas should be used as presented in the SINTEF appendix 
(SINTEF- Appendices B and C). 
• All module failure rates are less than 10-2 per hour. 
• At least 10% of all failures in a redundant system are multiple failures causing 
two or more identical modules to fail simultaneously. 
• When this assumption applies, single failures will not contribute significantly to 
loss of safety in redundant systems in which at least two modules must fail 
before the system fails to operate on a safety demand. If, for instance, 90% of 
the failures are single and the test period is I month, the single failures will 
contribute to system failures in the order of 1 %, which is rather insignificant. 
Which a test period of 3 months, this contribution increases to about 3%. 
• The repair time is small when compared to the interval of time between functional 
testing; 
• The self-test period is small when compared to the interval of time between 
functional testing. 
4.3.4.3. Safety System Configuration 
4.3.4.3.1. Voting Logic 
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The concept related to some different types of voting logic, that can be chosen for 
safety shut-down systems (and will be in the chapter concerning the methodology 
application) are described below: 
• 1001 - The single module has to give a shut-down signal for a shut-down to be 
activated (no redundancy - no voting); 
• 1002 - Only one of the two redundant modules has to give a shut-down signal 
for a shut-down to be activated; 
• 2001 - Both redundant modules have to give a shut-down signal for a shut-
down to be activated; 
• 1003 - Only one of the three redundant modules has to give a shut-down 
signal for a shut-down to be activated. 
• 2003 - At least two of the three redundant modules have to give a shut-down 
signal for a shut-down to be activated. 
In Table 4.3.4.1.1, various voting logic are visualised, along with the corresponding 
reliability block diagram for calculations of both loss of safety (CSU) and spurious 
trip (STR). 
4.3.4.4. Loss of Safety Calculation 
When designing safety shut-down systems, the main objective is to detect the 
hazardous condition, to shut in the process upon hazardous situations and to minimise 
the adverse effects of such occurrences. Failure to detect the hazardous event, or to 
shut in the process within a suitable period of time may lead to serious adverse effects 
and impose severe damage to human health, to assets or environment. Those types of 
events are usually denoted as undesirable events. 
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When quantifying loss of safety of safety shut-down systems, we are looking at the 
probability of occurrence of undesirable events due to failure of the safety shut-down 
systems (the probability that those systems will fail to Qperate (ETO), upon a 
hazardous situation). This is denoted as the critical safeO' unavailability (CSU) of the 
safety shut-down systems (SINTEP-). 
The evaluation of the loss of safety is carried out in a two step procedure (SINTEP-): 
• Qualitative eYaluation 
(a) Defme the undesirable event and the corresponding success criterion. 
(b) Describe the module types of the system; 
(c) Draw the overall failure to operate - ETO - reliability block diagram of system. 
In this step you do not need to consider the effect of dependent failures or self-test 
mechanisms. 
@ Draw the approximate detailed failure to operate - ETO - reliability block 
diagram. In this step you should consider the effect of dependent failures and the 
effect of self-test mechanisms. 
• Quantitative eyaluation 
(a) Establish the necessary input data. 
(b) Calculate the Critical Safety Unavailability (CSU) based on the approximate 
detailed failure to operate - PTO - reliability block diagram. 
4.3.4.4.1. Qualitative Evaluation 
• Definition of the Undesirable Event and the Success Criterion 
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In every reliability study, the very frrst step is to well defme the undesirable event or 
to defme what will be an unsuccessful mission of the system. It is important that the 
undesirable event gives a clear and unambiguous defmition, or the analysis will 
mislead results. The defmition should always include (SINTEF-): 
• The type of event for instance fires. 
• Where the hazardous situation occurs, for instance frre in area 1. 
• The required action of the safety shut-dowri system, for instance shut-in the 
production of oil or gas. 
A precious defmition of an undesirable event is thus: "Failure of the safety shut-down 
system to shut in the oil and gas production when there is afire in area 1". 
The corresponding "success criterion" is: "The safety shut-down systems shuts in the 
oil and gas production plant when there is afire in area 1". 
In this work, the undesirable event for calculating critical safety unavailability values 
for the considered FPSO's safety systems will be: 
"The safety system fail to promote the shut-down of the oil or gas production in the 
proper branch of the FPSO's unit, when there is the occurrence of an accidental 
scenario or event in the area under its protection". 
In quantitative risk assessment studies the hazardous scenarios that are going to be 
modelled, are defmed by the frequency of occurrence of a hazardous condition 
(leakage, for example) times the critical safety unavailability of the safety shut-down 
systems times the probability of other attributes (see equation 4.3.2.1 provided in 
section 4.3.2). Therefore, the unavailability or availability values that appear in the 
event trees (figures A.l.I to A.1.32 - Appendix I) are always related to critical 
unavailability values (FTO). 
• ReUabiUty Block Dia&ram 
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In order to draw the reliability block diagrams; the different module types of the 
system have to be described. The description should specify (SINTEF-): 
• The voting logic of the module. For sensors, it is introduced a distinction between 
physical voting and logical voting. The physical voting logical is the actual 
hardware-configured voting logical, whereas the logical voting logic refers to the 
degree of redundancy at a specific "measure point". Thus, when the physical 
voting is carried out for a large number of sensors, being spread over a wide area, 
all these sensors should not be considered as redundant. In this case, the analyst 
must himself sPecify how many sensors are actually intended to detect a particular 
abnormal operating condition. This is the number to be used in the logical voting 
logic. 
Assume for example, that for fIre detectors there is a physical 2 out of 20 voting logic. 
Further, that the 20 sensors are located in such a way that only 3 sensors are close 
enough to give a signal sufficiently fast, in the occurrence of a fife. In this case a 
logical 2 out of 3 voting logic should be specified. Similarly, a lout of 20 physical 
voting would be reduced to a lout of 3 voting. 
In this work we are considering detection units, e.g., we assume that each detection 
unit will be the only one capable of detecting the hazardous condition in a certain 
point. Therefore, if that detection unit (which can present a 1001, 1002, 2003, 1003 
or 2002 voting logic) fails to operate upon a hazardous situation, it will be considered 
a critical failure. 
• Drawine the Oyerall Failure to Operate - no . Reliability Block Diaeram 
The next step is to draw the overall reliability block diagram based on the defInition of 
the undesirable event, which is to be analysed. 
A reliability block diagram is a logic diagram showing the combinations of module 
failures that may lead to specific system failures (in this case: fail to operate upon 
demand (FrO». The reliability block diagram is a "success path" diagram. This 
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means that if a path through the diagram exists (with no failed modules in the path), 
the system has not failed (ie .• it is able to perform its intended function). 
It is always important to be aware of which failure mode or undesirable event of the 
system you are analysing. (In the present section, the failure mode to be analysed is 
"fail to operate upon demand"). 
We are assuming that no critical failure will occur to power modules' failures, once 
their failures will not incur in any fail to operate of the system, considering that a fail-
safe design is used. 
Some points that should be considered during the drawing of the overall failure to 
operate - FrO - reliability block diagram are the following (SINTEP-): 
• Identify the reliability block diagram of the actuating modules by asking: 
(J "How many of the components/modules need to operate suitably in order to have 
the safety shut-down system functioning properly by the occurrence of an 
abnormal operating situation? " 
Reliability block diagrams for the various voting logic are given in Table 4.3.4.4.1. 
The reliability block diagrams for the most common voting logic are described below. 
• If there is a single component that must operate (must detect or must be 
shut) in order to have the safety shut-down system functioning properly, 
you have a 1001 votin~ lo~ic. Therefore, the corresponding reliability 
block diagram shall be drawn as a single box in the diagram (in series). 
• If there are two redundant components/modules, you have two possible 
voting logic. giving different reliability block diagrams for failure to 
operate - FrO - failures: 
129 
* 1002-votin~ 101:ic: the safety shut-down system fails to carry out a 
proper safety action only if both components/modules present failure to 
operate - FrO - failures. The corresponding reliability block diagram 
shall be drawn as two parallel boxes. 
* 2002-votinl: 101:ic: the safety shut-down system fails to carry out a 
proper safety action if any componentimodule presents failure to 
operate - FrO - failures. The corresponding reliability block diagram 
shall be drawn as two serial boxes. 
• The two most commonly used voting logic for triplicated modules have 
the following reliability block diagrams for failure to operate - FrO -
failures (SINTEF4I): 
* 1003-votinl: lo~ic: The safety shut-down system fails to carry out 
proper safety action if all three components/modules present failure to 
operate - FrO - failures. The corresponding reliability block diagram 
shall be drawn as three parallel boxes. 
* 2003-votinl: 101:ic: The safety shut-down system fails to carry out a 
proper safety action if at least two of the components/modules present 
failure to operate - FrO - failures. The corresponding reliability block 
diagram shall be drawn as three serial subsystems. each of the 
subsystems consisting of two modules in parallel. The frrst subsystem 
consists of module A and B, the next of module A and C, and the third 
of module B and C . 
• Modules of the same type should be drawn below each other, so that they form 
a column in the diagram. These columns of modules are in this work denoted as 
the module subsets of the system. The module subsets are visualised in the 
overall reliability block diagram of the example cases. 
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The overall and approximate detailed failure 10 .operate (PTO) block diagrams are 
provided on Table 4.3.4.4.1 and in Appendix 2. 
• Approximated Detailed Failure to Operate - FTO . Reliability Block 
Diagram for the Studied Cases 
The purpose of the detailed reliability block diagram is to model in detail the failure 
mechanisms of the system. When drawing the detailed reliability block diagram, the 
failure categories of the modules, and the operation and maintenance philosophy of 
the system have to be closely examined. 
The failure categories to be examined are (SINTEP'): 
• Fail to operate upon demand (PTO-failure) versus spurious operation failure 
(SO-failure); 
• Single versus multiple failure; 
• Undetectable versus detectable failure (by self-test). 
Special notation is used to take into account these types of failure, as presented in the 
list of symbols and notations of this Thesis. 
The detailed failure to operate - PTO - reliability block diagram is drawn, considering 
the module subsets. Note that each of the module subsets forms a cut set of the 
reliability block diagram, i.e., if none of the module in a subset functions, the system 
fails. 
Table 4.3.4.4.1 and Appendix 2 present the detailed failure to operate - PTO -
reliability block diagrams for different voting logic. They also gives the critical safety 
unavailability formulas for these reliability block diagrams. The reliability block 
diagrams given in table 4.3.4.4.1 are not exact, but when the limitations given in 
section 4.3.4.4.2.1 apply, it is sufficient to use these approximate reliability block 
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diagrams. Full detailed reliability block diagrams can be found in SINTEF- -
Appendix B. 
4.3.4.4.2. Quantitative evaluation (quantification of the ~ritical ~afety 
lInavailability (CSU) 
• Necessary Input Data 
For each module, the following input data are required for calculation of the critical 
safety unavailability (SINTEF-): 
F 
A 
10lal Total rate of FrO - failure for a module (for a module of medium 
complexity). 
C 
TIF 
Coverage, i.e., fraction of actual FrO - failure being detected by the 
built-in self-test. 
Factor for module complexity. 
Test-independent failure probability for FrO - failures. These are not 
detected by built-in self-test or manual functional testing. 
Probability that k modules (of a specific type) fail simultaneously in a 
redundant configuration. This is the multiplicity distribution. 
Test period for manual functional testing (varies typically from one to 
three months for different module types). 
The rate of undetectable FrO-failure is given by: 
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That expression represents the module failure rate that should be inserted into the 
formulas shown in table 4.3.4.4.1.1, during the application of the methodology 
(Chapter 5). 
Additional comments and defInitions related to the input parameters used in the 
formulas utilised for Module complexity factor applies only for the logic control 
modules, and is typically related to the coverage, C, of the built-in self-test reliability 
calculations are given below. 
Built-in self-tests are constructed to detect physical failures in the logic control 
modules and field cabling automatically. However, only a fraction of all failures 
occurring during operation will be detected by self-test (e.g., coverage), and thereby, 
prevented from causing systems failures. This fraction may be different for failures 
causing loss of safety and failures causing loss of production. 
Modules complexity factor. cill 
Module complexity factor applies only for the logic control modules, and it is 
typically related to the coverage, C, of the built-in self-test of the module. If built-in 
self-test is added to a "standard" module, the module failure rate will increase. In 
fact, due to increased complexity, it is not certain that a higher *coverage* actually 
gives a higher degree of protection against failures causing loss of safety. 
The module complexity factor is introduced to include also the negative aspects of 
built-in self-test, which is increased complexity. 
For modules of "medium" complexity (e.g. coverage of CPU module - 90%) the 
complexity factor equals Cm - 1.0. However, if the applied module is more complex 
(e.g. with a coverage factor, C - 99%), them the complexity factor should be greater 
than 1.0 (e.g. Cm - Lv). For very simple modules (C - 0), the complexity factor 
should be less than 1.0. 
Test-independent failure probability. TIF 
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Test-independent failure (TIF) probability is the constant probability that the safety 
system will fail to respond properly to a hazardous situation. The TIF probability 
represents the effect of all failures that are not eliminated by testing. Generally, 
design and engineering failures that have not been removed prior to system operation 
(inherent by the delivery of the module) will not be detected by testing. Actually TIF 
equals the value of CSU, immediately after a functional testing of the module has been 
performed. Examples of contributors to the TIF probability are: 
• Failure to operate - FTO - software-failures (CPU). 
• Failure to operate - FTO - failures caused by improper location of sensors (fIre 
and gas detectors). 
• Failure to operate - FTO - failures caused by lack of selectivity of a sensor (e.g. 
fIre detector not responding to "smoke fIre"). 
The multiplicity distribution. PI> 
The multiplicity distribution allows the reliability analyst to consider the effect of 
dependent failures on system reliability. 
Field experience shows that the effect of redundancy on system reliability is relatively. 
Hardware redundancy is very effective against natural ageing failures (inherent 
failures), but the technique is not very effective against failures due to excessive 
environmental stresses and human-induced failures during engineering and operation. 
These failures are denoted *dependent* failures, because they may affect two or more 
modules in a redundant configuration simultaneously (common cause failures). 
For a duplicated set of modules (A and B), there are actually three possibility by the 
occurrence of a failure (see figure 4.3.4.4.1): 
• Module A fails only. 
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• Module B fails only 
• Both module A and B fail (simultaneously). 
The probability PI· is the relative proportion of all failures where there is a single 
failure only (either A or B). Similarly P2 is the relative proportion of all failures where 
both A and B fail. The interpretation of Ph P2 and P3 for a triplicated system is quite 
analogous. 
A 
0.1 
B 
0.1 
N" of simultaneous failures 
Figure 4.3.4.4.1 - Multiplicity distribution for duplicated modules. 
Figure 4.3.4.4.1 shows example numbers for the multiplicity distribution of duplicated 
modules (SINTEF estimates). The distribution may be quite different for various 
module types. If, for instance, extra precautions are taken to prevent common cause 
failure, PI will be very close to 1 (e.g. greater than 0.99). 
Figure 4.3.4.4.1 also shows the relationship between the multiplicity distribution and 
the notation used in the reliability block diagrams. 
Modelling of diverse redundancy of double modules is done by specifying a new 
multiplicity distribution for the two modules, PkAB • This distribution replaces the pk, s 
in all critical safety unavailability formulas (see table 4.3.4.4.1.1), 
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Input I Output Cards (I I 0 cards) 
For I I 0 cards, the following information is required: 
• Rate of FrO - failures affecting all channels (i.e., the common part of the I 10 
card, A,F common 
• Rate of FrO - failures affecting one channels only, A,F one~hDnnel 
• Number of relevant channels (#Channels used). This number of channels is 
related to the given success criterion. Very often a single channel only is 
relevant for an input card. However, for output the number is often higher (if 
several valves are to be shut in, and are all connected to the same output card). 
From this information, AFtotaI is obtained from the formula: 
A,F,olal - A,Fcommon + {(#channels used) . A,F one channel } 
• Calculation 
Calculation of the CSU is done on the basis of the approximate detailed failure to 
operate (FrO) reliability block diagram, using the formulas given earlier in table 
4.3.4.4.1.1 and in Appendix 2. 
The calculation is done in steps, by calculating the critical safety unavailability for one 
module subset of the approximate detailed failure to operate (FrO) reliability block 
diagram at the time. For each module subset, the corresponding module (voting logic) 
in Table 4.3.4.4.1.1 is identified, and the given formula is used. The final calculation 
of the system critical safety unavailability is simply done by adding the critical safety 
unavailability values of the modules. 
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Voting logic Reability block diagram 
Fail-To-Operate on demand Spurious Operation 
J0"'~ {~}{~l0@ 
- LEJ .. ·§-J -
--000· .. · .. J 
N t--+-- L ..... 0E}E} 
Table 4.3.4.4.1 - Reliability Block Diagrams for Different Voting Logic 
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Voting logic Overall FrO reliability block diagram 
..s0 ... ~ 
- lEl···@J -
Aproximate detailed FTO 
reliability block diagram 
FTO 
-G-
FTO 
-G-
fJQ,~ 
~
~7.~ ~O FTO S 
FTO 
-§Sl-
FTO FTO 
.f ASSJ·· rMNO} 
Aproximate critical 
safety unavailability 
CSU 
3p, (F f ) 
2 3 lA. -;;+TlF +A p,+p,+p, L 
+ :p, 3 (AF -2f + TIF) 
P, + -A + P, 
Table 4.3.4.4.1.1 - Overall and Approximate Detailed FTO Reliability Block 
Diagrams and Formulas for Different Voting Logic 
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The adding of the critical safety unavailability values for the module subsets is a flrst 
order approximation, valid for low probabilities. Details can be found in SINTEF- and 
in references III and 121. 
4.3.4.5. Loss or Production Calculation 
Failures of safety shut-down systems modules may cause spurious shut down the 
production. This event is denoted spurious trip event in this work. When quantifying 
loss of production, we are looking at the rate of such events, the spurious trip rate 
(STR)' 
Calculating the spurious trip rate (STR) is carried out in a two step procedure, and 
should be performed in parallel with the calculation of the critical safety unavailability: 
• Qualitative evaluation 
(a) Defme the spurious trip event and the corresponding success criterion; 
(b) Describe the module types the system consists of; 
(c) Draw the overall spurious operation - SO - reliability block diagram. In this step 
you do not need to consider the effect of dependent failures or self-test 
mechanisms; 
(d) Draw the approximate detailed spurious operation - SO - reliability block diagram. 
In this step you should consider the effect of dependent failures and the effect of 
self-test mechanisms. 
• Quantitative eyaluation (quantification or the spurious trip rate· STR) 
(a) Establish the necessary input data; 
(b) Calculate the spurious trip rate (STR) based on the approximate detailed spurious 
operation - SO - reliability block diagram. 
4.3.4.5.1. Qualitative evaluation 
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• Definition of the Spurious Trip Event and the Success Criterion 
When calculating the loss of production, the very ftrst step is to defme the spurious 
trip event, which is to be analysed, in such a way that it is possible to obtain a clear 
and unambiguous defmition. If it is not done, the analysis will often be of limited 
value. The defmition should always include: 
• The undesired action of the safety shut-down systems modules upon spurious 
operation 
The defmition of the spurious trip event that is going to be considered for any safety 
shut-down system in this work is thus: 
"The oil and gas production is shut-in unintentionally due to a failure of any 
component or module of the safety shut-down system". 
In our case, that failure could derive from the sensor, from the input! output devices, 
from the CPU or from the valves. 
The corresponding "success criterion" is: "No oil and gas production is shut-in 
unintentionally due to a failure of any component or module of the safety shut-down 
system". 
• ReliabiHtv Block Diagram 
For the purpose of drawing the reliability block diagrams, different module types have 
to be described. The description should specify the following: 
• The voting logic of the module; 
• Whether the module has built-in self-tests for automatic detection of failures; 
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• The action upon loss of power, i.e., whether the module will give a spurious 
operation - SO or a failure to operate - FrO - failure upon loss of power. 
• Drawing the Overall Spurious Operation (SO) Reliability Block Diagram 
The next step is to draw the overall reliability block diagram based on the defmition of 
the spurious trip event. 
A reliability block diagram is a logic diagram showing the combinations of module 
failures that may lead to a specific system failure (here, the spurious activation). The 
reliability block diagram is a "success path" diagram. This means that if a path 
through the diagram exists (no failed modules exists in the path), the system as such 
has not failed (i.e., it is able to perform its intended function). 
When drawing the overall spurious operation - SO - reliability block diagram, some 
points should be considered as described below: 
• Identify the voting logic of the actuating components/modules by asking: 
"How many of the modules need to function properly in order to cause safety 
shut-down system to shut down the production by the occurrence of an 
abnormal operating condition?" 
The reliability block diagram for the various voting logics are given in table 4.3.4.4.1. 
The most common voting logics are further discussed below. 
• If there is only one component I module to shut in the production, you have a 
1001 voting logic. The corresponding reliability block diagram shall be drawn 
as a single box in the diagram (in series). 
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• If there are two redundant components I modules, you have two possible 
voting logics, giving different reliability block diagrams for spurious operation 
- SO - failures: 
)0> lOO2-votinl: 101:ic: The safety shut-down systems will carry out safety 
actions unintentionally if any component I module experiences spurious 
operation - SO-failures. The corresponding reliability block diagram is 
drawn as two serial boxes. 
)0> 2002-votinl: lo~ic: The safety shut-down systems will carry out safety 
actions unintentionally if both components I modules experiences a spurious 
operation - SO - failure. The corresponding reliability block diagram is 
drawn as two parallel boxes. 
• The two most commonly used voting logics for triplicated modules present the 
following reliability block diagrams for spurious operation - SO-failure: 
)0> lOO3-voting logic: The safety shut-down systems will carry out safety 
actions unintentionally if any component I module experiences a spurious 
operation - SO - failure. The corresponding reliability block diagram is 
drawn as three serial boxes. 
)0> 2003-voting logic: The safety shut-down systems will carry out safety 
actions unintentionally if at least two of the components I modules 
experience a spurious operation - SO - failure. The corresponding reliability 
block diagram is drawn as three serial sub-systems, each of the sub-systems 
consisting of two modules in parallel. The frrst sub-system consists of 
module A and B, the next of module A and C, and the third of module B 
andC. 
• Modules of the same type should be drawn after (or above) each other, so that 
they form a subset in the diagram. These subsets are in this work denoted as 
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module subsets of the system. The partitioning into subsets is done because when 
the detailed spurious operation - SO - reliability block diagram is to be drawn, 
dependent failures between components / modules of the same type are to be 
considered. 
• A separate block diagram for power modules should be drawn in series with the 
overall spurious operation - SO - reliability block diagram of the other modules 
(this is an approximation valid under the limitations given before). However, this 
is done only if at least one of the control logic modules gives spurious operation -
SO - failure upon loss of power; (if this is not the case, there will be no 
contribution from power module failures to STR). In this work, we are not 
considering the contribution of power module failures to the spurious trip rate. 
The overall and the approximate reliability block diagrams are provided in Table 
4.3.4.5.1.1 and in Appendix 2. 
4.3.4.5.2. Quantitative evaluation (quantification of the spurious trip rate -
STR) 
• Necessary Input Data 
For each module, the following input data are required for calculation of the spurious 
trip rate (STR): 
C 
Total rate of SO-failures for a module (for a module of medium 
complexity) . 
Coverage, i.e. fraction of actual SO-failures being detected by 
the built-in self-test. 
Factor for module complexity. 
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Probability that uk" modules (of a specific type) fail simultaneously 
in a redundant configuration. 
distribution. 
The rate of undetectable SO-failures is given by: 
This is the multiplicity 
This is the module failure rate that should be inserted into the formulas provided in 
table 4.3.4.5.1.1 and in Appendix 2. 
Coveraae of built-in self-test. C 
Built-in self-tests are constructed to detect physical failures in the logic control 
modules and field cabling automatically. However, only a fraction of all failures 
occurring during operation will be detected by self-test (i.e. coverage), and thereby 
prevented from causing system failures. This fraction may be different for failures 
causing loss of safety and failures causing loss of production. 
Tests on input channels without a validity test will only detect failures causing loss of 
safety. A validity test is a self-test run either continuously or immediately after a shut-
down command is detected. Failures causing loss of production will not give any pre-
warning that can be detected using periodic testing only. With an additional validity 
test, after the detection of a shutdown command, it is possible to mask out module 
failures causing loss of production. 
A non-redundant output configuration can only detect module failures causing loss of 
production, but not prevent them form giving a system trip. The coverage for the 
failures causing loss of production is therefore negligible. Adding redundant hardware 
and employing a 2002 voting configuration makes it possible to detect and mask these 
types of failures. 
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It should be stressed that self-tests do not reveal design weaknesses or software 
failures. In particular, software failures are relevant for the logic control modules. 
Module complexity factor. cm 
Module complexity factor applies only for the logic control modules, and it is typically 
related to the coverage, C, of the built-in self-test of the module. If a built-in self-test 
is added to a "standard" module, the module failure rate will increase. 
In fact, due to increased complexity, it is not certain that a higher *coverage* actually 
gives a higher degree of protection against failures causing loss of production. 
The module complexity factor is introduced to include the negative aspects of built-in 
self-test, which has an increased complexity. 
For modules of "medium" complexity (e.g. coverage of CPU module - 90%) ·the 
complexity factor equals Cm - 1.0. However, if the applied module is more complex 
(e.g. with a coverage factor, C - 99%), then the complexity factor should be greater 
than 1.0 (e.g. Cm - l.v). For very simple module (C - 0), the complexity factor should 
be less than 1.0. 
The multiplicity distribution allows the reliability analyst to consider the effect of 
dependent failures on system reliability. 
Field experience shows that the effect of redundancy on system reliability is relatively 
moderate. Hardware redundancy is very effective against natural ageing failures 
(inherent failures), but the technique is not very effective against failures due to 
excessive environmental stressed and human-induced failures during engineering and 
operation. These failures are denoted *dependent * failures, because they may affect 
two or more modules in a redundant configuration simultaneously (common cause 
failures). 
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For a duplicated set of modules (A and B), there are actually three possibilities by the 
occurrence of a failure (see figure 4.3.4.4.1): 
• Module A fails only. 
• Module B fails only. 
• Both module A and B fail (simultaneously) 
The probability PI is the relative proportion of all failures where there is a single 
failure only (either A or B). Similarly P2 is the relative proportion of all failures where 
both A and B fail. The interpretation of PI, P2 and P3 for a triplicated system is quite 
analogous. 
Figure 4.3.4.4.1 shows example numbers for the multiplicity distribution of duplicated 
modules (SINTEF- estimates). The distribution may be quite different for various 
module types. If, for instance, extra precautions are taken to prevent common cause 
failures, PI will be very close to 1 (e.g. greater than 0.99). 
Figure 4.3.4.4.1 also shows the relationship between the multiplicity distribution and 
the notation used in the reliability block diagrams. 
Modelling of diverse redundancy of double modules is done by specifying a new 
multiplicity distribution for the two modules, Pk AD. This distribution replaces the pk. s 
in all STR formulas (see table 4.3.4.5.1.1). 
Input I Output cards- I I 0 cards 
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Por Input / Output cards - I / 0 cards, the following information is required 
(SINTEP-): 
• Rate of SO-failures affecting all channels (i.e., the common part of the I / 0 
card), A S common; 
• Rate of SO-failures affecting one channel only, A S one channel; 
• Number of relevant channels (#Channels used). This number of channels is 
related to the given success criterion. Very often a single channel only is 
relevant for an input card. However, for output cards the number is often 
higher (if several valves are to be shut in, and are all connected to the same 
output card). 
Prom this information, A S lolal is obtained from the formula: 
~s = 1 S +(#channe!sused * 1 S ha ,) /ltroraI /Leommon ~ /Lonee nne 
• Calculation 
Calculation of the spurious trip rate (STR) is done on the basis of the approximate 
detailed spurious operation - SO - reliability block diagram, using the formulas given 
in table 4.3.4.5.1.1. 
The calculation should be done in steps, by calculating the spurious trip rate (STR) 
for one module subset of the approximate detailed spurious operation - SO -
reliability block diagram at the time. Por each module subset the corresponding 
module (voting logic) in table 4.3.4.5.1.1 is identified, and the given formula is used. 
The [mal calculation of the system's spurious trip rate (STR) is simply done by adding 
the spurious trip rates for the components / modules. 
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4.3.5. Cost Functions 
4.3.5.1. General 
The purpose of this Thesis is to present a model for allocating safety criteria, or in 
other words, for identifying the "best" way to improve the reliability or availability of 
safety systems to satisfy the established safety criteria. Therefore, the accountability of 
all the costs incurred due to the unavailability of these systems is very important, once 
it will add other elements that should be considered in order to obtain a whole picture 
of the cost-effectiveness of the improvement to be proposed. 
The elements that constitute the cost functions considered in this work are described 
below. The concept of life cycle cost usually utilised in reliability analysis were 
expanded in this work, in other to include, besides the cost of investment and spurious 
actuation, other elements such as loss to lives, assets and oil and gas production. 
4.3.5.2. Presentation of Life Cycle Cost Model 
Life Cycle Cost is usually modelled as following: 
Where, 
Lee = LeA + LSC + LSO 
Lce = Life Cycle Cost 
LeA = Life Acquisition Cost 
LSC = Life Support Cost 
(4.3.5.1) 
LSO = Loss due to Spurious Operation 
The Life Support Cost (LCC) is composed by two terms: the frrst parcel (eYR) is 
related to investments in resources for operation and maintenance of the equipment or 
system; the second parcel (CYC) is related to the yearly cost of operation and 
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maintenance of those equipment or systems. Hence the total Life Cycle Cost can be 
written as (SINTEP"): 
LCC = LCA + CIR + CYC + LSO (4.3.5.2) 
Where, the terms LCA and CIR are the costs of (primary) investments of the system 
or equipment. 
Three parcels compose the LCA term: the equipment cost (CIE), the 
installation/commissioning cost (CIIC) and the management cost (CIM). 
In this work we are going to expand the concept usually used for life cycle cost in 
order to take into account the benefits achieved due to the installation of the safety 
systems at the unit. Therefore, the life cycle cost will be expressed by the following 
equation: 
LCC = LCA + CIR + CYC + LSO + A REL+ ALL (4.3.5.3) 
Where: 
Li REL = represents the benefit obtained in terms of the oil and gas production saved 
and damage to the asset avoided due to the installation of safety systems at the 
facility. 
Li LL = represents the benefit obtained in terms of averted fatalities due to the 
installation of safety systems at the facility. 
All those terms are going to be described in detail below. 
4.3.5.2.1. Primary Investments Calculation 
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We are considering that the primary investments are composed by seven elements, as 
expressed bellow: 
Total Primary Investment = ClE+ ClM + CIlC+ClR (4.3.5.4) 
or as: 
Total Primary Investment = ClEH +ClEA+ClMV +ClMC+CIIC 
Where: + ClRS +ClRT (4.3.5.5) 
ClE = Equipment cost 
ClEH = Component cost (hardware) 
ClEA = Cost of necessary additional equipment 
ClM = Management cost 
ClMV = Vendor management and engineering cost 
ClMC = Contractor management and engineering cost 
CIlC = Installation/commissioning cost 
ClR = Cost of investments in resources for operation and maintenance 
ClRS = Cost of initial spare part stock 
ClRT = Training cost 
In order to easy cost calculations, the safety shut-down systems were divided into the 
following parts: 
Detection system: Composed by detectors (fIre or gas and input devices to CPU or 
by pressure sensors more the input device to CPU; fIeld cabling, including junction 
boxes and cubicles. 
CPU: Composed by CPU 
Actuation system: Composed by blockage valves and output devices from CPU. 
DefInitions of each one of the cost components are described below. 
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Component Cost (CIEU) 
The component cost includes the direct component cost (detector, sensor, CPU, 
valve, etc.) 
Cost of Necessan Additional Equipment (CIEA) 
SINTEP' considers that for logic units the "footprint cost" should be included here. 
That means that lhe indirect cost for the Oil Company of the floor area occupied by 
the equipment should be considered. In this case the relevant equipment to be 
considered would be the cabinet for CPUs. In this work we have included the cabinet 
cost and all other costs related to CPUs in the component cost (CIEH). 
Regarding others components like detectors, sensor, valves, the necessary additional 
equipment would be related to holders, field cabling, junction boxes and cubicles. In 
this work. the cost of holders were included in the component cost and the cost 
related to field cabling, etc. were included in the commissioning part of the investment 
cost (CIIC) which tales into account the installation and testing costs. 
vendor Management and Engineering Cost (CIMV) 
Two parts compose this cost element. The first one comprises the management and 
engineering done by the field equipment (detectors, sensors, valves) vendor and the 
second one comprises the management and engineering done by the vendor of logic 
units. For both parts, this includes the following: 
• Cost of management and engineering done by the vendor, including 
documentation; 
• Cost of the application software (non-standard software); 
• Cost of internal vendor acceptance tests and factory tests. 
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In this work as SINTEF49 has adopted, the vendor management and engineering cost 
was taking into account as following: 
For field equipment (detectors, pressure sensors, valves): 
CIMV =O.25*CIEflfieldeq (4.3.5.6) 
For logic control units (CPU, input and output devices): 
CIMV = 0.4 CIEH (4.3.5.7) 
InstaUationlCommissioning Cost (CIIC) 
This cost element considers all initial costs for installing and putting the equipment or 
system into operation. This includes the following: 
Installation/mechanical completion: 
• cabling 
• termination 
• hook-up 
• certification 
• etc. 
Commissioning: 
• loop-test 
• start-up 
• etc. 
Oil Company/Contractor Management and Engineering Cost (CIMC) 
This includes the cost of management ad engineering done by the Oil Company or 
contractor, including documentation. In this work this parcel is taken into account as 
following: 
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CIMC = 0.25 * (CIEH + CIMV + CIIC) (4.3.5.8) 
Cost of Initial Spare Part Stock (CIRS) 
This cost element comprises the initial investments in spares. It is assumed that the 
number of initial spare parts should be v% of the total number of components of that 
type, rounded up to the nearest integer. 
Trainine Cost (CIIT) 
This cost element comprises the cost of initial training of maintenance and operation 
personnel. Training costs were assumed to be equal for the detection system, for CPU 
and for the actuation system. 
All those terms are going to be described in detail below. 
4.3.5.2.2. Calculation of Cost for Operation and Maintenance (CY C) 
There are two elements included in the parcel concerning the yearly cost of operation 
and maintenance, as following: 
• periodic testing; 
• corrective maintenance 
4.3.5.2.2.1. Periodic Test Model 
The periodic testing costs per year for each component type are obtained as 
following: 
Test costs per year = (number of components) * (test frequency) * 
(average man-hours per test) *(cost per man-hour) (4.3.5.9) 
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Where: 
Testfrequency = (12 monthslyear) / (test period in months) (4.3.5.lO) 
4.3.5.2.2.2. Corrective Maintenance Model 
The total cost per repair will be expressed by: 
Total cost per repair = (man-hours per repair) * (cost per man-hour) 
+ (other costs per repair) (4.3.5.11) 
The last term in the expression above includes spare parts, tool consumption, etc. 
Repair costs per year = (number of components) * (failures per component per year) 
* (total cost per repair) (4.3.5.12) 
For corrective maintenance, the total rate of physical failures is used in the 
calculations. This value is equal to the sum of failures rates for failure to operate 
mode (FrO) and for spurious operation mode (SO). Sometimes for logic control 
units, different failure rates are used for different configurations, reflecting differing 
complexity between components. 
4.3.5.2.3. Unavailability Cost Calculation 
4.3.5.2.3.1. Overall Model 
In order to evaluate life unavailability cost it is necessary to take into account the 
yearly costs imposed due to the critical unavailability of safety systems, as well as the 
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yearly costs incurred due to the spurious actuation of safety systems (unintended 
production shut-downs). 
The critical unavailability of a safety system is the unavailability derived due to a 
failure to operate in case of the occurrence of an accidental event, leading to 
consequences in terms of fatalities, damage to assets and loss of income (due to 
deferred production). Therefore, we will express the fIrst parcel of the total life 
unavailability cost, e.g., the cost associated with the critical unavailability (LUe) as 
following: 
LUC .v.ar = LLy~ar + RELy~ar (4.3.5.13) 
Where: 
LL"II, = Expected Loss of Lives per year 
REL"II, = Expected Residual Loss per year 
• Expected Loss of Lives 
The parcel concerning the Expected Loss of Lives per year (LLyear) is given by the 
following expression: 
LLyear = Number offafalifies per year * value of life * 
Critical Safety Unavailability (4.3.15) 
Then the benefIt (..1 LLi ) obtained due to the installation of the safety systems is 
calculated in terms of deaths averted. The value of ..1 LLi will be obtained by the 
difference between the cost associated with loss of lives in case there is no safety 
system installed (e.g., when the safety critical unavailability is equal to 100%), and the 
cost associated with loss of lives related to a certain safety system confIguration (a 
156 
certain safety system's reliability level). The Li Ui value can be obtained by the 
following expression: 
ALLi = [NUmber of fatalities i=o*Valueof life*CSU i=O - ] 
Number of fatalities i= l,s*Valueof life*CSU i= I,S 
Where: 
CSU = critical safety unavailability, and 
(4.3.5.15) 
CSU; = 0 = I, critical safety unavailability value associated with no safety system 
installed 
• Expected Residual Loss per year 
The Expected Residual Loss per year (REL) is given by the following expression: 
I RELyear = fevent * Cevent * CSU (4.3.5.16) 
Where: 
RELyear = Expected Residual Loss per year after the occurrence of an accidental 
event 
levent = Event frequency of an accidental event 
Cevent = Expected Consequence of an accidental event 
CSV = Critical Safety Unavailability 
The term -Expected Residual Loss per year- includes the loss to assets plus the loss of 
net income per year after the occurrence of an accidental event due to the critical 
unavailability of safety systems. 
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Then the benefit (LiREL) obtained due to the installation of the safety systems is 
calculated, in terms of avoided loss. The value of LiRELi can be obtained, by the 
difference between the economic loss when there is no safety system installed (e.g., 
when the safety critical unavailability is equal to 100%), and the economic loss 
associated to a certain safety system configuration (a certain safety system's reliability 
level). The A RELi value can be obtained by the following expression: 
t1.RELi,i=I,S= fevent* Cevent * (CSU CaseO-CSU Casei,;= 1,5) (4.3.5.17) 
4.3.5.2.3.2. Loss to Assets and Loss of Income due to Total Loss or Severe 
Damage 
• Loss of Assets 
The calculation of the loss to assets can be performed, considering events that cause 
total loss or a severe damage to the unit. Therefore, it is necessary to get information 
about the number of occurrences related to accidental events that have caused total 
loss or severe damage to similar facilities. 
According to WOAD", it is possible to get the following figures for all units world 
wide, during the period of 1980 to 1993: 
Number of occurrence of frres that cause total damage to the unit: 2 
Number of occurrence of fires that cause severe damage to the structure: 3 
Based on the numbers presented above and after estimating values for the total loss of 
the industrial facility or for a severe damage (which can be considered as vO % of the 
value estimated for total loss), its is possible to obtain an average value estimated for 
loss of the asset. 
158 
It is important to consider the insurance made for the installation, the cost of this 
insurance and if it would cover a total loss of the unit, in case of the occurrence of a 
major accident. 
• Loss or income due to the occurrence or a dangerous situation 
Considering that after the occurrence of an accidental event the unit will be out of 
operation during a certain period of time, it is necessary to calculate the associated 
loss of income. In the case of oil production facilities the loss of income is expressed 
in terms of deferred production (oil plus gas). 
We will considered that the occurrence of a major accident in the vessel will delay the 
enterprise as a whole for a period of time equal to n months (Pereira"). 
The delay of n months of the enterprise as a whole will imply in a displacement of n 
months of all the enterprise's cash flows simultaneously. Therefore, the income loss 
calculation (in Net Present Value - NPV) will be simply the discount of the original 
NPV (NPVo - without delay or delay equal to zero) by the discount factor (1 + r)"l12, 
where r is the annual discount rate and n is equal to number of months of delay of the 
enterprise as a whole. 
Therefore, the income loss due to n months of delay (ANPV) will be given by the 
following expression (Pereira55): 
8NPV=NPVO(1 
Where: 
(4.3.5.18) 
ANPV = NPV loss due to n months of delay of the enterprise as a whole 
NPVo = original NPV of the enterprise with no delay 
( 1 + r )nl12 = discount factor 
n = number of months of delay 
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4.3.5.2.3.3. Expected Loss per year due to Spurious Actuation 
The expected loss per year due to spurious operation or unintended production shut-
down (LSOyear ) will be given by the following expression: 
I LSD,.", = I,pur * Cost,pur 
Where: 
Ispur = Frequency of spurious failures 
Costspu = Cost of spurious failures 
(4.3.5.19) 
The cost of spurious actuation is calculated in terms of loss of production (oil loss 
plus gas loss), as described below. In fact, we would have an income loss due to 
postponed production during the production shut-down time, which could be 
calculated. As this period of time is very short (equal to vO min- estimation based on 
PETROBRAs offshore experience), it is possible to simplify this calculation and just 
consider this parcel as loss of production during this period of time. This is the period 
of time estimated as the required returning time to normal production after an 
unintended production shutdown. Therefore, we will have the following expressions: 
Oil loss due to spurious actuation (pounds) = oil production (barrels/day) * oil 
price (pounds /barrel) * fraction of time to return to normal production (4.3.5.20) 
Gas loss due to spurious actuation (pounds) = gas production (m3/day) * gas price 
(pounds/day) * fraction of time to return to normal production + gas loss due to the 
bum of gas (pounds) 
(4.3.5.21) 
Where: 
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Gas loss due to the burn of gas (pounds) = gas production (m3/day) * gas price 
(pounds/day) * fraction of time for plant blow-dow (4.3.5.22) 
4.3.6. Optimisation Model 
The optimisation model that will be used to solve the problem proposed by the 
allocation model is the Solver - Microsoft Office 97, an user-friendly code that is 
applied to linear and non linear problems. 
Solver is used to solve typical optimisation problems. where it is necessary to 
maximise or minimise a certain function with several variables, submitting that 
function to some constraints. 
The values that will be addressed to the safety systems' availability variables will be 
the ones established by ISA·4 for Safety Integrity Levels, which deftnition and values 
are given below: 
Safety availability deftnition (lSA·4): "Fraction of time that a safety system is able to 
perform its designated safety service when the process is operating. " 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL): "One of three possible discrete integrity levels (SIL }, 
SIL 2, SIL 3) of Safety Instrumented Systems. SILs are defined in terms of 
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD)." 
Table 4.3.6 shows the three Safety Integrity Levels - SILs - proposed by ISA\'4 : 
At present designed engineers are trying to achieve SIL 4 for safety instrumented 
systems, which corresponds to a probability of success on demand greater than 
0.9999. 
The constraints will be dermed as a function of safety system's 
availability/unavailability and in terms of maximum tolerable individual risk and 
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maximum tolerable frequency of impairment to main safety functions of the facility 
under analysis. 
Safety Integrity Level Probability of Failure on Probability of Success on 
(SIL) Demand Demand 
1 10- 1 to 10-": 0.9 to 0.99 
2 10-" to 10--' 0.99 to 0.999 
3 10--' to 10-" 0.999 to 0.9999 
Table 4.3.6 - Safety IntegrIty Levels proposed by ISA , .. 
The use of Solver will be presented in Chapter 5 of this Thesis, in the application of 
the proposed methodology for the allocation of risk and reliability. 
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s. Methodology Application 
S.l.General 
The proposed model was developed for a Floating Production Storage Offloadirrg 
vessel (FPSO), which is a ship that is capable of receiving the production, processing 
the production through a process plant, and of storing oil in its tanks until the 
offloading occurs. The detailed description of the FPSO used in this work is presented 
below. Figures 5.1.1, 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 illustrate the FPSO's layout and the turret 
system. 
The methodology presented here has to be based on a complete quantitative risk 
assessment previously performed for the facility under analysis. In our case, the 
quantitative risk assessment performed for one of the PETROBRAs FPSO's was 
utilised as the basis for the methodology's application (Principia! Petrobras4l•U ). 
5.2. Floating Production Storage Omoading (FPSO) Description 
5.2.1. Introduction 
The availability of very large crude carrier (VLCC) tankers with their low cost of 
conversion, associated with the availability of turret and swivel technology were the 
main reasons to PETROBRAS decision to install FPSO's vessels since 1997. The 
arrangement option made for the sub-sea pipelines oil exportation was a tandem ship-
to-ship system. 
Area of application 
In Campos Basin, PETROBRAS has been developing fields like Barracuda, Albacora, 
Marlim and South Marlim. 
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Figure 5.1.1 - I1ustration of FPSO and its turret system 
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ELEVATION 
I I lustrotion of FPSO's turret system 
Formerly, the successful concept adopted by PETROBRAs was the use of floating 
production systems with the semi-submersible conversion and/or construction of new 
production units. 
During the development of preliminary feasibility studies (until 1993) for the oil field 
mentioned above, world situation has changed a lot and PETROBRAS has decided to 
adopt FPSOs in Barracuda, Marlim and Albacora fields due the following reasons: 
-Availability of existing tankers (VLCC) in the Company's Fleet. 
-High cost of existing semi-submersible units for conversion or new construction. 
-Less initial investments for tankers conversion. 
-More flexibility for production transportation 
-Less initial costs in comparison with pipelines and with on shore facilities. 
Besides the exposed reasons, the FPSO's concept with their several alternatives of 
mooring has been extensively used worldwide, as in North Sea, West Africa, 
Indonesia, South America, etc. . 
5.2.2. Main Features of FPSOs 
The main features of the FPSO under study will be presented below. The main 
characteristics of its systems, as well as the safety design and supervisory and control 
philosophy are going to be briefly described. 
5.2.2.1. Safety Philosophy 
The description of the main aspects concerning the safety philosophy adopted by 
PETROBRAs for FPSO's and which are directly related to the Thesis approach are 
presented below. Details can be obtained in PETROBRAs safety philosophy's 
technical specificationS6, as mentioned in the Thesis's references. 
Lifeboats 
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At FPSO's, lifeboats shall be installed in a number large enough for the abandonment 
of 100% of the population at each side of the Unit. 
Lifeboats shall be installed as close as possible to sea level, preferably perpendicular 
to the deck and at the same level, so that there will not be a two way flow of people 
on the stairs during abandonment preparation. They shall be placed away and 
protected from the dangerous areas in positions such as to facilitate their removal 
from the platform preventing prev~g sea currents or wind from driving them 
against the legs of the platform. 
Inftatable rafts 
Inflatable rafts shall be specified so as to withstand a fall from the height of the 
facility or provision should be made for a device to lower them. 
In the case of the FPSO's, there shall be installed on each side of the installation 
rafts in a number sufficient for the abandonment of 100% of the population (number 
of bunks on the living quarters). 
Rescue boats 
The Unit shall be outfitted with a rescue boat located close to sea level to facilitate 
operations of lowering and raising equipment and capable of carrying at least five 
seated persons and a person lying down according to SOLAS requirements. 
Muster stations 
There shall exist locations on the Unit, outside the processing area, that provide 
safety for the purposes of isolation in emergency situations and bring together the 
personnel not involved in the respective control operations for the transmission of 
specific instructions for evacuation or abandonment. 
Active and Passive Fire Protection Systems 
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Fixed Protection Systems 
• General 
The location of the fIre fIghting resources and appliances, such as fIre water main, 
deluge valves, hydrants, fIre extinguishers, fIre-fIghting equipment lockers etc, shall 
take into consideration a qualitative/quantitative analysis of risks (fIre, explosion 
.. 
falling load etc.) that may affect the operation of such resources. This analysis shall 
also evaluate the possibility of propagation of fIre and its consequences considering 
each risk scenario. 
The philosophy of protection operations in cases of fIre demands, depending on the 
circumstances, shall action to: 
- Alert the population of the Unit to any emergency conditions; 
- Actuate the emergency shutdown system to shut down the wells and block the 
processing and utilities systems; 
- Exhaust the entire stock of gas in a controlled manner at a safe point away from 
the Unit; 
- Activate the water spray system in the area affected and lor adjacent areas in 
order to laminate the possibility of fIre propagation; 
- Rood the affected area with C02 in order to extinguish the fIre.; 
- Etc. 
Equipment containing, handling and/or storing flammable fluids (well area, process 
area, riser's connection area, turret area etc.), even when located in utilities areas, 
shall be protected by water spraying devices. The water mist should be applied to 
cool the surfaces of the equipment, thus avoiding them getting heating up to a point 
of collapse. 
Diesel oil storage tanks, including day tanks, shall be protected by water spray, 
except those tanks located inside rooms protected by CO2, those inside pontoons of 
Semi-submersible Platforms and those in the engine rooms of the FPSO's. 
166 
Low risk areas, such as living quarters, workshops, storage facilities etc. shall be 
protected by manual fIre-fIghting systems. 
Portable fife extinguishers and hydrants shall also be adequately located as described 
in this chapter. 
For FPSO's there shall be provided fo~ systems to protect the tanks storing crude 
oil according to classifying authorities and SOLAS requirements. Additional foam 
applicators shall be required if there is production equipment above the oil storage 
area and if the steel supporting members of the process plant can obstruct the foam 
system for the cargo deck. 
For the FPSO's provided with "Turret", arrangements shall be made for a specific 
"Swivel" for water ducts to fight fife, protecting the equipment installed inside. 
The helideck shall be provided with fife-fIghting equipment for helicopter fuel 
leakage fife. 
Passive Protection 
Classified bulkheads and decks shall enclose high risk areas isolating them from 
normally serviced areas, as well as from low risk areas, as defmed in IMO. 
Vertical access connecting only two decks inside accommodations shall be protected 
in at least one of the decks by self-closing A class doors in order to avoid fife 
spreading from one deck to the other one. When vertical accesses connect more than 
two decks, they shall be enclosured by A class walls and protected by self-closing A 
class doors at all decks. 
Bulkheads separating corridors from sleeping rooms inside accommodations shall be 
at leas B-15 class, extending from the floor to ceiling if the lining is not also 
classified as B-15 class. 
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Penetration 
Wherever it is necessary to penetrate a classified bulkhead and deck with piping 
ducts, trays or cables, proper measures shall be taken to ensure the integrity, 
according to classification, at the penetration point. For that purpose, fIreproof 
sealing materials properly classified shall be used to seal the penetration, and thus 
avoiding fire spreading. 
Doors and Windows 
Doors and windows shall be constructed following the integrity requirements of the 
type of the bulkheads in which they are located. The fIre doors shall be of the self-
closing type. 
Windows shall not be installed in Class A-60 bulkheads. 
Structural Protection 
Requirements for application of passive protection on structural supports shall be 
defmed based on studies considering the fIre propagation analysis as required at this 
item and according to General Criteria for Petrobras Structure Installation Design. 
Fire and Gas Detection Systems 
These systems aim to detect the occurrence of fife and accumulation of flammable or 
toxic gases and vapours in dangerous concentrations. They warn the people the unit 
of the presence of risk conditions allowing for control actions to minimise the 
probability of increasing undesired effects. 
Fire Detection System 
General Remarks 
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The activated fIre sensors (except those of fIxed temperature type with fusible plug) 
shall be ready for reuse without replacement of any of their components after they 
have been operated. 
There shall be in all Units areas hand-operated fIre alarm of the "Break Glass and 
Push Button" type painted in the safety red colour. These push buttons shall sound a 
warning (indicating a confIrmed outbreak of fIre) in the control room and all over 
'. 
the Unit, except as described below: 
- The hand-operated fIre alarms in the living quarters shall only sound a warning in 
all the installation after two minutes without being acknowledged in the central 
control room. 
Smoke and heat sensors shall be of the addressable type allowing for identillcation at 
the ECOS of the place where the detection may occur. 
Selection of Sensors 
In the processing and storing of flammable/fuel areas, fusible plug heat sensors shall 
be used with operating temperatures ranging between 70° and 77°C. 
UltravioletlInfrared sensors may also be used in these areas. 
Closed areas with clean atmosphere not associated with flammable fluids, such as 
electric switchboard rooms, empty spaces and ceilings and false floors, batteries and 
battery charging rooms, telecommunication equipment rooms etc. shall be fItted with 
smoke sensors. Two loops of sensors are used in these areas and the activating of 
one sensor indicates "detected fIre" and the activating of another sensor of the other 
loop "confIrmed frre". 
At points where smoke and/or dust are usually present such as: store rooms, 
laboratories, workshops, etc., thermovelocimetric heat sensors shall be used. 
Location of Sensors 
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The fmal location of each sensor shall be established after the installation of 
equipment, piping, ventilation ducts etc., but the number of sensors and the 
respective spacing follow the recommendations on "NFP A-72E", "API -RP-14C" 
and manufacturers. 
In all systems of detection of the type fusible plug and UV IIR in areas of confmed 
processing , the activation of a single ~.ensor shall be sufficient to initiate automatic 
safety actions such as: 
- Alarm in the control and on the installation. 
- Activating of ESD-3 system. 
- Activating of the deluge system. 
- etc. 
In areas that require the actuation of 2 sensors, they shall be installed in a way that 
all points of the protected area are monitored by a minimum of two sensors. 
Gas Detection System 
Sensors 
The sensors provide electrical signals corresponding to the levels of gas 
concentration detected in the monitored area. Warnings shall set off in the central 
control room whenever levels reach 20% and 60% of the LI.I. (Lower Explosive 
Limit) for fuel gases and 10 I 20 ppm in the air for toxic gases. 
A punctual sensor type infrared shall be used for detecting combustible gases. 
Location of Sensors 
In order to place the sensors, a study on gas dispersion shall be elaborated taking into 
consideration the following aspects: gas leakage points; leakage occurrence 
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frequency; amount and process conditions of the released gas cost x efficiency 
analysis. 
Design Criterion: 
The amount and location of the gas sensors shall be based on the utilisation of tri 
dimensional models for gas concentration. The air intakes for cooling machinery and 
air intakes for ventilation shall be monitored by gas sensors. Monitoring of exhaust 
'. 
outlets shall be verified case by case. 
Configuration of System: 
Safety actions on the Unit shall be initiated only with coincident operation of two 
gas sensors in the same area. To ensure that the failure of any sensors will not cause 
the non-operation ofthe system, there shall be three gas sensors (2 of 3 voting logic) 
on each detection location determined by the Gas Dispersion Study. The 2 of 3 
voting logic criteria shall also be applied' to the air intakes and outlets above 
described .. 
Detection of Combustible Gas 
The operation of a single sensor indicating a concentration of 20% or 60% of the 
LI.1. for gas will merely set off a warning in the central control room. 
Simultaneous operation of two sensors indicating a concentration of 60% of the 
L.I.I for gas signifies confrrmed gas at a level of 60% of LI.I. and they shall start 
suitable control actions such as: 
- A warning in the central control room; 
- Disconnection of electrical equipment unsuitable for operation in the presence of 
gas; 
- Shutdown the flow of hydrocarbons to the affected area; 
- Activation of the emergency shutdown system level (ESD-3); 
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- etc. 
Hydrogen sensors shall be installed in the exhaust ducts of the battery rooms. The 
activating of one sensor indicating 20% of the L 1.1. shall be signalled in the control 
room and start up the stand-by exhausters. Detection of gas by two sensors at a 
level of 60% of the L.I.I. shall also inhibit the deep battery charging system. 
The activating of only one sensor indicating concentration in the air of 10ppm or 
above will just activate the warning in the central control room of the unit. 
Simultaneous activation of two sensors indicating 10 ppm of gas concentration in 
the air means confIrmed gas at 10 ppm and besides alarming at central control on the 
unit they will initiate actions such as: 
- alarm all over the insta11ation~ 
- start stand by ventilation (when is the case) 
- etc. 
Simultaneous activating of two sensors indicating 20 ppm of gas concentration in 
the air means confIrmed gas at 20 ppm and will initiate, according to the situation, 
control actions such as: 
- alarm at the central control room and all over the unit; 
- activating the level 3 (ESD-3) system; 
- interrupting the gas flow to the affected area; 
- etc. 
Pressure Relief and Depressurisation Systems 
General Remarks 
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The pressure relief and depressurising systems shall be designed in accordance with 
"API RP 520 and API RP 521". 
Depressurisation System 
In principle, all pressurised equipment handling hydrocarbons shall have two 
independent means of relief capable of avoiding over-pressure owed to the 
occurrences mentioned in API RP 521 and any other specific situation not 
mentioned in the same norm .. 
The primary protection shall be provided by the emergency shutdown system and 
the secondary protection by a safety and pressure relief valve (PSV). 
The need for installation of depressurising valves (blow down valves - BDV's) shall 
be analysed in all the equipment containing flammable fluids that might be set off 
during a fIre so as to avoid a failure in the equipment due to a rise in temperature .. 
The depressurising system shall also be operable from the central control room or 
locally and automatically when activated the level 4 emergency shutdown signal 
(ESD-4). 
Atmospheric Vent System 
This system shall be used to collect all vents from equipment operating at 
atmospheric pressure. The gas inventory shall be dispersed safely through the 
"atmospheric vent". Discharge of this system may be at a point along the structure of 
the flare so that the exhausted gas is not ignited by the flare flame and does not form 
an explosive mix over the Unit. 
A CO2 snuffmg system shall be provided for the flame extinction in case of ignition 
of exhausted gases. Provision shall be made for injecting fuel gas into the header so 
as to prevent the penetration of oxygen into the circuit. 
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Esgpe Ways and Routes 
Escape routes have as their main purpose to provide access in a quick and safe way 
to the place where the lifeboats are. And they facilitate the way out for people from 
hazardous areas. 
The following shall be considered when designing these routes: 
The installation shall be fitted with primary and secondary routes and they must be 
free from obstacles and have the following dimensions: 
- Primary route- Minimum width = 1.2 m , minimal height = 2.1 m. 
- Secondary route - Minimal width = 1.0 m, minimal height = 2.1 m. 
- Escape ways accessible by any area on the Unit via two different routes shall be 
provided. Those ways should have 1.2 m of width and 2.1 m of height. 
- There must be at least two independent escape routes coming from the service 
areas to the living quarters or to the abandonment stations. 
- Doors leading to external walkways of the Unit or other escape routes shall open 
outwards. Under no circumstance shall these doors obstruct the escape routes. 
From any point on the installation there shall be two alternative ways leading to the 
escape route, except for cabins, offices, cold storage room and other rooms with less 
than 10m2 which can only have one way out. 
Each access from the rooms shall have emergency lighting. 
All legs of floating units located on the corners shall be provided with escape 
stairways leading to the sea. By each of these stairs there shall be installed a stair 
head two meters above sea level and large enough to accommodate two people side 
by side. These stairs shall be provided with emergency lighting. 
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The escape routes shall not be obstructed by any kind of equipment like elevators, 
lifting, cables etc. The escape routes floors must be painted in white and covered 
with anti-sliding coating. 
Floors and Walkways 
The walkway around the entire periphery of the Unit is a main escape route and shall 
not be narrower than 1.2 meters and u.~der any circumstances, no loads shall be left 
there. These walkways shall be provided with railings no less than 1.1 meters high. 
- The walkways on the installation premises shall, as primary escape route, have a 
minimal width of 1.2 meters. 
Whenever necessary, the floors must have suitable protection characteristics to 
isolate the areas of greater risks from others of lesser risks. 
For locations where the utilisation of floor railing are foreseen, they shall be of the 
type serrated. 
The design shall foresee special spots for the" transportation basket" operation. 
Emergency Shut-Down Systems 
General Remarks 
The emergency shutdown system shall permit an effective and safe shutdown of the 
process and other equipment on the Unit in order to restrict risks caused by 
undesired effects. 
The emergency shutdown system shall be comprised of the four different levels 
listed below: 
- Levell: Partial shutdown of process or utilities; 
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- Level 2: Total shutdown of process without affecting utilities; 
- Level 3: Total shutdown of process and "non essential" utilities; 
- Level 4: Automatic depressurisation and preparation to abandon if necessary. 
The emergency shutdown system for levels I, 2 and 3 may be operated by hand or 
automatically. 
The level 4 operation shall be only han~ operated, except at inhabited Units where it 
can be operated by hand or remote control. 
The pushbuttons for activating of the emergency shutdown system (ESD-2, ESD-3 
and ESD-4) shall be installed at only two points, listed below in order of priority. 
- Control room (through ECOS); 
- Radio room; 
- Unit manager's room. 
ESD-2 push-buttons (adequately protected) shall also be installed at the helideck 
and abandonment stations. 
Activities unleashed by an emergency shutdown hierarchically higher than other 
cover the remaining levels as well. 
Safety Interlocking System 
This system shall be responsible for functions such as : 
- Fire/Gas Detection Fighting; 
- Emergency process shutdown; 
- Alarms; 
- Interfacing with the Unit operation and supervisory system. 
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Programmable logic controllers perform all functions of the safety interlocking 
system where applicable. 
Status warnings and signals referring to the detection and ftre-ftghting system and 
the status of the flfe-ftghting pumps shall be displayed on the monitor of the Central 
Operation and Supervisory station (ECOS). 
The Electric circuits of the drive warning and signalising devices of the Unit safety 
~ 
systems shall have continuous monitoring arrangements to indicate open circuit, 
short-circuit, etc. As described in Petro bras Interlocking Technical Specillcation, the 
following equipment shall be monitored: hand-operated fife alarms, ESD and C02 
push-buttons, fusible plug and fife network pressure switch (PSL's), C02 Master 
cylinders solenoid valves and directional valves, C02 directional valves. 
In case of using remote stations connected to the PLC's, they shall be installed 
inside protected rooms or in compartments with essential equipment. 
5.2.2.2. Supervisory and Control Philosophy 
The basic concept concerning this topic is to concentrate all actions related to the 
control and to the supervision system of the whole unit from a single control room. 
Therefore, for all FPSO vessels, a supervision system based upon Digital Alpha 
stations was designed. From those stations, operators can interact with all the process 
plant, with transferring, separation and compression equipment, with navigation 
systems, with storage, off-loading operations, etc. 
All actions related to the automatic control and interlocking of any systems are 
assigned to programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Those programmable logic 
controllers are linked to the ETHERNET network, as well as all package unit panels 
(used for turbo- compressor or turbo-generator, flares, booster compressor, heater 
panels, etc.). 
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There are exclusive programmable logical controllers assigned to signals from safety 
systems, as fIre and gas detection systems, fIre fIghting systems, etc. There are others 
assigned to process interlocking, others dedicated only to process control loops, and 
fmally there are programmable logical controllers dedicated to electrical functions (as 
load shedding and sharing, start-up and shutdown of electrical loads, etc). All those 
systems are interconnected through a local area network (LAN) in order to exchange 
information. 
All formerly local operated ship engines were modifted to allow remote operation. 
Consequently, the main FPSO's engine rooms, after the transformation of very large 
cargo carrier vessels into production units, have become unmanned rooms. 
Referring to programmable logical controller units, the basic concept usually adopted 
is to locate the greatest possible number of remote units in the fIeld, linked to the 
central room through a fully duplicated proprietary network. The purpose of that, is 
to avoid undesirable shutdowns, caused by electric failures. 
Closed circuit TV cameras are also provided for visual information from all over the 
process areas to the control room (in some units there are TV cameras installed in the 
risers arrival's deck). Up to now this function is not integrated to the supervisory 
system, but studies are being carried out to provide visual information available at the 
workstation. 
5.2.3. Vessel Characteristics 
• Formerly a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) 
• Launched in 1974 
• 337 meters length 
• 54.5 meters breadth 
• 21. 6 meters draft 
• 279,749 KT dead weight 
• Main Engine: Steam Turbine 
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The FPSO will be installed in a water depth of 720 m and it was designed to produce 
oil in Marlim Field, from 6 production wells, two of them horizontal wells, 3 water 
injection wells, water injection facilities, gas lift compressor, oil storage, offloading 
and gas exportation. 
The total production will be around 50,000 bb1/day of oil, 680,000 Nm3/d of gas, and 
10,500 m3/d of water injection. 
5.2.2.3.1. Main Systems Description 
The mooring system is installed at the bow (as shown in figure 5.1.1) and it was 
designed to provide a safe suitable mooring facility for the FPSO in the specified 
conditions. It should be able to support a shuttle tanker of the same size, moored in 
tandem to the FPSQ, while they weathervane together around the mooring, in the 
design's operation sea state. 
Turntable Assembly 
The turntable assembly is designed to permit rotational, in order to allow the FPSO 
weathervane. An adjustable brake mechanism is installed to apply sufficient friction, 
eliminating turntable motions in light weather, reducing maintenance intervention. 
The main bearing is of the roller type, sealed, with lubrication (or semi-automatic 
lubrication). If the bearings are located above the water line, the semi-automatic 
lubrication is not required. 
The main bearing's maintenance will be carried out without taking the FPSO out of its 
permanent moorings. Any bearing change-out will be performed using equipment 
installed on board, since positive lock/unlock devices are installed in order to allow 
the FPSO to operate during maintenance procedures. 
Anchorin~ System 
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The anchoring system has a maximum of eight mooring lines and it was designed in 
such a way that the chain and wire rope have the same size. in order to minimise 
maintenance and spare parts. The system presents a hybrid configuration (chain, wire 
rope, and chain) in order to minimise the fatigue and erosion effects during operation 
and also to ease mooring lines handling and pull-in operations 
Swivel 
The swivel is designed to allow a continuous and unrestricted rotation. The unit is 
stackable and comprises independent paths. The swivel has two electrical brushes for 
power transmission and control signals. All oil paths provided in the swivel are 
designed to handle boiling water for wax removal purposes. 
Each swivel has two internal pressure seals. one above and other below the fluid 
chamber. 
The sealing system was designed with a barrier to eliminate seal degradation in case of 
fluid leakage. During all normal operation time, the pressure seal shall operate with a 
clean fluid. A leak detection monitor located between each pair of seals is provided 
and is linked with the control room. Table IV.I shows swivel fluid characteristics. The 
electrical characteristics are described below. 
Electrical Characteristics 
440 V AC 3 phases 5 KV A 
110 V Dc 
Supply Ground 
Ship ESD Signal 
Turret ESD Signal 
6 control signals (+) communication network 
6 control signals (-) communication network. 
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Each swivel contains its own roller bearing assembly and all seals shall be made in one 
piece. The bearings of each path shall be provided with a self-lubrication system. 
5.2.2.3.2. Main Facilities 
Production Collec\ion 
The FPSO's facilities are designed to handle 50,000 bbVday of crude oil, 1,050,000 
~ 
Nm3/day of gas at 180 Bar discharge pressure, and 1O,500mlday of water injection at 
147 Bar. 
Collection Facilities 
Facilities are provided to collect the production from six wells, from the water 
injection manifold and from the lift gas manifold. They are installed inside the turret. 
In this arrangement concept, a pigllauncher receiver was included to remove wax 
formation. 
In order to minimise the use of swivels, the turret is provided with tanks and metering 
pumps for chemical injection of demulsifier and anti-foam. There is also a Nitrogen 
Generator System (SGN) for wax removal purposes. 
In order to avoid oil spills, a drainage tank is installed to collect oil leaks in the turret 
seals. That tank is installed in the lower deck and it is vented to the higher point of the 
turret's system. 
Separation System 
The flfst stage of the separation system comprises a three-phase separator, with 
capacity of 50,000 bbVday and 10 minutes of residence time, considering severe foam 
formation. The operation pressure is 10 Bar. In parallel, there is a test separator with 
a capacity of 15,000 bbVday. 
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The FPSO's separation plant consists of a three-stage separation system, with a 
desalter between the fIrst and the second stage. In the design it was conceived the 
utilisation of two tanks to coalesce the production before going to the dehydration 
system. 
The tanks present a total capacity of 32,000 metric tons that will allow a 20 hours of 
residence time, based on the maximum production capacity. Coalesce tanks will allow 
the separation of some free water and it is expected to obtain 10 % of water cut at 
... 
tank outlet. 
All the produced crude oil, with a 50 % maximum BSW, is heated up to 90°C, 
utilising water as the heating medium, which is heated with the high pressure vapour 
obtained from steam generator. 
Offloading System 
The FPSO has four transfer pumps, with 4,500 m3/h capacity, steam turbine driven, 
which permit a complete offloading in 24 hours. 
The produced water that comes from the fIrst stage separator, from the test separator 
and from the desalter, flows to the water treatment system, which consists of 
hydrociclones, which are installed to provide a maximum of 20 ppm of oil in water. 
Besides that, the effluent that comes from the hydrocyclone water flows to the 
FPSO's slope tank, which provides a fifteen-hour residence time to guarantee the 
maximum oil-water content of 20 ppm that will be then discharged into the sea. 
Hydrocarbon Drainage System 
A closed drainage system outside the turret is provided in order to lead hydrocarbon 
flows to the slope vessel, in an independent via from the tanker slope vessel. 
Gas Handle System 
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The gas produced at the ftrst stage of separation is scrubbed in vane type ftlter 
separators and is then compressed on turbo-compressor units (2 trains), which handle 
1,050,000 Nmlday each, at a 180 Bar discharge pressure for lift gas and exportation. 
The units include heat recovery systems to provide hot water for oil treatment. Check 
valves and subsea blockage valves were included in all gas import flow lines. 
In order to prevent hydrate problems in pipelines, in the exportation and lift gas 
systems (chokes, lines, mandrels, etc.), one dehydration unit, which uses tri-ethylene 
glycol (TEG) solution, was installed at the third stage discharge compressor. Gas 
from the dehydration unit flows to the gas lift manifold (which is installed inside the 
turret), after passing through the swivel path. 
The low-pressure gas from the stabilisation system is compressed in an electric driven 
screw compressor, and pumped to the turbo-compressor inlet. 
Fuel Gas System 
Low-pressure fuel gas (20 Bar) is produced in order to supply fuel gas to gas 
turbines, steam generators, dearator, to the gas dehydration unit and to the flare 
ignition system. 
Flare System 
In order to determine the location of the flare stack, radiation levels were considered. 
The flare was then positioned at the bow. Special attention has to be given to the 
flare's boom angle and length in order to prevent interference with the riser-launching 
vessel and with the anchor handling boat, during pull-in and pullout activities. 
Vent System 
Atmospheric relieves from the installed coalesce tanks should be collected, in order to 
be vented in a safe location. Tanker vent existing system uses a vacuumlrelief valve, 
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which discharges to the atmosphere. Another independent vent collection system was 
installed at the turret system. 
Utility Systems 
The FPSO utilities systems basically consist of two steam generators, air compressors, 
inert gas generator system, electrical system, industrial water system, cooling water 
system and other facilities for life supporting. 
" 
The available heat from steam generator was not enough to supply maximum crude 
oil heat requirements (40 MM KcaVHr) , therefore two heat recovery units and one 
furnace were installed in the vessel. 
In order to maximise the operational flexibility, lift water pumps were installed 
additionally to the existing fire pumps. 
5.3. Facility's Model 
The proposed model was developed for a FPSO and it was based on a complete 
quantitative risk assessment (Principia! Petrobras43.") previously performed for that 
vessel. 
The description of the scenarios considered in the quantitative risk assessment is given 
in Appendix 3, item A3.1. 
As it is possible to observe from Appendix 3 - figures AI.I to Al.32, for each 
initiator event, there is a related event tree. For each one of the initiator events, there 
are several related accident scenarios identified by the code ID in the event trees. 
The availability values addressed in the quantitative risk assessment to the four 
protection systems (P-l, P-2, P3, P4) identified in the facility, were obtained from 
small fault trees (they include valve, pressure switch level (PSL) faults, etc.). The 
availability values addressed to gas detection and fire detection systems were obtained 
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from previous studies (PrincipialPetrobras4s ... ) that were performed for some typical 
Brazilian offshore platforms. 
For each one of the identified accident scenarios, the associated phenomenological 
event tree, which in our case will comprise different ignition probabilities (different 
ignition points - three different ignition points were considered in that study), different 
wind velocities, different jet directions, etc. Four different wind directions (NE, SE, 
NW, and SW) and five different wind yelocities were considered. Figure A1.33 in 
Appendix 3 provides an example of an event tree traced for the quantitative risk 
assessment, where the weather conditions and others probabilities are shown. 
The software used for the quantitative risk assessment study makes all calculations 
and generates the results, which are illustrated for the initiator event named EI -11, on 
Table AI.3 in Appendix 3. The results include the probability of fatalities, the 
average population, which is in each specific position (area), the associated average 
societal risk, and then the total (the sum) average societal risk associated with this 
specific scenario. 
The proposed model considers that the units' safety can be represented as the 
interconnection of "elements", to which certain availability! unavailability values or 
variables are addressed. 
In our case those elements will be referred as xii for fire detection systems, xgi for gas 
detection systems, pi for pressure sensors systems, vi for actuation systems and c for 
the CPU. 
Therefore, utilising the quantitative risk assessment results, an expression has been 
produced for the societal risk and for the associated individual risk expression, 
imposing variables that replace the availability values addressed to four protection 
systems, to four different gas detection systems and also to four different fire 
detection systems. The average individual risk expression is obtained by dividing the 
total average societal risk of the facility (which is the sum of all average societal risk 
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values calculated for each accident scenario) by the vessel's population, which in our 
case is equal to 26 employees. 
The expressions of the total average societal and individual risk are shown in 
Appendix 4 - Frameworks A.4.1 and A.4.2 respectively. They were obtained using the 
software Microsoft Excel-97. They are equal to the sum of the two last columns of 
these frameworks. As it is possible to observe from them, the values of the total 
average societal risk, calculated in the quantitative risk assessment study for each one 
... 
of the chosen scenarios, were put in the second column of the frameworks. Then, the 
expression of average societal risk in terms of unavailability variables was obtained. 
It is important to notice that the number presented in the seventh column of the 
average societal risk expression is equal to the product of the values of the initiating 
accident frequency times the phenomenological probability value times the number of 
fatalities, as it was explained before. 
Framework A.4.2 - Appendix 4 - shows the average individual risk expression, which 
is obtained by the sum of all terms presented in the two last columns. 
From the mentioned frameworks, we can see seventeen different 
availability/unavailability variables, to which values will be allocated. They correspond 
to four different fIre detection systems (xfI, xf2, xf3, x4), four gas detection systems 
(xgl, xg2, xg3, xg4), four different "pressure sensor systems" (pI, p2, p3, p4), four 
different blockage systems (v!. v2, v3, v4) and the CPU system(c). 
The areas of the FPSO to which these variables were associated to the respective 
safety systems are the following: 
• Turret: xg 1, xfl 
• Process plant: xg2, xf2 
• Pump room: xg3, xf3 
• Machine room: xg4, xf4 
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In the original quantitative risk assessment study, as it is usually done, when 
addressing values to the ftre or gas detection system, as well as to pressure sensor 
systems (pI, p2, p3 and p4, the control programmable unit CPU and the actuator 
(valves) - are taken into account. For the purposes of this Thesis they have to be split 
into the sensor itseif plus the CPU plus the actuator itself. 
As shown in the event trees of ftgures AI.I to AI.32 in Appendix I, the common 
elements of the safety systems were represented in the beginning of the event trees, so 
... 
that they would not be accounted more than once during the reliability allocation 
model. The calculation of the availability values calculated for each safety system 
studied in the original quantitative risk assessment, has taken into account the failures 
of the detectors or pressure sensors plus the failures in the CPU unit, plus the failures 
in the valves, all together. In the presented model, they will be decomposed into the 
CPU (referred from now on as the variable ~), the valve (referred from now on as the 
variable vi i= 1.4) and the detector or pressure sensor itself. Their availability values will 
then be evaluated separately. 
4. Decision Space 
The next step will be to defme the set of all the alternatives to be evaluated - the 
decision space. The generation of these alternatives was based on alternative design 
conftgurations for the safety systems existent in the vessel under study. For each one 
of the safety systems, different configurations were proposed and the respective 
availability values were calculated. Five different configurations were considered for 
each one of the safety systems studied. Figures A5.1, A5.IA, A5.1B to A5.5, 
A5.5A, A5.5B in Appendix 5 illustrate the basic configurations used for the ftve 
cases studied for the turret system. Therefore, our decision space will be composed by 
discrete values, calculated for these different configurations. 
5.5. Reliability Calculation 
Based on the basic conftgurations used for the ftve cases studied for each one of the 
safety systems considered in this work, as shown in Appendix 5 - ftgures A.5.1 to 
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A5.5, on the theory and expressions given in tables 4.3.4.4.1.1 and 4.3.4.5.1.1., the 
critical safety unavailability (CSU) and the spurious trip rates (STR) values were 
calculated. 
Tables A5.1, A5.2, A5.3, A5.4 in Appendix 5 present the formulas used for the 
critical safety unavailability and the spurious trip rate values calculations. 
5.5.1. Presentation of the Safety System Configurations 
The FPSO considered for the application of the methodology will comprise four ftre 
and four gas detection areas. The basic system -1001 voting logic system will be 
considered for the ftre and gas detection systems, as well as for the pressure switch 
levels, CPU and valves. Figure A5.1 - Appendix 5 - illustrates the original 
conftguration that is going to be considered as the basic one for the turret safety 
system. This conftguration is the reference one, which is going to be optimised. 
It is assumed that the response time of detectors in neighbouring areas is too long for 
those detectors to initiate proper safety actions. 
There are of course, several ways of introducing redundancy into safety systems, as 
for example, promoting the duplication or triplication of each one of their 
components: of the sensor (gas or fife detector, or PSL), of the input and output 
cards, of the CPU, and of the actuator (valve). 
In this work, taking the basic conftguration as a reference (1001 voting logic -, shown 
in ftgure A5.l - Appendix 5), the optimisation was promoted in four more different 
ways for each safety system considered. They are going to be addressed as different 
cases (Case 1 to Case 5 - including the original conftguration), as shown in Appendix 
5 - ftgures A5.l, A5.lA, A5.lB to A5.5, A5.5A and A5.5B. 
The number of sensors that will be considered in each protected area of the FPSO is 
indicated below: 
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Turret: 7 
Process Plant: 10 
Pump room: 4 
Pump machine: 8 
The basic configuration shown in Appendix 5 - figure A5.1 - is related to the FPSO 
turret's safety system. The difference between them and the others FPSO's safety 
systems is in the number of sensorsldete.~tors. Therefore, for example, for the process 
plant's fife and gas detection systems, the difference in the configuration presented in 
figure V1.34, for Case 1, will be that instead of the 7 detectors shown, we will have 
10 detectors. In Cases 2 and 5, there will be 20 detectors and in Cases 3 e 4, there will 
be 30 detectors. This can be extended to all safety systems studied in this work for the 
other FPSO's areas. 
We are assuming that there are the same number of gas and fife detectors in each area 
considered in the analysis. 
Tables Figures A5.l, A5.2, A5.3 and A5.4 in Appendix 5 show the formulas used 
for the calculations of the critical safety unavailability and the spurious trip rate for the 
five configurations (Case 1 to 5) for each one of the safety systems considered. 
A single pressure switch level (1001) plus an input card (1001) will compose the basic 
configuration adopted for the pressure sensor system. They will be optimised 
considering four more cases, which adopted logical and formulas used for calculations 
are shown on table A5.2. 
A single CPU (1001) will compose the basic configuration adopted for the CPU 
system. They will be optimised considering four more cases, which adopted logical 
and formulas used for calculations are shown on table A5.3. 
A single valve (1001) plus an output card (1001) will compose the basic configuration 
adopted for the actuation system. They will be optimised considering four more cases, 
which adopted logical and formulas used for calculations are shown on table A5.3. 
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Note that although there are also detectors in other areas of the FPSO, as for 
example, in mid-ship superstructure, in aft superstructure, in the deck and in the 
accommodation area, they do not appear in the quantitative risk assessment study. 
This is due to the fact that no accidental event that has been considered as a critical 
one in that study has demanded any actuation from these specific safety systems. 
The description of each considered case for the safety systems under study is given 
... 
below: 
For fIre. &as detection systems and for pressure sensor system 
Case I: No redundancy exists. The safety system is composed by components, which 
present a 1001 voting logic. 
Case 2: Redundancy is introduced by doubling, in each area, the sensor and the input 
card only. Therefore, the sensors and the input card will present a 1002 voting logic. 
Case 3: Redundancy is introduced by promoting a triplication, in each area, of the 
sensor and the input card only. Therefore, the sensors and the input card will present a 
1003 voting logic. 
Case 4: Redundancy is introduced by introducing in each area a logic of 2003 for the 
sensor and the input card only. Therefore, the sensors and the input card will present a 
2003 voting logic. 
Case 5: Redundancy is introduced by introducing, in each area, a logic of 2002 for the 
sensor and the input card only. Therefore, the sensors and the input card will present a 
2002 voting logic. 
In this context, for the fIre and gas detection systems of the FPSO's turret, seven 
detection units, with seven detectors were considered in Case I; seven detection units, 
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with fourteen detectors in Cases 2 and 5; and seven detection units, with twenty one 
detectors in Cases 3 and 4. 
For CPU: 
The five cases analysed for the CPU present the same voting logic of each one of the 
cases described above. The considered CPU system will be composed just by the CPU 
itself, excluding the input and output devices. The basic case - Case 1- will be 
composed by a simplex CPU (1001 voting logic), which will be optimised utilising the 
redundancy with a voting logic identical to the ones of the four cases - Cases 2 to 5, 
described above. 
For the actuation system: 
The voting logic is the same described above for all five cases analysed for the fire and 
gas detection systems. The considered actuation system will be composed by valve (s) 
and by the output device (s). The basic case - Case 1- will be composed by a simplex 
system with a single valve and a single output device (1001 voting logic), which will 
be optimised utilising the redundancy with a voting logic identical to the ones of the 
four cases - Cases 2 to 5, described above. 
The necessary additional assumptions are (for all example systems): 
• The fail-safe principle applies (normally energised modules). 
This means, for instance, that a power failure will lead to a system SO-failure, 
and not to a system FTO-failure. 
• Self-testing on the CPU's only. 
5.5.2. Loss of Safety Calculation 
When quantifying loss of safety of safety shutdown systems, we are looking at the 
probability of occurrence of undesirable events due to failure of the safety shutdown 
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systems (the probability that those systems will fail to operate (ETO), upon a 
hazardous situation). This is denoted as the critical sQ[ety unavailability (CSU) of the 
safety shutdown systems (SINTEF·). 
Based on Tables Figures A.5.1, A.5.2, A.5.3, A.5.4 and on the theory presented 
before, the failure to operate - FTO - reliability block diagrams were made for our 
model. 
... 
• Overall failure to operate - FTO - Reliability Block Diagram for the Studied 
Systems 
Figures A.5.IA to A.5.5A in Appendix 5 show the failure to operate - FrO -
reliability block diagrams for example Cases I to 5 for the FPSO - turret's safety 
systems. These systems are the gas detection system (xg I), the fire detection system 
(xfl), the pressure switch level system (which includes the input cards for the CPU), 
the CPU and for the actuation system (valve plus output card from CPU) respectively. 
Therefore, for each FPSO's area, there will be five cases analysed for each one of its 
safety systems. For all areas, the basic configuration (Case 1) that is going to be 
adopted is the simplex one - 100 I-voting logic. Case 2 to 5 voting logics were 
described above. 
The difference that is going to be found in critical safety unavailability values for the 
gas and fife detection systems for different FPSO's areas (turret, process plant, etc.) is 
derived only from a different number of sensors. We are assuming that the failure data 
and other attributes of the safety system's components included in each area were 
considered the same. 
Therefore, for the turret's gas and fife detection systems, we have considered seven 
detectors in the basic configuration: it is addressed as Case 1 (seven detection units of 
1001 detectors voting logic). Fourteen detectors were considered in Case 2 and in 
Case 5 (seven detection units of 1002 and 2002 detectors voting logic respectively). 
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Twenty one detectors were considered in Cases 3 and 4 (seven detection units of 
2003 and 1003 detectors voting logic respectively). As we have discussed earlier in 
this work, this concept should be extended to the others FPSO's areas. It is important 
to keep in mind the concept of detection unit, e.g., the detection unit will be the single 
one responsible for detecting any hazardous condition in a certain point of the plant. 
Therefore, if it f~ we would have ~ critical failure (if detectors compose the unit 
with a 1002 voting logic - two sensors will have to fail to lead to a critical fail to 
operate - FrO - failure). 
RateofFTO failures (per 106 brs) 
I I 0 Card type Rate of FrO Rate of FrO Number of Total rate of 
(1) failures affecting failures relevant FrO failure 
all channels affecting one channels (4) /t;Olal 
(common part) (2) channel only (3) 
Input card 0,3 0,15 1 0,45 
Output card 0,3 0,15 1 0,45 
Table 5.5.2.1 - Input I Output Card - Input Information (SINTEF4Il) 
Notes: 
(1) Specify all types of 1/0 cards used. If the same 110 card type is used with a different number of 
channels (see note 4 below), repeat the I/O card type. 
(2) This is the rate of failures affecting all channels of the I/O card, i.e., failure rate of the common 
part of the I/O card. 
(3) This is the rate of failures affecting one channel of the 110 card only. 
(4) Give the number of relevant channels for the success criterion defined. 
(5) The total rate of FrO failures, A/total, is the failure rat of the common part plus the failure rate 
affecting one channel multiplied by the number of relevant channels. 
Tables A5.1, A5.2, A5.3 and A5.4 illustrate the formulas used for the critical 
safety unavailability calculations made for each one of the safety systems considered. 
193 
Table 5.5.2.1 provides information related with input/output cards that was used in 
the calculations. 
• Calculation of the Critical Safety Unavailability for the Studied Cases 
Calculation of the CSU is done on the basis of the approximate detailed failure to 
operate (Fl'O) reliability block diagram, using the formulas given earlier in table 
4.3.4.4.1 and in Appendix 2. 
Framework A6.1 in Appendix 6 show the data used for critical safety unavailability 
calculations. Framework A6.2 in Appendix 6 shows the critical safety unavailability 
values calculated for Cases 1 to 5 for each one of the safety systems considered. The 
critical safety unavailability values for the gas detection, fIre detection and pressure 
systems were obtained by the sum of the critical safety unavailability values calculated 
for the detector or sensor itself and the CPU's input card. 
In the case of the actuator system the critical safety unavailability values were 
obtained by the sum of the critical safety unavailability values calculated for the valve 
(s) and the CPU's output card (s). 
5.5.3. Loss of Production Calculation 
Failures of safety shutdown systems modules may cause spurious shut down the 
production. This event is denoted .fpurious trip event in this work. When quantifying 
loss of production, we are looking at the rate of such events, the spurious trip rate 
(STRl. 
The overall and the approximate reliability block diagrams are provided in table 
4.3.4.4.1 and in Appendix 2. 
• Overall spurious operation - SO - Reliability Block Diagram for the Studied 
Systems 
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Figures A5.IB to A5.5B in Appendix 5 show the overall spurious operation - SO -
reliability block diagrams for example Cases 1 to 5, which were based on the overall 
and the approximate reliability block diagrams provided on table 4.3.4.4.1 and in 
Appendix 2. 
Rate of SO-failures 
(all rates per 10' hours) 
"-
110 Card 
Type (1) 
Rate of SO-failures Rate of SO- Number of Total rate of 
affecting all channels failures affecting relevant critical SO-
(common part) (2) one channel only channels (4) failures 
(3) A~olal 
Input card 0.3 0.15 7 1.35 
Output card 0.3 0.16 1 0.45 
Table 5.5.3.1- Input/Output Card Information (SINTEF4I) 
Notes: 
(1) Specify all types of 110 cards used. If the same 110 card type is used with different number of channels (see 
note 4 below). repeat the 110 card type. 
(2) This is the rate of failures affecting all channels of the 110 card. i.e., failure rate of the common part of the 
110 card This is the rate of failures affecting one channel of the 110 card only. 
(3) Give the number of relevant channels on each 110 card 
(4) The total rate of critical SO-failures, A:otal' is the failure rate of the common part, plus the failure rate 
affecting one channel only multiplied with the number of relevant channels. The total rate of critical SO-
failures is used on SO tables. 
Specification of input data for the I I 0 cards in the example is given in table 5.5.3.1. 
• Calculating the Spurious Trip Rate (STR) of the Example Systems 
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Calculation of the spurious trip rate (STR) is done on the basis of the approximate 
detailed spurious operation - SO - reliability block diagram, using the formulas given 
earlier in Tables A.5.1, A.5.2, A.5.3, A.5.4 and in Appendix 5. 
Framework A.6.3 in Appendix 6 shows the data used for spurious trip rates 
calculation. Framework A.6.4 in Appendix 6 shows the spurious trip rate values, 
calculated for Cases I to 5 for each one of the safety systems considered. The 
formulas and the actual spurious trip ~~te numbers for the different components I 
modules, and the total system spurious trip rate (STR) is summed up and given in the 
frameworks. 
5.6. Cost Functions 
5.6.1. Life Cycle Cost Model 
Life Cycle Cost (LCC) is given by the following expression: 
LCC = LCA + LSC+ LSD + !iREL + !iLL (4.3.5.1) 
Where: 
LCA = Life Acquisition Cost 
LSC = Life Support Cost 
LSD = Loss due to Spurious Operation 
A REL = represents the benefit obtained in terms of the oil and gas production saved 
and damage to the asset avoided due to the installation of safety system..~ at the 
facility. 
A LL = represents the benefit obtained in terms of averted fatalities due to the 
installation of safety systems at the facility. 
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The LSC part consists of two parcels, CIR (investments in resources for operation and 
maintenance), and CYC (yearly cost of operation and maintenance). Therefore, the 
expression above can be written as following: 
LCC = LCA + CIR+ CYC + LSO + AREL + ALL (4.3.5.2) 
Where, the terms LCA and CIR are the costs of primary investments of the system or 
equipment. 
Three parcels compose the LCA term: the equipment cost (CIE), the 
installation/commissioning cost (CIIC) and the management cost (CIM). 
5.6.1.1. Primary Investments Calculation 
We are considering that the primary investments are composed by seven elemchts, 
and expressed bellow: 
Total Primary Investment = CIE+ CIM + CIIC+CIR (4.3.5.4) 
or 
Total Primary Investment = CIEH + ClEA + CIMV + CIMC+ CIIC 
+CIRS +CIRT (4.3.5.5) 
Where: 
CIE = Equipment cost 
CIEH = Component cost (hardware) 
ClEA = Cost of necessary additional equipment 
ClM = Management cost 
CIMV = Vendor management and engineering cost 
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CIMC = Contractor management and engineering cost 
ClIC = Installation/commissioning cost 
CIR = Cost of investments in resources for operation and maintenance 
CIRS = Cost of initial spare part stock 
CIRT = Training cost 
In order to easy cost calculations, the safety shut-down systems were divided into the 
following parts: 
Detection system: Composed by detectors (fIre or gas and input devices to CPU or 
by pressure sensors more the input device to CPU; fIeld cabling, including junction 
boxes and cubicles. 
CPU: Composed by CPU 
Actuation system: Composed by blockage valves and output devices from CPU. 
DefInitions of each one of the cost components are described below. Frameworks 
A. 7.1 to A. 7 .11.3A in Appendix 7 present all the costs addressed to the fIve different 
confIgurations of the considered safety systems. The equations obtained for the Life 
Cycle Cost x Availability curves for each one of the safety systems considered are 
shown in fIgures A.9.1 to A.9.7 in Appendix 9. 
Component Cost (CIEU) 
The component cost includes the direct component cost (detector. sensor, CPU, 
valve, etc.). Frameworks A.7.1 to A.7.11.3A in Appendix 7 present all the costs 
addressed to the fIve different confIgurations of the considered safety systems. 
Cost of Necessary Additional Equipment (CIEA) 
Frameworks A.7.1 to A.7.11.3A in Appendix 7 present all the costs addressed to the 
five different confIgurations of the considered safety systems. 
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Vendor Management and Engineering Cost (CIMV) 
Frameworks A.7.1 to A.7.11.3A in Appendix 7 present all the costs addressed to the 
five different configurations of the considered safety systems. Equations 4.3.5.6 and 
4.3.5.7 were used for calculation. 
Installation/Commissioning Cost (CD~) 
Frameworks A. 7.1 to A. 7 .11.3A in Appendix 7 present all the costs addressed to the 
five different configurations of the considered safety systems. 
Oil Company/Contractor Management and Engineering Cost (CIMC) 
Frameworks A. 7.1 to A. 7 .11.3A in Appendix 7 present all the costs addressed to the 
five different configurations of the considered safety systems. Equations 4.3.5.8 was 
used for calculation. 
Cost of Initial Spare Part Stock (CIRS) 
This cost element comprises the initial investments in spares. It is assumed that the 
number of initial spare parts should be 5% of the total number of components of that 
type, rounded up to the nearest integer. Frameworks A. 7.1 to A. 7 .11.3A in Appendix 
7 present all the costs addressed to the five different configurations of the considered 
safety systems. 
Training Cost (CIRT) 
Frameworks A. 7.1 to A. 7 .11.3A in Appendix 7 present all the costs addressed to the 
five different configurations of the considered safety systems. 
5.6.1.2. Calculation of Cost for Operation and Maintenance (CYC) 
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There are two elements included in the parcel concerning the yearly cost of operation 
and maintenance, as following: 
• periodic testing; 
• corrective maintenance 
5.6.1.2 .. 1. Periodic Test Model 
The periodic testing costs per year for each component type are obtained as follows: 
Test costs per year = (number of components) * (test frequency) * 
(average man-hours per test) * (cost per man-hour) (4.3.5.9) 
Where: 
Test frequency = 
(4.3.5.10) 
(12 months/year) / (test period in months) 
• A verage Man-hours per Test 
The average number of man-hours spent per test adopted in this work was based on 
the guide figures listed in table A5.6.1.2.1. Obviously each life cycle model should 
consider specific values for the interval of tests, time per test and man-hour spent per 
test, based on the company/unit specific test philosophy and conditions. 
• Man-hours per Test for Alternative Configurations 
In all cases presented in this work, it was assumed that the time spent to test each 
additional detector at the same sub-area, is equal to the time spent to test the first 
detector at that sub-area. 
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Frameworks A. 7.1 to A. 7 .11.3A in Appendix 7 present all the costs addressed to the 
five different configurations of the considered safety systems. 
5.6.1.2.2. Corrective Maintenance Model 
The total cost per repair will be expressed by: 
Total cost per repair = (man-hours per repair) * (cost per man-hour) 
+ (other costs per repair) (4.3.5.11) 
The last term in the expression above includes spare parts, tool consumption, etc. 
The repair cost per year is given by: 
Repair costs per year = (number of components) * (failures per component per year) 
* (total cost per repair) (4.3.5.12) 
The necessary spare parts for repair are supposed to be in the unit. 
The cost per man-hour for maintenance personnel is assumed to be equal to 50 
pounds. 
As shown in frameworks A. 7.1 to A. 7 .11.3A in Appendix 7, the yearly costs of 
operation and maintenance have been calculated for the five cases (Case 1, 2, 3, 4 and 
5) associated to each of the safety systems considered. 
Data used for periodic testing are shown on table 5.6.1.2.2.1 that displays values 
raised in PETROBRAs and provided by SINTEp9. Note that the time spent testing 
each additional component is assumed to be equal to the time spent with the fIrst 
component at the sub-area. 
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Frameworks A. 7.1 to A. 7 .11.3A in Appendix 7, in their fIrst pages show a column 
related to "others repair costs". Those costs refer to spare parts, tool consumption, 
etc. As a fIrst approximation, these costs were assumed to be equal to the component 
acquisition costs. 
Device Test period (months) Average man- hours per test 
Petro bras SINTEF Petro bras SINTEF 
Pressure sensor 6 3 0.5 1.0 
" 
Flame detector 6 3 1.0 0.75 
Heat detector 6 6 1.0 0.75 
Gas detector 6 1 1.0 1.0 
Valve 12 - 0.50 -
, 
Table 5.6.1.2.2.1 - Periodic Test Data (PETROBRAS, SINTEF49) 
5.6.1.3.Unavailability Cost Calculation 
5.6.1.3.1. Overall Model 
The critical unavailability of a safety system is the unavailability derived due to a 
failure to operate in case of the occurrence of an accidental event, leading to 
consequences in terms of fatalities, damage to assets and loss of income (due to 
deferred production). The fIrst parcel of the total life unavailability cost, e.g., the cost 
associated with the critical unavailability (LUe) can be given in equation 4.3.5.17: 
LUCy.ar =LLyear+RELyear (4.3.5.13) 
Where: 
LL~war = Expected Loss of Lives per year 
RELy,tI, = Expected Residual Loss per year 
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• Expected Loss of Lives 
The parcel concerning the Expected Loss of Lives per year (LLyear) is given by 
equation 4.3.5.14: 
LLyear = Number of fatalities per year * Value of life * Critical Safety 
Unavailability (4.3.5.14) 
The number of fatalities per year for each configuration is obtained from the 
expression of average societal risk 
The value of life was assumed to be equal to 3E+06 pounds, as mentioned in Chapter 
2. 
The critical safety unavailability are presented on Frameworks A. 7.1 to A. 7 .11.3A in 
Appendix 7 for five different configurations for each considered safety system. They 
also show the value (LLyear) associated with loss of lives for each one of these 
configurations. Then the benefit (Li LLi ), obtained due to the installation of the safety 
systems is calculated in terms of deaths averted. The value of Li LLi will be obtained 
by the difference between the cost associated with loss of lives in case there is no 
safety system installed (e.g., when the safety critical unavailability is equal to 100%), 
and the cost associated with loss of lives related to a certain safety system 
configuration (a certain safety system's reliability level). The Li LLi value can be 
obtained by equation 4.3.5.15: 
. [NUmber of fatalities i=O * Value of life * CSU ;=0 - ] 
A LLl, ;=1,5 = 
Numberof fatalities ;=I,S * Value of life * CSU;= 1,5 
Where: 
CSU = critical safety unavailability, and 
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CSUi = 0 = 1, critical safety unavailability value associated with no safety system 
installed 
• Expected Residual Loss per year 
The Expected Residual Loss per year (REL) is given by equation 4.3.5.16: 
the following expression: 
I RELyear = feverit * Cevent * CSU (4.3.5.16) 
Where: 
RELyear = Expected Residual Loss per year after the occurrence .01' an accidental 
event 
fevent = Event frequency of an accidental event 
Cevent = Expected Consequence of an accidental event 
CSU = Critical Safety Unavailability 
The Expected Residual Loss per year considers the loss to assets plus the loss of net 
income per year after the occurrence of an accidental event due to the critical 
unavailability of safety systems. It is calculated for each one of the five configurations 
considered for each safety system in this Thesis. 
The values used for the frequency of the accidental event were obtained from WOAD, 
taking into account the type of the safety system considered in each case. For fire 
detection systems, this frequency was considered to be equal to the frequency of 
occurrence of fires during the period of 1980 to 1993 in North Sea, e.g., 1.849E-02 
per year (WOAD"). 
For CPU, gas detection, blockage and pressure sensor systems, the frequency of the 
accidental event was considered to be equal to the frequency of the occurrence of 
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fIres plus the frequency of occurrence of explosions during the period of 1980 to 1993 
in North Sea, e.g., 2.412e-02 per year (WOAD"). 
Regarding the evaluation of consequences in terms of residual costs, resulting from 
the occurrence of accidental events, like fIres and· explosions, the following items 
were considered: 
(I) Loss to the asset: total loss or severe damage 
... 
(2) Loss of income: in this case we have considered that the production will not be 
lost, but deferred (postponed) for a period of time equivalent to the period of time 
to bring the same type of unit into operation. Then, the loss of income due to the 
occurrence of a dangerous situation associated with the unavailability of safety 
systems will be taken into account in the expected residual loss (REL) expression, 
as we have already mentioned above. 
The loss of income due to an unintended production shutdown will be considered in 
the expression presented below for Loss due to spurious actuation (LSO). 
Frameworks A.7.1 to A.7.11.3A in Appendix 7 present REL values obtained for fIve 
different confIgurations for each considered safety system. They also show the value 
(REL) associated with loss of income (due to deferred oil and gas production) and 
loss due to damage to assets, calculated for each one of these confIgurations. Then 
the benefIt obtained (AREL) due to the installation of the safety systems is calculated, 
in terms of avoided loss. The value of ARELi can be obtained, by the difference 
between the economic loss when there is no safety system installed (e.g., when the 
safety critical unavailability is equal to 100%), and the economic loss associated to a 
certain safety system confIguration (a certain safety system's reliability level). The .1 
RELi value can be obtained by equation 4.3.5.17: 
MELi, i = 1,5 = fevent * Cevent * (CSU Cas .. O - CSU Ca3 .. i = 1.S) (4.3.5.17) I 
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5.6.1.3.2. Loss to Assets and Loss of Income due to Total Loss or Severe Damage 
• Loss of Assets 
The calculation of the loss to assets was made considering events that cause total or 
severe damage to the unit. According to WOAD", it is possible to get the following 
figures for all units world wide, during the period of 1980 to 1993: 
... 
Number of occurrence of fires that cause total damage to the unit: 2 
Number of occurrence of fires that cause severe damage to the structure: 3 
It was considered that the average cost associated with a total loss of FPSO's is equal 
to U$ 140,000,000 (information obtained from the Insurance Department of 
PETROBRAS). This value includes the cover of the cost items listed on table 
5.6.1.3.2.1 below. For severe damage it was considered a value equal to 50% of the 
cost associated with total loss. . 
The insurance cost (insurance premium) is taken into account as an yearly expense of 
the installation during the unit operation time (20 years), which is included in the 
operational costs (as shown on table 5.6.1.3.2.2) 
We will assume that the Oil company has made an insurance for total loss of the unit 
and that this insurance value will always cover the investment initially made, although 
Petro bras should in any case pay the deductible value of U$ 6,500,000 
(PETROBRAS Insurance Report'·) in any case. 
In our case we will consider that only the unit itself will be damaged in a total loss 
accident, excluding lines, wells and X trees, that would keep intact. Based on that and 
from table 5.6.1.3.2.2, the insured value will be the one to cover only the unit's loss, 
which will be equal to U$ 84,10E+06. 
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We will assume that after the occurrence of an accidental event, an FPSO will be out 
of operation during two years in case of total loss, and during one year in case of 
severe damage. We will also assume that the accident will occur in the first year of 
operation. 
Therefore, we will assume that if the accident occur the related loss will be equivalent 
the deferred production plus the deductible insurance value that must be paid. That 
means that after a total or severe loss ~f the unit, the Oil Company will receive an 
amount of money equivalent to the cost of rebuilding and reinstalling the same unit 
(100% for total damage and 50% for a severe damage). The value of this is equal to 
U$ 84,lOE+06 (total damage) and U$ 42,05E+06 (severe damage) respectively, as 
shown on tables 5.6.1.3.2.1 and 5.6.1.3.2.2, as accounted in frameworks A.8.1 to 
A.8.3 in Appendix 8, where Net Present Values are calculated. 
Regarding the environmental damage, it was assume that the Oil Company will be 
covered in case of any oil spill occurrence. 
All the values discussed in this section are taken into account in a specific software 
developed in PETROBRAs for performing feasibility studies which provides values in 
terms of net revenues - Net Present Values (NPV) (as shown in Frameworks A.8.1 to 
A.8.3 in Appendix 8). 
• Loss of income due to the occurrence of a dangerous situation 
Considering that after the occurrence of an accidental event, the FPSO will be out of 
operation during two years in case of total loss, and during one year in case of severe 
damage, it is necessary to take into account the loss of income in terms of deferred 
production (oil plus gas). All that information will be put together in the software 
mentioned above, together with the values related to the loss of assets in order to 
provide the results in terms of net revenues - Net Present Values (NPV) (as shown in 
Frameworks A.8.1 to A.8.3A in Appendix 8. Equation 4.3.5.18 was used for 
calculations. 
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Table 5.6.1.3.2.3 provides useful infonnation related to gas and oil production 
values, cost of the oil barrel, interest rates, etc, utilised for the calculations. The 
insurance cost (insurance premium) is taken into account as an yearly expense of the 
installation during the unit operation time (20 years), which is included in the 
operation costs. 
Therefore, based on the mentioned methodology and considering the specific FPSO 
under study, we will get the following values for net revenues: 
(1) Nonnal Production: 2,2701E+08 U$ (NPV) - 1,4237E+08 pounds 
(2) Two years of delayed production: 1 ,0974E+08 U$ (NPV) - 6,8821 E+07 pounds 
(3) One year of delayed production: 1,5837E+08 - 9,9319E+07 pounds 
Item Cost 
Exploration & Production Unit (E&PU) 15,00 
• acquisition 20,00 
• conversion 1,00 
• design 7,00 
• mooring -
• turret 18,00 
Subtotal 27,50 
Utilities 
• basic design 0,20 
• detailed engineering/building equipment 56,40 
Subtotal utilities 56,60 
Subtotal 
Other investments 184,60-84,10- 100,50 
TOTAL 267,90 
Table 5.6.1.3.2.1 - Nominal Investments (MM US) 
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Item 
Material 650 
Personnel wages (E&P unit, Drilling) 2800 
Third parties services 2000 
Supervision 560 
General charges 55 
Equipment inspection 24 
Utilities maintenance (except huge 850 
equipment) 
Turbo machine maintenance 1094,40 
Aerial transportation (PB personnel) 363,80 
Aerial transportation (load) 18,40 
Naval transportation (personnel) 29,10 
Personnel wages (Production) 2043,90 
Naval transportation (load) 547,50 
Tuck boat 328,50 
Diesel and lubrication fluid 489,5 
Water 166,1 
Insurance (E&P unit + UtiI.) 171,4 
Subtotal 12191,6 
Table 5.6.1.3.2.2 - Operational Costs (MM U$lyear) 
(PETROBRAS/Campos BasinlGEDEP/GBAR) 
Cost 
Therefore, we would have the following figures for the loss of net income in terms of 
NPV: 
• For Total Loss: 1,4237E+08- 6,8821E+07 - 7,3544E+07 pounds 
• For severe damage: 1,4237E+08 - 9,9319E+07 - 4,3046E+07 pounds 
These figures will give the following average loss of net income after the occurrence 
of an accidental event: 
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Average loss of net income = (2* 7,3544E+07+ 3*4,3046E+(7)/5 = 
= 5,52452E+07 pounds 
Therefore the consequences will be the loss of: 
Cevent = 5,52452E+07 pounds (NPV) 
-
Gas production 164000 m3/day 
Oil production 13047.35 barrels/day 
Gas price 0.08 U$I m3 
0.05 pounds/m3 
Oil price 15.5 U$/barrel 
9.72 pounds/barrel 
Return average time to normal production 50 min 
after spurious operation 
Blow-down average time due to a shut-down 15 min 
Interest rate 15% 
Operation time 20 years 
Unit Oil Storage Capability 55000 m3 
FRP (20 years) (correction factor) 6.25933 
Deductible insurance value U$ 6.500.000 
U nit Insured value U$ 140.000.000 
Table 5.6.1.3.2.3 - Data for Calculation of Economic Losses 
Therefore, we will have the following expression for the Expected Loss per year due 
to an accidental event (REL.vear) for each configuration considered in this Thesis: 
I RELyear =fevent * 5,52452E+07 * CSU 
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Now we will have to consider the loss of income due to spurious operation or 
unintended production shutdowns. 
5.6.1.3.3. Expected Loss per year due to Spurious Actuation 
The expected loss per year due to spurious operation or unintended production shut-
down (LSOyear ) will be given by equation 4.3.5.19, as following: 
Where: 
!.pur = Frequency of spurious failures 
Costspu = Cost of spurious failures 
" 
The frequency of spurious actuation was calculated for each configuration studied in 
this work as shown on frameworks A. 7.1 to A. 7 .11.3A. 
The cost of spurious actuation is calculated in terms of loss of production (oil loss 
plus gas loss), as described below. In fact, we would have an income loss due to 
postponed production during the production shutdown time, which could be 
calculated by the same methodology described before for deferred production. As this 
period of time is very short (equal to 50 min- estimation based on PETROSRA.S 
offshore experience), we will simplify this calculation and just consider this parcel as 
loss of production during this period of time. This is the period of time estimated as 
the required returning time to normal production after an unintended production 
shutdown. Therefore, we will have the following expressions: 
Oil loss due to spurious actuation (pounds) = oil production (barrels/day) ... oil 
price (pounds !barrel) ... fraction of time to return to normal production 
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Gas loss due to spurious actuation (pounds) = gas production (m3/day) '" gas price 
(pounds/day) * fraction of time to return to normal production + gas loss due to the 
burn of gas (pounds) 
Where: 
Gas loss due to the bum of gas (pounds) = gas production (m3/day) '" gas price 
(pounds/day) * fraction of time for plant ... blow-down 
Therefore, we would have: 
Gas loss due to spurious operation (pounds) = 164000 m3/day '" 0,05 pounds/m3 '" 
50 minI(24"'60 min) + 164000 m3/day * 0,05 pounds/m3 * 15min1(24 "'60min) 
5.7. Individual Risk Calculation 
5.7.1. General 
We have pointed out all over this work that risk assessment is one of the components 
to be considered in decision making processes related to industrial risks. Quantitative 
risk assessment came to reduce the subjectivity involved in those processes and may 
help all societal actors regarding questions associated with industrial safety. 
Regarding this context and trying to obtain reference values for the risks involved in 
the operation of offshore oil facilities in Brazilian continental shelf, data collected 
from Campos Basin (Brazilian Oil Company - PETROBRAS) are going to be 
presented. Campos Basin is the area responsible for most of Brazilian offshore oil 
production, where there are more than 30 platforms, some of them operating for more 
than 15 years. Therefore, it is assumed that it is the best area to represent Brazilian 
offshore oil "universe". 
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Based on data collected in PETROBAAS, risk indices were calculated, and a risk 
tolerability criterion for individual risk for offshore oil workers proposed. 
It is important to highlight that although some facilities present an acceptable societal 
risk level, they may impose a high-risk level to certain group of individuals. This 
worry about the most exposed population to risk is responsible for the requirement of 
individual risk assessment, which has been inserted in different international 
regulations. 
S.7.2. Fatal Accident Rate and Individual Risk Expressions 
As it was presented earlier in this work, an ordinary index used to express individual 
risk to workers is the Fatal Accident Rate - FAR, which is given by the following 
formula: 
Number of fatalities x 108 FAR = --.:..:.~-...::......:~----
Total Working - Hours 
The number 108 hours, which is used as a reference, is obtained by the following 
expression: 
108 = 1000 employees working x 2500 working hours per year x 40 years 
This index - FAR - can easily be converted into the individual risk using the following 
formula: 
FAR x Working -Hours per year 
Individual Risk =-----..:::..-------:~~-
108 
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5.7.3. CoUected Data and Calculations 
In all Fatal Accident Rate calculations, the number of fatalities associated with 
PETROBRAs employees was obtained from the PETROBRAs/SUSEMA Report. 
The Fatal Accident Rate presented in this Thesis is going to be exposed for two 
different periods of time. The Fatal Accident Rate from 1982 to 1993 has already 
been calculated (Faertes57) and the Fatal Accident Rate during the period of 1994 to 
1998 is going to be calculated in this Thesis. Data utilised for the calculation of both 
of them are shown below. Than, the total Fatal Accident Rate, calculated for the 
period of time from 1982 to 1998 is going to be presented. 
In order to evaluate the term ''total working hours", it was considered the average 
offshore unit's population, which was obtained from PETROBRAsl Campos Basin I 
NUPRO-N, NUPRO-NE, NUPRO-S, NUPRO-AB, NUPRO-MRL. We have 
considered that the total working-hours will be obtained by the product of this 
number times 24 hours (since we have assumed that an average population will be 
present at the offshore unit for 24 hours a day, and that those employees will be 
subject to risk for 24 hours per day). 
For the period of 1982 -1993 it was not possible to obtain the precise operation time 
of all units considered, once some (few of them) have been operating in different 
places in Brazil and there is no sufficient registration. However for this period of time, 
it was possible to fmd most of the necessary data. For the period of time from 1994 to 
1998, all the necessary data were available. Table 5.7.3.1 presents the operation time 
for 36 of the 41 platforms considered for the period of 1982 to 1993, as well as the 
unit's average popUlation. Table 5.7.3.2 shows the operation time for the period of 
time from 1994 to 1998, as well as the associated unit's average population for all 
units considered. 
From PETROBRAS Safety Indices Report and from PETROBRAs Injuries Resulting 
Accident Report (RAL), a total number of 65 fatalities was found during the period of 
1982 to 1993. This number includes accidents related to PETROBRAs employees 
who work in Campos Basin, for the Southwest Production Department (RPSE) , for 
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the Southwest Drilling Department, and for the Telecommunication Department 
(DITEL), as all of them work offshore. 
From those 65 fatalities, which happened in the "platform universe" during the period 
of 1982 to 1993, 37 refer to the major accident (blowout) that occurred in Enchova 
Platform (PCE-l) in 1984. From those 37 fatalities, 27 refer to PETROsRAs 
employees and 10 to third parties' employees. 
From data provided in PETROBRAs reports mentioned above, we have 3 fatalities (1 
in 1987 and the other 2 in 1991) in the period of 1982 to 1993, related only to the 
process activity itself. The others fatalities were related to accidents associated with 
falls, dropped objects, helicopter falls, diving, etc. Table 5.7.3.3 describes the 
accidents associated to process activi~y that occurred during 1982 to 1993. 
Using the total number of fatalities, equal to 65, as well as the number of fatalities 
associated with the process activity, i.e., 40 (37 from Enchova accident plus the 3 
mentioned above), the total working hours, the Fatal Accident Rate for the period of 
1982 to 1993 was calculated. 
As it is possible to see from Table 5.7.3.1, the total working-hours value for 36 
platforms is equal to 2.10 x 108 hours. As it was not possible to obtain suitable 
information for platforms PA-6, PA-l3, PA-16, SS-14, SS-23 and SS-24, an average 
working hours value was estimated, which is equal to 0.067x 108 hours for each one 
of them. Therefore, multiplying this value by 6 platforms, we have 0.36 x 108 hours. 
This makes a total working- hours value of 2.50 x 108 hours. 
Therefore the following Fatal Accident Rate values were obtained for the period ·of 
time from 1982 to 1993: 
65 x108 
Total FAR 1982 -1993 = 8 26 
2.5xlO 
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40x 108 
FAR related to process including PeE 19982 - 1993 = 8 = 16 
2.5x 10 
3 X 108 
FAR relaud 10 process, e:u:luding PCE 1982 - /993 = 8 = 1. 2 
2.5 xlO 
In order to calculate the Average Individual Risk (AIR) values, we have to consider 
the crew working offshore regime, whic~ comprises 14 days working offshore and 21 
free days. This regime corresponds to a value of 3384 working-hours per year, 
assuming that the average offshore population is present and exposed to risks for 24 
hours per day. 
Therefore, the following values were obtained for Average Individual Risk (AIR) for 
offshore workers, corresponding to the FAR values calculated above: 
26x3384 0-4 
AIR 1982-1993 = = 8.80 xl per year 108 . 
16x 3384 -4 
AIR related to process including PCE19982 - 1993 = 8 = 5.41x10 per year 
10 
1.2 x 3384 -5 
AIRrelaudlOprocess,e:u:ludingPCEl982 -/993 = 8 = 4.06 x 10 per year 
10 
For the period of 1994 to 1998, data were collected from different sources, as for 
example, from PETROBRAs software named SISIN, complemented by datasheets 
comprising third parties accident data. The data of our concern is associated with 
accidents occurred in Campos Basin during the period of 1994 to 1998.nclude 
accidents related to PETROBRAs employees who work in Campos Basin. 
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From these sources it was possible to fmd a total number of 12 fatalities during the 
period of 1994 to 1998. From those 12 fatalities, 2 refer to PETROBRAs employees 
and 10 to third parties' employees, as shown in tables 5.7.3.4 and 5.7.3.5 below. 
From data provided by PETROBRAs, it is possible to fmd 1 (one) single fatality 
related to the process activity itself that has occurred in 1997, as shown in table 
5.7.3.4, related only to the process activity itself. The others fatalities were related to 
accidents associated with falls, dropped Qbjects, helicopter falls, car accidents, etc. 
As it is possible to see from Table 5.7.3.2, the total working-hours value for the 
universe of offshore units considered, which corresponds to the number of units that 
have been operating during the period of 1994 to 1998, is equal to 1,1644E+08 
hours. 
Therefore the following Fatal Accident Rate values can be obtained for the period of 
time from 1994 to 1998: 
12 x108 Total FAR 1994-1998= 8 10,31 
1,1644xlO 
Ix 108 
FAR related to process 1994 • 1998 = 8 =0.86 
1.1644x 10 
In order to calculate the Average Individual .Risk (AIR) values, we have considered 
the same regime of 14 days working offshore and 21 free days. 
Therefore, the following values were obtained for Average Individual Risk (AIR) for 
offshore workers, corresponding to the FAR values calculated above: 
10.31 x 3384 -4 AIR 1994-1998 = 8 = 3.49 xlO per year 10 . 
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0.86x 3384 s AIR related to process 199.J ·1998 = 8 = 2.91xl0- per year 10 . 
Platform Average Population Operating Time (hours) 
In the Unit 
55-05 69 96576 
55-06 78 104376 
55-08 73 96576 
55-10 110 6840 
55-11 75 78624 
55-15 80 90840 
55-17 84 95952 
55-18 135 88344 
55-19 74 87480 
55-20 104 14424 
55-28 89 48528 
55-29 138 4608 
55-33 102 13176 
55-38 54 18192' 
PNA-l 122 90984 
PNA-2 96 87408 
PCH-l 100 84576 
PCH-2 143 88272 
PGP-l 146 105120 
PCP-l 67 43872 
PCP-2 73 43992 
PPG-l 150 43848 
PVM-l 65 40344 
PVM-2 65 43080 
PVM-3 47 39912 
PPM-l 181 81408 
PCE-l 70 78740 
55-01 68 105120 
55-37 72 20448 
55-43 98 9984 
55-16 100 100032 
55-21 90 89448 
55-22 110 82512 
SS-34 90 42384 
SS-36 70 16104 
PMLZ-l 27 10224 
TOTAL 2.1 x 108 hours 
Table 5.7.3.1 • Operating time and average population on board for units 
operating during the period of 1982 to 1993 
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Unit , Total Total Total Total 
: 
Average Operation Operation working 
Population Time (days) Time (hours) Hours 
P-09 : 114 1672 40128 4,5746E+06 
P-13 73,20 1672 40128 2,9374E+06 
PCH-I 133,60 129 3096 4, 1363E+05 
PCH-II 91,80 1672 40128 3,6838E+06 
PGP-I 166,40 3344 80256 1,3355E+07 
& SS-l1 
PNA-I 87,60 1672 40128 3,5152E+06 
PNA-II 145 1672 40128 5,8186E+06 
P-26 130 129 3096 4,0248E+05 
P-07 128 1672 40128 5, 1364E+06 
P-19 190 243 5832 1,1081E+06 
P-24 89 1672 40128 3,5714E+06 
P-25 150 1672 40128 6,0192E+06 
P-34 65 306 7344 4,7736E+05 
PVM-I 70 1672 40128 2,8090E+06 
PCP-IIIII 55 1672 40128 2,2070E+06 
PCP-II 67,60 1672 40128 2,7127E+06 
P-20 114,80 1672 40128 4,6067E+06 
PCE-I 114 1672 40128 4,5746E+06 
FPSO-2 89 1672 40128 3,5714E+06 
SS-06 (*) 90 1672 40128 3,6115E+06 
PPG-l 150,60 1672 40128 6,0433E+06 
PPM-l 216,40 1672 40128 8,6837E+06 
PVM-II 71,60 1672 40128 2,8732E+06 
PVM-III 65 1672 40128 2,6083E+06 
P-15 81,64 1672 40128 3,2762E+06 
P-18 116,10 1672 40128 4,6589E+06 
P-12 126,40 1672 40128 5,0722E+06 
P-08 102,2 1672 40128 4, 1011 E+06 
P-21 133 1260 30240 4,0219E+06 
Total 1,1644E+08 
Table 5.7.3.2 - Operating time and average population on board for units 
operating during the period of 1994 to 1998 
The Fatal Accident Rates associated to the period of 1982 to 1998 are provided 
below: 
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77 xlO8 Total FAR 1982-1998= 21.01 (l.I644xI08 + 2.5x 108 ) 
41x 108 
FAR ffllated to process including PeE 19982 - 1998 = 8 8 = 11. 19 (1.1644 xlO + 2.5x 10 ) 
4x 108 
FAR related 10 procen ,occluding peE 1982 - 19938 = 8 8 = l. 09 (l.l644xlO + 2.5 xlO ) 
Date of Number of Number of Unit Description 
Accident Fatalities- Fatalities-
Petrobras Third Parties 
Employees Employees 
1987 1 Pampo (PPM-I) During a hot-
work in a well-
head, there was 
an oil and gas 
leak, followed 
by a nre 
1991 1 Namorado-I During a purge 
operation in a 
vessel, an 
explosion has 
occurred 
1991 1 Pargo Fire in a water 
and oil 
separator 
Table 5.7.3.3 - Accident data during the period of 1982 to 1993 
Year Total Number of Fatalities- Total Number of 
Petrobras Employees Fatalities- Third Parties 
Employees 
1998 None 2 
1997 1 3 
1996 1 3 
1995 None 1 
1994 None 1 
Table 5.7.3.4 - Total number of fatalities during the period of 1994 to 1998 
Therefore, the following Average Individual Risk (AIR) values corresponding to the 
FAR were obtained for the period of 1994-1998: 
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21.01x 3384 -4 AIR ffllatedto process includingPCE 1994 - 1998 = 8 = 7.11xlO per year 
10 
Date of Accident Number of Number of Unit Description 
Fatalities- Fatalities-
Petrobras Third Parties 
Employees Employees 
7 April 98 1 - Ueliton S. P-25 Hit by marble blocks 
Moraes when repairing the 
(LOCMAR) unit's bathroom 
21 March 1998 1- Renato Gomes PCH-I Fall in the ocean 
Machado 
(Con tinen tall 
97 1- Marco Land Car Accident during 
Antonio Vieira transportation course from 1mbetiba 
to 1mboacica 
31 March 1997 1- Homero Higino Well RPS-232- During diving 
(Stalt Comer) Pirauna field operation to fix an X 
trees there was an 
accumulation of 
inflammable material 
and an explosion (the 
diver was cutting a 
[piece) 
17 July 1997 1- Paulo Cesar NS-09 Hit by a crane's cable 
Valen~ Pinto 
(Schabin Cury) 
29 August 1997 1- Manoel Tug - Maersk Hit by the buoy of the 
Rodrigues da Silva Rider anchor system during 
(crew) its launching 
29 August 1996 1 Land Car accident 
transportation 
21 September 1996 1- Raul Mire Tide vessel Oxygen absence when 
Hernandez trying to lift cement 
Martinez bags inside the silo 
(Java Boat) 
29 September 1996 1- Paulo Sergio S. Albacora field Helicopter fault -
Moraes going to NS-09. The 
1- Ornar first one has died 
Broseghini during the helicopter's 
(both from forced land of the on 
Schabimn Cury) water. The second one 
hasdis~ed. 
19 July 1995 1- Jos~ Dalmo Land- in a Hit by pipes during a 
Mar~ shipyard piling up operation 
(Gemat-AtIant.) with a empilhadeira!! 
8 November 1994 1- Reinaldo dos Land - Pipeline Fall during an Xtree 
Santos Storage Park repair 
Vangeler 
(ISA Asesessoria) 
Table 5.7.3.5 - Accident data during the period of 1994 to 1998 
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Period of time and type of FAR values Individual Risk values 
cakuhmWnpenfonned per year 
Total-1982 to 1993 26 8.80e-04 
Process activity including 16 5.41e-04 
peE accident - 1982 to 
1993 
Process activity excluding 1.2 4.06e-05 
peE accident -
1982 to 1993 
Total- 1994 to 1998 10.31 3.4ge-04 
... 
Process activity - 0.86 2.9Ie-05 
1994tol998 
Total- 1982 to 1998 21.01 7.lle-04 
Process activity excluding 1.09 3.6ge-05 
peE accident -
1982 to 1998 
Process activity including 11.19 3.7ge-04 
peE accident -
1982 tol998 
Table 5.7.3.6 - Fatal Accident Rates and Average Individual Risk values 
obtained from data collected in PETROBRAS 
11.19x 3384 -4 
AIRrelatedtoprocessincludingPCEl994-1998 = 8 =3.79xl0 per year 10 . 
1.09 x 3384 -5 
AIR related to process excluding PCE 1994 - 1998 = 8 = 3.69 xl 0 per year 
10 
5.8. Allocation Model Application 
Based on the cost equations (Life Cycle Cost x Availability) obtained for each one of 
the safety systems considered, on the expressions of average individual risk in terms 
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of availability variables, and on established targets, the optimisation model and the 
results achieved are going to be presented in this section. 
The life cycle cost equations, as a function of availability values were obtained for 
each one of the safety systems considered (turret's fire and gas detection systems., 
process plant's ftre and gas detection systems, pump room's ftre and gas detection 
systems, machine room's fife and gas detection systems, CPU system, pressure sensor 
systems and actuation (valve) systems) .. !he curves with the associated equations are 
shown in ftgures A9.1 to A9.7 in Appendix 9. They were obtained using the 
software -Microsoft Excel. Microsoft Office 1997. 
Frameworks A 7.1 to A 711.3A in Appendix 7 show the Life Cycle Cost calculations. 
Life cycle cost equations were obtained for each one of the considered systems, as 
shown in ftgures A9.1 to A9.7 in Appendix 9 and in framework A 10.2. The total 
Life Cycle Cost equation is then obtained by the sum of all these equations. 
Framework Al 0.1 shows the expressions related to the accidental events that impact 
the Temporary Safety Refuge (TSR) and escape routes, in terms of safety system's 
unavailability variables. The fmal expressions are obtained by the sum of each term 
shown in framework A 10.2. 
Framework AlO.2 also shows the expression of average individual risk in teOOs of 
the same availability variables presented in the total life cycle cost equation. 
Regarding the establishment of safety goals to be achieved, maximum tolerable values 
can be specifted for the expression of average individual risk and also for the 
equations, which express the frequency of impairment to the FPSO's main safety 
functions. 
The maximum tolerable values specifted for the average individual risk expression 
were based on the values obtained from data collected in PETROBRAs, presented in 
section 5.7.3. 
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Regarding the expressions presented for the frequency of impairment to main safety 
functions, they were based on the quantitative risk assessment previously performed. 
Therefore, expressions for the frequency of impairment to the Iemporary Safety 
Refuge (TSR) and to escape routes are presented also as a function of availability 
variables. The frequency of impairment to TSR expression was obtained from the 
initiator event EI-23 expression, as a function of availability variables. This event was 
identified in the quantitative risk assessment. as the single one that impacts the TSR. 
The frequency of impairment to escape routes' expression was obtained from the sum 
of all initiator events that cause any damage to them. They are also presented as a 
function of availability variables. 
In our case, the single scenario identified as the one that could impact the FPSO's 
structure was an explosion in the vessel's tanks. In this case no p~otection system 
exists to prevent this accident, therefore no expression as a function of safety 
variables was obtained. But the model is flexible and others expression can easily 
replace the ones presented in our model. 
The maximum tolerable frequency of impairment value used at first in the model is the 
classic one utilised in several risk assessment studies, and presented for the first time 
by NPD regulations (as mentioned in Chapter 2). 
These equations expressed as a function of availability variables are going to compose 
the restrictions of our optimisation problem. They are shown in Framework A.I0.1 
and in Framework A.1O.2, together with the cost expressions. 
The objective function of our optimisation problem will be the Life Cycle Cost 
equation expressed in terms of availability variables, which should be minimised. 
It is important to highlight that the values presented in this work should not be 
regarded as prescriptive safety criteria or prescriptive safety goals. Any other 
expression obtained from quantitative risk assessment studies and for costs x 
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reliability levels could replace the ones presented in the allocation model, as well as 
other desired safety goals. 
Therefore, the following attributes are considered in the allocation model: 
• Objective fun~tion: 
Cost function which will be minimised 
• Restrictions or Safety goal to be achieved: 
AIR :s; any of the values presented in Chapter III 
ITSR :s; 10-4 per year 
IER :s; 10-4 per year 
Where: 
AIR = Average Individual Risk expression 
ITSR = Frequency of Impairment to TSR 
IER = Frequency of Impairment to Escape Routes 
Tables A.II.I to A.II.I 0 in Appendix 11 shows the results obtained for the equations 
shown in framework five. The values obtained for the cost function expressed by the 
variable FeOST, the restrictions imposed (represented by the values of AIR, ITSR, 
IER), as well as the variable values found by the optimisation software are shown in 
these frameworks. 
It can be observed from Table 5.8.1 which presents a resume of the sensitivity analysis 
performed, that different Safety Integrity Level (SIL) values were addressed to the 
availability variables, as well as different restriction values. 
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The Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) with the other constraints of the model compose the 
safety goals to be achieved and that should be balanced in terms of costs. 
Chapter 8 will provide an analysis of the results obtained for the allocation model. 
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AIR < 3.7ge-04 AIR < 3.79e-()4 AIR < 3.79e-04 AIR < 3. 7ge-04 AIR < 3.79e-04 AIR < 3.7ge-04 AIR < 3.7g..04 
Cell ITSR<1D-4 ITSR<1D-4 ITSR<1D-4 AIR> 2.21e-(J4 AIR> 2.1ge-(J4 AlR=2.17s.44 AIR> 2. 17s.-D4 
IER< 10-4 IER < 10-4 IER < 10-4 ITSR<1D-4 ITSR<1D-4 ITSR<1D-4 ITSR<1D-4 
Name IER< 10-4 IER< 10-4 IER < 10-4 IER < 1D-4 
0.999 < x < 0.9999 0.9g < x < O.99g 0.90 < x < 0.99 O.go < x < 0.99 0.99 < x < 0.g99 0.999 < x < 0.9999 0.999 < x < 0.9999 
SIL 3 SIL2 SILt SIL 1 SIL2 SIL3 SIt 3 
FeOST -133072928.00 -133057504.00 194525696.00 194895200.00 -132951680.00 -133051744.00 -133086304.00 
(poundS) 
AIR 2.173323E-04 2.176586E-04 2.207949E-04 2.263829E-04 2.193722E-04 2.17521603E-04 2.17S217E-04 
IER 7.270396E-OS 7.335401E-OS 8.086S12E-OS 1.000043E-04 7.767994E-OS 7.29439760E-05 7.2S4659E-05 
rrSR 1.099493E-16 1.095505E-14 1.067329E-12 3.368321E-12 4.394308E-14 1 .20508484E-16 1.097114E-16 
xfl 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-Ol 9.900000E-01 9.649899E-01 9.902971 E-01 9.99187656E-01 9.99900000E-01 
xf2 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.899445E-01 9.989985E-01 9.99899988E-01 9.99900000E-01 
xf3 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.899997E-01 9.990000E-01 9.99900000E-01 9.99900000E-01 
xf4 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.99900000E-01 9.99900000E-01 
~ 
-....J 
xgl 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.990000E-Ol 9.99900000E-01 9.99900000E-01 
xg2 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.885686E-01 9.989368E-Ol 9.9!t899566E-Ol 9.99900000E-Ol 
xg3 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-Ol 9.900000E-01 9.899997E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.99900000E-01 9.99900000E-01 
xg4 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-O 1 9.900000E-01 9.899989E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.99900000E-01 9.99900000E-01 
pl 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.684451 E-01 9.959523E-01 9.99890234E-01 9. 99900000E-O 1 
p2 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.886592E-01 9.988125E-Ol 9.99899261 E-01 9.99900000E-01 
p3 9.999000E-01 9. 990000E-O1 9.900000E-01 9.899576E-Ol 9.989947E-Ol 9.99899983E-Ol 9.99900000E-Ol 
p4 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-Ol 9.858222E-Ol 9.984114E-Ol 9.99896292E-01 9.99900000E-Ol 
v1 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.900000E-Ol 9.900000E-Ol 9.900020E-Ol 9.99161370E-Ol 9.99900000E-01 
v2 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.900000E-O 1 9.989811 E-01 9.99899718E-01 9.99900000E-01 
Y3 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-Ol 9.900000E-01 9. 989996E-0 1 9.99899996E-01 9.99900000E-Ol 
v4 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-Ol 9.900000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.989505E-Ol 9.99899525E-01 9.99900000E-01 
C 9.997393E-01 9.979083E-01 9.900000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.978750E-Ol 9.99000018E-01 9.97575426E-01 
Table 5.8.1 - Final Results Obtained for FCOST, AIR, ITSR and Safety Systems' Availabilities 
AIR < or:: 3.798-04 AIR < or = 3.7ge-04 AIR < or = 3.7ge-04 
Cell AIR> or=2.17~ ITSR<1D-4 ITSR <1D-4 
ITSR<1D-4 IER< 10-4 IER< 10-4 
Nam. IER < 10-4 0.1111 < x < 0.111111- SlL 2 - for gas d.hfction, pressur. 0.1111 < x < 0.999 - SlL 2 - for gas dehfction, pressur. 
0.1199 < x < 0.11999 sensor and actuation syst.",s sensor and actuation syst.",s 
SIL 3 O.HII < x < 0.9H II - SIL 3 - for fir. dehfction system 0.1199 < x < 0.1199 11- SIL 3 - for fire dehfction sys"'" 
0.H9 < x < O.IIH 9 - SIL 3 - for CPU syst.", CPU system = 0.111199 
FeOST -132,276,064.00 -133,024,320.00 -133,029,936.00 
AIR 2.176000E-04 2.174166E-04 2.17 4009E-04 
IER 7.248158E-05 7.308563E-05 7.309841E-OS 
ITSR 1.096130E-16 1.098488E-14 1.098680E-14 
xf1 9.999000E-01 9.999000E-Ol 9.999000E-Ol 
xf2 9.999000E-Ol 9.999000E-Ol 9.999000E-Ol 
xf3 9.999000E-Ol 9.999000E-Ol 9.999000E-Ol 
xf4 9.99900oE-01 9.999000E-Ol 9.999000E-Ol 
~ 
00 
xg1 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 
xg2 9.999000E-Ol 9. 990000E-O 1 . 9.990000E-Ol 
xg3 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 
xg4 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.990000E-01 
p1 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 
p2 9. 999000E-01 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 
p3 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 
p4 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 
v1 9.999000E-01 9. 990000E-O1 9.990000E-Ol 
v2 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 
V3 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 
v4 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 
C 9.966814E-Ol 9.997252E-Ol 9.999000E-Ol 
Table 5.8.1 - Final Results Obtained for FCOST, AIR, ITSR and Safety Systems' Availabilities (cont.) 
6. Conclusion 
6.1. Analysis of Results 
The attributes considered in the allocation model were: 
1. Cost 
2. Individual Risk 
3. Frequency of Impairment to main safety functions (impairment to the Iemporary 
Safety Refuge (TSR), escape routes and to structure) 
The second and third attributes represent the "safety goals" to be achieved. 
The second attribute is also essential to the analysis, since precluding the economic 
dimension involved in the evaluation of the industrial risks would lead to conclusions 
that would not be supported by a consistent basis, once the whole frame of the losses 
incurred due to failures would not be considered. They also constitute constraints, 
and once more, if there is no constraints to achieve the various reliability levels, we 
would choose "perfect systems", with the maximum availability and lowest related 
consequences in case of failure. 
Therefore, the element cost appears as a mediator, as an element to promote a 
reasonable balance between mathematical and technological solutions and what is 
really feasible to achieve. In our case, the cost function is also taking into account all 
losses involved in an accident scenario. 
Based on the cost equations (Life Cycle Cost x Availability) obtained for each one of 
the safety systems considered, on the expressions of average individual risk in terms 
of availability variables, and on established targets, the optimisation model and the 
results achieved are going to be analysed in this section. 
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The objective function of our optimisation problem, as we have already mentioned in 
the last section of Chapter 5 was the Life Cycle Cost equation expressed in terms of 
availability variables, which should be minimised. 
The following attributes were considered in the allocation model: 
• Objective function: 
Cost junction - to be minimised 
• Restrictions or Safety goal to be achieved: 
AIR ~ any of the values presented in Chapter 2 or section 5.7.3 
ITSR ~ 10-4 per year 
IER ~ 10-4 per year 
Where: 
AIR = Average Individual Risk expression 
ITSR = Frequency of Impairment to IS.E 
IER = Frequency of impairment to Escape Routes 
Tables A.II.I to A.ll.IO shows the results obtained for the equations shown in 
framework five. The values obtained for the cost function expressed by the variable 
FCOST, the restrictions imposed (represented by the values of AIR, ITSR, IER), as 
well as the variable values found, using the optimisation software are shown in these 
frameworks. 
It can be observed from Table 5.8.1, which presents a resume of the sensitivity 
analysis performed, that different Safety Integrity Level (SIL) values were addressed 
to the availability variables. as well as different restriction values. 
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t-.J 
w 
.... 
AIR < 3.7h-04 AIR < 3.1ge-04 AIR < 3.1ge-04 AIR < 3.1ge-04 AIR < 3.79e-04 AIR < 3.'1h4U 
Cell ITSR <10-4 ITSR <10-4 ITSR <10-4 AIR> 2.21...04 AIR> 2.111e-04 AIR = 2.175e-64 
IER < 10-4 IER < 10-4 IER < 10-4 ITSR <10-4 ITSR <10-4 ITSR <10-4 
Nam. IER < 10-4 IER < 10-4 IER < 10-4 
0.999 < x < 0.9999 0.99 <x<0.999 0.90 <x <0.99 0.90 < x < 0.99 0.99 < x < 0.999 0.999 < x < 0.9999 
SIL3 SIL2 SILt SiLt SIL2 SIL3 
FeOST -133072928.00 -133057504.00 194525696.00 194895200.00 -132951680.00 -133051744.00 
(pounds) , .. , 
AIR 2.173323E-04 2.176586E-04 2.207949E-04 2.263829E-04 2.193722E-04 2. 17521603E-04 
IER 7.270396E-05 7.335401 E-05 8.086512E-05 1.000043E-04 7.767994E-05 7.29439760E-05 
ITSR 1.099493E-16 1.095505E-14 1.067329E-12 3.368321E-12 4.394308E-14 1.20508484E-16 
xf1 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.649899E-01 9.902971 E-01 9.99187656E-01 
xf2 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.899445E-01 9.989985E-01 9.99899988E-01 
xf3 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.899997E-01 9.990000E-01 9.99900000E-01 
xf4 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.99900000E-0 1 
xg1 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.900000E-0 1 9.990000E-01 9.99900000E-or 
xg2 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.885686E-01 9.989368E-01 9.99899566E-01 
~3 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.899997E-01 9.990000E-01 9.99900000E-01 
xg4 9. 999000 E-O1 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.899989E-01 9.990000E-01 9.99900000E-01 
p1 9.999000E-01 9. 990000E-0 1 9.900000E-01 9.684451 E-01 9.959523E-01 9.99890234E-01 
p2 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.886592E-01 9.988125E-01 9.99899261 E-01 
p3 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-0 1 9.900000E-01 9.899576E-01 9.989947E-01 9.99899983E-01 
~ 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.858222E-01 9.984114E-01 9.99896292E-01 
v1 9. 999000E-O 1 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.900020E-01 9.99161370E-01 
v2 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.989811 E-01 9.99899718E-01 
v3 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.989996E-01 9.99899996E-01 
v4 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.989505E-01 9.99899525E-01 
C 9.997393E-01 9.979083E-01 9.900000E-01 9.900000E-01 9.978750E-01 9.99000018E-01 
Table 5.S.1 • Final Results Obtained for FCOST, AIR, ITSR and Safety Systems' Availabilities 
AIR < 3.7h-04 
AIR> 2. 17s.-D4 
ITSR<10-4 
IER < 10-4 
0.999 < x < 0.9999 
SIL 3 
-133086304.00 
.... 
2.175217E-04 
7.254659E-05 
1.097114E-16 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.99900000E-01 
9.97575426E-01 
N 
W 
N 
AIR < or = 3.711e-04 AIR < or = 3.711e-04 AIR < or = 3. 7ge-04 
Cell AIR> or = 2. 176e-64 ITSR<ID-4 ITSR<1D-4 
ITSR<1D-4 IER < 10-4 IER < 1D-4 
Name IER < 10-4 0.99 < x < 0.9g9 - SIL 2 - for gas detection, pressure 0.99 < x < 0.999 - SIL 2 - for gas detection, pressure 
0.999 < x < 0.9999 sensor and actuation systems sensor and actuation systems 
SIL3 0.999 < x < 0.999 9 - SIL 3 - for fire detection system 0.999 < x < 0 .• 9 - SIL 3 - for fire detection system 
0.999 < x < 0.999 9 - SIL 3 - for CPU system CPU system = 0.9999 
FeOST -132,276,064.00 -133,024,320.00 -133,029,936.00 
AIR 2.176000E-04 2. 1741 SSE-04 2. 174009E-04 
IER 7.248158E-05 7.308563E-05 7.309841 E-05 
rrSR 1.096130E-16 1.098488E-14 1.098680E·14 
xfl 9.999000E-Ol 9.999000E-01 9.999000E-01 
xf2 9.999000E-Ol 9.999000E-Ol 9.999000E-01 
xf3 9. 999000E-O 1 9.999000E-Ol 9.999000E-01 
xf4 9.999000E-Ol 9.999000E-Ol 9.999000E-01 
Xgl 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E·01 
xa2 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol , 9.990000E-01 
xg3 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-01 9.990000E-01 
Xg4 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-01 9.990000E-01 
pl 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-01 
p2 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-01 
p3 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-01 
p4 9.999000E-01 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-01 
v1 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-01 9.990000E-01 
v2 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E·01 
v3 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-01 
v4 9.999000E-Ol 9.990000E-Ol 9.990000E-01 
c 9.966814E-01 9.997252E-01 9.999000E-01 
Table 5.S.1 - Final Results Obtained for FCOST, AIR, ITSR and Safety Systems' Availabilities (cont.) 
I 
I 
, 
I 
J 
As it is possible to conclude from Table 5.8.1, it is not possible for that FPSO to 
achieve the average individual risk target of 2.91e-05 per year, calculated in Chapter 
5, section 5.7.3 for the individual risk value associated with process activity (1994-
1998). Even if we have SIL levels greater than 0.9999 or even equal to 1 (100% of 
availability) for all its safety systems, we would not be able to achieve this goal The 
equivalent value of individual risk if we have a hypothetical availability value equal 
to 1 for all safety systems considered, will be equal to 2. I 7292E-04. 
In order to achieve lower individual risk values, it would be necessary to implement 
several measures in the installation, to reduce the number of fatalities. We could 
mention the installation of additional passive and active protection measures, as well 
as effective sheltering and escaping procedures and resources. It may be expressed in 
the average societal or individual risk expressions as probabilities that would provide 
a lower value for scenarios frequencies or a lower number of fatalities. 
We have run some examples (shown in A.Il.} to A.Il.lO and in Table 5.8.1) using a 
maximum value for the individual risk equal to 3.7ge-04, which is the value 
calculated in Chapter VI (table 5.7.3.6) for the individual risk associated with 
process activity, including PCE accident, during the period of 1992 to 1994. That 
value and even lower values can be achieved by the installation under analysis. 
From Table 5.8.1 we can observe that the greater the value of safety system's 
availability, more negative is the value of the cost function obtained, meaning that 
the greater the achieved benefit is. 
It is explained by the fact that, as we are dealing with big values involved with the 
loss of oil and gas, e.g., expressed in terms of loss of income due to deferred oil and 
gas production, as well as in terms of damage to assets in case of a major accident, 
any improvement in the critical safety availability will represent a significant benefit 
for the operator. 
It can be observed that when addressing values in the range of 0.90 to 0.99, 
corresponding to the lowest acceptable SIL level- SIL-I, there will be no benefit, 
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although the unit presents safety systems installed, once the losses incurred will 
prevail. 
Then we have varied the values of the acceptable ranges for the individual risk (A 
11.4 4 to AI1.8) to see how this variation impacts the fmal values of the function 
FeOST and the variable values. It can be observed that the requested critical safety 
availability values are loosen, but as expected, the benefit obtained is lower. 
Tables Al1.9 to Al1.l0 present other variations, e.g., different SIL levels are 
addressed to the safety systems, demonstrating that the model allows the analyst to 
evaluate the benefits achieved with different reliability levels addressed to any safety 
system considered. The analyst can also vary the restrictions expressions and target 
values in order to arrive to the best optimisation solution, regarding what is 
reasonably practicable to implement. 
The model allows the analyst to vary the values of AIR and ITSR and fER, reliability 
levels (SIL levels), performing sensitivity analyses, in order to make a balance 
between the benefits and the reliability levels achieved. The model also allows the 
analyst to have a whole picture of the facility in terms of safety goals previously 
established. It also provides a clear view of the vulnerable points of the considered 
unit in terms of safety. 
It is important to highlight that any other expression obtained from quantitative risk 
assessment studies and for costs x reliability levels could replace the ones presented 
in the allocation model, as well as other desired safety goals. 
6.2. General Comments 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the intention of the proposed model was to provide a 
"safety overview" of the installation, taking into account the safety systems installed, 
and safety goals previously established. 
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As we have demonstrated, the model provides an evaluation of how far the 
installation is in terms of risk levels or safety levels, from the established safety 
targets. 
The result of the proposed approach was presented in terms of information related to 
costs, risk and maximum tolerable frequencies of impairment to the main safety 
functions of a particular offshore unit design (in our case, a Boating froduction 
Storage Qffloading- FPSO). It was presented as a function of the availability of its 
safety systems, and components and structure. Additionally, the methodology 
presented in this Thesis provides information about alternative design configurations 
and operational practices. 
Regarding the objective proposed in Chapter 4, the following comments are 
presented: 
The objective of the model that was developed in this Thesis is: 
(1) To propose a feasible model to allocate reliability and risk criteria for the main 
safety functions of an offshore unit in a self-consistent manner. This model 
would provide a method for evaluating the global safety of an industrial facility 
regarding aspects as safety design configurations (passive and active protection) 
and operation procedures (test and maintenance). It will provide a method for 
design engineers to establish minimum reliability levels for safety functions in 
order to achieve safety targets previously defined. 
(2) To apply the proposed methodology, through numerical examples. 
(3) To evaluate the generated results. identifying the vulnerabilities and performing a 
sensitive analysis. with the variation of the goal setting values. 
(4) To demonstrate the if it is possible or not to achieve the proposed criteria for the 
specific installation. providing a detailed look of the unit design in terms of the 
reliability of safety functions and the adequacy of active and passive protection. 
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And the section still mentions that the model is flexible, in such a way that it allows 
the analyst to include other variables that were not included in this study, such as the 
probability of a successful or unsuccessful sheltering, probability of a successful or 
unsuccessful, etc. 
The model presented has achieved all these goals. 
The model presented allows the analyst to propose his own safety goals and evaluate 
. 
if it is feasible to reach them, based on design or operational targets. 
The fact that you can achieve other goal levels, e.g. availability goals for the safety 
functions, from top level goals (individual risk criterion) is an important task, once it 
provides a better understanding of the safety importance of each one of the various 
safety systems and the respective cost-effectiveness improvements. 
The approach presented in this Thesis will then be a problem of determining the 
optimum design configuration for safety functions of an offshore unit, considering 
simultaneously the risk measures and costs. 
In essence, the approach will be to determine the "optimum design" of the plant in 
terms of safety (which in our case were based on Safety Integrity Levels to be 
achieved for the safety systems together with the satisfaction of the proposed 
constraints), considering simultaneously the established global measure and the costs 
to achieve it. 
Regarding the essential elements of the analysis presented in Chapter 4, the 
following comments are presented below: 
1) The establishment of a global measure of unit's safety performance (top level 
safety indices: which in our case was given by the individual risk to offshore 
workers and the maximum tolerable frequency of impairment to the main 
safety functions of the FPSO; 
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• In this work, the fIrst element mentioned above has consisted of a set of two 
components: a proposed individual risk criterion for Brazilian offshore workers, 
which was calculated based on data collected in Brazilian Oil Company 
(Petrobras), which as a monopolist company (until the data of calculation) is far 
representative of the Brazilian offshore oil production "universe"; and of the 
maximum tole~able frequency of impairment to the main safety functions, which 
value is based on HSE Guidelines (HSE 
. 
• Therefore, the [rrst step of the analysis was the collection of data related to 
fatalities occurred in oil platforms (including workers from PETROBRAs and 
from others companies, who work for PETROBRAS). After obtaining this data, 
it was possible to calculate the associated "fatal Accident Rate" (FAR) and the 
Average Individual Risk (AIR), as shown in Table 5.7.3.6. 
• The individual risk was calculated for the specific case of Brazilian offshore 
units, although the values obtained are very compatible with other values 
presented world wide for individual risks as shown in Table 5.7.3.6. 
2) The "objective function": that in our case was defined as the cost function 
which was minimised; 
• The total life cycle cost equation, as a function of availability values was 
provided by the sum of the life cycle cost equations obtained for each one of the 
safety systems considered (turret's fIre and gas detection systems, process plant's 
fire and gas detection systems, pump room's fIre and gas detection systems, 
machine room's frre and gas detection systems, CPU system, pressure sensor 
systems and actuation (valve) systems). The curves with the associated equations 
were obtained using the software -Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Offtce 1997. 
3) a model for relating the global measure of plant's safety performance to specillc 
set of measures of plant performance: which was provided as average societal 
and individual risk expressions as a function of the availability of safety 
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systems, as well as the expressions of frequency of impairment to the main 
safety functions, which constituted the udecision varillbles"; 
• Regarding the expressions presented for the frequency of impairment to main 
safety functions, they should be based on quantitative risk assessments previously 
performed. Therefore, expressions for the frequency of impairment to the 
Temporary Safety Refuge (TSR), to escape routes and to structure can be 
presented as a function of availability variables. 
4) A method for allocating values to these specific measures of the unit safety 
performance (availability of safety functions) in order to optimise the plant 
design and satisfy the global measures established: the allocation model 
proposed. 
• In order to solve model, we have used the optimisation software named Solver, 
provided by Microsoft (1997), which is a very simple one. Other methods could 
be used to solve the equations, as genetic algorithms. 
We can conclude that the proposed objective of this work was achieved and that it 
confirms the technical feasibility of allocating reliability and risk in a self-consistent 
way. 
We hope that this work can be useful to purposes of evaluating the global safety of 
offshore oil units, and maybe can be extended to other industrial facilities. 
We hope that the values presented here for the individual risk for offshore workers in 
Brazilian oil fields, can add a contribution to the wide debate that has been being 
promoted all over the world around risk targets and risk decision making processes. 
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CPU I I Valve I I PS-lIEI-I ~ (vI) 
5.3HE-03 YES=9.9000E-OI YES=9.800E-OI YF..S=9.791HE-Ol EI-l.l.l 5.1110E-03 
N0=2.08200-02 VF..S=9.9464F..-OI EI-1.1.2 1.0809E-04 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464F..-Ol EI-l.1.3 5.7935E-07 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-l.lA 3.1219E-09 
N0z2.0000E-02 YES=9.7918E-Ol EI-l.2.1 1.0431E-04 
N0=2.08200-02 VF..S=9.9464F..-Ol EI-1.2.2 2.2060E-06 
~ N0:5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464F..-Ol EI-1.2.3 1.1823E-08 
VI N0:5.3597E-03 ~I-1.2A 6.3712E-11 
NO=U)OOE-02 YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.7918E-01 EI-1.3.1 5.1626E-05 
N0=2.08200-02 YES=9.9464F..-0\ EI-l.3.2 1.0919E-06 
N0:5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464F..-OI EI-1.3.3 5.8520E-09 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-l.3A 3.1534E-11 
N0=2.00000-02 YES=9.79I 8E-01 EJ-1.4.1 1.0536E-06 
N0=2.08200·02 YES=9.9464F..-OI EI-1.4.2 2.2283E-08 
N0:5.3597E-03 VF..S=9.9464F..·O 1 . EI-1.4.3 1.1943E-10 
NO=5.3597E-03 EI-1.4A 6.4356E-13 
Figure A.I.I Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event I 
N 
.a;.. 
01 
CPU 
I I 
Valve 
I I PS-41EI -9 I (v4) 
5.26E-04 YES=9.9000E-OI YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.8227E-0I 
I NO: 1.1128E-02 
N0=2.0000Il-02 YES=9.8227E-OI 
I NO= 1.1728E-02 
NO:I.000Il-02 YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.8227E-OI 
I INO=1.1128E-02 
N0:2.OOOOIl-02 YES--9.8227E-0I 
1NO: 1.1728E-02 
YES=9.9464E-OI 
INO=5.3597E-03 
YES=9.9464E-OI 
IN0:5.3597E-03 
YES=9.9464E-OI 
IN0:5.3597E-03 
YES=9.9464E-OI 
1,"0=5.3597E-03 
~ 
EI-9.1.1 
EI-9.1.2 
EI-9.1.3 
EI-9.2.1 
EI-9.2.2 
EI-9.2.3 
EI-9.3.1 
EI-9.3.2 
EI-9.3.3 
EI-9.4.1 
EI-9.4.2 
EI-9.4.3 
Figure A.L2 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Ssytemic Event Tree of the Initiator Event 9 
5.0128E-04 
8.9987E-06 
4.8490E-08 
1.0230E-05 
1_8365E-07 
9.8960E-10 
5.0634E-06 
9.0896E-08 
4.8980E-10 
1_0333E-07 
1.8550E-09 
9.9960E·12 
6.22E·03 
~ 
-..J 
CPU I I Valve I PS-lIEI-lO I (vi) 
YES=9.9000E-OI YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.79181l-01 
IN0=2.08200-02 
N0=2.0000Il-02 YES=9.79181l-01 
INO=2.08201l-02 
NO=I.000E-02 YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.7918E-OI 
I IN0=2.08201l-02 
N0=2.OOOOIl-02 YES=9.7918E-OI 
1N0=2.08201l-02 
Io!~e (Xfl)l 
Detection 
YES=9.9464E-O I 
IN0=5.35971l-03 
YES=9.9464E-OI 
IN0=5.35971l-OJ 
YES=9.94641l-01 
IN0=5.35971l-03 
YES=9.9464E-OI 
1N0=5.35971l-03 
c:J 
EI-lO.l.l 
EI-IO.1.2 
EI-lO.l.3 
EI-IO.2.l 
EI-IO.2.2 
EI-IO.2.3 
EI-IO.3.1 
EI-IO.3.2 
EI-IO.3.3 
EI-IO.4.l 
EI-1O.4.2 
EI-IO.4.3 
Figure A.l.3 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 14 
5.9090E-03 
1.2497E-04 
6.7342E-07 
1.2059E-04 
2.5504E-06 
1.3743E-08 
5.9687E-05 
1.2623E-06 
6.8022E-09 
1.2181E-06 
2.5762E-08 
1.3882E-10 
6.18E-04 
~. 
00 
CPU I I Valve I PS-2/EI-ll I (v2) 
YES=9.9000E-OI YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.6J82E-Ol 
I [~O=3.6178E-02 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.6382E-Ol 
INO=3.6178E-02 
NO=l.OOOE-02 YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.6382E-Ol 
IN0=3.6178E-02 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.6382E-Ol 
INO=3.6178E-02 
YES=9.9464E-Ol 
I NO=5.3597E-03 
YES=9.9464E-Ol 
IN0=5.3597E-03 
YES=9.9464E-Ol 
IN0=5.3597E-03 
YES=9.9464E-Ol 
I NO=S.3597E-03 
~ 
EI-Il.l.l 
EI-l1.1.2 
EI-ll.1.3 
EI-ll.2.l 
EI-l1.2.2 
EI-ll.2.3 
EI-l1.3.1 
EI-ll.3.2 
EI-ll.3.3 
EI-l1.4.1 
EI-l1.4.2 
EI-l1.4.3 
Figure A.l.4 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 11 
5.nB9E-04 
2.157GE-05 
1.162GE-07 
1.1794E-05 
4.4032E-07 
2.3727E-09 
5.8373E-06 
2. 1793E-07 
1.1744E-09 
1.1913E-07 
4.447GE-09 
2.39G7E-11 
2.25E-04 
IV 
~ 
CPU 
I I Valve I PS-4IEI-12I (v4) 
YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.8227E-OI I NO= I. 7728E-02 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.8227E-OI 
INO=I.77281l-02 
NO=I.000E-02 YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.8227E-OI 
INO=I.7728E-02 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.8227E-OI 
INO=I.7728E-02 
YES=9.9464E-OI 
IN0=5.3597E-03 
YES=9.9464E-OI 
[N0=5.3597E-03 
YES=9.9464E-OI 
IN0=5.3597E-OJ 
YES=9.9464E-OI 
I N0=5.3597E-03 
~ 
EI-12.1.1· 
EI-12.1.2 
EI-12.1.3 
EI-12.2.1 
EI-12.2.2 
EI-12.2.3 
EI-12_3.1 
EI-12.3.2 
EI-12.3.3 
EI-12.4.1 
EI-12.4.2 
EI-12.4.3 
Figure A.IS Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 12 
2.1443E-04 
3.8493E-06 
2.0742E-08 
4.3760E-06 
7.8556E-08 
4.2331E-10 
2.1659E-06 
3.8881E-08 
2.0952E-10 
4.4202E-08 
7.9350E-10 
4.2758E-12 
r __ CPU I I 
Valve 
(vi) 
5.26E.()4 YES=9.9000E-OI YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.94641l-01 
IN0:5.3591E-03 
N0:2.()()(J()fl-02 YES=9.94641l-01 
INO:5.3591E-03 
N 
VI 
0 
NO: \.OOOIl-02 YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.94641l-01 
INO=5.3591E-03 
N0:2.()()(J()fl-02 YES=9.9464Il-O I 
IN0=5.3591E-03 
Figure A.l.6 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 1~ 
~ 
EI-l3.1.1 
EI-l3.l.2 
EI-l3.2.l 
El-13-2.2 
El-13.3.1 
EI-l3.3.2 
EI-l3.4.1 
EI-l3A.2 
5.0759E-04 
2. 7352E-06 
1.0359E-Q5 
5.5820E-08 
5. 1272E-06 
2.7628E-08 
1.0464E-Q7 
5.6384E-10 
CPU I I Valve 
5.261l·04 YES=9.9000E·O) YES=9.800E-0I YES=9.9464E-OI 
-----_._-----
\ NO=5.3597E·03 
N0=2.0000E·02 YES=9.9464E·O I 
\ NO=5.3597E-03 
tv 
VI 
.... 
NO=J.OOOIl-02 YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.9464E-OI 
\N0=5.3597E-03 
N0=2.OOCJOIl.02 YES=9.9464E-O I 
IN0=5.3597E-03 
Figure A.t.7 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event I.: 
~ 
EI-14.1.1 
EI-14.1.2 
EI-14.2.1 
EI-14.2.2 
EI-14.3.1 
EI-14.3.2 
EI-14.4.l 
EI-14.4.2 
5.0759E-04 
2.7352E-06 
1.0359E-05 
5.5820E-08 
5.1272E-06 
2.7628E-08 
1.0464E-07 
5.6384E-10 
CPU 
\ I Valve I PS-2/EI-15\ Fire (xfl) (v2) Detection I 
3.26E-04 YES=9.9000E-OI YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.7918E-OI 
!NO=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI 
[NO=S.3597E-OJ 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.7918E-OI 
! NO=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI 
N ! N()':S.3597E-03 
VI 
N 
NO=I.000E-02 YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.7918E-OI 
I !N0=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-Ol INO=S.3597E-03 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.7918E-OI 
IN0=2.0820E-02 YES--9.9464E·OI 
INO=S.3597E-03 
Figure A.l.S Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 15 
~ 
EI-15.1.1 
EI-15.1.2 
EI-15.1.3 
EI-15.2.l 
EI-15.2.2 
EI-15.2.3 
EI-15.3.1 
EI-15.3.2 
EI-15.3.3 
EI-15.4.l 
EI-15.4.2 
EI-15.4.3 
3.0484E-04 
1.1381E-QS 
6_1329E-08 
6.2213E-06 
2.3227E-Q7 
1.2S16E-Q9 
3.0792E-06 
1_1496E-Q7 
6.1949E-10 
6.2841E-08 
2_3462E-Q9 
1_2643E-11 
N 
VI 
I.M 
Scenario Frequency Cakulation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 16 
This event (gas stack accumulation) was not simulated due to a hole made in the stack top. incresaing the ventilation and avoiding gas accumulation 
Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 17 
Initiator 
Event 17 
1.42E-03 
[_. -to "-J 
EI-17.1 1.42E-03 
In this event no gas and fire detection systems were considered. No protection system was identified. 
File--~ 
Name I 
EIAI7RSB. Em 17RSB. 
The frequency used in this event was equal to 114 of the calculated frequency (the event was calculated for 4 different release points- 1 
17B, 17C and 170) 
Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Sytemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 19 
Initiator 
Event 19 
2.16E-03 
[-10---1 
EI-19.1 2. 16E-03 
In this event no gas and fire detection systems were considered. No protection system was identified. 
File' . 
Name 
EIAI9RSB, EmI9RSB, 
The frequency used in this event was equal to 114 of the calculated frequency (the event was calculated for 4 different release points- 1 
19B.I9C and 19D). 
Figure A.l.8A Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Events 16, 17, 18 and 19 
l7A, 
19A 
~ 
Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 20 
Initiator 
Event 20 
1.01£-03 
[-iO· 
EI-20.l 1.02E-03 
In this event no gas and fire detection systems were considered. No protection system was identified. 
File l 
Name 
EIA20RSB, EIB20RSB, 
El:-:20RSB, EID20RSB 
The frequency used in this event was equal to 114 of the calculated frequency (the event was calculated for 4 different release points- I 
20A, 20B, 20C and 20D). 
Scenary Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 21 and 22 
20A 
These events were simulated as explosions in oil storage tanks. For each one of the tanks a file exists, all of them with same frequency of occurrence 
addressed. The files are: EI-TQ** IC, IP, IS,2C, 2P, 2S, 3C, 4C, 4P, 4S, 5C, 5P and 5S. 
Figure A.l.9 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Events 20, 21 and 22 
CPU 
\ \ 
Valve \ PS-lIEI-IS\ Fire (xf3) ~ (vi) Detection 
9.50E-05 YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-O 1 YES=9.7918E-OI EI-IS.Ll. 9.0250E-05 
I NO=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-IS.1.2 1.9087E-06 
INO=5.3597E-Q3 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-IS.1.3 1.0230E-08 
INO=5.3597E-03 EI-IS.1.4 5.5126E-11 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.7918E-OI EI-IS.2.1 1.8418E-06 
N0=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-IS.2.2 3.8953E-08 
tv NO=5.3597E-03 YES=9.94641l-0\ EI-IS.2.3 2.0878E-10 
U\ 
U\ N0=5.3597E.Q3 EI-IS.2.4 1.1250E-12 
NO=1.000ll-02 YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.7918E-OI EI-lS.3.1 9.1162E-07 
N0=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-lS.3.2 1.9280E-08 
N0=5.3597E·Q3 YES--9.9464E-OI EI-lS.3.3 1.0334E-10 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-lS.3.4 5.56B3E-13 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.7918E-OI EI-lS.4.1 1.8604E-OB 
N0=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-lS.4.2 3.9347E-10 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-lS.4.3 2.1089E-12 
NO=5.3597E-03 EI-lS.4.4 1.1364E-14 
Figure A.I.IO Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 18 
CPU 
I I 
Valve I PS-lIEI-23I ~ (vi) 
6.75E-05 YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.7918E-OI EI-HU 6.4125E-05 
NO=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-23.1.2 1.3562E-06 
N0=5.J597E-03 YES=9 .9464E-O I EI-23J3 7.2688E-{)9 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-23.1.4 3.9169E-11 
ND=2.0000E-02 YES=9.7918E-OI EI-2U.I 1.3087E-06 
N0=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-2U.2 2.7677E-oa 
IV N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-23.23 1.4834E-10 
VI 
EI-23.2.4 0\ N0=5.3597E-03 7.9936E-13 
NO=I.000E-02 YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.7918B-OI EI-23.3.1 6.4773E-07 
N0=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464B-OI EI-23.3.2 1.3699E-08 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-2333 7.3422E-11 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-23.3.4 3.9564E-13 
ND=2.0000E-02 YES=9.7918E-OI EI-23.4.l 1.3219E-08 
N0=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-ot EI-23.4.2 2.7957E-10 
NO=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-23.43 1.4984E-12 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-H4.4 8.0744E-15 
Figure A.l.ll Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 23 
CPU 
I I 
Valve I PS-31EI-24I ·Fir~(Xf2~ ~ (v3) Detection 
7.700-04 YES=9.9000E-OI YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.668IE-OI EI-24.1.1 7.2226E-04 
JN0=3.3189E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-24.1.2 2.4661E-05 
IN0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-24.1.3 1.3218E-07 
IN0=5.3597E-03 EI-24.1.4 7.1225E-10 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES-9.668IE-OI EI-24.2.1 1.4740E-05 
I NO=3.3181)E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-24.2_2 5.0329E-07 
IN0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-24.2.3 2.6975E-09 
N I N0=5.3597E-03 EI-24.2.4 1.4536E-11 
VI 
....j 
NO=I.00QE..02 YES=9.800E-OI YES--9.668IE-OI EI-24.3.1 7.2956E-06 
I I N0=3.3189E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-24.3.2 2.4910E-07 
IN0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.94641l-01 EI-24.3.3 1.3351E-09 
INO=5.3597E-03 EI-24.3.4 7.1944E-12 
ND=2.00000-02 YES=9.668IE-OI EI-24.4.1 1.4889E-07 
&0=3.3 I 89E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-24.4.2 5.0837E-09 
IN0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-24.4.3 2.7247E-11 
IN0=5.3597E-03 EI-24.4.4 1.4682E-13 
Figure A.I.12 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 24 
CPU 
I I Valve 
Fire (xf2) 
(v2) Detection 
7.800-04 YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-Ol YES..9.9464Il-Ol 
I NO=S.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-Ol 
INO=.5.3597E-03 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.94641l-01 
I NO=S.3S97E-03 YES=9_9464E-Ol 
INO=S.3S97E-03 
N 
VI 
oc 
NO=1.000E-02 YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.94641l-01 
INo=s.3S97E-03 YES=9.9464Il-Ol 
IN0=5.3597E-03 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES--9.9464Il-OI 
[NO=S_3S97E-03 YES..9.9464E-OI 
\N0=5.3597E-03 
Figure A.I.B Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 2S 
c:J 
EI-25_Ll 
EI-25_L2 
EI-25.L3 
EI-25_2.1 
EI-25_2_2 
EI-25_2.3 
' EI-25.3_1 
EI-25.3_2 
EI-25.3.3 
EI-25.4_1 
EI-25_4_2 
EI-25.4.3 
7_5270E-04 
4_0343E-06 
2.1739E-OS 
1.5361E-05 
8_2332E-OS 
4_4365E-10 
7_6030E-06 
4_0750E-OS 
2_1959E-10 
1_5516E~7 
8.3163E-10 
4.4813E-12 
CPU 
I I 
Valve I PS-3/EI-26I Fire (xf2) ~ Detection 
1.49B-03 YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-OI YES=9 .66lIlE-O I EI-26.1.l 1.3976E-03 
NO=3.3189E-02 YES=9.9464P.-OI EI-26.1.2 4.n21E-05 
N0=5.3591E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-26.1.3 2_55nE-07 
N0=5.3591E-03 EI-26.1.4 1.3782E-09 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.66lIIE-0I EI-26_2.l 2_8523E-05 
N0=3.3189E-02 YES=9.9464P.-OI EI-26.2_2 9_7389E-07 
N0=5.3591E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-26.2.3 5.2198E-09 
NO=5.3597E-03 EI-26_2.4 2_8127E-11 
N 
VI NO=1.OOOIl-02 YES=9.8OOE-OI YES=9.66lIIE-OI EI-26.3.1 1.4117E-05 \0 
N0=3.3I 89B-02 YES=9.9464P.-OI . EI-26.3.2 4_8203E-07 
------ -----
IN0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-0I EI-26.3.3 2_5835E-09 
IN0=5.3591E-03 EI-26.3.4 1.3922E-11 
NO=2.0000E-02 YES=9.66lI1E-OI BJ-26.4.1 2.8811E-07 
N0=3.3189E-02 YES=9.9464P.-OI EI-26.4.2 9.8373E-09 
N0=5.3591E-03 YES--9.9464E-OI EI-26.4.3 5.2725E-11 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-26.4.4 2.8412E-13 
Figure A.l.14 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 26· 
[CPU I r Valve Fire (xf2) Detection .... _(v2) 
1.100-03 YES=9_9000E-OI YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.9464E-OI 
IN0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E·OI 
IN0=5.3597E-03 
NO=2.0000E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI 
1N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI 
1N0=5.3597E-03 
B YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.9464E·OI NO=1.OOOI!-02 
IN0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI 
1N0=5.3597E-03 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI 
-TN0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI 
fN0=5.3597E-03 
Figure A.t.tS Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 27 
~ 
EJ-27.1.1 
EJ-27.1.2 
EJ-27.1.3 
EI-27.2.l 
EJ-27.2.2 
EJ-27.2.3 
EJ-27.3.1 
. EJ-27.3.2 
EJ-27.3.3 
EJ-27.4.1 
EJ-27.4.2 
EJ-27.4.3 
1.0615E-03 
5.6893E-06 
3.0658E-08 
2.1663E-05 
1.1611E-07 
6.2567E-10 
1.0722E-05 
5.7468E-08 
3.0967E-10 
2. 1882E-07 
1.1728E-Q9 
6.3199E-12 
[_CPU I I Valve I PS-4IEI-28I Fire (xf2) ~ Detection 
6.10E-04 YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-Ol YIlS=9.53E-Ol EI-28.1.1 5_81E-04 
ND=4.74B-02 YES=9.9464B-01 EI-28_1.2 2_79E-05 
N0=5.3597E-03 YIlS=9_9464B-OI EI-28_1.3 9_79E-07 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-28_L4 3.:56E-08 
NO=2.0000E-02 YES=9.53E-Ol EI-28_2.1 
IND=4.74B-02 YES=9.94641l-01 EI-28_2_2 
IN0=5.3597E-03 YF,s=9.9464B-Ol EI-28_2.3 
IN0=5.3597E-03 EI-28_2.4 
N 
Q'I NO=1.000B-02 YES=9.800E-Ol YES--9.53E-Ol EI-28.3_1 
- ND=4.74B-02 YES=9.9464E-Ol EI-28.3_2 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464B-OI EI-28.3.3 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-28.3.4 
N0=2.0000E-02 YIlS=9.53E-Ol EI-28.4.1 
IND=4.74B-02 YES=9.9464B-OI EI-28.4.2 
IN0=5.3597E-03 YIlS=9.9464B-Ol EI-28.4.3 
IN0=5.3597E-03 EI-28.4.4 
Figure A.t.t6 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 28 
L CPU I I Valve I PS-41EI-29I Fire (xf2) ~ (v4) Detection 
6.92E·04 YES=9.9000E·OI YES=9.800E·OI YES=9.8227E·OI EI-29.Ll 6.5948E-04 
NO=I.7728E-02 YES~9.94641l·01 EI·29.L2 1.1839E-OS 
N0=5.3597E·03 YES=9.9464E·OI EI-29.L3 6.3452E-08 
NO~.3597E·03 EI-29.1.4 3.4192E-10 
ND=2.0000Il·02 YES=9.8227E·O I EI-29.2.l 1.3459E-05 
NO= 1.7728E·02 YES~.9464Il·Ol EI-29.2.2 2.4160E-07 
ND=5.3597E-03 ~.9464E·OI EI-29.2.3 1.2949E-09 
N~.3597E·03 EI-29.2.4 6.9n9E-12 
?J ND=\'OOOE-02 YES=9.800E-OI YES~9.8227E·OI EI-29.3.l 6.6614E-06 
ND=\' 7728E·02 YES=9.9464E·OI . EI-29.3.2 1.1958E-07 
N~.3597E-03 ~.9464E·OI EI-29.3.3 6.4093E-10 
ND=5.3597E·03 EI-29.3.4 3.4537E-12 
ND=2.0000Il·02 YES=9.8227E·OI EI-29.4.l 1.3595E-07 
ND= 1.7728E·02 YES--9.9464E·OI EI-29.4.2 2.4404E-09 
ND=5.3597E-03 ~.9464Il·OI EI-29.4.3 1.3080E-11 
N~.3597E-03 EI-29.4.4 7.0483E-14 
Figure A.t.t7 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 29 
CPU I I Valve I PS-4/EI-30 I Fire (xf2) ~ (v4) Detection 
8.500-04 YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.8227E-OI EI-30.1.l B_1005E-<>4 
INO=I.77281l-02 YI!S=9.94641!-OI EI-30.L2 1.4542E-05 
!N0=5.35971l-03 YI!S=9 .94641!-O I EI-30.1.3 7.7939E-Q8 
IN0=5.3597E-03 EI-30.1.4 4.199BE-10 
N0=2.0000Il-02 YES=9.8227E-OI EI-30.2.1 1.6532E-05 
NO=I.17281l-02 YES=9.94641!-OI EI-30.2.2 2.9677E-07 
N0=5.3597E-03 YI!S=9.9464I!-OI EI-30.2.3 1.5906E-09 
N0=5.3S97E-03 EI-30.2A B.5711 E-12 
t...l 
0- NO=I.OOOB-02 YES=9.800Il-Ol YES-9.8227E-OI EI-30.3.1 8.1823E-06 Vl 
NO=I.7728I!-02 YES=9.94641!-OI 'EI-30.3.2 1.4689E-07 
!N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464I!-OI EI-30.3.3 7.8726E-10 
IN0=5.3597E-03 EI-30.3.4 4.2423E-12 
N0=2.()()[)()f!..02 YES---9.B2211!-OI EI-30.4.l 1.6699E-07 
INO=I.7728Il-02 YES---9.9464I!-OI EI-30.4.2 2.9977E-09 
! N0=5.3597E-03 YI!S=9.9464Il-OI EI-30_4.3 1.6067E-11 
IN0=5.3597E-03 EI-30.4A 8.6577E-14 
Figure A.t.tS Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 30 
CPU I I Valve I PS-IIEI-3I I Fire (xf2) c:J Scenario (vI) Detection Frequency 
6.400-04 YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.7918E-0I EI-31.1.1 6.0800E-04 
N0=2.0820B-02 YES=9.94641l-01 EI-31.1.2 1.2859E-OS 
N0=5.3597E-OJ YES=9.94641l-0l EI-31.1.3 6.8919E-08 
NO=S.3597E-OJ EI-3 1. 1.4 3.7138E-10 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES--9.7918E-OI EI-31.2.l 1.2408E-OS 
N0=2.0820E-02 YES=9.94641l-01 EI-31.2.2 2.6242E-07 
NO=S.3597E-03 YES=9 .94641l-0 I EI-31.2.3 1.4065E-09 
NO=S.3S97E-OJ EI-31.2.4 7.S791E-12 
N 
~ NO=\.000E-02 YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.7918E-OI EI-31.3.l 6.1414E-06 
N0=2.0820E-02 YES=9.94641l-01 EI-31.3.2 1.2989E-07 
NO=S3S97E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-31.3.3 6.961SE-10 
NO=S.3S97E-OJ EI-31.3.4 3.7S13E-12 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES--9.7918E-OI EI-31.4.1 1.2533E-07 
N0=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464Il-OI EI-31.4.2 2.6507E-09 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES--9.9464E·OI EI-31.4.3 1.4207E-11 
NO=S.3S97E-03 EI-31.4.4 7.6557E-14 
Figure A.t.t9 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 31 
CPU 
I I 
Valve I PS-IIEI-32I Gas (xg2) 1 Io!ir~ (xf2) 1 ~ (vi) Detection Detecllon 
7.55E-04 YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.7918E-Ol EI-32_Ll 7_1725E-04 
NO=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-Ol FJ-32J.2 1.5169E-05 
N0=5.3597E-01 YES=9.9464E-Ol FJ-32J3 8.1303E-08 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-32.1.4 4.3811 E-10 
NO=2.0000E-02 YES=9.7918E-Ol EI-32.2J 1.4638E-05 
IN0=2_0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-Ol FJ-32.2.2 3.0958E-07 
I N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-Ol EI-32.23 1.6592E-09 
IN0=5.3597E-03 EI-32.2.4 8.9410E-12 
~ NO= 1.000E-02 YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.7918E-Ol EI-323J 7.2449E-06 VI 
N0=2_0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-Ol EI-32.3.2 1.5322E-07 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-Ol EI-32.3.3 8.2124E-10 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-323.4 4.4253E-12 
N0=2.0000Il-02 YES=9.7918E-Ol EI-32.4J 1.4786E-07 
IN0=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-Ol EI-32.4.2 3.1270E-09 
IN0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-Ol EI-32.43 1.6760E-11 
I N0=5.3597E-03 EI-32_4.4 9.0313E-14 
Figure A.l.20 Scenario Frequencr Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 32 
CPU I I Valve I PS-lIEI-33I Fire (xf2) c:J Detection 
6.300-04 YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.791SE-Ol EI-33.l.l 5_9850E-04 
IN0=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464B-OI EI-33.1.2 1_2658E-05 
INO=S.3S97l!~OJ YES--9.9464B-OI EI-33.1.3 6.7842E-08 
INO=S.3S97E-03 EI-33.1.4 3_6557E-10 
N0=2.0000Il-02 YES-9.79ISE-OI EI-33.2.l 1_2214E-05 
I NO=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464B-OI EI-33-2.2 2.5832E-07 
INO=S.3S97E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-33-2.3 1.3845E-09 
INO=S.3S97E-03 EI-33.2.4 7.4607E-12 
~ NO=I.OOOE-02 YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.79ISE-OI EI-33.3.l 6.0455E-06 
N0=2.08200-02 YES=9.9464B-OI EI-33.3.2 1.2786E-07 
~O=S.3S97E-Q3 YES=9.9464B-OI EI-33.3.3 6_8527E-10 
INo=s.3S97E-03 EI-33.3.4 3.6927E-12 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.79ISE-OI EI-33.4.l 1.2338E-07 
IN0=2.0820E-<J2 YES=9.9464B-OI EI-33.4.2 2.6093E-09 
INO=S.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-33.4.3 1.3985E-11 
INo=s.3597E-OJ EI-33.4.4 7.S361E-14 
Figure A.I.21 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 33 
CPU 
I I 
Valve I PS-llEI-34I Fire (xf2) c:J Detection 
8.051'..-04 YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.7918E-OI EI-34.1.1 7.6475E-<>4 
N0=2.0820E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-34.1.2 1_6174E-05 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES:9.9464E-OI EI-34.1.3 8_6687E-08 
N0=5.J597E-OJ EI-34.l.4 4_6712E-10 
NO=2.()()()()Il-02 YES:9.7918E-OI EI-34.2.l 1_5607E-05 
NO=2.082OB-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-34.2.2 3.3008E-07 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-34.2.3 1.7691E-09 
NO=5.3597E-03 EI-34_2.4 9.5331E-12 
N 
0\ NO=I.000E-02 YES=9.800E-Ol YES--9.7918E-OI EI-34.3.1 7.7247E-06 
-...J 
N0=2.082OB-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-34.3.2 1.6337E-07 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES:9.9464E-OI EI-34.3.3 8.7563E-l0 
NO=5.J597E-03 EI-34.3.4 4.7184E-12 
N0=2.()()()()Il-02 YES=9.7918E-OI EI-34.4.1 1.5765E-07 
N0=2.0820E-02 YES:9.9464E-OI EI-34.4.2 3_3341E-09 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES--9.9464E-0I EI-34.4.3 1.7870E-ll 
N0=5.J597E-03 EI-34.4.4 9.6294E-14 
Figure A.I.22 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 34 
CPU I I Valve I PS-IIEI-35I Fire (xf2) c:J (vI) Detection 
8.801l-04 YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-Ol YIlS=9.79t8B-OI EI-35.1.1 S.3600E-04 
NO=2.08201l-02 YES-9.9464E-01 EI-35.1.2 1.7681E-05 
N0=5.3597E-03 YP..s=9.9464E-OI EI-35.1.3 9.4764E-oS 
N0=5.3S97E-03 EI-35.1.4 5.1 064E-1 0 
N0=2.0000Il-02 YIlS=9. 7918B-O I EI-35.2.I 1.7061E-05 
IN0=2.0820B~02 _ YES=9.9464E-OI EI-35.2.2 3.6083E-07 
IN0=5.3597E-03 YIlS=9.9464E-Ol EI-35.2.3 1.9340E-09 
IN0=5.3597E-03 EI-35.2.4 1.0421 E-11 
N 
0- NO= 1.000Il-02 YES=9.800E-Ol YIlS=9.7918B-OI EI-35.3.1 S.4444E-06 00 
N0=2.08201l-02 YIlS=9.9464E-0I 
. EI-35.3.2 1.7859E-07 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-01 EI-35.3.3 9.5721E-1O 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-35.3.4 5.1580E-12 
N0=2.0000Il-02 YIlS=9.7918B-Ot EI-35.4.1 1.7234E-07 
N0=2.0820E-02 YIlS=9.9464E-OI EI-35.4_2 3.644SE-09 
N0=5.3597E-03 YIlS=9.9464E-OI EI-35.4.3 1_9535E-11 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-35.4.4 1.0527E-13 
Figure A.l.23 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 35 
CPU 
! I Valve I PS-llEI-26! Fire (xf2) [:J (vi) Detection 
4.70E-04 YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.7918E-Ol EI-36.l.1 4.4650E-04 
N0=2.0820B-02 YBS=9.9464B-Ol EI-36_1.2 9.4431 E-06 
N0=5.3597B-03 YflS,.9.9464E-Ol EI-36.l.3 5.0612E-08 
NO=5.3597B-03 EI-36.1.4 2.7273E-10 
N0=2.()()()()B-02 YBS=9.7918E-OI EI-36.2.1 9.1122E-06 
NO=2.0820E-02 YBS=9.9464E-Ol EI-36.2.2 1.9272E-07 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-36.2.3 1.0329E-09 
I N0=5.3597E-03 EI-36.2.4 5.5659E-12 
~ NO=t.<lOOE-02 YES=9.800E-Ol YBS=9.7918E-OI EI-36.3.l 4.5101 E-06 \0 
N0=2.082OB-02 YBS=9.9464B-Ol . EI-36.3.2 9.5385E-08 
NO=5.3597B-03 YBS=9.9464E-OI EI-36.3.3 5.1124E-10 
N0=5.3597B-03 EI-36.3.4 2.7549E-12 
N0=2.()()()()B-02 YBS=9.7918B-OI EI-36.4.1 . 9.2043E-08 
~B-02 YBS=9.9464B-Ol EI-36.4.2 1.9466E-09 
IN0=5.3597E-03 YBS=9.9464E-OI EI-36.4.3 1.0433E-11 I N0=5.3597E-03 EI-36.4.4 5.6221E-14 
Figure A.I.24 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 36 
CPU 
I I 
Valve I PS-4/EI-3~1 Fire (xf2) ~ (v4) Detection 
5.800-04 YES=9.9000E-OJ YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.8227E-OI EI-37_1_1 5.5274E-04 
I INO=I.77281l-02 YES=9.94641l-01 EI-37.1.2 9.922SE-06 IN0=5.3597E-OJ YES--9.9464E-OI EI-37.L3 S.3182E-oB 
IN0=5.3597E-03 EI-37.1.4 2.8658E-10 
N0s2.00001l-02 YES=9.8227E-OI EI-37.2.1 1.1280E-oS 
NO=1.77281l-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-37-2_2 2.0250E-07 
N0=5.3597E-03 \'BSE9.9464E-0I EI-37.2.3 1.0853E-09 
N0:5.3597E-03 EI-37-2A 5.8485E·12 
N 
-...I NO=I.OOOIl-02 YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.8227E-OI EI-373.1 5.5832E-06 0 
NO=I. 7728E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI 
, EI-373.2 1.0023E-07 
- --
IN0=5.3597E-03 YES--9.9464E-OI EI-37.3.3 5.3719E·10 
IN0:5.J597E-03 EI-37.3A 2.8947E·12 
N0=2.0000Il-02 YES=911227E-OI EI-37A.I 1.1394E-07 
NO=I.7728E-02 YES=9.9464E·OI EI-37.4.2 2.0455E-09 
N0=5.3597E-<l3 \'BSE9.9464E-OI EI-37A3 1.0963E-11 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-37_4A 5.9076E-14 
Figure A.l.2S Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 37 
CPU ! I Valve ! PS-41EI-38! Fire (xf2) ~ (v4) Detection 
9.S00-04 YF..5=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-0l YES=9.8227E-OI EI-38.1.1 9_0535E-04 
NO: I. 7728E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-38.1.2 1.6252E-D5 
NO=S.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-0I EI-38.1.3 8.7108E-08 
NO:S.3597E-03 EI-38.1.4 4.6939E-10 
N0s2.0000E-02 YES=9.8227E-OI EI-38.2.1 1.8477E-05 
NO: I. 7728E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-38.2.2 3.3168E-D7 
NO=S.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-38.2.3 1.7777E-09 
NO=5.3597E-03 EI-38.2.4 9.5794E-12 
N 
-..J NO:I.000E-02 YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.8227E-OI EI-38.3.1 9.1449E-Q6 
- NO: I. 7728E-02 YES--9.9464E-OI 
. EI-38.3.2 1.6417E-D7 
N0:5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-38.3.3 8.7988E-10 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-38.3.4 4.7413E-12 
N0:2.0000E-02 YES=9.8227E-OI EI-38.4.1 1.8663E-D7 
~28E-()2_ YES=9.9464E-OI EI-38.4.2 3.3503E-09 
INO:S.3597E-03 YES--9.9464E-OI EI-38.4.3 1.7957E-11 
IN0=5.3597E-03 EI-38.4.4 9.6762E-14 
Figure A.I.26 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 38 
[ CPU \ I Valve I PS-41EI-39\ Fire (xf2) c:J (v4) Detection 
4.500-04 YES=9.9000E-OI YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.8227E·OI EI-39.1.1 4.2885E-04 
NO= J.7728E-02 YES=9.9464E·OI EI-39.l.2 7.6985E-06 
NO=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E·OI EI-39.1.3 4.1262E-08 
N0=5 3597E·03 EI-39.1.4 2.2234E-10 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.8227E·OI EI-39.2.1 8.7520E-06 
INO=I.7728E.02 YES=9.9464E·OI EI-39.2.2 1.5711E-07 
[N0=5.3597E.03 YES=9.9464E·OI EI-39.2.3 8.4208E-10 
I N0=53597E-03 EI-39.2.4 4.5376E-12 
N 
-..J NO=1.000f!..02 YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.8227E·OJ EI-39.3.1 4.3318E-06 N 
NO= I. 7728B·02 YES=9.9464E·OI 
. EI-39.3.2 7.n63E-08 
N0=5.3597E·03 YES--9.9464E-OI EI-39.3.3 4.1679E-10 
N0=5.3597E·03 EI-39.3.4 2.2459E-12 
N0=2.0000B-02 YES=9.8227E·OJ EI-39.4.1 8.8404E-08 
NO= I. 77281l·02 YES=9.9464E·OI EI-39.4.2 1.5870E-09 
N0=5.3597E·03 YES=9.9464E-OJ EI-39.4.3 8.5059E-12 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-39.4.4 4.5835E-14 
Figure A.t.27 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 39 
N 
..., 
~ 
CPU I I Valve Fire (xf2) (v2) Detection 
\.000·03 YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9.9464E·01 
IN<)=5.3597E.03 YES=9.9464E·OI 
IN0=5.3597E.03 
N0=2.000<lI>·02 YES=9.94641l·01 
lN0=5.3597E.03 YES=9.94641l·01 
lN0=5.3597E.03 
NO=\.000Il-02 YES=9.800E·Ol YES=9.9464E·OI 
IN0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.94641l·0t 
IN0=5.3597E.03 
N0=2.000<lI>-02 YES=9.9464E·Ot 
lN0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E·OI 
TN0=5.3597E"()3 
Figure A.l.28 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 40 
~ 
EI-40.1.1 
EI-40.1.2 
EI-40.1.3 
EI-40.2.1 
EI-40.2.2 
EI-40.2.3 
EI-40.3.l 
EI-40.3.2 
EI-40.3.3 
EI-40.4.1 
EI-40.4.2 
EI-40.4.3 
9.6500E-04 
5.1721E-06 
2.7871 E-08 
1.9694E-05 
1.0555E-07 
5.6879E-10 
9.7475E-06 
5.2244E-08 
2.8152E-10 
1.9893E-07 
1.0662E-09 
5.7453E-12 
N 
~ 
\.64I!-03 
[IDU--J 
EI-4Ll 
In this event no gas and fire detection systems were considered_ No protection system was identified. 
The frequency used in this event is equal to 114 of the calculated frequency (the event was 
8 different points: 41A, 41B, 41C,4ID, 41E, 41F, 410, 41H. 
Figure A.t.29 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 4t 
File Name 
1. 64E-03 EIMIRSB to EIH41RSB 
CPU I I Valve I PS-2/EI-42 1 Fire (xf2) c:J (v2) Detection 
1.69£-03 YES=9.9000E-Ol YES=9.800E-Ol YES=9 .. 6382E-Ol EI-42.1.1 1.5803E-03 
N0=3.6178E-02 YES=9.9464E-Ol EI-42.1.2 S.9001E-oS 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.94641l-01 EI-42.1..3 3_1623E-07 
N0=53597E-03 EI-42.1.4 1.7040E-09 
.. . .. 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9 .. 6382E-Ol EI-42.2.1 3.2251E-oS 
N0=3.6178E-02 YES--9.9464E-Ol EI-42.2.2 1.2041E-06 
NO=5.3597E-03 YES=9.94641l-01 EI-42_2 . .3 6.4537E-09 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-42.2.4 3.4n6E-11 
N 
EI-42.3.i -....I NO=I.000E-02 YES=9,800E-Ol YES=9 .. 6382E-Ol 1.5963E-05 Ul 
N0=3.6178E-02 YES=9.94641l-01 EI-42.3.2 5.9597E-07 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.94641l-01 EI-42.3 . .3 3.1942E-09 
IN0=5.3597E-03 EI-42.3.4 1.7212E-11 
N0=2.OOOOIl-02 YES=9 .. 6382E-01 EI-42.4.1 ' 3.25nE-07 
N0=3.6178E-02 YES=9.9464E-Ol EI-42.4.2 1.2163E-08 
N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464Il-Ol EI-42.4 . .3 6.5188E-11 
N0=5.3597E-03 EI-42.4.4 3.5127E-13 
Figure A.l.30 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 42 
N 
-...l 
0\ 
CPU I I Valve Fire (xf2) Detection 
5.3SE-04 YES=9.~E-OI~ES=9·IIOOE-OI YES=9.9464E-01 
!N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E-Ol 
INO=5.3597E-03 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.9464E·Ol 
lNO=S.3591E-03 YES--9.9464E·OI 
TN0=5.3597E-03 
NO=1.OOOIl-02 YES=9.800E-OI YES=9.9464E-OI 
(N0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E·Ol 
TN0=5.3591E-03 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI 
TN0=5.3591E-03 YES--9.9464E-Ol 
TN0=5.3597E-03 
Figure A.I.31 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 43 
~ 
EI-43.1.1 
EI-43.1.2 
EI-43.1 .. 3 
EI-43.2.1 
EI-43.2.2 
EI-43.2 .. 3 
EI-43.3.1 
EI-43.3.2 
EI-43.3 .. 3 
EI-43.4.1 
EI-43.4.2 
EI-43.4 .. 3 
S.16E-04 
1.81E-OS 
6.59E-07 
CPU I I Valve I PS-21EI-44\ Fire (xf2) ~ (v2) Detection 
9.30E-04 YES=9.9000E-OI YES=9.800E-OI YES=9 .. 6382E-OI EI-44.l.1 8.6964E-Q4 
\N0=3.6I 78E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-44.1.2 3.2468E-QS 
\N0=5.3597E:23 YES=9.9464B-OI EI-44.1.3 1.7402E-Q7 
\N0=5.3597E-03 EI-44.l.4 9.3n2E-10 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES-9 .. 6382E-OI EI-44.2.1 1.n48E-QS 
IN0=3.6178E-02 YES=9.9464B-OI EI-44.2.2 6.6261E-Q7 
INO=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E·OI EI-44.2.3 3.5514E-Q9 
IN0=5.3597E-03 EI-44.2.4 1.9137E·11 
N 
-....I NO=1.000E-02 YES=9.800E-OI YES=9 .. 6382E·OI EI-44.3.1 8.7843E-06 
-....I 
N0=3.6178E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-44.3.2 3.2796E-Q7 
NO=S.3S97E·03 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-44.3.3 1.7S78E-Q9 
INO=5.3597E-03 EI-44.3.4 9.4719E-12 
N0=2.0000E-02 YES=9 .. 6382E·OI EI-44.4.1 1.7927E-Q7 
~E-02 YES=9.9464E-OI EI-44.4.2 6.6931E-Q9 
IN0=5.3597E-03 YES=9.9464E·OI EI-44.4.3 3.5873E-11 
IN0=5.3597E-03 EI-44.4.4 1.9330E-13 
Figure A.l.32 Scenario Frequency Calculation of the Systemic Event Tree of Initiator Event 44 
ID SoenMo 1.=1 Frequency 
789E-05 0 4 0 25 1 7.89E-oe Fire In area 
0.25 2 7.89E-OS Jetfire-short 
0.25 3 7.89E-OS Fire in are. 
0.25 4 7.89E-OS Jetfire-ahort 
0.6 0.069 0.9 0.25 0.5 5 3.67E-07 Fire in area 
I 0.5 6 3.67E-07 Explosion 
0.25 0.5 7 3.67E-07 Jetfire-short 
I 0.5 8 3.67E-07 Explosion 
0.25 0.5 9 3.67E-07 Fire in a",a 
I 0.5 10 3.67E-07 Explosion 
0.25 0.5 11 3.67E-07 Jetfire-short 
I 0.5 12 3.67E-07 Explosion 
0.1 . 13 3.27E-07 Leak no ign . 
0.300 0.9 0.25 0.5 14 1.6E-OS Fire in area 
I 0.5 15 1.6E-OS Explosion 
0.25 0.5 16 1.SE-OS Jetfire-ahort 
I 0.5 17 1.6E-OS Explosion 
0.25 0.5 18 1.6E-OS Fi", in area 
I 0.5 19 1.SE-OS Explosion 
0.25 0.5 20 1.SE-OS Jetfire-short 
I 0.5 21 1.6E-OS ExplOSion 
0.1 22 1.42E-06 Leak no ign. 
0.205 0.9 0.25 0.5 23 1.09E-OS Fi", in area 
I 0.5 24 1.09E-06 Explosion 
0.25 0.5 25 1.09E-06 Jetfire-short 
I 0.5 26 1.09E-06 Explosion 
0.25 0.5 27 1.09E-oe Fi", in area 
I 0.5 28 1.09E-06 Explosion 
0.25 0.5 29 1.09E-OS Jethre-short 
I 0.5 30 1.09E-06 Explosion 
0.1 31 9.7E-07 Leak no ign. 
0.193 0.9 0.25 0.5 32 1.03E-06 Fi", in area 
I 0.5 33 1.03E-06 Explosion 
0.25 0.5 34 1.03E-06 Jetfire-short 
I 0.5 35 1.03E-06 Explosion 
0.25 0.5 36 1.03E-06 Jetfire-short 
I 0.5 37 1.03E-06 Explosion 
0.25 0.5 38 1.03E-06 Jetfire-short 
L 0.5 39 1.03E-06 Explosion 
0.1 40 9.14E-07 Leak no ign. 
0.233 0.9 0.25 0.5 41 1.24E-06 Fire in area 
I 0.5 42 1.24E-06 Explosion 
0.25 0.5 43 1.24E-06 Jetfire-short 
I 0.5 44 1.24E-06 Explosion 
0.25 0.5 45 1.24E-06 Fire in area 
I 0.5 46 1.24E-06 Explosion 
0.25 0.5 47 1.24E-06 Jetfire-short 
I 0.5 48 1.24E-06 Explosion 
0.1 49 1.10E-06 Leak no ign. 
Figure A.l.33 Phenomenological Event Tree· Scenario Frequency Calculation 
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Overall FrO Reliability Block Diagram 
Detailed FrO Reliability Block Diagram 
CSU: 
A 
FrO 
A 
1 F 
-l . f' 2 tI 
Approximate Detailed FrO Reliability Block Diagram 
FrO 
A 
CSU: 
Figure A.2.1- Overall and Approximate FTO Reliability Block Diagrams and 
Formulas -1001 VOTING LOGIC 
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Overall FrO Reliability Block Diagram 
A 
B 
Detailed FrO reliability Block Diagram 
FrO 
A 
FTO 
B 
CSU: 
Approximate Detailed FrO Reliability Block Diagram 
FTO 
-----Ir AB JI---
CSU: 
Figure A.2.2 - Overall and Approximate FrO Reliability Block Diagrams and 
Formulas .1002 VOTING LOGIC 
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Overall FTO Reliability Block Diagram 
A M 
B M 
Detailed FTO Reliability Block Diagram 
FrO 
FrO A 
----1r AB J.--.-.--"----_~---I FrO 
B 
CSU: 
Approximate Detailed FTO Reliability Block Diagram 
FrO FrO 
----ir AB )-----+r MN Jt---
CSU: 
Figure A.2.3 - Overall and Approximate FrO Reliability Block Diagrams and 
Formulas -1002 VOTING LOGIC - 2 or more modules in series 
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Overall FTO Reliability Block Diagram 
A B 
Detailed FTO Reliability Block Diagram 
flO flO RQ 
----~r AB J~--~ ___ A __ ~~--~ ___ B __ ~~---
CSU: 
Approximate Detailed FTO Reliability Block Diagram 
flO RO flO 
----~r AB Jr--~~ __ A __ ~~--~ ___ B __ ~r----
CSU: 
Figure A.2.4 - Overall and Approximate FrO Reliability Block Diagrams and 
Formulas ·2002 VOTING LOGIC 
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Overall FrO Reliability Block Diagram 
A 
B 
C 
Detailed FrO Reliability Block Diagram 
FrO 
CSU: 
Approximate Detailed FrO Reliability Block Diagram 
FrO 
---Ir ABC j~-
CSU: 
Figure A.2.S - Overall and Approximate FrO Reliability Block Diagrams and 
Formulas ·1003 VOTING LOGIC 
284 
Overall FrO Reliability Block Diagram 
A A B 
B C C 
Detailed FrO Reliability Block Diagram 
CSU: 
Approximate Detailed FrO Reliability Block Diagram 
FrO FrO FrO FrO 
-{ ABC H ABHACH BC J 
CSU: 
Figure A.2.6 - Overall and Approximate FTO Reliability Block Diagrams and 
Formulas -2003 VOTING LOGIC 
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Overall SO Reliability Block Diagram 
A 
Detailed SO Reliability Block Diagram 
so 
A 
STR: 
Approximate Detailed SO Reliability Block Diagram 
so 
A 
STR: 
Figure A.2.7 - Overall and Approximate SO Reliability Block Diagrams and 
Formulas ·1001 VOTING LOGIC 
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Overall SO Reliability Block Diagram 
A B 
Detailed SO Reliability Block Diagram 
so SO SO 
----~r AB J~--~~ __ A __ ~~--~ ___ B __ ~~---
STR: 
Approximate Detailed SO Reliability Block Diagram 
SO SO SO 
----~r AB j~--~~ __ A __ ~~--~ ___ B __ ~~---
STR: 
Figure A.2.S - Overall and Approximate SO Reliability Block Diagrams and 
Formulas -1002 VOTING LOGIC 
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Overall SO Reliability Block Diagram 
A 
B 
Detailed SO Reliability Block Diagram 
so 
A 
so 
B 
STR: 
Approximate Detailed SO Reliability Block Diagram 
so 
---IF AB /It---
STR: 
Figure A.2.9 - Overall and Approximate SO Reliability Block Diagrams and 
Formulas -2002 VOTING LOGIC 
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Overall SO Reliability Block Diagram 
A B c 
Detailed SO Reliability Block Diagram 
w w w w w w w 
-{ABC H AB HAC H BC}1 A H,----B---.lH c t--
STR: 
A!BC + A~ + A!c + A~c + A! + A~ + ~ 
+ 3AA MITR(A; + A1: + A;c )+ 3AAB MITRAJ.: 
3P3 AS + 3P2 AS + 3PI AS 
PI + 2P2 + 3P3 PI +2P2 + 3P3 PI +2P2 + 3P3 
+ PI A. 2 AS . MITR + 3. P2 A. AS. MITR 
PI +2P2 +3P3 PI +2P2 PI +2P2 +3P3 
Approximate Detailed SO Reliability Block Diagram 
SO SO SO SO SO SO 
-{ABCHABHACHBC}1 A H B 
STR: 
3 
Figure A.2.10 - Overall and Approximate SO Reliability Block Diagrams and 
Formulas -1003 VOTING LOGIC 
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Overall SO Reliability Block Diagram 
A A B 
B C C 
Detailed SO Reliability Block Diagram 
STR: 
3A AS + 3A AS 
fJ.. + 2A + 3A Pt + 2A + 3A 
+ 3fJ.. A 2 AS MITR + 3 A US MITR 
fJ.. + 2A + 3A fJ.. + 2A fJ.. + 2A + 3A 
Approximate Detailed SO Reliability Block Diagram 
so so so so 
-{ ABC H AB H AC H BC J 
STR: 
Figure A.2.ll - Overall and Approximate SO Reliability Block Diagrams and 
Formulas -2003 VOTING LOGIC 
290 
Appendix 3 
291 
A.3.t. Description of the accidental events modelled In the quantitative risk 
assessment: 
1. Event EI -01: Explosion in turret 
2. Event EI-09: Large oil + natural gas release in the manifold deck, oil reception 
line 
3. Event EI-I0: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas lift line 
4. Event EI-Il: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation 
line 
5. Event EI-12: Large oil + natural gas-release, after header, production line 
6. Event EI-13: Large oil + natural gas release, after header, test production line, 
with blockage. :actuation 
7. Event EI-14: Large oil + natural gas release, after header in the manifold 
deck, gas lift line 
8. Event EI-15: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation 
line 
9. Event EI-17: Large natural gas release in lines that cross the vessel's deck, 
g'as exportation line 
10. Event EI-18: Explosion in pump room 
11. Event EI -19: Large natural gas release, in inert system gas lines 
12. Event EI-20: Large natural gas release, in blow-down system 
13. Event EI-23: Explosion in machine room, with detection 
14. Event EI-24: Large oil + natural gas release, in line from swivel to 
production separators (SG-12230 1 IV -030 
15. Event EI-25: Large oil + natural gas release, in line from production 
separators (SG-12230l/V-030) to the surge-tank (V-095) 
16. Event EI-26: Large natural gas release, from production separators (SG-
12230l/V-030) to vessel (v-122301) 
17. Event EI-27: Large natural gas release, in line from the surge-tank (V-095) to 
vessel (V-UC-122302-0l) 
18. Event EI-28: Large natural gas release, from vessel (V -UC-122302-1) to 
compressor C-UC-122302 
19. Event EI-29: Large natural gas release, from compressor C-UC-122302 to 
vessel (V-UC-122302-02) 
20. Event EI-30: Large natural gas release, from vessel (V-UC-122302-02) to 
safety vessel (V -122301) 
21. Event EI-31: Large natural gas release, in line from vessel (V-UC-122301-01) 
to first stage of compressor C-UC-122301 
22. Event EI-32: Large natural gas release, in line from first stage of compressor 
C-UC-122301 to vessel (V-UC-122301-02) 
23. Event EI-33: Large natural gas release, in line from vessel (V-UC-122301-
02) to the second stage of compressor C-UC-122301 
24. Event EI-34: Large natural gas release, in line from the second stage of 
compressor C-UC-122301 to vessel (V-UC-122301-03) 
25. Event EI-35: Large natural gas release, in line from vessel (V-UC-122301-
03) to dehydration system 
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26. Event EI-36: Large natural gas release, in line from dehydration system, to 
gas-lift swivel, with blockage actuation 
27. Event EI-37: Large natural gas release, in line from vessel (V-UC-122303-0l) 
to compressor C-UC-122303 
28. Event EI-38:. Large natural gas release, in line from compressor C-UC-
122303 to vessel V -122302 
29.Event EI-39: Large natural gas release, in line from vessel V-122302 to gas 
exportation swjvel 
30.Event EI-40: Large natural gas release, in line from vessel V-122302 to 
combustible gas vessel 
31.Event EI-41: Large natural gas release, in flare relief line actuation 
32.Event EI-42: Large oil + natural gas release, in line from test swivel output to 
test separator V -020 
33.Event EI-43: Large oil + natural gas release, in line from test separator V -020 
to surge tank (V -095) 
34.Event EI-44: Large oil + natural gas release, in line from test separator V -020 
to safety valve 
35. Event EI-TQIC:Explosion in tank lC 
36.Event EI-TQIS:Explosion in tank IS 
37.Event EI-TQIP:Explosion in tank IP 
38.Event EI-TQ2C:Explosion in tank 2C 
39.Event EI-TQ2S:Explosion in tank 2S 
4O.Event EI-TQ2P:Explosion in tank 2P 
41.Event EI-TQ3C:Explosion in tank 3C 
42.Event EI-TQ4C:Explosion in tank 4C 
43.Event EI-TQ4S:Explosion in tank 4S 
44.Event EI-TQ4P:Explosion in tank 4P 
45.Event EI-TQ5C:Explosion in tank 5C 
46.Event EI-TQ5S:Explosion in tank 5S 
47.Event EI-TQ5P:Explosion in tank 5P 
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A.3.2. OUTPUT FILE - Software VULNER PLUS - Version 1.0 
For each one of the events shown several scenarios were considered regarding 
different weather conditions and different points of ignition. Therefore, for 
example for the event EI-ll, we would have the following related scenarios: 
Initiator event EI-H.l: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas 
exportation line 
Frequency: 0.000578 
Derived Scenarios: 
Scenario 1: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with 
blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 0 to 2 mis, with ignition in point PI16 -
Furnace, 18 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud explosion. 
Frequency: 1.79469E-05 
Consequences: 0.0455466 
Average societal risk: 8.l7421E-07 
Scenario 2: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 0 to 2 mis, with ignition in point 
PI17 - Process Plant, 28 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud 
explosion. 
Frequency: 5.9823E-07 
Consequences: 1.46792 
Average societal risk: 8.78l56E-07 
Scenario 3: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 0 to 2 mis, with ignition in point 
PI13 - Process Plant, 38 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud 
explosion. 
Frequency: 4.18761 E-07 
Consequences: 2.2794 
Average societal risk: 9.54525E-07 
Scenario 4: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 0 to 2 mis, with ignition in point 
PIl4- Process Plant, 43 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud 
explosion. 
Frequency: 2.93133E-07 
Consequences: 2.4847 
Average societal risk: 7.28347E-07 
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Scenario 5: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 0 to 2 mis, with ignition in point 
PIl 0- Process Plant, 59 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud 
explosion. 
Frequency: 2.05193E-07 
Consequences: 2.20103 
Average societal risk: 4.51636E-07 
Scenario 6: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 0 to 2 mis, with ignition in point 
PIll - Process Plant, 61 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud 
explosion. 
Frequency: 1.43635E-06 
Consequences: 2.26326 
Average societal risk: 3.25084E-07 
Scenario 7: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 0 to 2 mis, with ignition in point 
PI07 - Helideck, 122 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud explosion. 
Frequency: 1.00545E-07 
Consequences: 1.85128 
Average societal risk: 1.86136E-07 
Scenario 8: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 0 to 2 mis, with ignition in point 
PI08 - Helideck, 124 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud explosion. 
Frequency: 7.03812E-08 
Consequences: 0 
Average societal risk: 0 
Scenario 9: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 0 to 2 mis, with ignition in point 
PI04- Helideck, 138 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud explosion. 
Frequency: 9.2668E-08 
Consequences: 0 
Average societal risk: 0 
Scenario 10: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 0 to 2 mis, with ignition in point 
PI05 - Helideck, 141 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud explosion 
Frequency: 3.44868E-08 
Consequences: 0 
Average societal risk: 0 
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Scenario 11: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 0 to 2 mis, with ignition in point 
PIO! - Helideck, 156 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud explosion. 
Frequency: 2.41407E-08 
Consequences: 0 
Average societal risk: 0 
Scenario 12: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 0 to 2 mis, with ignition in point 
pI02 -Helideck, 159 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud explosion. 
Frequency: 1.68985E-08 
Consequences: 0 
Average societal risk: 0 
Scenario 13: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 2 to 4 mis, with ignition in point 
PI16 - Furnace, 6 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud explosion. 
Frequency: 7.803E-05 
Consequences: 0.0455466 
Average societal risk: 3.554E-06 
Scenario 14: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 2 to 4 mis, with ignition in point 
PI13 - Process Plant, 14 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud 
explosion. 
Frequency: 2.601E-06 
Consequences: 1.97566 
Average societal risk: 5.13869E-06 
Scenario 15: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 2 to 4 mis, with ignition in point 
PI14 - Process Plant, 16 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud 
explosion. 
Frequency: 1.8207E-06 
Consequences: 2.3047 
Average societal risk: 4. 19617E-06 
Scenario 16: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 2 to 4 mis, with ignition in point 
PIlO - Process Plant, 21 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud 
explosion. 
Frequency: 1.27449E-06 
Consequences: 2.64946 
Average societal risk: 3.37671E-06 
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Scenario 17: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 2 to 4 mis, with ignition in point 
PIll - Process Plant, 23 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud 
explosion. 
Frequency: 8.92143E-07 
Consequences: 2.87741 
Average societal risk: 2.56706E-06 
Scenario 18: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 2 to 4 mis, with ignition in point 
PI07 - Helideck, 49 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud explosion. 
Frequency: 6.245E-07 
Consequences: 1.35973 
Average societal risk: 8.49152E-07 
Scenario 19: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 4 to 6 mis, with ignition in point 
PIl6 - Furnace, 4 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud explosion. 
Frequency: 5.33205E-05 
Consequences: 0.0227733 
Average societal risk: 1.21428E-06 
Scenario 20: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 4 to 6 mis, with ignition in point 
PIl3 - Process Plant, 9 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud 
explosion. 
Frequency: 1.77735E-06 
Consequences: 1.93566 
Average societal risk: 3.44034E-06 
Scenario 21: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 4 to 6 mis, with ignition in point 
PIl 0 - Process Plant, 13 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud 
explosion. 
Frequency: 1.24415E-06 
Consequences: 2.60883 
Average societal risk: 3.24577E-06 
Scenario 22: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 6 to 8 mis, with ignition in point 
PIl6 - Furnace, 3 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud explosion. 
Frequency: 5.01993E-05 
Consequences: 0.0860324 
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Average societal risk: 4.31877E-06 
Scenario 23: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 6 to 8 mis, with ignition in point 
PIl3 - Process Plant, 6 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud 
explosion. 
Frequency: 1.67331 E-06 
Consequences: 1.67275 
Average societal risk: 2.79903E-06 
Scenario 24: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, with 6 to 8 mis, with ignition in point 
PII 0 - Process ~,)lant, 10 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud 
explosion. 
Frequency: 1.17132E-06 
Consequences: 2.30776 
Average societal risk: 2.70312E-06 
Scenario 2S: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, beyond 8 mis, with ignition in point 
PIl6 - Furnace, 2 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud explosion. 
Frequency: 6.06033E-05 
Consequences: 0.0860324 
Average societal risk: 5.21385E-06 
Scenario 26: Large natural gas release in the manifold deck, gas exportation line, 
with blockage actuation, delayed ignition, beyond 8 mis, with ignition in point 
PI13 - Process Plant, 5 seconds after release, resulting in a fire and cloud 
explosion. 
Frequency: 2.02011 E-06 
Consequences: 1.50835 
Average societal risk: 3.04704E-06 
Combined results for event EI-ll.l: Large natural gas release in the manifold 
deck, gas exportation line, with blockage actuation 
Total Average societal risk: S.OOllE-OS 
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F-N Curve 
Fatalities Number Frequency 
1 1.68586E-05 
2 7.46352E-06 
3 0 
4 0 
5 0 
6 0 
7 0 
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Scenario Frequency CPU Valve Pressure Scenario Phenomenological Consequences Average Average Societal Risk 
I Number sensor Frequency Probability Societal in terms of 
(c) (v2) (p2) Risk safety variabks 
1 6.1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789 E-04 3.1056E-02 4.5547E-02 8.1742E-07 8.7415E-07 c.v2.p2 
2 6.1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789E-04 1.0352E-03 1.4679E+OO 8.7815E-07 9.3910E-07 c.v2.p2 
3 6.1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789 E-04 7.2464E-04 2.2794E+OO 9.5452E-07 1.0208E-06 c.v2.p2 
4 6.1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9. 8OOOE-O 1 9.6382E-01 5. 7789E-04 5.0725E-04 2.4847E+OO 7.2835E-07 7.7890E-07 c.v2.p2 
5 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789E-04 3. 5507E-04 2.2010E+OO 4.51ME-07 4.8298E-07 c.v2.p2 
6 6.1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789 E-04 2.4855E-04 2.2633E+OO 3.2S08E-07 3.4765E-07 c.v2.p2 
7 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789E-04 1.7399E-04 1.8513E+OO 1.8614E-07 1.9906E-07 c.v2.p2 
13 6.1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789E-04 1.3503E-01 4. 5547E-02 3.5540E-06 3.8007E-06 c.v2.p2 
14 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789E-04 4.5009E-03 1.9757E+OO 5.1387E-06 5.4953E-06 c.v2.p2 
IoN 15 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789E-04 3.1506E-03 2.3047E+OO 4.1962E-06 4.4874E-06 c.v2.p2 
8 16 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789E-04 2.2054E-03 2.6495E+OO 3. 3767E-06 3.6111E-06 c.v2.p2 
17 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789E-04 1.5438E-03 2.8774E+OO 2.S611E-06 2.7452E-06 c.v2.p2 
18 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789E-04 1.0807E-03 1.3597E+OO 8.4915E-07 9.0809E-07 c.v2.p2 
19 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789 E-04 9.2267E-02 2. 2773E-02 1.2143E-06 1.2986E-06 c.v2.p2 
20 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789E-04 3.0756E-03 1.9357E+OO 3.4403E-06 3.6791E-06 c.v2.p2 
21 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789E-04 2.1529E-03 2.6088E+OO 3.24S8E-06 3.4711E-06 c.v2.p2 
22 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789 E-04 8.6866E-02 8.6032E-02 4.3188E-06 4.618SE-06 c.v2.J!2 
23 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789 E-04 2.8955E-03 1.6728E+OO 2.7990E-06 2.9933E-06 c.v2.p2 
24 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789 E-04 2. 0269 E-03 2.3078E+OO 2.7031E-06 2.8907E-06 c.v2.p2 
25 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789E-04 1.0487E-01 8.6032E-02 5.2138E-06 5.5757E-06 c.v2.p2 
26 6. 1800E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6382E-01 5. 7789E-04 3.4957E-03 1.5112E+OO 3.OS27E-06 3.2646E-06 c.v2.p2 
Total S.OO77E-DS S.3482E-DS c.v2.p2 
ASR I 
Tabela A.3.1- Scenarios Associated with Initiator Event EI-ll.I.I 
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S 
The Average Societlll Risk Expression as a/unction 0/ availability variables wiU be given by ti,e sum o/the terms presented in the last 
column in Italic characters 
Risk Assessment Ori2inal Values Variables Values Utilised 
sp1 9.50000E-Ol sp1' 5.0000E-02 sp1 9.7918E-Ol sD1' 2.0820E-02 
Isp2 9.35100E-Ol sp2' 6.4900E-02 sp2 9.6382 E-O 1 ISD2' 3.6178E-02 
Isp3 9.38000E-Ol sp3' 6.2000E-02 sp3 9.6681E-Ol sp3' 3.3189E-02 
ISD4 9.53000E-Ol sp4' 4.7000E-02 sp4 9.8227 E-O 1 1sp4' 1.7728E-02 
XGaXF- 9.65000E-Ol xg'= xf'= 3.5000E-02 xg'= xf'= 9.9464E-Ol xg'= xf'= 5.3597E-03 
..,.,.,..rio ayerage CPU protection blockage psdeledlon fire deledlon metal risk In terms or 
metal risk aduator system system system unaYailabilty Yar Yarlables Yarlables 
EI-I.I.I 5.4085E-06 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OC 5.6932E-06 cpu.v1 sp1 
EI-I.Iol 1.1457E-07 9.9000E-Ol 9. 8OOOE-O 1 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol l.0000E+OO 5.7023E-06 cpu.v1 sp1'xg1 
EI-I.I.J 6.1454E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 5.706BE-06 cpu.v1 sp1'xg1'xf1 
EI-I.I.4 3.3115E-12 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 5.7068E-06 cpu.v1 sp1'xg1'xf1' 
EI-Iol.1 1.1055E-07 9.9OQOE-Ol 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+DO 1.0000E+OO 5.7023E-06 ·cpu.v1 sp1 
EI-Iolol 2.3400E-09 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 5.7068E-06 cpu.v1' sp1'xg1 
EI-l.2.J 12542E-l1 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 5.7068E-06 cpu.v1' sp1'xg1'xf1 
EI-I.2.4 6.7582E-14 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 5.7068E-06 cpu.v1' sp1'xg1'xf1' 
EI-l.3.1 5.4719E-08 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 5.7023E-06 cpu'.v1 sp1 
EI-I.3.2 1.1582E-09 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 5.706BE-06 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg1 
EI-l.3.J 62075E-12 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 5.706BE-06 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg1'xf1 
EI-I.3.4 3.3450E-14 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 5.706BE-06 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg1'xf1' 
EI-IA.l 1.1167E-09 1.0000E-02 2.ooooE-02 9.7918E-Ol 1.ooooE+OO 1.ooooE+()( 5.7023E-06 cpu'.v1 sp1 
EI-lAol 2.3636E-ll 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+()( 5.706BE-06 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg1 
EI-lA.J 12668E-13 1.0000E-02 2.ooooE-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 5.706BE-06 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg1'xf1 
EI-I.4.4 6.8265E-16 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 5.7068E-06 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg1'xfJ' 
Framework A.4.l Average Societal Risk in Terms orUnavilability/Avaiiability Variables 
S.6937E-06 S.6934E-06 
EI-9.1.1 4.9529E-Q5 9.9000E-Q1 9.8000E-01 9.8227E-01 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OC S.1972E-OS cpu.v4 sp4 
EI-9.1.2 8.8913E-07 9.9000E-Q1 9.8000E-Q1 1.7728E-Q2 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Q1 S.1972E-OS cpu.v4 sp4'JefI 
EI-9.1.3 7.9880E-07 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 1.7728E-Q2 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 B.66S0E-03 cpu.v4 sp4'JefI' 
EI-9.2.1 1.0108E-06 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-02 9.8227E-01 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO S.1972E-OS cpu.v4' sp4 
EI-9.2.2 3.0253E-06 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Q1 B.66S0E-03 cpu.v4' sp4'Jef1 
EI-9.2.3 1.6302E-08 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-Q2 1.7728E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-Q3 B.66S0E-03 cpu.v4 sp4'Jef1' 
EI-9.3.1 5.0030E-07 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 9.8227E-01 1.0000E+OO 1. OOOOE+OO S.1972E-OS cpu'.v4 sp4 
EI-9.3.2 1.4974E-06 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 1.7728E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-01 B.66S0E-03 cpu'.v4 sp4'Jeff 
EI-9.3.3 8.0687E-09 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 1.7728E-Q2 1.0000E+OO 5. 3597E-03 B.66S0E-03 cpu'.v4 sp4'Jeff' 
s 
EI-9.4.1 1.0210E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.8227E-Q1 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+JXJ S.1972E-OS 'cpu'.v4 sp4 
EI-9.4.2 3.0558E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Q1 B.66S0E-03 cpu'.v4 sp4'JefI 
EI-9.4.3 1.6467E-10 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-Q3 B.6650E-03 cpu'.v4 sp4'JefI' 
5.7316E-05 6.6323E-OS 
EI-IO.I.I 5.9534E-Q4 9.9000E-Q1 9.8000E-Q1 9.7918E-Q1 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 6.2667E-04 cpu.vl spl 
EI-IO.I.2 12591E-Q5 9.9000E-Q1 9.8000E-Q1 2.0820E-02 1.0000E+oo 9.9464E-Q1 6.2667E-04 cpu.vl spl'JefI 
EI-IO.l.3 6.0607E-06 9.9000E-Q1 9.8000E-Q1 2.0820E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-Q3 5.59BOE-02 cpu.vl spl'Jeff' 
EI-IO.2.1 12150E-Q5 9.9000E-Q1 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-Q1 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 6.2667E-04 cpu.vl spf 
EI-IO.2.2 22954E-Q5 9.9000E-Q1 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Q1 5.5980E-02 cpu.vf spf'Jeff 
EI-IO.2.3 12369E-Q7 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 5.59'8OE-02 cpu.vf' spf'Jeff' 
EI-IO.3.1 6.0135E-06 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Q1 9.7918E-Q1 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 6.2661E-04 cpu'. vI spf 
EI-IO.3.2 1.1361E-Q5 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Q1 2.0820E-02 1.0000E+oo 9.9464E-Q1 5.5980E-02 cpu'.vf spf'Jeff 
EI-IO.3.3 6. 1220E-08 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Q1 2.0820E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-Q3 5.5980E-02 cpu'.vl spf'Jefl' 
- _.- ~ --
-----
Framework A.4.1 Average Societal Risk in Terms of Unavilability/Avaiiability Variables 
EI-IO.4.1 12272E-07 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 6.2667E-04 cpu'.tl1 sp1 
EI-IO.4.2 2.3186E-07 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 5.5980E-02 cpu'.tl1 sp1'xf1 
EI-IO.4.3 1.2494E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 5.5980E-02 cpu'.tl1 sp1'xf1' 
6.6701E-04 7.2408E..Q4 
EI-ll.I.I 5.OO11E-05 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 9.6382E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 5.3482E-05 cpu.tl2 sp2 
EI-ll.I.2 1.8672E-06 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 5.3482E-05 cpu.tl2 sp2'xf1 
EI-ll.l.3 7.6594E-07 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+OO 5. 3597E-03 4.0714E-03 . cpu.tl2 sp2'xf1' 
EI-ll.2.1 1.0206E-06 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 9.6382E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 5.3482E-05 cpu.tl2' sp2 
EI-ll.ll 2.9008E-06 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 4.0714E-03 cpu.tl2' sp2'xf1 
EI-Il.2.3 1.5631E-08 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+OO 5. 3597E-03 4.0714E-03 cpu.tl2' sp2'xf1' 
1M 
EI-ll.3.1 5.0516E-07 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 9.6382 E-O 1 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E-t-QO 5.3482E-05 cpu'.tl2 sp2 
~ EI-ll.3.2 1.4358E-06 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 4.0714E-03 cpu'.tl2 sp2'xf1 
. 
EI-II.3.3 7.7367E-09 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 4.0714E-03 cpu'.tl2 sp2'xf1' 
EI-ll.4.1 1.0309E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.6382E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+JlO 5.3482E-05 cpu'.tl2 sp2 
EI-ll.4.2 2.9301E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 4.0714E-03 cpu'.tl2 sp2'xf1 
EI-ll.4.3 1.5789E-l0 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+oo 5.3597E-03 4.0714E-03 cpu'.tl2 sp2'xf1' 
5.857OE-05 6.2629E-05 
EI-I2.1.1 2.08888E-05 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 9.8227E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 2. 1919E-05 cpu.tl4 sp4 
EI-I2.1.2 3.7569E-07 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.7728E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 2. 1960E-05 cpu.tl4 sp4'xf1 
EI-I2.I.3 1.9083E-07 9.9000E-Ol 9. 8000 E-O 1 1.7728E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 2.0700E-03 cpu.tl4 sp4'xf1' 
EI-illi 42710E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 9.8227E-Ol 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+OO 2. 1960E-05 cpu.tl4 sp4 
EI-I2.ll 72272E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464 E-O 1 2.0700E-03 cpu.tl4 sp4'xf1 
EI-I2.2.3 3.8944E-09 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 2.0700E-03 cpu.tl4 sp4'xf1' 
Framework A.4.1 Average Societal Risk in Terms ofUnavilability/Avaiiability Variables 
EI-I2.l.1 2.1139E-07 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 9.B227E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 2. 1960E-OS cpu'.v4 sp4 
EI-12.3.2 3.5771E-07 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.7728E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 2.0700E-03 cpu'.v4 sp4'xl1 
EI-12.3.3 1.9276E-09 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.7728E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 2.0700E-03 cpu'.v4 sp4'xl1' 
EI-12.4.1 4.3141E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.8227E-Ol 1.0000E+OQ 1.0000E+OO 2. 1960E-05 cpu'.v4 sp4 
EI-I2.4.2 7.3002E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 2.0700E-03 cpu'.v4 sp4'xl1 
EI-12.4.3 3.9338E-l1 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3S97E-03 2.0700E-03 cpu'.v4 sp4'xl1'·· ." 
2.3192E-05 2.S337E-OS 5. 7316E-05 8.0508E-05 
EI-13.1.1 S.0221E-05 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 5.2042E-05 cpu.v1 xlI 
EI-13.1.2 62930E-06 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 1.2102E-03 cpu. vI xlI' 
EI-13.2.1 2.3834E-OS 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 1.2102E-03 cpu.vl' xlI 
~ 
EI-13.2.2 1.2843E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 5. 3597 E-03 1.2102E-03 cpu.vl' xlI' 
EI-13.3.1 1.1796E-05 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 
. 
9.9464 E-O 1 1.2102E-03 cpu'vl xlI 
EI-13.3.2 6.3566E-08 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 5.3S97E-03 1.2102E-03 cpu'vl xlI' 
EI-13.4.1 2.4074E-07 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 1.2102E-03 cpu'v1 xl1 
EI-13.4.2 12973E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+oo 5.3597E-03 1.2102E-03 cpu'vl xlI' 
9.2578E-05 9.2702E-OS 
EI-14.1.1 4.9760E-OS 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 5. 1565E-05 cpu. vI xl1 
EI-14.1.2 6.0377E-06 9.9000E-Ol 9. 8OOOE-O 1 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 1. 1611E-03 cpu.v1 xfl' 
EI-14.2.1 22867E-OS 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+oo 9.9464E-Ol 1. 1611E-03 cpu.v1 xlI 
EI-14.2.2 12322E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 1. 1611E-03 cpu.vI xl1' 
EI-14.3.1 1.1318E-OS 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 1. 1611E-03 cpu'vl xfl 
EI-14.3.2 6.0987E-OS 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+oo 5. 3597 E-03 1.1611E-03 cpu'v1 xl1' 
-_._. __ .-
Framework A.4.1 Average Societal Risk in Terms ofUnavilability/Avaiiability Variables 
EI-14.4.1 2.3098E-07 1.0000E-Q2 2.0000E-Q2 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+oo 9.9464E-Ol t.t61tE-03 cpu'.,t xtt 
EI-14.4.2 12446E-09 1.0000E-Q2 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-Q3 t.161tE-03 cpu'.,t xtt' 
9.0399E-05 9.0S14E-oS 
EI-lS.l.l 2.6120E-05 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 9.6382E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 2. 7933E-05 cpu • .,2 sp2 
EI-lS.l.2 9.7519E-07 9.9000E-Ql 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 2. 7933E-05 cpu . .,2 sp2'xf1 
EI-lS.1.3 2.4532E-08 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 t.3040E-04 cpu • .,2 sp2'xft' ! 
EI-lS.2.1 5.3306E-07 9.9000E-Ql 2.0000E-Q2 9.6382E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 2. 7933E-05 cpu • .,2' sp2 
EI-lS.2.2 92908E-08 9.9000E-Ql 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+oo 9.9464E-Ol t.3040E-04 cpu • .,2 sp2'xf1 
EI-lS.2.3 5.0065E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 t.3040E-04 cpu . .,2 sp2'xf1' 
EI-lS.3.1 2.6384E-07 1.0000E-Q2 9.8000E-Ol 9.6382E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 2.7933E-05 cpu' • .,2 sp2 
~ 
~ EI-lS.3.2 4.5985E-08 1.0000E-Q2 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+OO 9. 9464 E-O 1 t.3040E-04 cpu '. v2 sp2'xft 
EI-lS.3.3 2.4779E-l0 1.0000E-Q2 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+oo 5. 3597E-Q3 t.3040E-04 cpu'.v2 sp2'xf1' 
EI-lS.4.1 5.3845E-09 1.0000E-Q2 2.0000E-02 9.6382E-Ol 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+OO 2. 7933E-05 cpu'.v2 sp2 
EI-lS.4.2 9.3847E-l0 1.0000E-Q2 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-Q2 1.0000E+oo 9.9464E-Ol t.304OE-04 cpu'.v2 Isp2'xft 
EI-lS.4.3 5.0570E-12 1.0000E-Q2 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 1.0000E+oo 5.3597E-Q3 t.3040E-04 cpu '. v2 sp2'xft' 
2.8063E-05 2.8164E-05 
EI-16 No calculation 
EI-17.1 2.1658E-OS 
EI-17.2 2.5536E-06 No protection systems . 
EI-17.3 O.OOOOE+oo 
EI-17.4 3.162OE-09 Total EI-17.1: 2.4214E-05 
Framework A.4.1 Average Societal Risk in Terms orUnavilability/Avaiiability Variables 
EI-18.1.1 4.72605E-06 9. 90000 E-O 1 9.80000E-01 9.7918E-01 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 4.97479E-06 cpu.vl spl 
EI-18.1.2 9.99522E-08 9. 90000 E-O 1 9.80000E-01 2.OB20E-02 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 4.97479E-06 cpu.vl sp1'xg3 
EI-18.1.3 5.35716E-10 9.90000E-01 9.80000E-01 2.OB20E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 4.97479E-06 cpu. vI sp1'xg3'xf3 
EI-18.1A 1. 77833E-1 0 9. 90000 E-O 1 9.80000E-01 2.0820E-02 5. 3597E-03 5.3597E-03 3.06463E-04 cpu. vI sp1'xg3'xf3' 
EI-18.2.1 9.64500E-OB 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-01 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 4.97479E-06 cpu. vI , spl 
EI-l8.2.2 125661E-07 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-02 2.OB20E-02 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 3.06463E-04 cpu. vI , sp1'xg3 
EI-l8.2.3 6.73506E-10 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5. 3597 E-03 9.9464E-01 3.06463E-04 cpu.vl' sp1'xg3'xf3 
EI-18.2.4 3.62926E-12 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-02 2.OB20E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 3.06463E-04 cpu. vI , sp l'xg3'xf3' 
EI-18.3.1 4.77379E-08 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 9.7918E-01 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 4.97479E-06 cpu'.vl spl 
EI-18.3.2 6.21957E-08 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 2.OB20E-02 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 3.06463E-04 cpu'.vl sp1'xg3 
~ 
S EI-18.3.3 3.33351E-10 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 2.OB20E-02 5. 3597E-03 9.9464E-01 3.06463E-04 cpu'.vl sp1'xg3'xf3 
EI-18.3.4 1.79630E-12 1.0000E-02 9. 8OOOE-O 1 2.OB20E-02 5. 3597E-03 
. 
5.3597E-03 3.06463E-04 cpu'. vI sp l'xg3'xf3' 
EI-18.4.1 9.74243E-10 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-01 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 4.97479E-06 cpu'.vl spl 
EI-18.4.2 1.26930E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.OB20E-02 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 3.06463E-04 cpu'.vl sp1'xg3 
EI-18.4.3 6.80309E-12 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.OB20E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 3.06463E-04 cpu'.vl sp1'xg3'xf3 
EI-18.4.4 3.66591E-14 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.OB20E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 3.06463E-04 cpu'.vl sp1'xg3'xf3' 
5. 1620E-06 4.9989E-06 5. 1620E-06 
EI-19.1 32944E-05 
EI-19.2 3.8844E-06 No protection systems 
EI-19.3 8.7529E-06 
EI-19.4 2.4990E-06 Total EI-19: 4.808OE-05 
I 
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Ela-2Orsb O.OOOOE+oo 
Elb-lOrsb 4.1333E-06 No I protection systems 
Elc-20rsb 5.7819E-06 
Eld-20rsb 8.0864E-05 Total EI-20: 9.0779E-05 
EI-21 to 22 Oil Tanks Explosior: 
tqlc 2.5057E-06 
tqlp 1.6952E-06 
tqls 1.6951E-06 
tqlc 3.0999E-05 
tq2p 2.4803E-06 
tq2s 2.4799E-06 
w 
tq3c 32417E-06 
~ tq-4c 2.0112E-06 
tq-4p 1.6918E-06 . 
tq-4s 1.6915E-06 
tq-Sc 12200E-06 
tq-Sp 5.9400E-08 
tq-Ss 4.B477E-08 
Total EI-2lto 22: 5. 1819E-05 
EI-23.I.l 4.52B4E-06 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 4. 7667E-06 cpu.v1 sp1 
EI-23.I.2 9.5858E-08 9.9OOOE-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 4. 771 OE-06 cpu.v1 sp1'xg4 
EI-23.I.3 5. 1489E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9. 9464E-O 1 4. 7814E-06 cpu.v1 sp1'xg4'xf4 
EI-23.I.4 1.9978E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5. 3597E-03 3.442BE-D4 cpu.v1 sp1'xg4'xf4' 
EI-23.21 92499E-08 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OC 4.7710E-06 cpu.v1 sp1 
Framework A.4.1 Average Societal Risk in Terms ofUnavilability/Avaiiability Variables 
EI-23.2.2 1.9605E-{)9 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-Q2 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 4. 7814E-06 cpu.vl' spl'xg4 
EI-23.2.3 7.5662E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 3.4428E-04 cpu.vl' spl'xg4'xf4 
EI-23.2.4 4.0771E-12 9.9000E-Dl 2.0000E-Q2 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 3.4428E-04 cpu.vl' spl'xg4'xf4' 
EI-23.3.1 4.5782E-08 1.0000E-02 9. 8000 E-O 1 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 4. 771 OE-06 cpu'. vI spl 
EI-23.3.2 9.7037E-l0 1.0000E-D2 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-Q2 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 4. 7814E-06 cpu'.vl spl'xg4 
EI-23.3.3 3.7449E-l0 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5. 3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 3.442BE-04 cpu'. vI sp1'xg4'xf4 
EI-23.3.4 2.0180E-12 1.0000E-D2 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 3.4428E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg4'xf4' 
EI-23.4.1 9.3433E-l0 1.0000E-Q2 2.0000E-Q2 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 4. 771 0E-06 cpu'.v1 sp1 
EI-23.4.2 1.9803E-ll 1.0000E-Q2 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-Q2 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 4. 7814E-06 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg4 
EI-23.4.3 7.6426E-12 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9. 9464 E-O1 3.4428E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg4'xf4 
EI-23.4.4 4.1183E-14 1.0000E-D2 2.0000E-Q2 2.0820E-Q2 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 3.4428E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg4'xf4' 
IoU 
~ 4.76B2E-06 4.7884E-06 
EI-24.1.1 1.0000E+OO 2.2164E-04 
, 
cpu.v3 sp3 2.0790E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.6681E-01 1.0000E+OO 
EI-24.1.2 7.0986E-06 9.9000E-Dl 9.8000E-Ol 3.3189E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OC 2.2164E-04 cpu.v3 sp3'xg2 
EI-24.1.3 5.5514E-08 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 3.3189E-Q2 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 3.234OE-04 cpu.v3 sp3'xg2'xf2 
EI-24.1.4 5.9837E-l0 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 3.3189E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 6.4689E-04 cpu.v3 sp3'xg2'xf2' 
EI-24.2.1 42428E-06 9.9000E-D1 2.0000E-Q2 9.6681E-01 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OC 2.2164E-04 cpu.v3 sp3 
EI-24.2.2 2.1138E-07 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-Q2 3.3189E-Q2 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OC 3.234OE-04 cpu.v3 sp3'xg2 
EI-24.2.3 22662E-09 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-Q2 3.3189E-Q2 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 6.4689E-04 cpu.v3 sp3'xg2'xf2 
EI-24.M 12212E-11 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-Q2 3.3189E-Q2 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 6.4689E-04 cpu.v3' sp3'xg2'xf2' 
, 
EI-24.3.1 2. 1 OOOE-06 1.0000E-Q2 9.8000E-01 9.6681E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OC 2.2164&04 cpu'.v3 sp3 
EI-24.3.2 1.0462E-07 1.0000E-Q2 9. 8000 E-O 1 3.3189E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OC 3.234OE-04 cpu'.v3 sp3'xg2 
EI-24.3.3 1.1217E-09 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 3.3189E-Q2 5. 3597E-03 9. 9464 E-O 1 6.4689E-04 cpu'.v3 sp3'xg2'xf2 
EI-24.3.4 6.0442E-12 1.0000E-Q2 9 .. 8000E-Ol 3.3189E-Q2 5. 3597E-03 5.3597E-03 6.4689&04 cpu'.v3 sp3'xg2'xf2' 
._-
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• EI-24.4.1 42857E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.6681E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 2.2164E-04 cpu'.v3 sp3 
EI-24.4.2 2. 1352E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 3.3189E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 3.2340E-04 cpu'.v3 sp3'xg2 
EI-24.4.J 2.2891E-ll 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 3.3189E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 6.4689E-04 cpu'.v3 sp3'xg2'xf2 
EI-24.4.4 1.2335E-13 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 3.3189E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 6.4689E-04 cpu'.v3 sp3'xg2'xf2' 
2.2176E-04 2.2196E-04 
EI-2S.1.1 7.8638E-05 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 9. 9464E-O 1 1.0000E+OO 8. 1490E-05 cpu.v2 xg2 
EI-2S.1.2 4.214BE-07 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 5. 3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 8. 1490E-O::i cpu.v2 xg2'xf2 
EI-2S.1.3 4.9690E-09 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1. 7829E-04 cpu.v2 xg2'xf2' 
EI-2S.2.1 1.6049E-06 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 8. 1490E-05 cpu.v2' xg2 
EI-2S.2.2 1.8819E-08 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 1. 7829E-04 cpu.v2' xg2'xf2 
EI-2S.2.3 1.0141E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.7829E-04 cpu.v2' xg2'xf2' 
w 
EI-2S.3.1 7.9432E-07 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+oo 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 8. 1490E-05 cpu'.v2 xg2 .-o 
EI-2S.3.2 9.3145E-09 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 1.7829E-04 
, 
cpu'.v2 xg2'xl2 
EI-2S.3.3 5.0192E-l1 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.7829E-04 cpu'.v2 xg2'xf2' 
EI-2S.4.1 1.6211E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 8. 1490E-05 cpu'.v2 xg2 
EI-2S.4.2 1.9009E-l0 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 1.7829E-04 cpu'.v2 xg2'xf2 
EI-2S.4.3 1.0243E-12 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.7829E-04 cpu'.v2 xg2'xf2' 
8. 1508E-05 8.1618E-05 
EI-26.1.1 22300E-04 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 9.6681E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 2.3774E-04 cpu.v3 sp3 
EI-26.1.2 7.6142E-06 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 3.3189E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 2.3774E-04 cpu.v3 sp3'xg2 
EI-26.1.3 42363E-08 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 3.3189E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 2.4679E-04 cpu.v3 sp3'xg2'xf2 
EI-26.1A 1.5620E-09 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 3.3189E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.6887E-03 cpu.v3 sp3'xg2'xf2' 
EI-26.2.1 4.5510E-06 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 9.6681E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 2.3774E-04 cpu.v3 sp3 
EI-26.2.2 1.6131E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 3.3189E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 2.4679E-04 cpu.v3 sp3'xg2 
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w 
.... 
.... 
EI-26.2.3 5.9159E-09 9.9000E-ol 2.0000E-02 3.3189E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-ol 
EI-26.2.4 3.1878E-l1 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 3.3189E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-26.3.1 22525E-06 1.0000E-02 9. 8000E-o 1 9.6681E-ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 
EI-26.3.2 7.9839E-08 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 3.3189E-02 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 
EI-26.3.3 2.9281 E-OO 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 3.3189E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 
EI-26.3_4 1.5778E-11 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 3.3189E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-26.4.1 4.5970E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.6681E-ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 
EI-26.4.2 1.6294E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 3.3189E-02 9.9464E-ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-26.4.3 5.9757E-11 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 3.3189E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 
EI-26.4.4 32200E-13 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 3.3189E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
2.3776E-04 2.3794E-04 
EI-27.1.1 O.OOOOE+OO 9.9000E-01 9. 8OOOE-O 1 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-27.1.2 O.OOOOE+OO 9.9000E-ol 9. 8OOOE-O 1 1.0000E+OO 5. 3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 
EI-27.1.3 O.OOOOE+OO 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-27.2.1 O.OOOOE+OO 9.9000E-ol 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-27.2.2 O.OOOOE+OO 9.9000E-ol 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 
EI-27.2.3 O.OOOOE+OO 9.9000E-ol 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 5. 3597E-03 
EI-27.3.1 O.OOOOE+OO 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 
EI-27.3.2 O.OOOOE+OO 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 1.0000E+oo 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 
EI-27.3.3 O.OOOOE+OO 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-27.4.1 O.OOOOE+OO 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 
EI-27.4.2 O.OOOOE+OO 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+oo 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 
EI-27.4.3 O.OOOOE+OO 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 5. 3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
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1.6887E-03 cpu.v3 sp3'xg2'Jd2 
1.6887E-03 cpu.v3' sp3'xg2'Jd2' 
2.3774E-04 cpu'.v3 sp3 
2.4679E-04 cpu'.v3 sp3'xg2 
1.6887E-03 cpu'.v3 sp3'xg2'xf2 
1.6887E-03 cpu '. v3 sp3'xg2~~' 
2.3774E-04 cpu'.v3 sp3 
2.4679E-04 cpu'.v3 sp3'xg2 
1.6887E-03 cpu'.v3 sp3'xg2'Jd2 
1.6887E-03 cpu'.v3 sp3'xg2'Jd2' 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu.v2 xg2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu.v2 xg2'Jd2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu.v2 xg2'Jd2' 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu.v2 xg2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu.v2 xg2'Jd2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu.v2 xg2'Jd2' 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu'.v2 xg2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu'.v2 xg2'xf2 
O.OOOOE+oo cpu'.v2 xg2'xf2' 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu'.v2 xg2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu'.v2 xg2'Jd2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu'.v2 xg2'Jd2' 
EI·28.1 O.OOOOE+OO 
EI·28.2 O.OOOOE+oo 
EI·28.3 O.OOOOE+OO 
EI·28.4 O.OOOOE+OO 
EI·29.1.1 22793E-05 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 9.8227E-ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 2.3917E-05 cpu.v4 sp4 
EI-29.1.2 4.0917E-07 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-ol 1.7728E-D2 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 2.3917E·05 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2 
EI·29.1.3 3.90 14E-09 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-ol 1.7728E-02 . 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 4.2549E-05 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2 I 
EI·29.1.4 4.2047E-l1 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-ol 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 8.509BE-05 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
EI-29.2.1 4.6516E-07 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-D2 9.8227E-01 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+OO 2.3917E-05 cpu.v4' sp4 
EI·29.2.2 1.4856E-08 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-D2 1.7728E-D2 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 4.2549E·05 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2 
t..> EI·29.2.3 1.5924E-l0 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 8.5098E-05 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2 
.... 
IV EI·29.2.4 8.5810E-13 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 8.509BE-05 cpu.v4' sp4'xg2'xf2' 
EI·29.3.1 2.3023E-07 1.0000E-D2 9.8000E-ol 9.8227E-01 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 2.3917E-05 cpu'.v4 sp4 
EI-29.3.2 7.3527E-Q9 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 1.7728E-D2 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 4.2549E-05 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2 
EI·29.3.3 7.8817E-ll 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 1.7728E-D2 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 8.509BE-05 cpu'.v4 I sp4'xg2'xf2 
EI-29.3.4 42471E-13 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 1.7728E-D2 5.3597E-Q3 5.3597E-03 8.509BE-05 cpu'.v4 sp4~xg2'xf2' 
EI·29.4.1 4.6986E-Q9 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-D2 9.8227E-01 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+OO 2.3917E-05 cpu'.v4 sp4 
EI-29.4.2 1.5006E-10 1.0000E-D2 2.0000E-D2 1.7728E-02 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 4.2549E-05 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2 
EI·29.4.3 1.6085E-12 1.0000E-D2 2.0000E-D2 1.7728E-D2 5.3597E-Q3 9.9464E-01 8.509BE-05 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2 
EI·29.4.4 8.6676E-15 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-D2 1.7728E-D2 5. 3597E-Q3 5. 3597E-03 8.509BE-05 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
2.3929E-05 2.3959E-05 
EI·30.1.1 3.1280E-D4 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-01 9.8227E-ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 3.2823E-04 cpu.v4 sp4 
EI·30.1.2 5.6180E-D6 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-ol 1.7728E-D2 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 3.2839E-04 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2 
EI·30.1.3 1.0522E-07 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 1.7728E-D2 5.3597E-Q3 9.9464 E-o 1 1. 1475E-03 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2 
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: 
EI-30.1.4 9.4496E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-Q3 5.3597E-03 1.9125E-03 cpu.II4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
EI-30.2.1 6.3869E-06 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-D2 9.8227E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 3.2839E-04 cpu. 114' sp4 
EI-30.2.2 4.0064E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1. 1475E-03 cpu.II4' sp4'xg2 
EI-30.2.3 3.5788E-Q9 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-Q3 9.9464E-Ol 1.9125E-03 cpu.II4' sp4'xg2'xf2 
EI-30.2.4 1.9285E-l1 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-D2 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.9125E-03 cpu. 114 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
EI-30.3.1 3.1612E-06 1.0000E-Q2 9.8000E-Ol 9.8227E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 3.2839E-04 cpu '.114 sp4 
EI-30.3.2 1.9830E-07 1.0000E-Q2 9.8000E-Ol 1.7728E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1. 1475E-03 cpu '.114 sp4'xg2 
EI-30.3.3 1.7713E-Q9 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.7728E-02 5. 3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 1.9125E-03 cpu'.114 sp4'xg2'xf2 
EI-30.3.4 9.5451E-12 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.7728E-02 5. 3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.9125E-03 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
w 
-w EI-30.4.1 6.4514E-08 1.0000E-Q2 2.0000E-D2 9.8227E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 3.2839E-04 cpu'.114 sp4 
EI-30.4.2 4.0468E-Q9 1.0000E-Q2 2.0000E-D2 1.7728E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1. 1475E-03 cpu'. 114 sp4'xg2 
EI-30.4.3 3.6150E-ll 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-D2 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 1.9125E-03 cpu'.114 sp4'xg2'xf2 
EI-30.4A 1.9480E-13 1.0000E-Q2 2.0000E-D2 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.9f25E-03 cpu '. 114 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
3.2875E-04 3.2978E-04 
EI-31.1.1 1.8610E-04 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+~ f.9589E-04 cpu.vf spf 
EI-31.1.2 3.9358E-06 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-D2 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO f.9589E-04 cpu.llf spf'xg2 
EI-31.1.3 2.6878E-08 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-D2 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 2.4960E-04 cpu.llf spf'xg2'xf2 
EI-31.1.4 2.4140E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-D2 5. 3597E-Q3 5.3597E-Q3 4. 1600E-04 cpu.llf spf'xg2'xf2' 
EI-31.2.1 3.7979E-06 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-D2 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO f.9589E-04 cpu.llf spf 
EI-31.2.2 1.0234E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-D2 2.0820E-D2 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 2.4960E-04 cpu.llf spf'xg2 
EI-31.2.3 9.1423E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-D2 2.0820E-D2 5.3597E-Q3 9.9464E-Ol 4. 1600E-04 cpu.llf' spf'xg2'xfZ 
EI-31.U 4.9264E-12 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-D2 2.0820E-D2 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-Q3 4. 1600E-04 cpu.llf' spf'xg2'xf2' 
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I.>l 
~ 
EI-31.3.1 1.8798E-Q6 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 
EI-31.3.2 5.0656E-08 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-31.3.3 4.5250E-l0 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 
EI-31.3.4 2.4383E-12 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-31.4.1 3.8362E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OC 
EI-31.4.2 1.0338E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OC 
EI-31.4.3 9.2347E-12 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 
EI-31.4.4 4.9762E-14 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
1.9593E-04 1.9602E-04 
EI-31.1.1 1.8330E-04 9.9000E-Ol 9. 8000 E-O 1 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 
EI-32.1.2 3.8767E-06 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-32.1.3 6.5042E-08 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 
EI-31.1A 52573E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5. 3597E-03 
EI-31.1.1 3.7409E-Q6 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 
EI-31.2.2 2.4766E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-31.2.3 1.9911E-09 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 
EI-31.1.4 1.0729E-ll 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 S.3597E-03 
EI-32.3.1 1.8515E-Q6 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 
EI-32.3.2 12258E-07 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-32.3.3 9.8549E-l0 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9. 9464 E-O 1 
EI-32.3A 5.3104E-12 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-32.4.1 3.7787E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+OO 
EI-31.4.2 2.5016E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 
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1.9589E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1 
2.4960E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2 
4. 1600E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2 
4. 1600E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2' 
1.9589E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1 
2.4960E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2 
4. 1600E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2 
4. 1600E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2' 
1.9295E-04 cpu.v1 sp1 
1.9295E-04 cpu.v1 sp1'xg2 
6.0400E-04 cpu.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2 
9.0600E-04 cpu.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2' 
. 
1.9295E-04 cpu.v1 sp1 
6.0400E-04 cpu.v1 sp1'xg2 
9.0600E-04 cpu.v1' sp1'xg2'xf2 
9.0600E-04 cpu.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2' 
1.9295E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1 
6.0400E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2 
9.0600E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2 
9.0600E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2' 
1.9295E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1 
6.0400E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2 
EI-32.4.3 2.0112E-11 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 9.0600E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-32.4.4 1.0838E-13 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 9.0600E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2' 
1.9325E-04 1.9371E-04 I 
EI-33.1.1 3.8320E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.791BE-01 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+OO 4.0337E-04 cpu.v1 sp1 
EI-33.1.2 B.1044E-06 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 4.0337E-04 cpu.v1 sp1'xg2 
EI-33.1.3 2.3609E-07 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 2. 1924E-03 cpu.v1 ,sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-33.1.4 2. 1203E-Q9 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5. 3597E-03 3.6540E-03 cpu.v1 sp1 'xg2'xf2' 
EI-33.2.1 7.B204E-06 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-02 9.791BE-01 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 4.0337E-04 cpu.v1' sp1 
EI-33.2.2 B.9896E-07 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 2. 1924E-03 cpu.v1' sp1'xg2 
EI-33.2.3 8.0303E-09 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5. 3597E-03 9.9464E-01 3.6540E-03 cpu.v1' sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-33.2.4 4.3272E-11 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 3.6540E-03 cpu.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2' 
w 
.... 
VI EI-33.3.1 3.B707E-06 1.0000E-02 9. 8000 E-O 1 9.7918E-01 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 4.0337E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1 
EI-33.3.2 4.4494E-07 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 2. 1924E-03 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2 
EI-33.3.3 3.9746E-Q9 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 3.6540E-03 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-33.3.4 2.1418E-11 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 3.654OE-03 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2' 
EI-33.4.1 7.8994E-OS 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-01 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+OO 4.0337E-04 cpu'.v1 sp1 
EI-33.4.2 9.0804E-Q9 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 2. 1924E-03 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2 
EI-33.4.3 8.1114E-11 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 3.6540E-03 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-33.4.4 4.3709E-13 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 3.6540E-03 cpu'.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2' 
4.0468E-04 4.0665E-04 
EI-34.1.1 2.8100E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.7918E-01 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+OO 2.9579E-04 cpu.v1 sp1 
EI-34.1.2 5.9429E-06 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 2.9579E-04 cpu.v1 sp1'xg2 
EI-34.1.3 8. 1920E-OS 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 7.6073E-04 cpu.v1 sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-34.1.4 8.8289E-10 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.5215E-03 cpu.v1 sp1 'xg2'xf2' 
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EI-34.2.1 5.7347E-06 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 2.9579E-04 cpu.,," sp1 
EI-34.2.2 3.1193E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 7.6073E-04 cpu.,," sp1'xg2 
EI-34.2.3 3.3438E-09 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 1.5215E-03 cpu.,," sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-34.2.4 1.8018E-ll 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.5215E-03 cpu.,," sp1'xg2'xf2' 
EI-34.3.1 2.8384E-06 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 2.9579E-04 cpu'.,,' sp1 
EI-34.3.2 1.5439E-07 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 7.6073E-04 cpu'. ", sp1'xg2 
EI-34.3.3 1.6550E-09 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 1.5215E-03 cpu'. ,,1 sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-34.3.4 8.9181E-12 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.5215E-03 cpu'.,,' sp1'xg2'xf2' 
EI-34.4.1 5.7926E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-01 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 2.9579E-04 cpu'. ,,1 sp1 
EI-34.4.2 3.1508E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 7.6073E-04 cpu'.,,' sp1'xg2 
IN EI-34.4.3 3.3775E-ll 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5. 3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 1.5215E-03 cpu'.,,' sp1'xg2'xf2 
-01 EI-34.4.4 1.8200E-13 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5. 3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.5215E-03 cpu'.,,' sp1 'xg2'xf2' 
2.9613E-04 2.9669E-04 
EI-3S.1.1 62100E-04 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 6.536BE-04 cpu. ", sp1 
EI-3S.1.2 1.3134E-05 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 6.536BE-04 cpu. ,,1 sp1'xg2 
EI-3S.1.3 7. 1 073E-07 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464 E-O 1 6.6000E-03 cpu.,,' sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-3S.1.4 5.7447E-09 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 9.9000E-03 cpu.,,' sp1 'xg2'xf2' 
EI-3S.2.1 12673E-05 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 6.536BE-04 cpu.,,' sp1 
EI-3S.2.2 2.7062E-06 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 6.6000E-03 cpu.,,' sp1'xg2 
EI-3S.2.3 2. 1757E-08 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 9.9000E-03 cpu.,,' sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-3S.2.4 1.1724E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 9.9000E-03 cpu.,," sp1'xg2'xf2' ! 
I 
EI-3S.3_1 62727E-06 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+OO 6.536BE-04 cpu'. ", sp1 I 
EI-3S.3.2 1.3394E-06 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 6.6000E-03 cpu'. ,,1 sp1'xg2 
-
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EI-3S.3.3 1.0769E-08 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 9.9000E-03 cpu'. ", sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-3S.3.4 5.8028E-ll 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 9.9000E-03 cpu'.", sp1'xg2'xf2' 
EI-3S.4.t 12801E-07 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 6.536BE-04 cpu'.", sp1 
EI-3S.4.2 2.7336E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 6.6000E-03 cpu'.", sp1'xg2 
EI-3S.4.3 2.1977E-l0 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 9.9000E-03 cpu'.", sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-3S.4.4 1.1842E-12 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5. 3597E-03 5.3597E-03 9.9000E-03 cpu'.", sp1'xg2'xf2' 
6.5803E-04 6.6441E-04 
EI-36.1.t 3.2230E-04 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 3.3926E-04 cpu.,,' sp1 
EI-36.1.2 6.8163E-06 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 3.3926E-04 cpu.,,' sp1'xg2 
EI-36.1.3 1.4045E-07 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 1.3043E-03 cpu. ,,1 sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-36.1.4 1.7660E-09 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 3.0433E-03 cpu.,,' sp1'xg2'xf2' 
~ 
-...J EI-36.2.t 6.5775E-06 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 3.3926E-04 cpu.,,' sp1 
EI-36.2.2 5.3481E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.3043E-03 cpu.,,' sp1'xg2 
EI-36.2.3 6.6882E-09 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464 E-O 1 3.0433E-03 cpu.,,' sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-36.2.4 3.6040E-ll 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 3.0433E-03 cpu.,,' sp1'xg2'xf2' 
EI-30.t 32555E-06 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 3.3926E-04 cpu'. ", sp1 
EI-30.2 2.6470E-07 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.3043E-03 cpu'. ,,1 sp1'xg2 
EI-36.3.3 3.3103E-09 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464 E-O 1 3.0433E-03 cpu'. ", sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-30.4 1.7838E-ll 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-OO 3.0433E-03 cpu'.", sp 1'xg2'xf2' 
EI-36.4.t 6.6439E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.7918E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 3.3926E-04 cpu'. ,,1 sp1 i 
EI-36.4.2 5.4021E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.3043E-03 cpu'. ", sp1'xg2 
EI-36.4.3 6.7557E-l1 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 3.0433E-03 cpu'. ", sp1'xg2'xf2 
EI-36.4.4 3.6404E-13 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 2.0820E-02 
-----------
5.3597E-03 5.3597E-OO 3.0433E-03 cpu'.", sp1'xg2'xf2' 
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w 
00 
3.3997E-tU 3.4110E-04 
EI-37.1.1 3.9389E-05 9.9000E-ol 9. 8000 E-o 1 9.8227E-ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 
EI-37.1.2 7.0712E-07 9.9000E-ol 9.8000E-ol 1.7728E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-37.1.3 1.7018E-oB 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.n28E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 
EI-37.1.4 1.3756E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.n28E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-37.2.1 8.0388E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 9.8227E-ol 1.OOOOE+OO 1.OOOOE+OO 
EI-37.2.2 6.4800E-08 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.n28E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-37.2.3 52097E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.n28E-02 5. 3597E-03 9.9464E-ol 
EI-37.2.4 2.8073E-12 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.n28E-02 5.3597E-03 5. 3597E-03 
EI-37.3.1 3.9788E-07 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-ol 9.8227E-ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 
EI-37.3.2 3.2073E-oB 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-ol 1.n28E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-37.3.3 2.5785E-l0 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-ol 1.n28E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-ol 
EI-37.3.4 1.3895E-12 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-ol 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-37.4.1 8. 1200E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.8227E-ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 
EI-37.4.2 6.5455E-l0 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.n28E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-37.4.3 52623E-12 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.n28E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464 E-o 1 
EI-37.4.4 2.8356E-14 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.n28E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
4. 1422E-05 4.1S94E-OS 
EI-38.1.1 1.0200E-04 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-ol 9.8227E-ol 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+OO 
EI-38.1.2 1.8310E-06 9. 9OOOE-O 1 9. 8OOOE-o 1 1.n28E-02 9. 9464E-O1 1.0000E+OO 
EI-38.1.3 5.8072E-oB 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-ol 1.n28E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-ol 
EI-38.1A 9.3879E-l0 9.9000E-ol 9.8000E-ol 1.n28E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-38.2.1 2.0816E-06 9.9000E.{) 1 2.0000E-02 9.822?E:-ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 
- - -----------
Framework A.4.1 Average Societal Risk in Terms ofUnavilability/Avaiiability Variables 
4. 1332E-05 cpu.,,4 sp4 
4. 1333E-05 cpu.,,4 sp4'xg2 
1.8560E-04 cpu.,,4 sp4'xg2'xf2 
2. 7840E-04 cpu.,,4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
4. 1333E-05 cpu.,,4 sp4 ...... 
1.8560E-04 cpu.,,4' sp4'xg2 
2. 7840E-04 cpu.,,4 sp4'xg2'xf2 
2.7B40E-04 cpu.,,4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
4. 1333E-05 cpu'.,,4 sp4 
1.8560E-04 cpu'.,,4 sp4'xg2 
2. 7840E-04 cpu'.,,4 sp4'xg2'xf2 
2.7840E-04 cpu'.,,4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
4. 1333E-05 cpu'.,,4 sp4 
1.8560E-04 cpu'.,,4 sp4'xg2 
2.7840E-04 cpu'.,,4 sp4'xg2'xf2 
2.7840E-04 cpu'.,,4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
1.0703E-04 cpu.,,4 sp4 , 
1.0703E-04 cpu.,,4 sp4'xg2 
6.3333E-04 cpu.,,4 sp4'xg2'xf2 
1.9000E-03 cpu.,,4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
1.0703E-04 cpu.,,4 sp4 
EI-38.2.2 22112E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-Q2 1.7728E-Q2 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 6.3333E-04 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2 
EI-38.2.3 3.5554E-Q9 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-Q2 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 1.9000E-03 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2 
EI-38.2.4 1.9159E-ll 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.9000E-03 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
EI-38.3.1 1.0303E-06 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 9.8227E-01 1.OOOOE+OO 1.OOOOE+OO 1.0703E-04 cpu'.v4 sp4 I 
EI-38.3.2 1.0944E-07 1.OOOOE-02 9.8000E-01 1.7728E-02 9.9464E-01 1.OOOOE+OC 6.3333E-04 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2 
EI-38.3.3 1.7598E-Q9 1.OOOOE-02 9.8000E-01 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 1.9000E-03 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2 
EI-38.3.4 9.4827E-12 1.OOOOE-02 9.8000E-01 1.7728E-Q2 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.9000E-03 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
EI-38.4.1 2. 1 027E-OB 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-Q2 9.B227E-01 1.OOOOE+OO 1.OOOOE+OO 1.0703E-04 cpu'.v4 sp4 
EI-38.4.2 2.2335E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.772BE-02 9.9464E-01 1.OOOOE+OO 6.3333E-04 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2 
EI-38.4.3 3.5914E-ll 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-Q2 1.7728E-Q2 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 1.9000E-03 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2 
w EI-38.4.4 1.9352E-13 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-Q2 1.772BE-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.9000E-03 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
..... 
10 1.0736E-04 1.0802E-04 
EI-39.1.1 12890E-04 9.9000E-01 9.8000E-01 9.8227E-01 1.OOOOE+oo 1.OOOOE+OO 1.3526E-04 cpu.v4 sp4 
EI-39.1.2 2.3140E-06 9.9000E-{)1 9. 8000 E-O 1 1.7728E-02 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OC 1.3526E-04 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2 
EI-39.1.3 5.3640E-08 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.7728E-Q2 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 5.8500E-04 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2 
EI-39.1.4 4.3357E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 8.7750E-04 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
EI-39.2.1 2.6307E-06 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-Q2 9.8227E-01 1.OOOOE+OO 1.OOOOE+OO 1.3526E-04 cpu.v4 sp4 
EI-39.2.2 2.0425E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-Q2 1.7728E-Q2 9.9464E-01 1.OOOOE+OO 5.8500E-04 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2 
EI-39.2.3 1.6421E-Q9 9.9000E-{) 1 2.0000E-Q2 1.7728E-Q2 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 8.7750E-04 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2 
EI-39.2.4 B.8484E-12 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.772BE-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 8. 7750E-04 cpu.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
EI-39.3.1 1.3020E-06 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 9.8227E-01 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+()CJ 1.3526E-04 cpu'.v4 sp4 
EI-39.3.2 1.0109E-07 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.7728E-02 9.9464E-01 1.0000E+OO 5.8500E-04 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2 
EI-39.3.3 8.1273E-l0 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-03 9. 9464 E-O1 8. 7750E-04 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2 
----
Framework A.4.1 Average Societal Risk in Terms ofUnavilability/Avaiiability Variabl~ 
EI-39.3.4 4.3795E-12 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-01 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-Q3 5.3597E-03 8.7750E-04 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2'Jd2' 
I 
EI-39.4.1 2.6572E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.8227E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 1.3526E-04 cpu'.v4 sp4 
EI-39.4.2 2.0631E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 5.8500E-04 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2 
EI-39.4.3 1.6586E-l1 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 8. 7150E-04 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2'Jd2 
EI-39.4.4 8.9378E-14 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.7728E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 8. 7150E-04 cpu'.v4 sp4'xg2'xf2' 
1.3554E-04 1.3608E-04 
EI-40.1.1 8.8240E-04 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 9. 1440E-04 cpu.v2 xg2 
EI-40.1.2 4.7294E-06 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 9. 144OE-04 cpuv2 xg2'xf2 
EI-40.1.3 3.3445E-08 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+oo 5.3597E-Q3 5. 3597 E-03 1.2000E-03 cpuv2 xg2'xf2' 
EI-40.2.1 1.8008E-05 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 9. 1440E-04 cpuv2 xg2 
IH EI-40.2.2 12666E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 1.2000E-03 cpuv2 xg2'xf2 
~ EI-40.2.3 6.8254E-l0 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.2000E-03 cpuv2 xg2'Jd2' 
EI-40.3.1 8.9131E-06 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+oo 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OC 9. 144OE-04 cpu'~ xg2 
EI-40.3.2 62692E-08 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+oo 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 1.2000E-03 cpu'~ xg2'xf2 
EI-40.3.3 3.3782E-l0 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.2000E-03 cpu'~ xg2'Jd2' 
EI-40.4.1 1.8190E-07 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OC 9. 144OE-04 cpu'v2 xg2 
EI-40.4.2 12794E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+oo 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 1.2oo0E-03 cpu'v2 xg2'xf2 
EI-40.4.3 6.8944E-12 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 1.0000E+OO 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 1.2000E-03 cpu'v2 xg2'xf2' 
9. 1445E-04 9.1485E-04 
EI-41.1 3.5050E-04 Total EI-41: 3.5050E-04 
EI-42.1.1 2.1893E-04 9.9000E-Ol 9. 8OOOE-O 1 9.6382E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OC 2.3412E-04 cpu.v2 sp2 
EI-42.1.2 8. 1882E-06 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OC 2.3454E-04 cpu.v2 sp2'xg2 
EI-42.1..3 4.7385E-08 9. 9OOOE-O 1 9. 8OOOE-O 1 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-Q3 9. 9464E-O1 2.5324E-04 cpu.v2 sp2'xg2'Jd2 
Framework A.4.1 Av~age Societal Risk in Terms ofUnavilability/Avaiiability Variables 
t..l 
t-.l 
EI-42.1.4 1.0214E-09 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-42.1.4 1.0214E-09 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 5. 3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-42.2.1 4.4759E-Q6 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 9.6382E-Ol 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+OO 
EI-42.2.2 1.8043E-07 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-42.2..3 3.8684E-09 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 
EI-42.2.4 2.0845E-ll 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-42.3.1 22153E-Q6 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 9.6382E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 
EI-42.3.2 8.9302E-08 1.0000E-02 9. 8000 E-O 1 3.6178E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-42.3..3 1.9147E-09 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 
EI-42.3.4 1.0317E-ll 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-42.4.1 4.5211E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.6382 E-O 1 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 
EI-42.4.2 1.8225E-09 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-42.4..3 3.9074E-ll 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 
EI-42.4.4 2.1056E-13 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
2.3418E-D4 2.3397E-04 
EI-43 O.OOOOE+OO 
EI-44.1.1 1.1931E-04 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 9.6382E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OO 
EI-44.1.2 4.4544E-Q6 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 9. 9464E-O 1 1.0000E+OO 
EI-44.1.J O.OOOOE+OO 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 5. 3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 
EI-44.1.4 O.OOOOE+OO 9.9000E-Ol 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-44.2.1 2.4349E-Q6 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 9.6382 E-O 1 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+OO 
EI-44.2.2 O.OOOOE+OO 9.9000E-Ol 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 
Framework A.4.1 Average Societal Risk in Terms ofUnavilability/Avaiiability Variables 
1.0130E-03 cpu.v2 sp2'xg2'Jd2' 
1.0130E-03 cpu.v2 sp2'xg2'Jd2' 
2.3454E-04 cpu.v2 sp2 
2.5324E-04 cpu.v2' sp2'xg2 
1.0130E-03 cpu.v2 sp2'xg2'Jd2 
1.0130E-03 cpu.v2' sp2'xg2'Jd2' 
2.3454E-04 cpu'.v2 sp2 
2.5324E-04 cpu'.v2 sp2'xg2 I I 
1.0130E-03 cpu'.v2 sp2'xg2'Jd2 
1.0 130E-03 cpu'.v2 sp2'xg2'Jd2' 
2.3454E-04 cpu'.v2 sp2 
2.5324E-04 cpu'.v2 sp2'xg2 
1.0130E-03 cpu'.v2 sp2'xg2'Jd2 , 
1.0130E-03 cpu'.v2 sp2'xg2'Jd2' i 
! 
i 
i 
1.2759E-04 cpu.v2 sp2 
1.2759E-04 cpu.v2 sp2'xg2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu.v2 sp2'xg2'Jd2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu.v2 sp2'xg2'Jd2' 
1.2759E-04 cpu.v2 sp2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu.v2 sp2'xg2 
IJ.l 
N 
N 
EI-44.2.3 O.OOOOE+OO 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464 E-O 1 
EI-44.2.4 O.OOOOE+oo 9.9000E-01 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-44.3.1 12051E-06 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 9.6382E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 1.0000E+OC 
EI-44.3.2 O.OOOOE+OO 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 9. 9464E-O1 1.0000E+OO 
EI-44.3.3 O.OOOOE+OO 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-Ol 
EI-44.3.4 O.OOOOE+OO 1.0000E-02 9.8000E-Ol 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
EI-44.4.1 2.4595E-08 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 9.6382E-01 1.0000E+oo 1.0000E+OO 
EI-44.4.2 O.OOOOE+OO 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 9.9464E-Ol 1.0000E+OO 
EI-44.4.3 O.OOOOE+OO 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-03 9.9464E-01 
EI-44.4A O.OOOOE+OO 1.0000E-02 2.0000E-02 3.6178E-02 5.3597E-03 5.3597E-03 
1.2743E-04 1.2729E-04 
Framework A.4.1 Average Societal Risk in Terms of Unavilability/ Availability Variables 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu. ,,2 sp2'xg2'xf2 i 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu.,,2 sp2'xg2'xf2' 
1.2759E-04 cpu'.".2 sp2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu'.".2 sp2'xg2 
O.OOOOE+oo cpu'.v.2 sp2'xg2'xf2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu'.v2 sp2'xg2'xf2' 
1.2759E-04 cpu'.v2 sp2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu'.v2 sp2'xg2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu'.v2 sp2'xg2'xf2 
O.OOOOE+OO cpu'.v2 sp2'xg2'xf2' 
1,0.) 
tv 
1,0.) 
The A .erage Indi.idual Risk Expression as afunction of a.ailability .ariables will be gi.en by the sum of the following terms: 
3.9679E-03 
-S.IS38E-IO c.vl.pl 
2.1290E-03 c.vl.pl.xn 
2.9730E-04 c.vl.pl.xf2 
1.IS96E-OS c.vl.pl.xfJ 
1.30S8E-OS c.vl.pl.xf4 
1.7308E-IO c.vl.pl.xgl 
3.7039E-04 c.vl.pl.xK2 
-2.9730E-04 c. v l.p l.q2.xf2 
1.IS96E-OS c. v l.p l.xg3 
-1.IS96E-OS c.vl.pl.xg3.xfJ 
4.0000E-IO c.vl.pl.xg4 
-1.30SSE-OS c.vl.pl.xg4.xf4 
-2.2162E-03 c.vl.xn 
-2.9730E-04 c.vl.xf2 . 
-1.IS96E-OS c.vl.xf3 
-1.3OSSE-OS c.vl.xf4 
-1.7308E-IO c.vl.xgl 
-3.7039E-04 c.vl.xg2 
2.9730E-04 c. vl.xg2.xn 
-1.lS96E-OS c.vl0XK3 
1.IS96E-OS c.vl.xg3.xfJ 
-4.0000E-IO c.vl.xg4 
1.30S8E-OS c.vl.xg4.xf4 
-3.147SE-06 c.v2.p2 
1.6161E-04 c. v2.p2.xn 
2.9222E-OS c. v2.p2.xf2 
-4.1883E-06 c. v2.p2.xK2 
-2.9222E-OS c. v2.p2.xg2.xf2 
-1.5848E-04 c.v2.xO 
_._-
Framework A.4.2 - Average Individual Risk Expression in Terms of Availability Variables 
W 
N 
~ 
-4.3929E-OS c.v2.xfl 
4.1883E-06 c.v2.XR2 
4.3929E-OS c.v2.XR2.xfl 
6.7900E-OS c.v3.p3.xfl 
4.2619E-06 c.v3.p3.xg2 
-6. 7900E-OS c.v3.p3.xg2.xfl 
-6.7900E-OS c.v3.xfl 
-4.2619E-06 c.v3.xg2 
6.7900E-OS c.v3.xg2.xfl 
-7.7692E-09 c.v4.p4 
4.1004E-04 c.v4.p4.xfi 
9.4597E-OS c. v4.p4.xfl 
7.5310E-OS c. v4.p4.XR2 
-9.4597E-OS c. v4.p4.XR2.xfl 
-4.1004E-04 c.v4.xfi 
-9.4597E-OS c.v4.xfl 
-7.5310E-OS c.v4.XR2 
9.4597E-OS c. v4.XR2.xf'l 
5.301 IE-OS c.xf'l 
4.5042E-04 c.xgl 
-4.S042E-04 c.xg2 
-S.3OUE-OS cxfl 
-2.8213E-03 Ipl 
2.973OE-04 Ipl.XR2 
l.3058E-OS Ip1.XR4 
-1.8351E-04 Ip2 
2.9222E-OS p2.xg2 
-7.2162E-OS p3 
6.7900E-OS p3.xg2 
-5.7995E-04 p4 
9.4597E-OS p4.xg2 
----
Framework A.4.2 - Average Individual Risk Expression in Terms of Availability Variables 
.... 
." 
--
W 
N 
VI 
-1.3242E-OS vl.pl·xal .xf4 
1.3242E-OS v l.p l.xg4.xf4 
-9.1204E-OS vl.xh 
9.1204E-OS vixh 
4.S042E-04 xal 
-9.S4ISE-04 Ixa2 
-1.3058E-OS Ixa4 
8.26SIE-06 
Framework A.4.2 - Average Individual Risk Expression in Terms of Availability Variables 
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(1001) (1001) (1001) (1001) (1001) 
7 detection units I 7 detectors 
1 input device 
1 CPU 
1 output device 
1 blockalle valve 
Figure A.S.l- Case 1- Schematic Block Diagram - Turret's Fire and Gas 
Detection Systems 
De.tun (1001) 
ITO 
J.p. Derice (1001) 
ITO FrO ITO ITO 
(1001) 0,.. .. VIIlw 
(1001) 
7 detection UDits17 detectors (1001) 
1 input device (1001) 
1 CPU (1001) 
1 output device (1001) 
1 blockqe T8lve (1001) 
Devke 
(1001) 
Figure A.S.1.A- Case 1 -Critical Safety Unavailability Block Diagram - Turret's 
Fire and Gas Detection Systems 
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De_iDa (1001) 
so 
0-
l19utDnUe (1001) 
so so so 
(1001) ou,ut 
7 detection units/7 detectors (1001) 
1 Input device (1001) 
1 CPU (1001) 
1 output device (1001) 
1 blockale valve (1001) 
DeWee V_ 
(1001) (1001) 
Figure A.S.l.B - Case 1- Spurious Operation Block Diagram - Turret's Fire 
and Gas Detection Systems 
(1002) (1ooZ) (1001) (1001) (1001) 
/ 
.l~ ~ --,~ 
/ " 
I / ,'" m.u ...... ~/i 
7 detection units/14 detectors 
Z input devices 
1 CPU 
1 output device 
1 blockaae valve 
v ..... 
Figure A.S.2 - Case 2 - Schematic Diagram - Turret's Fire and Gas Detection 
Systems 
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DeadDII (1002) 
7 detection 1DIits (1002) 
1 Input device (1002) . 
1 CPU (1001) 
1 output device (1001) 
1 blockaae v,lve (1001) 
, 
.... tDe¥in (1002) 
(1001) 
(1001) (1001) 
Figure A.S.2.A - Case 2 - Critical Safety Unavailability Block Diagram -
Turret's Fire and Gas Detection Systems 
Deac.II (1002) 
so 
~-
7 detection units (1002) 
1 Input device (1002) 
1 CPU (1001) 
1 output device (1001) 
1 blockaKe valve (1001) 
so so so so 
o .... t Valve (1001) .... (1001) 
(1001) 
Figure A.S.2.B -Case 2 - Spurious Operation Block Diagram - Turret's Fire 
and Gas Detection Systems 
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(2003) (2003) 
.," 
Detecan 
7 detection units l:n detectors 
3 Input devices 
1 CPU 
1 output device 
1 bJoclcaae valve 
(1001) (1001) 
Figure A.S.3 -Case 3 - Schematic Block Diagram - Turret's Fire and Gas 
Detection Systems 
(2003) ITO (2003) 
ITO 
lJ9_tDmee (2003) Detecan (2003) 
ITO ITO FrO 
111111" 
.," ., .. 
ITO ~~(2003) 
ITO 
7 detection units (2003) 
1 Input device (2003) 
1 CPU (1001) 
1 output device (1001) 
1 bloclcaae valve (1001) 
ITO 
(1001) 
ITO ITO ITO 
FrO FrO 
(1001) 
(1001) 
Figure A.S.3.A -Case 3 - Critical Safety Unavailability Block Diagram-
Turret's Fire and Gas Detection Systems 
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FrO 
(2003) 
so so 
blp1dDmce (2003) (2003) De .... SO SO so 
~ 
so so so 
so 
(1001) 0ld,ut 
DeQ:e 
7 detecUon units (2003) (1001) 
1 Input device (2003) 
1 CPU (1001) 
1 output device (1001) 
1 hlockale mve (1001) 
Figure A.S.3.B - Case 3 • Spurious Operation Block Diagram - Turret's Fire 
and Gas Detection Systems 
(1003) (1003) 
(1001) (1001) 
•• 
... 
• 7' 
.7" 
De_dID 
7 detecUon units 121 detectors 
3 Input devices 
1 CPU 
1 output device 
1 blockale Y8lve 
Oqllt 
.... 
Figure A.S.4 - Case 4 • Schematic Block Diagram - Turret's Fire and Gas 
Detection Systems 
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(1003) 
lIIt-t Derice 
7 detecUon units (2003) 
1 Jnput device (2003) 
1 CPU (1001) 
1 output device (1001) 
1 bloekaKe valve (1001) 
Detedln 
FrO (1003) 
(1003) 
FrO 
(1001) 
Figure A.S.4.A - Case 4 - Critical Safety Unavailability Block Diagram-
Turret's Fire and Gas Detection Systems 
(1003) SO (1003) 
~"Dnil:e (1003) 
DeteetDn (1003) SO SO 
~ 
SO SO SO 
SO 
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7 detection units (2003) (1001) 
1 Jnput deviee (2003) 
1 CPU (1001) 
1 output device (1001) 
1 bloekaKe valve (1001) 
FrO 
FrO 
SO 
SO 
Figure A.S.4.B - Case 4 -Spurious Operation Block Diagram- Turret's Fire and 
Gas Detection Systems 
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(2002) (2002) (1001) (1001) 
DeWc1Dn 
7 detection units 114 detectors 
2 Input devices 
1 CPU 
1 output device 
1 blockale valve 
Figure A.5.5 - Critical Safety Unavailability Block Diagram - Turret's Fire and 
Gas Detection Systems 
DelledliD (2002) 
so 
~~-
7 detection units (1002) 
1 Input device (1002) 
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1 output device (1001) 
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(1001) 
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0 ..... VaM 
~. (1001) 
(1001) 
Figure A.5.5.A-Spurious Operation Block Diagram - Turret's Fire and Gas 
Detection Systems 
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De1Bemll (2002) 
so 
~~-
7 detection units (1002) 
1 input device (1002) 
1 CPU (1001) 
1 output device (1001) 
1 blockaae valve (1001) 
(2002) 
so so so SO 
01& ••• v ..... (1001) .... (1001) 
(l001) 
Figure A.S.S.B - Case S - Spurious Operation Block Diagram - Turret's Fire 
and Gas Detection Systems 
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v.> 
v.> 
VI 
Case Approximate Critical Safety Unavailability (CSU) Approximate rate for Spurious Trips (STR) 
Number 
Voting 
Logic Fire or Gas Detector Input Card Fire or Gas Detector Input Card 
Casel 
7( AF!+11F I (AFT +TlF I 7 AS AS 1001 .,-2 ) 2 ) 
Case 2 7 2p2 .1 A,F t" +TIF 2p2 (IF !.+TIF ) 7 2 AS 2 AS 1002 pl+2p2 2 pl+2p2 2 pl+2p2 pl+2p2 
Case 3 7 3(P2+ p3) (X !+TlF J 3(P2+p3) / A !+TIF' 7 3(P2+ p3) AS 3(P2+ p3) S 2003 
,pl+2p2+3p3 A pl+2p2+3p3 2 pl+2p2+3p3 2 pI +2p2+3p3 
Case 4 7 3 p3 ( X T TlF J 3p3 (AFT TIF J 7 3 AS 3 AS 1003 pl+2p2+3p3 "2+ pl+2p2+3p3 "2+ pl+2p2+3p3 pl+2p2+3p3 
CaseS 
7 2 (AFT +TIF ) 2 (AFT +TlF J 7 2 AS 2 AS 2002 pl+2p2 2 pl+2p2 2 pl+2 p2 pl+2 p2 
- ---------
Table A.S.l- Formulas for CSU and STR Calculation - Turret's Fire and Gas Detection Systems 
NQte: In <rder to calculate the CSU and STR for the process plant, for the pump room and the machine room, the number seven in the formulas shown (which 
is associated with 7 fIre detectioo units and 7 gas detection units installed in the turret) should be replaced by the numbers 10,4 and 8 respectively (since the 
process plant bas 10 detection units installed. the pump room bas 4 detection units installed and the machine room bas 8 detectioo units installed. 
w 
w 
01 
Case Approximate Critical Safety Unavailability (CSU) Approximate rate for Spurious Trips (STR) 
Number 
Voting 
Logic Pressure Sensor Input Card Pressure Sensor Input Card 
Casel (AFt" +11F ~ (AFt" +TlF ~ A.s A.s 1001 . ... ," ... 2 ) 2 ) 
Case 2 2p2 (A F .£+TIF ) 2p2 (A F .£+TlF ) 2 AS 2 S 1002 pl+2p2 2 pl+2p2 2 pl+2p2 pl+2 p2 A 
7 2 AS 
pl+2p2 
Case 3 3(P2+p3) / X 'f +TIF" 3(P2+p3) / X !+TIF 3(P2+ p3) S 3(p2+ p3) S 
2003 pi +2p2+3p3 A pI +2p2+3p3 A pl+2p2+3p3 2 pl+2p2+3p3 2 
Case 4 3p3 (AFt" TIF) 3p3 (AFt" TlF) 3 AS 3 AS 1003 pl+2p2+3p3 2 + pl+2p2+3p3 2 + pl+2p2+3p3 pl+2p2+3p3 
CaseS 
2 (Xt" TlF) 2 (AFt" +TIF) 2 AS 2 AS 2002 pl+2p2 2+ pl+2p2 2_ pl+2 p2 pl+2 p2 
- -
Table A.S.2 - Formulas for CSU and STR Calculations - Pressure Sensor System 
\.Iol 
\.Iol 
-l 
Case 
Number 
Voting Logic 
Casel 
1001 
Case2 1002 
Case32003 
Case4 1003 
CaseS 2002 
Table A.S.3 
Approximate Critical Safety Approximate rate for Spurious 
Unavailability (CSU) Trips (STR) 
CPU CPU 
J ( l' .!:+17F I AS 
2 ) 
2p2 (IF ~+TlF ) 2 S 
pl+2p2 A pl+2p2 2 
3(p2+p3) (X !+17F) 3(P2+p3) S 
pI +2p2+3p3 A pl+2p2+3p3 2 
3p3 (l,r T1F J 3 S 
pl+2p2+3p3 A pl+2p2+3p3 2+ 
2 (l' r T1F) 2 S pl+2 p2 A pl+2p2 2"+ 
Formulas for CSU and STR Calculations - CPU System 
UJ 
W 
00 
Case Approximate Critical Safety Unavailability (CSU) Approximate rate for Spurious Trips (STR) 
I Number Voting 
Logic Valve Output Card Valve Output Card Input Card 
Case1 (xr +17F ~ (A,F !+TIF ~ AS AS 1001 2 ) 2 ) 
Case 2 2p2 (IF !+TIF ) 2p2 (IF!+TlF) 2 AS 2 Ie 1002 pl+2p2 2 pl+2p2 2 pl+2p2 pl+2p2 
7 2 AS 
pl+2p2 
Case 3 3(P2+p3) / X !..+TIF 3(P2+p3) / X !"+TIF" 3(p2+ p3) S 3(P2+ p3) AS 2003 pI +2p2+3p3 A pl+2p2+3p3 2 pl+2p2+3p3 2· pl+2p2+3p3 
Case 4 
3p3 (xr 17F) 3p3 (Xr TIF J 3 AS 3 AS 1003 pl+2p2+3p3 2+ pl+2p2+3p3 2+ pl+2p2+3p3 pl+2p2+3p3 
CaseS 2 
, 
2 AS 2 AS AF 'i +TlF 2 AF 'i +TlF 2002 pl+2p2 2 pl+2p2 2' pl+2 p2 . pl+2 p2 
Table A.S.4 - Fonnulas for CSU and STR Calculations - Actuation System 
Appendix 6 
339 
Module Total Rate Coverage Module Rate of Probability Multiplicity Manual Test 
of 
subset FrO failures factor for self complexity undetect. of test distribution period in 
per 10' hrs test for FrO factor FrO failures independent hrs. 
failures per 106hrs. failures 
A Ftot C cM AF TIF pI p2 p3 l 
probability 
Fire 3,OOE-06 0,00 1,00 3,OOOOE-06 0,0050 0,90 0,1 2160 
Detector 3,OOE-06 0,00 1,00 3,OOOOE-06 0,0050 0,82 0,16 0,02 2160 
Gas 2,OOOOE-06 0,00 1,00 2,OOOOE-06 0,0050 0,90 0,1 2160 
Detector 2,0000E-06 0,00 1,00 2,OOOOE-06 0,0050 0,82 0,16 0,02 2160 
Pressure 6,7110E-06 0,00 1,00 6,7110E-06 0,0050 0,90 0,1 2160 
w 
~ sensor 6,71IOE-06 0,00 1,00 6,71IOE-06 0,0050 0,82 0,16 0,02 2160 
. 
Input card 4,5000E-07 1,00 4,5000E-07 0,0000 0,90 0,1 2160 
4,5000E-07 1,00 4,5000E-07 0,0000 0,82 0,16 0.02 2160 
CPU 1,2000E-05 0,90 1,00 1,2000E-06 0,0001 0,90 . 0,1 2160 
1,2000E-05 0,90 1,00 1,2000E-06 0,0001 0,82 0,16 0,02 2160 
Output card 4,5000E-07 1,00 4,5000E-07 0,0000 0,90 0,1 2160 
4,5000E-07 1,00 4,5000E-07 0,0000 0,82 0,16 0,02 2160 
Valve 8,OOOOE-06 1,00 8,OOOOE-06 0,0010 0,90 0,1 2160 
8,OOOOE-06 1,00 8,OOOOE-Q6_ 0,0010 0,82 0,16 0,02 2160 
~-
Framework A.6.1 - Data Used for Critical Safety Calculations 
.... 
"" 
.... 
Safety Case Turret Process Plant Pump Room 
System Number CSU CSA CSU CSA CSU CSA 
Fire Case I 5,81660E-02 9,41834E-Ol 8,28860E-02 9,1 71 14E-Ol 3,34460E-02 9,66554E-Ol 
Detection Case 2 1,05756E-02 9,89424E-Ol 1,50702E-02 9,84930E-Ol 6,08109E-03 9,93919E-Ol 
Case 3 2,61 747E-02 9, 73825E-Ol 3, 72987E-02 9,62701E-Ol 1,50507E-02 9,84949E-Ol 
Case 4 2,90830E-03 9,97092E-Ol 4,14430E-03 9,95856E-Ol 1,67230E-03 9,98328E-Ol 
Case 5 1,05756E-Ol 8,94244E-Ol 1,50702E-Ol 8,49298E-Ol 6,08109E-02 9,39189E-Ol 
Gas Case I 5,06060E-02 9,49394E-Ol 7,20860E-02 9,27914E-Ol 2,91260.~-O2 9,70874E-Ol 
Detection Case 2 9,20109E-03 9,90799E-Ol 1,31065E-02 9,86893E-Ol 5,29564E-03 9,94704E-Ol 
Case 3 2,27727E-02 9, 77227E-Ol 3,24387E-02 9,67561E-Ol 1,31067E-02 9,86893E-Ol 
Case 4 2,53030E-03 9,97470E-Ol 3,60430E-03 9,96396E-Ol 1,45630E-03 9,98544E-Ol 
Case 5 9,20109E-02 9,07989E-Ol 1,31065E-Ol 8,68935E-Ol 5,29564E-02 9,47044E-Ol 
Pressure Case I 1,27339E-02 9,87266E-Ol 1,27339E-02 9,87266E-Ol 1,27339E-02 9,87266E-Ol 
Sensor Case 2 2,31525E-03 9,97685E-Ol 2,31525E-03 9,97685E-Ol 2,31525E-03 9,97685E-Ol 
Case 3 5, 73025E-03 9,94270E-Ol 5,73025E-03 9,94270E-Ol 5, 73025E-03 9,94270E-Ol 
Case 4 6,36694E-04 9,99363E-Ol 6,36694E-04 9,99363E-Ol 6,36694E-04 9,99363E-Ol 
Case 5 2,31525E-02 9,76847E-Ol 2,31525E-02 9, 76847E-Ol 2,31525E-02 9,76847E-Ol 
CPU Case I 1,39600E-03 9,98604E-Ol 1,39600E-03 9,98604E-Ol 1,39600E-03 9,98604E-Ol 
Case 2 2,53818E-04 9,99746E-Ol 2,53818E-04 9,99746E-Ol 2,53818E-04 9,99746E-Ol 
Case 3 6,28200E-04 9,99372E-Ol 6,28200E-04 9,99372E-OI 6,28200E-04 9,99372E-OI 
Case 4 6,98000E-05 9,99930E-Ol 6,98000E-05 9,99930E-Ol 6,98000E-05 9,99930E-OI 
Case 5 2,53818E-03 9,97462E-Ol 2,53818E-03 9,97462E-Ol 2,53818E-03 9,97462E-Ol 
Actuator Case I I,OI260E-02 9,89874E-OI I,OI260E-02 9,89874E-Ol 1,01260E-02 9,89874E-OI 
(Valve) Case 2 1,84109E-03 9,98159E-Ol 1,84109E-03 9,98159E-Ol 1,84109E-03 9,98159E-Ol 
Case 3 4,55670E-03 9,95443E-OI 4,55670E-03 9,95443E-Ol 4,55670E-03 9,95443E-Ol 
Case 4 5,06300E-04 9,99494E-OI 5,06300E-04 9,99494E-Ol 5,06300E-04 9,99494E-Ol 
Case 5 1,84109E-02 9,81589E-Ol 1,84109E-02 9,81589E-Ol 1,84109E-02 9,81589E-Ol 
Framework A.6.2 - Critical Safety Unavailability/Availability Values Calculated for the Studied Safety Systems 
Machine Room 
CSU CSA 
6,64060E-02 9,33594E-Ol 
1,20738E-02 9,87926E-Ol I 
2,98827E-02 9, 701 17E-Ol 
3,32030E-03 9,96680E-Ol 
1,20738E-Ol 8, 79262E-Ol 
5,77660E-02 9,42234E-Ol 
1,05029E-02 9,89497E-Ol 
2,59947E-02 9,74005E-Ol 
2,88830E-03 9,97112E-Ol 
1,05029E-Ol 8,94971E-Ol 
1,27339E-02 9,87266E-Ol 
2,31525E-03 9,97685E-Ol 
5,73025E-03 9,94270E-Ol 
6,36694E-04 9,99363E-Ol 
2,31525E-02 9, 76847E-Ol 
1,39600E-03 9,98604E-Ol 
2,53818E-04 9,99746E-Ol 
6,28200E-04 9,99372E-Ol 
6,98000E-05 9,99930E-Ol i 
2,53818E-03 9,97462E-Ol . 
1,01260E-02 9,89874E-Ol 
1,84109E-03 9,98159E-Ol 
4,55670E-03 9,95443E-OI 
5,06300E-04 9,99494E-Ol 
1,84109E-02 9,81589E-Ol 
Module Total Rate Coverage Module Rate of (1) Multiplicity Manual 
of Test I 
subset SO failures factor for self complexity undetect. distribution period in I 
per IO'hrs test of SO factor SO failures hrs. 
failures per lO'hrs. 
I AStot C cM A.S pI p2 p3 t 
Fire Detector 2,OOOOE-06 1,00 2,OOOOE-06 0,90 0,1 2160 
2,OOOOE-06 1,00 2,OOOOE-06 0,82 0,16 ... 0,02 .... 2160 
Gas detector 2,OOOOE-06 1,00 2,OOOOE-06 0,90 0,1 2160 
2,OOOOE-06 1,00 2,OOOOE-06 0,82 0,16 0,02 2160 
Pressure 1,6000E-06 1,00 1,6000E-06 0,90 0,1 2160 
w 
t, Sensor 1,6000E-06 1,00 1,6000E-06 0,82 0,16 ·0,02 2160 
. 
Input card 1,3500E-06 1,00 1,3500E-06 0,90 0,1 2160 
1,3500E-06 1,00 1,3500E-06 0,82 0,16 0,02 2160 
CPU 1,2000E-05 0,90 1,00 1,2000E-06 0,90 0,1 2160 
1,2000E-05 0,90 1,00 1,2000E-06 0,82 0,16 0,02 2160 
Output card 4,5000E-07 1,00 4,5000E-07 0,90 0,1 2160 
4,5000E-07 1,00 4,5000E-07 0,82 0,16 0,02 2160 
Valve 8,OOOOE-06 1,00 8,OOOOE-06 0,90 0,1 2160 
8,OOOOE-06 1,00 8,OOOOE-06 0,82 0,16 0,02 
Framework A.6.3 - Data used for Spurious Trip Rate (STR) Calculations 
Note 1: 'The rate of undetectable SO failures A. S is obtained by multiplying the total SO failures AStot with the fact<IS (I-e).eM 
Safety Case Turret Process Plant Pump Room Machine Room 
System Number Spurious Number of Spurious Number of Spurious Number of Spurious Number of 
Trip Rate spurious trips Trip Rate spurious trips Trip Rate spurious Trip Rate spurious trips 
(STR) per~ear (STR) (per year) (STR) trips p/year (STR) ~ryear 
Fire Case I 1,53S00E-OS 1,34466E-Ol 2,13SOOE-OS 1,87026E-Ol 9,3S000E-06 8,19060E-02 1,73S00E-OS 1,51986E-Ol 
Detection Case 2 2, 79091E-OS 2,44484E-Ol 388182E-OS 3,40047E-Ol 1,70000E-OS 1,48920E-Ol 3,lS4SSE-OS 2, 76338E-Ol 
Case 3 6,907S0E-06 6,OS097E-02 9,607S0E-06 8,41617E-02 4,207S0E-06 3,68S77E-02 7,807S0E-06 6,83937E-02 
Case 4 3,837S0E-OS 3,3616SE-Ol S,337S0E-OS 4,67S6SE-Ol 2,337S0E-OS 2,0476SE-Ol 4,337S0E-OS 3, 7996SE-Ol 
CaseS 2, 79091E-06 2,44484E-02 3,88182E-06 3,40047E-02 1,70000E-06 1,48920E-02 3,IS4SSE-06 2, 76338E-02 
Gas Case I 1,53S00E-OS 1,34466E-Ol 2,13SOOE-OS 1,87026E-Ol 9,3S000E-06 8,19060E-02 1, 73S00E-OS 1,51986E-Ol 
Detection Case 2 2, 79091E-OS 2,44484E-Ol 3,88182E-OS 3,40047E-Ol 1,70000E-OS 1,48920E-Ol 3,lS4SSE-OS 2, 76338E-Ol 
Case 3 6,907S0E-06 6,OS097E-02 9,607S0E-06 8,41617E-02 4,207S0E-06 3,68S77E-02 7,807S0E-06 6,83937E-02 
Case 4 3,837S0E-OS 3,3616SE-Ol . S,337S0E-OS 4,67S6SE-Ol 2,337S0E-OS 2,0476SE-Ol 4,337S0E-OS 3, 7996SE-Ol 
CaseS 2,79091E-06 2,44484E-02 3,88182E-06 3,40047E-02 1,70000E-06 1,48920E-02 3,IS4SSE-06 2, 76338E-02 
~ 
w 
Pressure Case I 2,9S000E-06 2,58420E-02 2,9S000E-06 2,58420E-02 2,9S000E-06 2,58420E-02 2,9S000E-06 2,58420E-02 
Sensor Case 2 S,36364E-06 4,698SSE-02 S,36364E-06 4,6985SE-02 S,36364E-06 4,6985SE-02 S,36364E-06 4,6985SE-02 
Case 3 1,327S0E-06 1,16289E-02 1,327S0E-06 1,16289E-02 1,327S0E-06 1,16289E-02 1,327S0E-06 1,16289E-02 
Case 4 7,37S00E-06 6,460S0E-02 7,37S00E-06 6,460S0E-02 7,37S00E-06 6,460S0E-02 7,37500E-06 6,460S0E-02 
CaseS S,36364E-07 4,698SSE-03 S,36364E-07 4,6985SE-03 S,36364E-07 4,6985SE-03 5,36364E-07 4,69855E-03 
CPU Case I 1,20000E-06 I,05120E-02 1,20000E-06 I,OS120E-02 1,20000E-06 I,OSI20E-02 1,20000E-06 I,OS120E-02 
Case 2 2,18182E-06 1,91127E-02 2,18182E-06 1,91127E-02 2,18182E-06 1,91127E-02 2,18182E-06 1,91127E-02 
Case 3 5,40000E-07 4,73040E-03 S,40000E-07 4, 73040E-03 S,40000E-07 4,73040E-03 5,40000E-07 4,73040E-03 
Case 4 3 ,(J(J()()()E-06 2,62800E-02 3 ,(J(J()()()E-06 2,62800E-02 3 ,(J(J()()()E-06 2,62800E-02 3 ,(J(J()()()E-06 2,62800E-02 
CaseS 2,18182E-07 1,91127E-03 2,18182E-07 1,91127E-03 2,18182E-07 1,91127E-03 2,18182E-07 1,91127E-03 
Actuator Case I 8,4S000E-06 7,40220E-02 8,4S000E-06 7,40220E-02 8,45000E-06 7,40220E-02 8,45000E-06 7,40220E-02 
(Valve) Case 2 1,53636E-OS 1,3458SE-Ol 1,53636E-OS 1,34585E-Ol 1,53636E-OS 1,34585E-Ol 1,53636E-05 1,34585E-Ol 
Case 3 3,80250E-06 3,33099E-02 3,802S0E-06 3,33099E-02 3,802S0E-06 3,33099E-02 3,80250E-06 3,33099E-02 
Case 4 2,1 1250E-OS 1,850SSE-Ol 2,1 1250E-OS 1,850SSE-Ol 2,11250E-OS 1,850SSE-Ol 2,11250E-OS 1,850SSE-Ol 
CaseS 1,53636E-06 1,34S8SE-02 1,53636E-06 1,3458SE-02 1,53636E-06 I,34S8SE-02 1,53636E-06 1,34585E-02 
Framework A.6.4 - Spurious Trip Rate (STR) Values Calculated for the Studied Safety Systems 
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Number of Number ClEO CIMV CIIC 
Component Price Componts. of Component Price per total 
Loops Cost loop 
Gas 1881.39 7 7 13169.75 3292.44 1216.1 8512.70 
detector 
Input Dev. 1442.40 I 1442.40 576.96 
Total 
--
Table A.7.1- Costs related to the Turret's Gas Detection System (xgl) - Case 1 
(*) Includes: input card· binary -627.13 pounds plus rack -815.27 pounds that makes a total of 1442.40 pounds 
Maximum recommended number points for each input card: 32 
Rate (May,98): lpound- 1,828645 R$ and IUS - 1,1468 RS 
w Note I: All values in pounds 
~ 
-..J 
Test Man-hours Test costs Failureratt: Manhours Other 
Component Number of Period per test per year per repair costs per 
Components (months) repair 
Gas ~ I 420.011 4.00E-Ofi 1881.39 
detector 
InputDev. I I I 3O.D() 1.8OE-Ofi I 442.4(] 
Total 456.00 
CIMC CIRS 
No of Price 
6243.72 I 1881.39 
504.84 I 1442.40 
Total cost Repair costs ! 
per repair per year 
i 
1941.39 476.1_ 
i 
I 
IS02.4(] 23~ 
499.871 
Table A.7.1A- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Turret's Gas Detection System (xgl) - Case 1 
CIRT TOTAL I 
I 
656.22 33756.22 
1458.27 5424.87 
39181.10 
~ 
00 
Case CSU Spurious Number of LSOyear LSD Teslcosts Repair costs CYCtesting CYCrepair 
Number Trip Role spurious trips per year per year 
(STR) per year (Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
Case I 5.06060E-02 1.53500E-05 0.1344660 639.13 4000.51 450.00 499.87 2816.70 3128.88 
Case 2 9.20109E-03 2.79091E-05 0.2444836 1162.05 7273.66 900.00 999.75 5633.40 6257.76 
Case 3 2.27727E-02 6.90750E-06 0.0605097 287.61 1800.23 1350.00 1499.62 8450.\0 9386.64 
Case 6 2.53030E-03 3.83750E-05 0.3361650 1597.82 10001.28 1350.00 1499.62 8450.\0 9386.64 
CaseS 9.20 1 O9E-02 2.7909E-06 0.0244484 116.21 727.37 900.00 999.75 5633.40 6257.76 
Tabela A.7.1.B - Costs related to the Turret's Gas Detection System (xgl) - Case 1 
Case Critical Critkal Allerage 
Number Safey Safe, Sociellll 
UNll1tulability A vailobility Risk 
(CSA) (CSA) (ASR) 
CauO I.OOOOE+OO 9.07989E-01 5.8790S01 E-03 
Caul 5.0606()E.()2 O.OOOOE+OO 5.8790S01 E-03 
Case 2 9.20 I09E-03 9.49394E-01 5.8790S0IE-03 
Cau3 22m7&m 9.90799E-O 1 5.8790S0IE-03 
Cau6 2530JOE.03 9.77227E-O 1 5.8790S01 E-03 
CauS 9.20 1 09E-02 9.9747OE-01 5.8790S0IE-03 
Tabela A.7.1.C - Critical Safety Unavailability I Availability Values and Average Societal Risk 
Values (fatalities/year) Calculated for Different Cases related to the Turret's Gas Detection System (xgl) 
CYCtolil1 LCA+CIR+ LCA+CIR+ 
CYCtollll 
(Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
5945.58 39181.10 45126.68 
11891.16 72923.91 84815.07 
17836.74 105731.03 123567.77 
17836.74 105731.03 123567.77 
11891.16 72923.91 84815.07 
w 
~ 
-.0 
Discount rate 
Lifetime 
Expected accident frequency 
Average loss per accident (assets) 
Life value 
Gas Price 
Gas produc. 
Oil price 
Oil produc. 
Return average time of to normal 
Depressur. average time for the plant 
Oil calculat. loss due to Spurious O~!ation= 
Gas calculat. loss due to Spurious Operation = 
Total Gas Loss 
Total Loss due to Spurious Operation 
---
Table A.7.D· Data used for Loss Calculation 
6.25933 
20 years 
1.84900E-02 per year 
5.5245E+07 Pounds 
3.0000E+06 Pounds 
0.08 (U$/rn3) 
I 
~. 
0.05 Pounds 
164000 rn3/day 
15.50 (U$/barrel) 
9.72 Pounds 
2074.30 rn3/day 
13047.35 barrels/day 
production = 50 minutes 
due to ESD: 15 minutes , 
4403.72 Pounds 
268.74 Pounds (not producted) 
80.62 Pounds (burned gas) 
349.36 Pounds 
(LUe) = 4,753.08 Pounds 
w 
Vl 
o 
LCA.+CIR+ LSD 
CYOot. 
(Poruuls) (Poruuls) 
45126.68 4000.51 
84815.07 7273.66 
123567.77 1800.23 
123567.77 10001.28 
84815.07 727.37 
Table A. 7.1. E -Case 1- Costs involved in Turret's Gas Detection System (xgl) 
~ofDeaths Value of Loss Liveslyr Benefit in Loss T otIIl Benejil CSU RELyear Benefit 
per year Life (LLyear) Lives/year Loss Lives RELyear-
LL REL 
(Pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) 
5.87905OE-03 3.0000E+06 1.763715E+04 1.613296E-04 1.009815E-03 5.06060E-02 6743325 1265081.60 
5.87905OE-03 3.0000E+06 1.763715E+04 1.683656E-04 1.053851E-03 9.20109E-03 12260.59 1320254.25 
5.87905OE-03 3.0000E+06 1.763715E+04 1.660593E-04 1.03842OE-03 2.27727E-02 30344.96 1302169.88 
5.87905OE-03 3.0000E+06 1.763715E+04 1.694991 E-04 1.060851 E-03 2.53030E-03 3371.66 1329143.18 
5.87905OE-03 3.0000E+06 1.763715E+04 1.542937E-04 '.&57751E-04 9.20109E-02 122605.90 1209908.94 
5.87905OE-03 3.0000E+06 1.763715E+04 1.0000E+OO 1332514.84 
Table A. 7.1. F -Case 1- Life Cycle Cost Calculated for the Turret's Gas Detection System (xgl) 
Total Benefit TotIIl Benefit Lee 
RELoss 
(Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) 
1'18563.1' 1'18513.1' -""'436.00, 
8263107.05 8213107.05 -81NB18.32' 
8150711.00 8150711.00 -8025343.00 
8311545.78 8311545.78 -811151176.73 
757321'.32 7573219.33 -7487676.119 
w 
v. 
Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Turret Gas Detection System (xg1) 
9.2OOOE-01 88OOOE-01 1I.4OOOE-01 9.5OOOE-01 96OOOE-01 9.7000E-01 1I.8OOOE-01 9.9OOOE·01 1.ooooE..oo 1.0100e..oo 
i 
·7600000.00 I ............... 
~ ·7700000.00 • 4.43657760170634E+07x + 1.69158118588331 7 
•. 7600000.oot---------------~--------~~~~----_RL:~~~~~st~~----------------~ U 
~.7600000oo+-----------------------------~~~~~~----~--~----------~--~----~~ 
.! ~ .8000000.oo~------------------------------------------~~~--~--------------------~ 
-8100000.00 I ~ 
-8200000.00 I ~ ! 
-830000000 ,_"_, .. _._,,,. _~_. __ ...... _._. __ ." '''_'''''_'_-' '_~"" ____ ' ,,_. __ ... _ .. _. ____ ... _ ..... __ J 
Availability of the Tune. Gas Detection System 
Figure A.7.1.- LifeCyde Cost versus Critical Availability - Turret's Gas Detection System (xgl) 
Case Number CSU- xgJ CSA LCC 
Casel 5.06060E-02 9.493940E-0l -7869436.00 ! 
Case2 9.20109E-03 9.907989E-0l -8171818.32 
Case3 2.27727E-02 9.772273E-0l -8025343.00 
Case6 2.53030E-03 9.974697E-0 1 -8185976.73 
CaseS 9.20109E-02 9.079891 E-O 1 ~487676.89 
._ -
Table A.7.1.G - Life Cycle Values (LCC ) Obtained for Different Cases Related to the Turret's Gas Detection 
System (xgl) 
w 
v. 
N 
CIEH CIMV CIIC CIMC 
Component Price Number of Number Component Price pel' total 
componts. of Cost loop 
Loops 
Gas 1881.39 14 14 26339.50 6584.88 1216.10 17025.4 12487.44 
detector 
Input card 1442.40 2 2884.80 1153.92 1009.68 
TOTAL 
Table A.7.1.2 - Case 2- Cost related to the Turret's Gas Detection System (xgl) 
OBS: All values are given in pounds 
Test Man-hours Test costs lFailure rat4 Manhoul'S Other costs Total cost 
Component Number of Period pertest pel' year per repair per repair per repair 
(months) 
Gas 14 6 1 840.00 4.00E-06 2 1881.39 1941.39 
detector 
InputDev 2 12 1 60.00 1.80E-06 2 1442.40 1502.40 
TOTAL 900.00 
CIKS CIRT 
No of Price 
1 1881.39 656.22 
1 1442.40 1458.27 
Repair costs 
, 
pel' year 
952.37] 
47.38 
999.75 
Table A.7.1.2 A- Case 2- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Turret's Gas Detection System (xgl) 
w 
Vl 
W 
CIEH CIMV CllC CIMC 
Component Price Number of Number Compont. Price per total 
componts. of Cost loop 
Loops 
Gas 1881.39 21 21 39509.25 9877.31 1216.1 25538.10 18731.17 
detector 
Inputcanl 1442.40 3 4327.20 1730.88 1514.52 
TOTAL 
- ---- --- -- --
--
Table A.7.1.3 - Case 3- Cost related to the Turret's Gas Detection System (xgl) 
Test Man-hours Test costs Failure rate Manhours Other costs Total cost 
Component Number of Period pertest per year per repair per repair per repair 
(months) 
Gas 21 6 1 1260.00 4.00E-06 2 1881.39 1941.39 
detector 
InputDev 3 12 1 90.00 1.8OE-06 2 1442.4<l 1502.40 
c!Q!'A!--_ 1350.00 
'-----
Table A.7.1.3A - Case 3- Cost related to the Turret's Gas Detection System (xgl) 
CIKS CIRT TOTAL I 
No of Price 
2 1881.39 656.22 96193.45 
1 506.71 1458.27 9537.59 
--- --
~31.03 
Repair 
costs 
per year 
1428.55 
71.07 
1499.62 
w 
V> 
~ 
CIEn CIMV 
Component Price Number of Number Component Price per 
(Pounds) componts. of Cost loop 
Loops (Pounds) 
Fire 2947.52 7 7 20632.61 5,158.15 1216.1 
detector 
Input Dev (*) 2696.66 1 2696.66 1,078.67 
TOTAL 
-
Table A.7.2 - Costs related to the Turret's Fire Detection System (xfl) - Case 1 
(0) Includes: input card ·analogic = 1881,39 pounds pillS rack =815,27 pounds !bat makes a total of 2696,66 pounds 
Maximum recommended number points for each input card: 32 
Test Man-hours Test costs ~ailure rate Manhours 
Component Numbel"of Period pertest per year per repair 
componentl (months) (pounds) 
Fire 7 (; 1 420.00 5.00E-06 2 
detector 
InputDev. 1 12 1 30.00 1.80E-06 2 
TOTAL 450.00 
CDC CIMC CIRS 
total No of 
(Pounds) 
8512.7 8575.87 1 
943.83 1 
Other Total cost Repair C:osts 
costs per per repair per year 
repair 
2947.52 3007.52 922.10 
2696.66 2756.66 43.47 
965.57 
Table A.7.2A- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Turret's Fire Detection System (xfl) - Case 1 
CIRT TOTAL 
Price 
2947.52 656.22 46483.07 
2696.66 1458.27 8874.10 
~357.17 
w 
Vl 
Vl 
Spurious Numbero! LSOyear LSO Test costs Repair costll CYOesting CYCrepair 
ClISe Number CSU Trip Rate spurious trips per year per year 
(STR) per year (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
ClISe1 5.81660E-02 1.53500E-05 0.1344660 639.13 4000.51 450.00 965.57 2816.70 6043.83 
ClISe2 1.05756E-02 2.79091E-05 0.2444836 1162.05 7273.66 900.00 1931.14 5633.40 12087.66 
ClISd 2.61747E-02 6.90750E-06 0.0605097 287.61 1800.23 1350.00 2896.71 8450.10 1.8131.49 
ClISe' 2.90830E-03 3.83750E-05 0.3361650 1597.82 10001.28 1350.00 2896.71 8450.10 1 !fl 31.49 
CAseS 1.05756E-Ol 2.79091E-06 0.0244484 116.21 727.37 900.00 1931.14 5633.40 12087.66 
Tabela A.7.2.B • Costs related to the Turret's Fire Detection System (xfl) • Case 1 
ClISe Number CSU CSA ASR I 
ClISeO 1.0000BtOO O.OOOOOOOE+OO 8.746891lE-03 
ClISd 5.81660E-02 9.4183400E-Ol 5.8790501 E-031 
ClISe2 1.05756E-02 9.8942436E-Ol 5.7341396E-031 
ClISe3 2.61747E-02 9.7382530E-Ol 5.7816380E-03. 
ClISe6 2.90830E-03 9.9709170E-0l 5.7107929E-03 
ClISe5 1.05756E-01 8.9424364E-Ol 6.0239605E-03 
Tabela A.7.2.C· Critical Safety Unavailability I Availability Values and Average Societal Risk 
Values (fatalities/year) Calculated for Different Cases related to the Turret's Fire Detection System (xfl) 
CYOotal LCA+CIR LCA+CIR 
+CYOolIIl 
(Pounds) (Pounds) (Pountls) 
8860.53 55357.17 6U17.70 
17721.06 102955.66 120676.71 
26581.59 153501.66 180083.25 
26581.59 153501.66 180083.25 1 
17721:~ . 102955.6~ 120671.71 1 
---
v.> 
VI 
0'1 
LCA+CIR+ LSO 
CyCtot. 
(Poruuh) (Pounds) 
64217.70 4000.51 
120676.71 7273.66 
180083.25 1800.23 
180083.25 10001.28 
120676.71 727.37 
Table A. 7.2. E -Case 1- Costs involved in Turret's Fire Detection System (xfl) 
~orDeaths Value of Loss Liveslyr Benefit in Loss Total Benefit CSU RELyear Benefit 
per year Life (LLyear) Lives/year Loss Ulles RELyear-
U REL 
(Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
5.87905E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.15 8603.52 53852.29 5.81660E-02 59415.65 962068.57 
5.73414E-03 3.0000E+06 17202.42 9038.25 56573.42 1.05756E-02 10802.85 1010681.38 
5.78164E-03 3.0000E+06 17344.91 8895.76 55681.49 2.61747E-02 26737.04 994747.18 
5.71079E-03 3.0000E+06 17132.38 9108.29 57011.82 2.90830E-03 2970.78 1018513.44 
6.02396E-03 3.0000E+06 18071.88 8168.79 51131.16 1.05756E-01 108028.46 913455.76 
8.7468911E-03 3.0000E+06 26240.67 1.0000E+OO 1021484.22 
Table A. 7.2. F -Case 1- Life Cycle Cost Calculated for the Turret's Fire Detectioo System (xfl) 
Total Benefit Total Benefrt LCC 
RELoss 
(Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) 
6021904.66 6075756.95 -6007538. 75 
6326188.26 6382761.67 -6272532.36 
6226450.86 6282132.35 -6126830.46 
6375211.72 6432223.55 -6268720.60 
5717621.07 5768752.24 -5665969.21 
w 
Ul 
-...J 
Life Cycle Cost X Availability of theTurret Fire Detection System (xfl) 
, 
9.200000 9.400000 9.600000 9.800000 1.000000 1.020000 
E~1 E~1 E~l E~1 E~ E~ 
.. -5800000.00 +------~~------------------_I a 
u -5900000.00 + 3.38892767569879000E+07x + 
~ 70000E+07 ~ -6000000.00 ~ • U8391033413433000E-01 
.. -6100000.00 
:t: 
...I -6200000.00 +-_______________ -:::3 ...... ;;:-____ --: 
-~.OO+_~--~---~-~-----~-----~~~--~ 
-6400000.00 , __ .. ~~ .. ~_-1 
Availability of Turret Detection System 
Figure A.7.2 - Life Cycle Cost versus Critical Availability - Turret's Fire Detection System (xfl) 
Case Number CSU-xD_ CSA LCC 
Casel 5.81660E-02 9.418340E-0l -6007538.75 
Case2 1.05756E-02 9. 894244E-O1 -6272532.36 
Casel 2.61747E-02 9.738253E-0l -6126830.46 
Case4 2.90830E-03 9.970917E-0l -6268720.60 
Case 5 1.05756E-Ol 8.942436E-0l -5665069.21 
Table A.7.2.G • Life Cycle Values (LCC) Obtained for Different Cases Related to Turret's Fire Detection 
System (xfl) 
\N 
VI 
00 
CIEU CIMV CDC CIMC 
Component Price Number of Number Component Price per total 
componts. of Cost loop 
Loops 
Fire 2947.52 14 14 41265.22 10316.31 1216.10 17025.40 17151.73 
detector 
Input Dev. 2696.66 2 5393.33 2157.33 1887.66 
TOTAL 
_ .. _-- -~-
Table A.7.2.2 - Case 2- Cost related to the Turret's Fire Detection System (xfl) 
OB8: All values are given in pounds 
Test Man-hours Test costs Failure rate Manhours Other costs Total cost 
Component Number of Period per test per year per repair per repair per repair 
(months) 
Fire 14 6 1 840.00 5.00E-06 2 2947.52 3007.52 
detector 
InputDev. 2 12 1 60.00 1.8OE-06 2 2696.66 2756.66 
TOTAL 900.00 
-- -- - ---- ----- - ------
CIRS CIRT 
No of Price 
1 2947.52 656.22 
1 2696.66 1458.27 
Repair~ 
per year 
1844.21 
86.93 
1931.14 
Table A.7.2.2 A- Case 2- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Turret's Fire Detection System (xfl) 
TOTAL 
89362.40 
13593.26 
102955.66 
w 
VI 
\0 
CIEU CIMV CIIC CIMC 
Component Price Number of Number Compont. Price per total 
romponts. of Cost loop 
Loops 
Fire 2941.52 21 21 61891.83 15414.46 1216.1 25538.10 25127.60 
detector 
Input Dev. 2696.66 3 8089.99 3236.00 2831.50 
TOTAL 
Table A.7.3.2 - Case 3- Cost related to the Turret's Fire Detection System (xfl) 
ODS: All values are given in pounds 
Test Man-hour~ Test costs Failure ratE Manhours Otherrosts Total cost 
Component Number of Period per test per year per repair per repair per repair 
(months) 
Fire 21 6 1 1260.00 5.ooE-06 2 2941.52 3001.52 
detector 
Input Dev. 3 12 1 90.00 1.8OE-06 2 2696.66 2156.66 
TOTAL 1350.00 
- ~ 
---- --
CIRS CIRT TOTAL 
No of Price 
2 5895.03 656.22 135189.24 
1 2696.66 1458.27 18312.42 
153501.66 
Repair 
costs 
per year 
2766.311 
I 
130~ 
~8!6.711 
Table A.7.3.2 A- Case 3- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Turret's Fire Detection System (xfl) 
CIEH CIMV CIIC CIMC CIKS CIRT TOTAL 
Componen1 Price Number 0 Number Componen1 Price per Total No or Price 
(Pounds) componts. or Cost loop 
Loops (Pounds) (Pounds) 
Gas 1881.39 10 \0 18813.93 4,703.48 1216.1 12161 8919.60 1 1881.39 656.22 47135.63 
detector 
InputDev. 1442.40 1 1442.40 576.96 504.84 1 1442.40 1458.27 5424.87 
TOTAL 52560.50 
Table A.7.3 - Costs related to the Process Plant's Gas Detection System (xg2) - Case 1 
(*) Includes: input card - binary -627,13 pounds plus rack -815,27 pounds that makes a total of 1442,40 pounds 
Maximum recommended number points for each input card: 32 
Rate (May,98): I pound - 1,828645 R$ and IU$- 1,I468RS 
~ g Test Man-houn Test costs Failure rate Manhoun Other Total cost Repair~ 
Componen Number of Period pertest per year per repair costs per per repair per year 
componenb (months) (Pounds) repair 
Gas \0 6 1 600.00 4.00E-06 2 1881.39 1941.39 680.26 
detector 
Input Dev. 1 12 1 30.00 1.80E-06 2 1442.40 1502.40 23.69 
TOTAL 630.00 703.95 
Table A.7.3A- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Process Plant's Gas Detection System (xg2) - Case 1 
Vol 
01 
-
Spurious Number of LSOyear LSO Test costs Repair cost! CYCtesting CYCrepair 
Case Number CSU Trip Rille spurious trips per year per year 
(STR) per year (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
Case I 7.20860E-02 2. 13500E-05 0.1870260 888.95 5564.23 630.00 703.95 3943.38 4406.28 
Case 2 1.31065E-02 3.88182E-05 0.3400473 1616.27 10116.78 1260.00 1407.91 7886.76 8812.56 
Case 3 3.24387E-02 9.60750E-06 0.0841617 400.03 2503.90 1890.00 2111.86 11830.13 13218.84 
Case 6 3.60430E-03 5.33750E-05 0.4675650 2222.37 13910.58 1890.00 2111.86 11830.13 132Ib:d4 
CaseS 1.31065E-01 3.88182E-06 0.0340047 161.63 1011.68 1260.00 1407.91 7886.76 8812.56 
Tabela A.7.3.B - Costs related to the Process Plant's Gas Detection System (xg2) - Case 1 
Case Number CSU CSA ASR 
Case 0 I.OOOOE+OO O.OOOOE+OO 6.06162E-03 
Case I 7.20860E-02 9 .27914E-O 1 5.87905E-03 
Case 2 1.31065E-02 9.86893E-01 5.86745E-03 
Case 3 3.24387E-02 9.67561E-01 5.87125E-03 
Case 6 3.60430E-03 9.96396E-01 5.86558E-03 
CaseS 1.31 065E-O 1 8.68935E-01 5.89065E-03 
Tabela A.7.3.C - Critical Safety Unavailability I Availability Values and Average Societal Risk 
Values (fatalitiesfyear) Calculated for Different Cases related to the Process Plant's Gas Detection 
System (xg2) 
CYCtotol LCA+CIR LCA+CIR 
+CYCtottJI 
(Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
8349.66 52560.50 60910.16 
16699.32 99682.72 116382.04 
25048.97 145869.25 170918.22 
25048.97 145869.25 170918.22 
16699.32 99682.72 116382.04 
LeA+CIR+ LUC 
CYCtot. 
(Pounds) (Pounds) 
60910.16 5564.23 
116382.04 10116.78 
170918.22 2503.90 
170918.22 13910.58 ! 
116382.04 1~J!.~ ! 
Table A.7.3. E -Case 1- Costs involved in Process Plant's Gas Detection System (xgl) 
rforDeaths Value or Loss Uveslyr. Benelit in Loss Totlll Berujit CSU RELyear Berujit Tollll Benejit Total Berujit LeC 
I per year Lire (LLyear) Liveslyear Loss Lives RELyear- REL 
LL REL 
IN 
R3 (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 5.87905E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.15 547.70 3428.20 7.20860E-02 96055.66 1236459.18 7739406.02 7742834.22 -7676359.83 
5.86745E-03 3.0000E+06 17602.34 582.51 3646.11 1.31065E-02 17464.67 1315050.18 8231333.02 8234979.12 -8108480JO 
5.87125E-03 3.0000E+06 17613.75 571.10 3574.68 3.24387E-02 43225.05 1289289.79 8070090.28 8073664.96 -7900242.83 
5.86558E-03 3.0000E+06 17596.73 588.12 3681.21 3.60430E-03 4802.78 1327712.06 8310587.92 8314269.13 -8129440J3 
5.89065E-03 3.0000E+06 17671.96 512.88 3210.30 1.31 065E-O I 174646.66 1157868.18 7247479.03 72S0689.33 -7133295.61 
6.06162E-03 3.0000E+06 18184.85 1.0000E+OO 1332514.84 
Table A.7.3. F -Case 1- Life Cycle Cost Calculated for the Process Plant's Gas Detection System (xgl) 
w 
01 
w 
Life Cycle Cost x Avallbllity of the Process Plant Gas Detection System (xg2) 
GI g, -7600000.00 
o 
~ -7800000.00 
:::; 
Availability of Process Plant Gas Detection System 
Figure A.7.3.- Life Cycle Cost versus Critical Availability - Process Plant's Gas Detection System (xg2) 
Case Number CSU-xg2 CSA LCC 
Casel 7.20860E-02 9.279 1 4OE-Ol -7676359.83 
Case2 l.31065E-02 9.868935E-Ol -8108480.30 
Case3 3.24387E-02 9.6756 13E-O 1 -7900242.83 
Case4 3.60430E-03 9.963957E-Ol -8129440.33 
CaseS 1.31 065E-0 1 8.689345E-Ol ~7133295.611 
----- -
Table A.7.3.G - Life Cycle Values (LCC ) Obtained for Different Cases Related to the Process Plant's Gas Detection (, 
System (xgl) 
IoU 
~ 
ClEO CIMV CIIC 
Component Price Number of Number Component Price per total 
componts. of Cost loop 
Loops 
Gas 1881.39 20 20 37627.86 9406.97 1216.\0 24322.00 
detector 
Input Dev. 1442.40 2 2884.80 1153.92 
TOTAL 
Table A.7.3.2 - Case 2- Cost related to the Process Plant's Gas Detection System (xgl) 
OBS: All values are given in pounds 
Test Man-hours Test costs Failure Manhours Other 
Component Number Period pertest per year rate per repair costs per 
of (months) repair 
Gas 20 6 1 1200.00 4.00E-06 2 1881.39 
detector 
Input Dev. 2 12 1 60.00 1.80E-06 2 1442.40 
Total 1260.00 
CIMC 
17839.21 
1009.68 
Total cost 
per repair 
1941.39 
1502.40 
Table A.7.3.2 A- Case 2- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Process Plant's Gas 
Detection System (xgl) 
CIRS CIRT TOTAL 
No of Price 
1 1881.39 656.22 91733.65 
1 1442.40 1458.27 7949.08 
99682.72 
Repair costs 
peryear ' 
1360.53 
• 
I 
47.381 
1407.911 
I..J.) 
~ 
CIEU CIMV CIIC CIMC 
Component Price Number 01 Number Compont. Price total 
componts. of Cost per 
Loops loop 
Gas 1881.39 30 30 56441.79 14110.45 1216.1 36483.00 26758.81 
detector 
Input card 1442.40 3 4327.20 1730.88 1514.52 
TOTAL 
Table A.7.3.3 - Case 3- Cost related to the Process Plant's Gas Detection System (xg2) 
OBS: All values are given in pounds 
Test ~an-hour: Test costs Failure rate Manhours Otbercosts Total cost 
Component Number 01 Period pertest per year per repair per repair per repair 
(months) 
Gas 30 6 I 1800.00 4.00E-06 2 1881.39 1941.39 
detector 
lnputDev. 3 I" I 90.00 1.80E-06 2 1442.40 1502.40 
Total 1890.00 
------- -- -
CIRS 
No of 
2 
I 
Repair~ 
per year 
2040.79 
71.07 
2111.86 
Table A.7.3.3 A- Case 3- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Process Plant's Gas (xf2) 
Detection System (xg2) 
CIRT TOTAL 
Price 
1881.39 656.22 136331.66 
506.71 1458.27 9537.59 
145869.25 
CIEH CIMV CUC CIMC CIRS CIRT TOTAL 
Componen Price Number 01 Number Componen Price per Total No of Price 
(Pounds) componts. of Cost loop I 
i Loops (Pounds) (Pounds) i 
Fire 2947.52 10 10 29475.16 7,368.79 1216.1 12161 12251.24 I 2947.52 656.22 64859.92 
detector 
Input Dev. 2696.66 I 2696.66 1,078.67 943.83 I 2696.66 1458.27 8874.10 
TOTAL 73734.02 
Table A.7.4 - Costs related to the Process Plant's Fire Detection System (xf2) - Case 1 
(*) Includes: input card -analogic - 1881.39 pounds plus rack -815.27 pounds that makes a lotal of 2696.66 pounds 
Maximum recommended number points for each input card: 32 
Rate (May.98): lpound- 1.828645RS and IUS- 1.I468RS 
IoU 
8i Test Man·boon Test costs ~ailure rail Manhours Other Total cost Repair costs 
Componen Number of Period per test per year per repair costs per per repair per year 
component! (months) (Pounds) repair I I 
J 
Fire 10 6 I 600.00 5.00E-06 2 2947.52 3007.52 1317.291 
detector i 
Input Dev. 1 12 1 30.00 1.80E-06 2 2696.66 2756.66 43A7 
Total 630.00 1360.76 
Table A.7.4A- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Process Plant's Fire Detection System (xf2). Case 1 
~ 
0'1 
...... 
Spurious NlUllberof LSOyeor LSO Test costs ~epaircost CYCtesting CYCnpair 
Case Number CSU Trip Rate spurious trips per year per year 
(STR) per ;yeor (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
Casel 8.28860E-02 2.1 3500E-05 0.1870260 888.95 5564.23 630.00 1360.76 3943.38 8517.44 
Case2 1.50702E-02 3.88 1 82E-05 0.3400473 1616.27 10116.78 1260.00 2721.52 7886.76 17034.88 
Case3 3.72987E-02 9.60750E-06 0.0841617 400.03 2503.90 1980.00 4212.68 12393.47 26368.54 
Case6 4. I 4430E-03 5.33750E-05 0.4675650 2222.37 13910.58 1980.00 4212.68 12393.47 263(~.54 
Case S 1.50702E-O 1 3.88 1 82E-06 0.0340047 161.63 1011.68 1260.00 2721.52 7886.76 17034.88 
Tabela A.7.4.B - Costs related to the Process Plant's Fire Detection System (xf2) - Case 1 
Case Number CSU CSA ASR 
CaseO I.OOOOOE+OO O.OOOOOE+OO 5.9 1 462E-03 
Casel 8.28860E-02 9.171 1 4E-O 1 5.87905E-03 
Caul 1.50702E-02 9.84930E-Ol 5.87642E-03 
Case3 3.72987E-02 9.6270 lE-O 1 5.87728E-03 
Case6 4. 1 4430E-03 9.95856E-01 5.87600E-03 
CaseS 1.50702E-O 1 8.49298E-O I 5.88 1 68E-03 
Tabela A.7.4.C - Critical Safety Unavailability I Availability Values and Average Societal Risk 
Values (fatalitieslyear) Calculated for Different Cases related to the Process Plant's Fire Detection 
System (xfl) 
CYCtotal 
(Pounds) 
12460.82 
24921.63 
38762.02 
38762.021 
24921.63 
LCA+CIR+ LUC 
CYCtoL 
(Pounds) (Pounds) 
86194.84 5564.23 
164631.00 10116.78 
261551.73 2503.90 
261551.73 13910.58 
164631.00 1011.68 
Table A7.4 •• E-Case 1- Costs involved in Process Plant's Fire Detection System (xf2) 
~ofDeaths Value of Loss Liveslyr Benefit in Loss TolJll Benefit CSU RELyeor Benefit TolJll Benefit ToIJIl Benefit LeC 
per year Life (LLyear) Liveslyear Loss Uves RELyeor- REL 
w 
~ LL REL (Pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) • (pounds) (Pounds) 
5.87905E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.15 106.71 667.94 8.28860E-02 84666.74 936817.48 5863849.76 5864517.70 -5772758.63 
5.87642E-03 3.0000E+06 17629.26 114.60 717.33 1.50702E-02 15393.95 1006090.27 6297451.00 6298168.33 -6123420.55 
5.87728E-03 3.0000E+06 17631.85 112.02 701.14 3.72987E-02 38100.03 983384.19 6155326.15 6156027.29 -5891971.66 
5.87600E-03 3.0000E+06 17627.99 115.87 725.29 4. I 4430E-03 4233.34 1017250.88 6367308.98 6368034.27 -6092571.96 
5.88 I 68E-03 3.0000E+06 17645.04 98.82 618.55 1.50702E-O I 153939.53 867544.69 5430248.52 5430867.l)7 -5265224.39 
5.91 462E-03 3.0000E+06 17743.86 0.00 I.OOOOE+OO 1021484.22 
Table A.7.4. F-Case 1- Life Cycle Cost Calculated for the Process Plant's Fire Detection System (xf2) 
~ 
$ 
Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Process Plant Fire Detection System (xf2) 
~!l'\I\I\OOE- 9.800000E· 9.000000E- 9.200000E- 9.400oo0E· 9.600000E- 9.800000E· 1.000000E 
. ... 
• • o I ~ -5600000.00 ~ OOOE+07 
~ ft = 9.76356145670798000E-01 I 
u ·5800000.00 +---------------1:~!!!11000,,,..;;:::__----------------'-_i 
~ 
...I -6000000.00 I ! 
... _. __ ••••• _." ... ~_ •• _ .. _. ___ "_'_ ._~ ••• ._....;_. ____ ._ ..... _ '_' •• _ • __ 0" •• __ '_"_" ___ .. n. __ ,,",,".,~ __ ,,_~ _,, ___ ..__ .j 
-6200000.00 
Availability of the Process Plant Detection System 
Figure A.7.4.- Life Cycle Cost versus Critical Availability - Process Plant's Fire Detection System (xC2) 
Case Number CSU-xfl CSA LCC 
Casel 8.28860E·02 9.171140E·0l -5772758.63 
Case2 1.50702E-02 9.849298E-Ol -6123420.55 
Case3 3.72987E·02 9.627013E-0l -5891971.66 
Case4 4. 14430E-03 9.958557E·0l -6092571.961 
CaseS 1.50702E-0l 8.492982E·0 1 -5265224.391 
Table A.7.4.G - Life Cycle Values (LCC) Obtained for Different Cases Related to the Process Plant's Fire 
Detection (xC2) 
1M 
-.J 
o 
CIEH CIMV CIIC CIMC 
Component Price Number 01 Number Componen Price per total 
componts. of Cost loop 
Loops 
Fire 2947.52 20 20 58950.32 14737.58 1216.10 24322.00 24502.47 
detector 
InputDev. 2696.66 2 5393.33 2157.33 1887.66 
TOTAL 
Table A.7.4.2 - Case 2- Cost related to the Process Plant's Fire Detection System (xfl) 
ORS: All values are given in pounds 
Test Man-boon Test costs Failure rall Manhours Other costs Total cost 
Component Number of Period pertest per year per repair per repair per repair 
(months) 
Fire 20 6 1 1200.00 5.ooE-06 2 2947.52 3007.52 
detector 
InputDev. 2 12 1 60.00 1.80E-06 2 2696.66 2756.66 
TOTAL 1260.00 
-
CIKS 
No of 
1 
1 
Repair cost! 
per year 
2634.58 
86.93 
2721.52 
Table A.7.4.2 A- Case 2- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Process Plant's Fire 
Detection System (xfl) 
CIRT TOTAL 
Price 
2947.52 656.22 126116.11 
2696.66 1458.27 13593.26 
139709.37 
\.Iol 
-..J 
-
CIEH CIMV CIIC CIMC 
Componen Price Number of Number Compont. Price per total 
componts. of Cost loop 
Loops 
Fire 2947.52 30 30 88425.47 22106.37 1216.1 36483.00 36753.71 
detector 
InputDev. 2696.66 6 16179.98 6471.99 5662.99 
TOTAL 
- ,-- -- -_.- --- ---
Table A.7.4.3 - Case 3- Cost related to the Process Plant's Fire Detection System (xf2) 
OBS: All values are given in pounds 
Test Man-boon Test costs Failure rat Manhours ~thercosts Total cost 
Componen Number 01 Period pertest per year per repair per repair per repair 
(months) 
Fire 30 6 1 1800.00 5.00E-06 2 1947.52 3007.52 
detector 
linputDev. 6 12 I 180.00 I.80E-06 2 2696.66 2756.66 
TOTAL 
- --
_1980.00 
-- --- -- - - -- -
CIRS 
No of 
2 
I 
----
Repair 
costs 
per year 
3951.88 
260.80 
_ 4212.681 
Table A.7.4.3 A- Case 3- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Process Plant's Fire 
Detection System (xf2) 
CIRT TOTAL 
I 
Price 
5895.03 656.22 190319.81 
2696.66 1458.27 32469.90 
222789.71 
-- ---
\oN 
-....I 
N 
Number 01 Number CIEH CIMV CIIC CIMC 
Componen Price Componts. of Componen Price per total 
Loops Cost loop 
Gas 1881.39 4 4 7525.57 1881.39 1216.1 4864.40 3567.84 
detector 
Input Dev. 1442.40 I 1442.40 576.96 504.84 
------- --- _ .. -
L .. _. _______ L-. ________ 
'----
Table A.7.S - Costs related to the Pump Room's Gas Detection System (xg3) - Case 1 
(.) Includes: input card· binary -627.13 pounds plus rack -SI5.27 pounds that makes a total of 1442.40 pounds 
Maximum recommended number points for each input card: 32 
Rale(May.98): lpound- I.S28645R$ and JU$- 1.I468R$ 
Test Man-boon Test costs Failure rate Manhours Other costs Total cost 
Componen Number of Period per test per year per repair per repair per repair 
Component!; (months) 
Gas 4 6 I 240.00 4.00E-06 2 1881.39 1941.39 
detector 
Input Dev. I 12 I 30.00 1.80E-06 2 1442.40 1502.40 
Total 270.00 
-------
------_ ... -
-- ---------
CIRS 
No of Price 
I 1881.39 
I 1442AO 
Repair costs 
per year 
272.11 
23.69 
295.80 
Table A.7.5A- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Pump Room's Gas Detection System (xgJ) - Case 1 
CIRT TOTAL, 
! 
I 
I 
656.22 20376.82· 
1458.27 5424.87 
25801.69 
w 
...., 
w 
Case CSU Spurious Number 0/ LSOyear LSO Test costs Repair costs CYCU!sting CYCrepair CYCtolDl 
Number Trip Rail! spur.trips (Pounds) per year per year 
(STR) per year (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
Case I 2.9 1 260E-02 9.35000E-06 0.0819060 389.31 2436.79 270.00 295.80 1690.02 1851.48 3541.50 
Case 2 5.29564E-03 1.70000E-05 0.1489200 707.83 4430.54 540.00 591.59 3380.04 3702.96 7083.00 
Casel 1.31067E-02 4.20750E-06 0.0368577 175.19 1096.56 810.00 887.39 5070.06 5554.45 10624.50 
Case 6 1.45630E-03 2.33750E-05 0.2047650 973.26 6091.99 810.00 887.39 5070.06 5554.45 10624.50 
Case S 5.29564E-02 1.70000E-06 0.0148920 70.78 443.05 540.00 591.59 3380.04 3702.96 -7083.00 
Tabela A.7.S.B - Costs related to the Pump Room's Gas Detection System (xg3) - Case 1 
Case Crilical Crilical AYerage 
Number Safey Safey S«iI!tal 
U1UI¥llilobility A POilability Risk 
(CSA) (CSA) (ASR) 
Case 0 I.()()()()E+OO 9.47044E-01 5.879053IE-03i 
Case I 2.9 1 260E-02 O.OOOOE+OO 5.879 1 733E-03 
Case 2 5.29564E-03 9.70874E-01 5.879050 1 E-03 
Case 3 J.31067E-02 9.94704E-01 5.879047IE-03 
Case 6 1.45630E-03 9.86893E-01 5.8790480E-03 
CaseS 5.29564E-02 9.98544E-01 5.8790466E-03 
Tabela A.7.5.C - Critical Safety Unavailability I Availability Values and Average Societal Risk 
Values (fatalities/year) Calculated for Different Cases related to the Pump Room's Gas Detection System (xg3) 
LCA+CIR LCA+CIR+ I 
(Pounds) 
CYCtolDl I 
(pounds) I 
25801.69 29343.19 
46165.10 53248.10 
65592.82 76217.32 
65592.82 76217.32 
46165.10 53248.10 
LCA+CIR+ LSO 
CYCtot. 
(Pounds) (Pounds) 
29343.19 2436.79 
53248.10 4430.54 
76217.32 1096.56 
76217.32 6091.99 
53248.10 443.05 
--------_ .. _-
Table A.7.5 E -Case 1- Costs involved in Pump Room's Gas Detection System (xg3) 
~ofDeaths Value of Loss Liveslyr Benefit in Loss Total Benefit CSU RELJear Benefit Total Benefit Total BeneflJ LCC 
per year Life (LLyear) Liveslyear Loss Uves RELJear- RELoss 
LL REL 
(Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) 
5.87905E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.15 3.6968561E-O 1 2.3139846E+OO 2.91260E-02 38810.83 1293704.01 8097720.35 8097722.66 -8065942.68 
w 
~ 5.87905E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.14 3.7875970E-OI 2.3707820E+OO 5.29564E-03 7056.51 1325458.33 8296481.08 8296483A5 -8238804.81 5.87905E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.14 3. 7578544E-O 1 2.3521651E-tOO 1.31067E-02 17464.87 1315049.97 8231331.73 • 8231334.os -8154020.20 
5.87905E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.14 3.8022163E-O 1 2.3799327E-tOO 1.45630E-03 1940.54 1330574.30 8328503.64 8328S06.02 -8246196.71 
5.87905E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.16 3.6061164E-01 2.2S71872E+OO 5.29564E-02 70565.14 1261949.70 7898959.62 7898961.88 -7845270.72 
Table A.7.5. F -Case 1- Life Cycle Cost Calculated for the Pump Rooms's Gas Detection System (xg3) 
Vl 
-.J 
lJl 
Vi -7950000.00 
o 
o -8000000.00 
Q) 
~ -8050000.00 
~ -8100000.00 
:5 -8150000.00 
-8200000.00 
-8250000.00 
-8300000.00 . 
life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Pump Room Gas Detection System (xg3) 
Availability of the Pump Room Gas Detection System 
Figure A.7.S.- Life Cycle Cost versus Critical Availability - Pump Room's Gas Detection System (xg3) 
Case Number CSU-xg3 CSA LCC ! 
Case1 2.9 1 26E-02 9.70874E-Ol -8065942.68 
Case2 5.2956E-03 9.94704E-Ol -8238804.81 
Case3 1.3107E-02 9.86893E-Ol -815402020 ! 
Case6 1.4563E-03 9.98544E-0l -8246196.71 
Case5 5.2956E-02 9.47044E-Ol -7845270.72 
Table A.7.S.G - Life Cycle Values (LCC ) Obtained for Different Cases Related to the Pump Room's Gas 
Detection System (xg3) 
U) 
..... 
01 
Number of Number CIEH CIMV Price per CIIC CIMC 
Componen Price Componts. of Componen1 loop total 
Loops Cost 
Gas 1881.39 8 8 15051.14 3762.79 1216.10 9728.8 7135.68 
detector 
Input Dev. 1442.40 2 2884.80 1153.92 1009.68 
Total 
Table A.7.5.2 - Case 2- Cost related to the Pump Room's Gas Detection System (xg3) 
ODS: All values are given in pounds 
Test Man-hour§ Test costs Failure rat« Manhours Other costs Total cost 
Componen Number of Period pertest per year per repair per repair per repair 
(months) 
Gas 8 6 1 480.00 4.00E~ 2 1881.39 1941.39 
detector 
InputDev. 2 12 1 60.00 1.80E~ 2 1442.40 1502.40 
Total 540.00 
CIKS 
No of 
1 
1 
Repair costs I 
per year 
544.21 
47.38 
591.59 
Table A.7.S.2 A- Case 2- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Pump Room's Gas 
Detection System (xgJ) 
CIRT TOTAL 
Price 
I 
I 
1881.39 656.22 38216.03 
1442AO 1458.27 7949.08 
46165.10 
Yo) 
....., 
....., 
Number of Number CIEU CIMV Price per CIIC 
Component Price Componts. of Component loop total 
Loops Cost 
Gas 1881.39 12 12 22576.72 5644.18 1216.10 14593.2 
detector 
Input card 1442.40 3 4327.20 1730.88 
Total 
Table A.7.S.3 - Case 3- Cost related to the Pump Room's Gas Detection System (xg3) 
OBS: All values are given in pounds 
Test Man-boun Test costs Failure rate Manbours Other costs 
Component Number 01 Period pertest per year per repair per repair 
(months) 
Gas 12 6 1 720.00 4.00E-06 2 1881.39 
detector 
InputDev. 3 12 1 90.00 1.80E-06 2 1442.40 
Total 810.00 
CIMC 
10703.52 
1514.52 
Total cost 
per repair 
1941.39 
1502.40 
Table A.7.S.3 A- Case 3- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Pump Room's Gas 
Detection System (xg3) 
CIRS CIRT TOTAIJ 
No of Price 
1 1881.39 656.22 56055.23 
1 506.71 1458.27 9537.59 
65592.82 
Repair costs , I 
peryear , 
I 
816.32i 
. 
71.o7j 
887.391 
IN 
-...I 
oc 
CIEH CIMV cnc CIMC CIRS CIRT 
Componen Price Number 01 Number Componen Price per total No of Price 
(Pounds) componts. of Cost loop 
Loops (pounds) (Pounds) 
F"u-e 2947.52 4 4 11790.06 2,947.52 1216.1 4864.4 4900.49 1 2947.52 656.22 
detector 
Input Dev. 2696.66 I 2696.66 1,078.67 943.83 1 2696.66 1458.27 
Total 
-~ 
Table A.7.6 - Costs related to the Pump Room's Fire Detection System (xfJ) - Case 1 
Test ~-bour Test costs Failure ratE Manbours Other Total cost Repair cost! 
Componen Number of Period per test per year per repair costs per per repair per year 
Component!; (months) repair 
detector 
IoputeaniJ I 12 1 30.00 1.80E-06 2 2696.66 2756.66 43.47 
Total 270.00 570J8 
Table A.7.6A- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Pump Room's Fire Detection System (xfJ) -,Case 1 
TOTAL 
28106.21 
8874.10 
36980Jl 
IoU 
-...I 
100 
SPurUJus Nulfllwrof LSOyear LSO rrestc0st8 Repair costs ~YCtesiing ICYCrepair CYCtoIIIl LCA+CIR 
Case CSU Trip Rate spurious trips per year per year 
Number (STR) per year (pounds) (Pounds (Pounds) (pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) 
Casel 3.34460E-{)2 9.35000E-06 0.0819060 389.31 2436.79 270.00 570.38 1690.02 3570.22 5260.24 36980.31 
Case2 6.08I09E-{)3 1.70000E-{)5 0.1489200 707.83 4430.54 540.00 1140.77 3380.04 7140.41 10520.48 66201.95 
Case3 1.50501E-{)2 4.20750E-06 0.0368577 175.19 1096.56 810.00 1711.15 5070.06 10710.66 15780.72 95423.58 
Case6 1.67230E-{)3 2.33750E-{)5 0.2047650 973.26 6091.99 810.00 1711.15 5070.06 10110.66 15780.72 95423.58 
CaseS 6.08109E-{)2 1.70000E-06 0.0148920 70.78 443.05 540.00 1140.77 3380.04 7140.44 f 10520.48 66201.95 
Tabela A.7.6.B - Costs related to the Pump Room's Fire Detection System (xf3) - Case I 
Case Critical Critical Average 
Number Safe] Saley Societal 
Unavailability Availability Risk 
(CSU) (CSA) (ASR) 
Case(} 1.0000E+OO O.OOOOE+OO 5.8791 51E-{)3 
Casel 3.34460E-02 9.66554E-{)1 5.879050E-{)3 
Case2 6.08109E-03 9.939 1 9E-{)1 5.879041E-{)3 
CaseJ 1.50501E-02 9.84949E-{)1 5.879048E-{)3 
Case6 1.6723OE-03 9.98328E-{)1 5.879041E-03 
CaseS 6.08109E-02 9.39189E-{)1 5.879053E-03 
Tabela A. 7 .6.C - Critical Sarety Unavailability I Availability Values and Average Societal Risk 
Values (ratalitieslyear) Calculated for Different Cases related to the Pump Room's Fire Detection System (xfJ) 
LCA+CIR 
+CYCtoIIIl 
(Pounds) I 
42240.55 
76722.43 
111204.30 
111204.30 
76722.43 
~ 
00 
o 
LCA.+CIR+ LSD 
CYCtoL 
(Powuls) (Pounds) 
42240.55 2436.79 
76722.43 4430.54 
111204.30 1096.56 
111204.30 6091.99 
76722.43 443.05 
Table A.7.6.E- Case 1 -Costs involved in Pump Room's Fire Detection System (xfJ) 
~ofDeatbs Value of Loss Lives Benefit in Loss Total Benefit CSU RELyetu Benefit Total Benefit 
per year Life per year Liveslyear Loss Lives RELyetu- RELoss 
(LLyear) LL REL 
(Pounds) (Pounds (pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) 
5.87905E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.15 3.2050E-01 l.006I36E+OO 3.34460E-02 34164.56 987319.66 6179959.57 
5.87905E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.14 3.2957735E-01 2.062933E+OO 6.08I09E-03 6211.74 1015272.48 635492S.51 
5.87905E-03 3.()()()()E+06 17637.14 3.2660308E-OI 2.044316E+OO 1.50507E-02 15374.05 1006110.17 6297575.56 
5.87905E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.14 3.3103928E-01 2.072084E+OO 1.67230E-03 1708.23 1019775.99 6383114.47 
5.87905E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.16 3.1142928E-01 1.949339E+OO 6.08I09E-02 62117.38 959366.84 6004993.63 
5.87916E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.47 O.OOOOOOOE+OO I.OOOOE+OO 1021484.22 
Table A.7.6.F - Case 1- Life Cycle Cost Calculated for the Pump Rooms's Fire Detection System (xfJ) 
Total Benefit LCC 
(pounds) (Pounds) 
6179961.58 -6135284.23 
6354927.58 -6273774.61 
6297577.61 -6185276.75 
6383116.54 -6265820.26 
6004995.58 -5927830.10 
w 
00 
"iii y.:.I 
"g -59500oo.UO' 5 I 
o -6000000.00 
Q. 
::- -6050000.00 
., 
<3 -6100000.00 
~ -6150000.00 
o ti -6200000.00 
~ -6250000.00 
...J 
-6300000.00 
Ute Cycle Cost X Avallabilityot the Pump Room Fire Detection System (xt3) 
QOOOOE+07x' -7.82369432333316000E+07x + 
Availability of the Pump Room Fire Detection System 
Figure A.7.6 - Life Cycle Cost versus Critical Availability - Pump Room's Fire Detection System (xf3) 
Case Number CSU -xf3 CSA LCe 
Casel 3.34460E-02 9.665540E-Ol -6135284.23 
Case2 6.08109E-03 9.939189E-Ol -6273774.61 
Case3 1.SOS07E-02 9.849493E-Ol -6185276.75 
Case4 1.67230E-03 9.983277E-Ol -6265820.26 
CaseS 6.08109E-02 9.391891 E-Ol -S927~lQ.lQ 
Table A.7.6.G - Life Cycle Values (LCC) Obtained for Different Cases Related to Pump Room's Fire 
Detection System (xf3) 
w 
00 
N 
CIEn CIMV CUC CIMC ClRS ClRT 
CCIIDpOMRt Prk:e Number of Number Compoaent Prkeper total No of Prk:e 
--ponti. of Cost loop 
Loops 
Fare 2947.52 ~ ~ Z358G.13 5895.0 1216.IC 9728.1M1 91100.9'l I 1947.5 656.2 
detector 
InputDev. 2696.~ 5393.33 2151.33 1887.66 I 2696.~ 14511.Zl 
Total 
Table A.7.6.2 - Case 2 - Costs related to the Pump Room's Fire Detection System (,,0) 
Test Man-boors Test costs Failure rate Manhours Other costs Total cost Repair costs 
Component Number of Period pertest peryeM per repair per repair per repair per year 
<BIOUths) 
Fare @ t I 48O.IMI 5.00E-0li 1947.5 3007.5 IOS3.8:l 
detector 
InputDev. I I ".1M 1.800-Ot 2696.~ 2756~ 86.91 
Total 540JIO 1140.77 
Table A.7.6.2A- Case 2 - Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Pump Room's Fire Detection System (,,0) 
TOI'AL 
52608.69 
13593.26 
66201.95 
I.H 
00 
I.H 
CIEH CIMV CDC CIMC CIKS CIRT 
Component Price Number of Number Compont. Price per total No of Price 
componts. of Cost loop 
Loops 
Fire 2947.52 12 12 35370.19 8842.55 1216.1 14593.20 14701.48 1 2947.52 656.22 
detector 
Input Dev. 2696.66 3 8089.99 3236.00 2831.50 I 2696.66 1458.27 
Total 
Table A.7.6.3 - Case 3 - Costs related to the Pump Room's Fire Detection System (xf3) 
Test Man-hoon Test costs Failurerab Manhoun Other costs Total cost Repair 
Component Number of Period per test per year per repair per repair per repair costs 
(months) per year 
Fire 12 6 1 720.00 5.00E.06 2 2947.52 3007.52 1580.75 
detector 
Input DeY. 3 12 1 90.00 1.800.06 2 2696.66 2756.66 130.40 
Total 810.00 1711.15 
Table A.7.6.3A- Case 3 - Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Pump Room's Fire Detection System (xfJ) 
TOTAL 
77111.16 
18312.42 
95423.58 
IN 
00 
~ 
Number of Number CIEH CIMV CUC CIMC CIRS CIRT 
Component Price Componts. of Component Price per total No of Price 
Loops Cost loop 
Gas 1881.39 8 8 15051.14 3762.79 1216.1 9728.80 7135.68 1 1881.39 656.22 
detector 
Input Dev. 1442.40 1 1442.40 576.96 504.84 1 1442.40 1458.27 
Total 
Table A.7.7 - Costs related to the Machine Room's Gas Detection System (xg4) - Case 1 
Test Man-boon Test costs Failure rate Manhours Other costs Total cost Repair costs 
Component Number of Period per test per year per repair per repair per repair per year 
Component! (months) 
Gas 8 6 1 480.00 4.00E-06 2 1881.39 1941.39 544.21 
detector 
InputDev. 1 12 1 30.00 1.80E-06 2 1442.40 1502.40 23.69 
Total 510.00 567.90 
Total 270.00 570.38 
Table A.7.7 A- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Machine Room's Gas Detection System (xg4) - Case 1 
TOTAL 
, 
38216.03 
5424.87 
43640.90 
~ 
00 
VI 
Case CSU Spurious Number of LSOyear LSO Test costs Repair cost CYCtesting CYCreptJir CYCIoIJll 
Number Trip Rate spur.trips per year per year 
(STR) per year (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
ClISe I 5.77660E-02 1.73500E-05 0.1519860 722.40 4521.75 510.00 567.90 3192.26 3554.68 6746.94 
ClISe 2 1.05029E-02 3. 1 5455E-05 0.2763382 1313.46 8221.37 1020.00 1135.80 6384.52 7109.36 13493.88 
Case 3 2.59947E-02 7.80750E-06 0.0683937 325.08 2034.79 1530.00 1703.70 9576.77 10664.04 20240.82 
CIISe6 2.88830E-03 4.33750E-05 0.3799650 1806.00 11304.38 1530.00 1703.70 9576.77 10664.04 20240.82 
ClISe 5 1.05029E-O 1 3. 1 5455E-06 0.0276338 131.35 822.14 1020.00 1135.80 6384.52 7109._~{j 13493.88 
Tabela A.7.7.B - Costs related to the Machine Room's Gas Detection System (xg4) - Case 1 
Case Critical Critical Average 
Number Safe, Safe, SocieIJll 
UlUlWlilability A 'tlilability Risk 
(CSU) (CSA) (ASR) 
ClISe 0 I.OOOOE+OO O.OOOOE+OO 5.87936E-03 
Case I 5.77660E-02 9.42234E-01 5.879OSE-03 
Case 2 1.05029E-02 9.89497E-O I 5.87903E-03 
Case 3 2.59947E-02 9.74005E-01 5.87904E-03 
Case 6 2.88830E-03 9.971 I 2E-O 1 5.87903E-03 
~ase~ 1.05029E-O I 8.9497IE-01 S.87907E-03 
-- - ------
Tabela A.7.7.C - Critical Safety UnavaUability I Availability Values and Average Societal Risk Values 
(fatalitieslyear) Calculated for Different Cases related to the Machine Room's Gas Detection System (xg4) 
ILCA+CIR+ LCA+CIR+ 
CYCtolJll 
(Pounds) (Pounds) 
43640.90 50387.84 
81843.52 95337.39 
119110.44 139351.26 
119110.44 139351.26 
81843.52 95337.39 
~ 
00 
0'1 
LeA+CIR+ LUC i 
CYCtot. 
(Pounds) (Pounds) 
50387.84 4521.75 
95337.39 8221.37 
139351.26 2034.79 
139351.26 11304.38 
95337.39_ 822.14 
-_._._--
Table A.7.7.E- Case I-Costs involved in Machine Room's Gas Detection System (xg4) 
~orDeaths Value of Loss Lives Benefit in Loss Total Benefit CSU RELyear Benefit Total Benefit 
per year Life per year Liveslyear Loss Lives RELyear- RELoss 
(LLyear) U. REL 
(Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) , 
5.87903E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.10 9.9046471E-01 6.1996458E+OO 1.05029E-02 13995.28 1318519.56 8253049.04 
5.87904E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.12 9.7495783E-01 6.1025828E+OO 2.59941E-02 34638.32 1297876.52 8123837A3 
5.87903E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.10 9.9808682E-01 6.2473548E+OO 2.888300-03 3848.70 1328666.14 8316559.83 
5.87901E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.20 8.9584614E-01 S.6073966E+OO 1.05029E-O 1 139952.82 1192562.02 7464639.23 
5.87936E-03 3.0000E+06 17638.09 I.OOOOE+OO 1332514.84 
Table A.7.7.F - Case 1- Life Cycle Cost Calculated for the Machine Rooms's Gas Detection System (xg4) 
Total Benefit LeC 
(Pounds) (Pounds) 
8253055.23 -8149496.47 
8123843.53 -7982457.49 
8316566.07 -8165910.44 
7464644.83 -7368485.30 
w 
00 
-...J 
S -7600000.00 
o -7700000.00 
CD 
~ -7800000.00 
o -7900000.00 
CD 
-::::i 
-8100000.00 
-8300000.00 
Life Cycle Cost X Critical Availability -
Machine Room Gas Detection System (xg4) 
Availability of the Machine Room Gas Detection System 
- 3.93711831279142E+07x + 
0787E+07 
4102055364E-01 
Figure A.7.7.- Life Cycle Cost versus Critical Availability - Machine Room's Gas Detection System (xg4) 
Case Number CSU CSA LCC 
Casel 5.7766E-02 9.42234E-Ol -7803940.44 
Case2 1.0503E-02 9 .89497E-O 1 -8149496.47 
Case3 2.5995E-02 9.74005E-Ol -7982457.49 
Case6 2.8883E-03 9 .97112E-O 1 -8165910.44 
CaseS 1.05 03 E-O1 8.94971E-Ol -7368485.30 
Table A.7.7.G - Life Cyde Values (LCC ) Obtained for Different Cases Related to the Machine Room's Gas 
Detection System (xg4) 
~ 
00 
00 
Number of Number CIEH CIMV Price per CDC CIMC cms CIRT 
Component Price Componts. of Componen loop total No of Price 
Loops Cost 
Gas 1881.39 16 16 30102.29 7525.57 1216.10 19457.6 14271.37 1 1881.39 656.22 
detector 
Input Dey. 1442.40 2 2884.80 1153.92 1009.68 1 .,' 1442.40 1458.27 
Table A.7.7.2- Case 2 - Costs related to the Machine Room's Gas Detection System (xg4) 
Test Man-hours Test costs Failure rab Manhours pther costs Total cost Repair costs 
Component Number of Period per test per year per repair per repair per repair per year 
(months) 
Gas 16 6 1 960.00 4.00E-Of'i 2 1881.39 1941.39 1088.42 
detector I 
InputDev. 2 12 1 60.00 1.80E-Of'i 2 1442AQ 1502.40 47.38 
~I_-
_ ... _----- ~-
1020.00 
__ L- _____ 1135.80 
--- -- --- - ---
Table A.7.7.2A- Case 2- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Machine Room's Gas Detection System (xg4) 
TOTAL 
73894.44 
7949.08 1 
81843.52 
-
Number 01 Number CIEH CIMV Price per CIIC CIMC CIRS CIRT TOTAL 
Componen Price Componts. of Componen loop total No of Price 
Loops Cost 
Gas 1881.39 24 24 45153A3 11288.36 1216.10 29186A 21407.05 2 1881.39 656.22 109572.85 
detector 
Input card 1442.40 3 4327.20 1730.88 1514.52 1 506.71 1458.27 9537.59 
Total 119110A4 
Table A.7.7.3- Case 3 - Costs related to the Machine Room's Gas Detection System (xg4) 
Test Man-boon Test costs iFailure rab Manbours Other costs Total cost Repair costs! 
IoN 
~ 
Componen Number 01 Period pertest per year per repair per repair per repair peryear I (months) 
I 
Gas 24 6 1 1440.00 4.00E-06 2 1881.39 1941.39 1632.63 
detector 
Input Dev. 3 12 1 90.00 I.80E-06 2 1442.40 1502.40 71.07 
Total 1530.00 1703.70 
Table A.7.7.3A- Case 3- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Machine Room's Gas Detection System (xg4) 
CIEH CIMV CIIC CIMC CIKS CIRT TOTAL 
Componen Price Number 01 Number icomponen Price~ total No of Price 
(Pounds) componts. of Cost loop 
Loops (Pounds) (Pounds) 
Fire 2947.52 8 8 23580.13 5,895.03 1216.1 9728.8 9800.99 I 2947.52 656.22 52608.69 
detector 
InputDev. 2696.66 I 2696.66 1,078.67 943.83 I 2696.66 1458.27 8874.10 
Total 61482.79 
Table A.7.S - Costs related to the Machine Room's Fire Detection System (xf4) - Case 1 
IoN 
8 
Test Man-houn Test costs Failure ratE Manhours IOther costs Total cost Repair~ 
Componen Number of Period pertest per year per repair per repair per repair peryear I 
component! (months) (Pounds) 
Fire 8 CI 1 480.00 5.00E-06 2 2947.52 3007.52 1053.83 
detector 
! 
Inoutcard. I I~ I 30.00 1.80E-06 2 2696.66 2756.66 43.471 
Total 510.00 1097.30 
Table A.7.SA- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Machine Room's Fire Detection System ("f4) - Case 1 
~ 
\CO 
... 
Ctue CSU Spurious Number of LSOyelll' LSO Test costs Repaircosb CYCtesting CYCreptJir CYCtotal 
Number Trip Rate spur.trips per year per year 
(STR) [per ,ear (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
Casel 6.64060E-02 1.73500E-05 0.1519860 722.40 4521.75 510.00 1097.30 3192.26 6868.37 10060.62 
Case2 1.20738E-02 3. 1 5455E-05 0.2763382 1313.46 8221.37 1020.00 2194.60 6384.52 13736.73 20121.25 
Case3 2.98827E-02 7.80750E-06 0.0683937 325.08 2034.79 1530.00 3291.90 9576.77 20605.10 30181.87 
Case6 3.3203OE-03 4.33750E-05 0.3799650 1806.00 11304.38 1530.00 3291.90 9576.77 20605.10 30181.87 
CaseS 1.20738E-O 1 3. 15455E-06 0.0276338 131.35 822.14 1020.00 2194.60 6384.52 13736.73 20121.25 
Tabela A.7.8.B - Costs related to the Machine Room's Fire Detection System (xf4) - Case 1 
Case Critical Critical Avel'llge I 
Number Safe, Safe, s ....... 
UnaWJilability A Nilability Risk 
(CSU) (CSA) (ASR) 
CaseD I.OOOOE+OO O.OOOOE+OO 5.87928E-03 
Casel 6.64060E-02 9.33594E-01 5.87905E-03 
Case2 1.20738E-02 9.87926E-01 5.87904E-03 
Ctue3 2.98827E-02 9.70l17E-01 5.87904E-03 
Case6 3.320JOE-03 9.96680E-01 5.87903E-03 
CaseS 1.20738E-01 8.79262E-01 5.87906E-03 
Tabela A.7.8.C - Critical Safety Unavailability I Availability Values and Average Societal Risk Values 
(fatalitiesfyear) Calculated for Different Cases related to the Machine Room's Fire Detection System (xf4) 
jLCA+CIR+ LCA+CIR+ 
CYCtotal 
(pounds) (Pounds) 
61482.79 71543.41 
115206.89 135328.14 
171878.52 202060.39 
171878.52 202060.39 
115206.89 135328.14 
LCA,+CIR+ LUC 
CYCtot. 
(PolUlds) (Pounds) 
71543.41 4521.75 
135328.14 8221.37 
202060.39 2034.79 
202060.39 11304.38 
135328.14 822.14 
Table A.7.S.E- Case I-Costs involved in Machine Room's Fire Detection System (xf4) 
~ofDeaths Value of Loss Lives Benefit in Loss Totsl BelUljiJ CSU RELyear BellejiJ Tollll BelUljiJ Tollll BelUljiJ LCC 
per year Life per year Liveslyear Loss Lipes RELyear. RELoss 
(LLyear) LL REL 
(Pounds) (Pounds (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) 
5.87904E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.11 7.3 1 62747E-O 1 4.5794978E+OO 1.20738E-02 12333.21 1009151.01 6316609.17 6316613.75 -6173064.24 
1M 
~ 
5.87904E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.12 7. 1843877E-01 4A969453E+OO 2.98827E-02 30524.71 990959.52 6202742.62 6202747.12 -5998651.94 : 
5.87903E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.10 7.3811006E-01 4.6200744E+OO 3.3203OE-03 3391.63 1018092.59 6372577.48 6372582.10 -6159217.32 
5.87906E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.19 6.5115402E-01 4.0'757879E+OO 1.20738E-O 1 123332.15 898152.07 5621830.22 5621834.30 ·5485684.02 
5.87928E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.84 1.0000E+OO 1021484.22 
Table A.7.S.F - Case 1- Life Cycle Cost Calculated for the Machine Rooms's Fire Detection System (xf4) 
..., 
\0 
W 
Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Machine Room Fire Detection System (xf4) 
~ -5600000.00 I ;O~' f~';rl~ . ~f.!H o -5700000.00 f' :;'~'~:7~ .. N:0?'::~ _58oooo0.oo f;(~" it:~§~x· . " . .-' ... '. . 
u r; -5900000.00 
~ -6000000.00 
~ -6100000.00 
-6200000.00 
'~,,'~;1:7ti~~\';:3E+07X z - 3.889691 93650354000E+07x + 
,', •. ",. '." ,;-,,'''".-00, .. n30425791000E+07 
364427635804000E-01 
Availability of the Machine Room Fire Detection System 
Figure A.7.S.- Life Cycle Cost versus Critical Availability - Machine Room's Fire Detection System (xf4) 
Case Number CSU-Fire CSA LCC 
Casel 6.64060E-02 9.335940E-Ol -5893158.86 
Case2 1.20738E-02 9 .879262E-O 1 -6173064.24 
Case3 2.98827E-02 9.701173E-Ol -5998651.94 
Case4 3.32030E-03 9.966797E-0l -6159217.32 
CaseS 1.20738E-O 1 8.792618E-Ol -5485684.02 
Table A.7.S.G - Life Cycle Values (LeC ) Obtained for Different Cases Related to the Machine Room's Fire 
Detection System (xf4) 
cnm CIMV cnc CIMC CIRS CIRT TOTAL 
Component PrIce Number 01 Number Component PrIce per total No 01 PrIce 
eomponts. 01 Cost loop 
Loops 
Fire 29475 I~ It 4716O.J.!i 11790.0I! 1216.IV 19457.641 19601.98 I 2947.5 6S6.22 101613.63 
detector 
In~utDev. Z696.~ 5393.33 2157.33 1887.~ I ~~696.~ 1458.l1 13593.26 
Total 115206.89 
Table A.7.S.2- Case 2 - Costs related to the Machine Room's Fire Detection System (xf4) 
Test Man-hours Test costs Failure rate Manhours Othercusts Total cust Repair costs 
Componen Number 01 PerIod pertest per year per repair per repair per repair per year 
IoN (months) 
~ 
Fire I~ 6 I 96O.OCJ 5.0IJE..0I: 2947.5 30075 2101.6' 
detector 
l~utDev. I I .~ I.lJOE.Oti 2696.66 2756~ 86.~ 
Total 1021.10 2194.60! 
Table A.7.S.2A- Case 2- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Machine Room's Fire Detection System (xf4) 
CIEH CIMV CIIC CIMC CIRS CIRT TOTAL 
Componen Price Number 01 Number ComponL Price per total No of Price 
componts. of Cost loop 
Loops 
Fire 2947.52 24 24 70740.38 17685.09 1216.1 29186.40 29402.97 2 5895.03 656.22 153566.10 
detector 
InputDev. 2696.66 3 8089.99 3236.00 2831.50 I 2696.66 1458.27 18312.42 
Total 171878.52 
Table A.7.S.3- Case 3 - Costs related to the Machine Room's Fire Detection System (xf4) 
IoN (S; 
Test Man-boon Test costs Failure rat. Manhours Other costs Total cost Repair I 
Componen Number of Period pertest per year per repair per repair per repair costs 
(months) per year 
Fire 24 6 1 1440.00 5.00E-06 2 2947.52 3001.52 3161.50 
detector 
InputDev. 3 I:.! I 90.00 I.80E-06 2 2696.66 2756.66 130.40 
Total 1530.00 3291.90 
------- --
- ---_ .. -
Table A.7.8.3A- Case 3- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Machine Room's Fire Detection System (xf4) 
CIEH CIMV CIIC 
Componen Price Numberot Number Componen Price per 
of Cost loop 
Loops 
Pressure 81.07 I I 81.07 20.27 1216.1 
sensor 
Input card 1442.40 1 1442.40 576.96 
Total 
Table A.7.9 - Costs related to the Pressure Sensor's System (p) - Case 1 
(*) Includes: input card - binary -621.13 potmds plus rack -815;21 pounds that makes a total of 1442.40 pounds 
Maximum recommended number points for each input card: 32 
Rate (May.98): I pound - 1.828645 RS and IUS - 1.1468 RS 
total 
1216.1 
\,U Note I: All values in potmds 
\0 
'" Test Man-boon Test costs Failure rate Manhours IOther costs 
Componen Numberot Period per test per year per repair per repair 
(months) 
Presmre I 6 0.5 30.00 8.3IE-06 2 81.07 
sensor 
Inputcani 1 12 1 30.00 I.80E-06 2 1442.40 
Total 60.00 
---
CIMC CIRS 
No of 
329.36 I 
504.84 1 
Total cost Repair costs 
per repair per year 
141.07 10.27 
1502.40 23.69 
33.96 
---
_._-
---
Table A.7.9A- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Pressure Sensor System ( p ) - Case 1 
CIRT TOTAL 
Price 
81.07 300.00 2027.88 
1442.40 1458.27 5424.87 
7452.75 
w 
\0 
....... 
Case CSU Spurious Number 01 LSOyellT LSO Test costs Repair costs CYCtesting CYCrepoir 
Number Trip Rate spurious trips per year per year 
(STR) per year (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
Casel 1.2734E-02 2.95000E-06 0.0258420 122.83 768.83 60.00 33.96 375.56 
Case2 2.3 1 53E-03 5.36364E-06 0.0469855 223.33 1397.87 120.00 75.01 751.12 
Casd 5.7302E-03 1.3275OE-06 0.0116289 55.27 345.97 180.00 112.51 1126.68 
Case6 6.3669E-04 7.37500E-06 0.0646050 307.07 1922.07 180.00 112.51 1126.68 
Case 5 2.3153E-02 5.36364E-07 0.0046985 22.33 139.79 120.00 75.01 751.12 
- "---
Tabela A.7.9.B - Costs related to the Pressure Sensor's System (p) - Case 1 
Case Critical Critical Aperuge 
Number Soley Safey Socillal 
UlUlWJilabilily A WJiIabiIiIy Risk 
(CSA) (CSA) (ASR) 
caseO I.OOOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO I. 1 699065E-02 
Casel 1.2734E-02 9.87266E-01 5.879050 1 E-03 
Case2 2.3 I 53E-03 9.97685E-01 5.8176314E-03 
Case3 5.7302E-03 9.94270E-01 5.8377631E-03 
Case6 6.3669E-04 9.99363E-01 5.8077362E-03 
Case5 2.3 1 53E-02 9.76847E-Ol 5.9404688E-03 
---
Tabela A.7.9.C - Critical Safety Unavailability I Availability Values and Average Societal Risk 
Values (fatalities/year) Calculated for Different Cases related to the Pressure Sensor's System (p) 
(Pounds) 
212.57 
469.49 
704.24 
704.24 
469.49 
CYCtolal LCA+CIR+ LCA+CIR+ 
CYCtotal 
(Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
588.13 7452.75 8040.88 
1120.61 11623.75 12844.37 
1830.92 15794.76 17625.68 
1830.92 15794.76 17625.68 
1220.61 11623.75 12844.37 
\.U 
\C 
00 
LCA,+CIR+ LUC 
CYCtot. 
(Pounds) (Pounds) 
8040.88 768.83 
12844.37 1397.87 
17625.68 345.97 
17625.68 1922.07 
12844.37 139.79 
- --- --
Table A.7.9.E- Case I-Costs involved in Pressure Sensor's System (p) 
N'ofDeaths Value of Loss Lives !Benefit in Loss Total Benefit CSU RELyear Benefit 
per year Life per year Liveslyear Loss lilies RELyear-
(LLyear) U REL 
(pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
5.8 1 763E-03 3'()OOOE+06 17452J~9 17644.30 110441.50 2.3 1 525E-03 3085.11 1329429.74 
5.83776E-03 3.0000E+06 17513.29 17583.91 110063.47 5.73025E-03 7635.64 1324879.20 
5.80774E-03 3.0000E+06 17423.21 17673.99 110627.31 6.36694E-04 848.40 1331666.44 
5.94047E-03 3.0000E+06 17821.41 17275.79 108134.86 2.31525E-02 30851.06 1301663.78 
I. 1699065E-02 3.0000E+06 35097.20 1.0000E~ 1332514.84 
Table A.7.9.F - Case 1- Life Cycle Cost Calculated for the Pressure Sensor's System (p) 
Total Benefit Total Benefit LCC ! 
RELoss 
(Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
8321339.43 8431780.93 -8417538.69 
8292856.15 8402919.62 -8384947.97 
8335339.68 8445%7.00 -8426419.25 
8147543.15 8255678.01 -8242693.86 
W 
\0 
\0 
Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Pressure Sensor Systems (p) 
~20c000.OOT--------~--------r-------~--------~--------~------~ 9.7~5-G1 9.SOOOOOE-01 O..asooooe-ot 9.~1 M60000E-4lt 1.000000£+00 l~E+OO 
;; 
o 
~25~.00 +1---~~~~~------------------------------------------------------~ 
o 0300000 00 --- - , I ~ -o • ~ 
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Figure A.7.9.- Life Cycle Cost versus Critical Availability - Pressure Sensor's System (p ) 
Case Number esu eSA LCe 
Case I 1.27339E-02 9.872661 E-O 1 -8334919.76 
Case2 2.31525E-03 9.976847E-01 -8417538.69 
Case3 5.73025E-03 9.942698E-Ol -8384947.97 
Case4 6.36694E-04 9.993633E-0l -8426419.25 
CaseS 2.31525E-02 9.768475E-Ol -8242693.86 
Table A.7.9.G - Life Cycle Values (LCC ) Obtained for Different Cases Related to the Pressure Sensor's 
System ( p ) 
CIEH CIMV CIIC CIMC CIRS CIRT TOTAL 
Cornponen Price Number 0 Number Componen Price per total No of Price 
of Cost loop 
Loops 
Pressure 81.07 2 2 162.15 40.54 1216.\0 2432.20 658.72 I 81.07 300.00 3674.68 
sensor 
~. 
Input card 1442.40 2 2884.80 1153.92 1009.68 I 1442AO 1458.27 7949.08 
Total 11623.75 
Table A.7.9.2- Case 2 - Costs related to the Pressure Sensor's System (p) 
8 Test Man-boon Test costs Failurerab Manhours pthercosts Total cost Repair costS Cornponen Number 01 Period pertest per year per repair per repair per repair per year 
(months) 
, 
Pressure 2 6 0.5 60.00 8.31E-06 2 81.07 181.07 26.37 
sensor 
I 
Jnputcard 2 12 I 60.00 1.80E-06 2 1442.40 1542.40 48.641 
Total 120.00 75.01 1 
Table A. 7.9.2A- Case 2- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Pressure Sensor's System ( p ) 
CIEU CIMV CIIC CIMC CIRS CIRT TOTAL 
Componen Price Number 01 Number Componen Price per total No of Price 
of Cost loop 
Loops 
Pressure 81.07 3 3 243.22 60.805 1216.10 3648.3 988.08 I 81.07 300.00 5321.48 
sensor 
... 
. .... 
Input card 1442.40 3 4327.204 1730.8816 1514.52 I 1442.40 1458.27 10473.28 
Total 15794.76 
Table A.7.9.3- Case 3 - Costs related to the Pressure Sensor's System ( p ) 
~ 
-
Test Man-boon Test costs lFailure rat. Manhours Other costs Total cost Repair costs 
Componen Number of Period pertest per year per repair per repair per repair per year 
(months) 
Pressure 3 ti 0.5 90.00 8.31E-06 2 81.07 181.07 39.55 
sensor 
I~utcanl 3 12 I 90.00 I.80E-06 2 1442.40 1542.40 72.96 
Total 180.00 112.51 
- '--- -- - - -- - - -
Table A.7.9.3A- Case 3 - Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Pressure Sensor's System (p ) 
CIEU CIMV CIIC CIMC CIRS CIRT TOTAL 
Component Price Number 01 Number Componen Price per total No of Price 
(Pounds) componts. of Cost loop 
Loops (pounds) (pounds) 
CPU 4000.00 1.00 4000.00 1600.00 1400.00 1.00 4000.00 2000.00 13000.00 
in PLC(*) 
TOTAL 13()()().OO 
--
Table A.7.10 - Costs related to the CPU's System (c) - Case 1 
(*) Includes: electrical source 
Rate (May.98): I pound - 1.828645 RS and IUS - 1.1468 RS 
Note I: All values in pounds 
Test Man-boon Test costs railure ra14 Manbours IOther costs Total cost Repair costs 
Component Number of Period per test per year per repair per repair per repair per year 
component (montbs) (Pounds) 
s CPU 1 12 1 30.00 2.40E-06 3 4000.00 4090.00 85.99 
loPLC 
TOTAL 30.00 85.99 
~--- - -
Table A.7.10A- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the CPU System (c) - Case 1 
s 
Case CSU SpIlrious Number of LSOyear LSO Test costs ~epaircost CYCtesting I'-YCrepa;, 
Number Trip Rate SplU'iOIlS trips per year per year 
(STR) peryear (pounds) (pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) 
Casel 1.396OOE-03 1.20000E-06 0.0\05120 49.96 312.74 30.00 85.99 187.78 538.23 
Case2 2.53818E-04 2.18182E-06 0.0191127 90.84 568.62 60.00 171.98 375.56 1076.46 
Case3 6.28200E-04 5.40000E-07 0.0047304 22.48 140.73 90.00 257.96 563.34 1614.68 
Case6 6.98000E-05 3.00000E-06 0.0262800 124.91 781.86 90.00 257.96 563.34 1614.68 
CaseS 2.53818E-03 2.18182E-07 0.0019113 9.08 56.86 60.00 171.98 375.56 \076.46 
Tabela A.7.10.B - Costs related to the CPU System (c) - Case 1 
Case Critical Critical Avemge 
I Number Safe] Safey Societal 
UnavailDbility A vailabililJ Risle 
(CSA) (CSA) (ASR) 
Case(} 1.0000E+OO O.OOOOOOE+OO 9.00 19283E-03 
Casel 1.396OOE-03 9.9860400E-Ol 5.879050 1 E-03 
Case2 2.53818E-04 9.9974618E-OI 5.8754782E-03 
Case3 6.282OOE-04 9.9937180E-01 5.8766490E-03 
Case6 6.98OOOE-05 9.9993020E-01 5.8749027E-03 
~ase5 2.538 1 8E-03 9.97461 82E-OI 5.8826220E-03 
- -----~-
Tabela A.7.10.C - Critical Safety Unavailability I Availability Values and Average Societal Risk 
Values (fatalitieslyear) Calculated for Different Cases related to tbe CPU System (c) 
CYCIottll LCA+CIR LCA+CIR+ 
CYCtolill 
(Pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) 
726.01 13000.00 13726.01 
1452.02 20000.00 21452.02 
2178.02 27000.00 29178.02 
2178.02 27000.00 29178.02 
1452.02 20000.00 21452.02 
LCA+CIR+ LSO 
CYCt«. 
(Pounds) (Pounds) 
13726.01 312.74 
21452.02 568.62 
29178.02 140.73 
29178.02 781.86 
21452.02 56.86 
Table A.7.IO.E- Case 1 -Costs involved in the CPU System (c) 
r.f of Deaths Value of Loss Lives !Benefit in Loss TotIll BelUjil CSU RELyear Benefit Total BelUjil TotIll BelUjil LeC 
per year Life per year Lives/year Loss Uves RELyear- RELoss 
§ (LLyear) U REL (Pounds) (pounds (pounds) (pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) 
5.87905E-03 3.0000E+06 17637.15 9368.63 58641.38 1.39600E-03 1860.19 1330654.65 8329006.58 8387647.95 -8373609.20 
5.87548E-03 3.0000E+06 17626.43 9379.35 58708.45 2.53818E-04 338.22 1332176.63 8338S33.11 8397241.56 -8375220.92 
5.87665E-03 3.0000E+06 17629.95 9375.84 58686.46 6.28200E-04 837.09 1331677.76 8335410.53 8394096.99 -8364778.23 
5.8749OE-03 3.0000E+06 17624.71 9381.08 58719.25 6.98000E-05 93.01 1332421.83 8340067.95 8398787.20 -8368827.32 
5.88262E-03 3.0000E+06 17647.87 9357.92 58574.30 2.53818E-03 3382.16 1329132.68 8319480.04 8378054.34 -8356545.46 
9.001928E-03 3.0000E+06 27005.78 I.OOOOE+OO 1332514.84 
Table A.7.IO.F - Case 1- Life Cycle Cost Calculated for the CPU System (c) 
~ 
-8350000 
-8360006· 
iii -8370000 
o 
o -8380000 
CD 
~ -8390000 
CD -8400000 
:5 -8410000 
-8420000 
-8430000 
Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the CPU System 
Availability of the CPU System 
Figure A.7.10.- Life Cycle Cost versus Critical Availability - CPU System (c) 
Case Number CSU CSA LCC 
Casel 1.39600E-03 9 .986040E-O I -8373609.20 
Case2 2.53818E-04 9.997 462E-0 1 -8375220.92 
Case3 6.28200E-04 9.993718E-Ol -8364778.23 
Case4 6.98000E-05 9.999302E-Ol -8368827.32 
CaseS 
_ 2.?}818§-Q3_ c2·974618E-Ol -8356545.46 
- -- ----- - - - -- - -- ---- --
Table A.7.10.G - Life Cyde Values (LCC ) Obtained for Different Cases Related to CPU 
System ( c ) 
+ 
CIEH CIMV CIIC CIMC CIKS CIRT TOTAL 
Component Price Number of Number Componen Price per total No of Price 
componts. of Cost loop 
Loops 
CPUinPLC 4000 2 8000.00 3200.00 2800.00 1 4000.00 2000.00 20000.00 
TOTAL ~. 20000.00 
Table A.7.10.2 - Case 2 - Costs related to the CPU's System (c) 
(*) Includes: electrical source 
Note I: All values in pounds 
Test Man-houn; Test costs Failure rat Manhours ~thercosts Total cost Repair~ 
Component Number 01 Period pertest per year per repair per repair per repair per year 
(months) 
~ CPU in PLC 2 12 1 60.00 2.40E-06 3 4000.00 4090.00 171.98 
TOTAL 60.00 171.98 
--
'-~- .-
- -
Table A.7.10.2A- Case 2 - Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the CPU System (c) 
CIEU CIMV cnc CIMC CIRS CIRT TOTAL 
Component Price Number 01 Number Compont. Price per total No of Price 
componts. or Cost loop 
Loops 
CPU in PLC 4000.00 3 12000.00 4800.00 4200.00 I 4000.00 2000.00 27000.00 
... ' ••• 0. 1 
TOTAL 27000.001 
Table A.7.10.3 - Case 3 - Costs related to the CPU's System (c) 
(*) Includes: electrical source 
Note I: All values in pounds 
~ 
Test Man-boon Test costs lFailure rat Manhours IOther costs Total cost Repair I 
Component Number 01 Period pertest per year per repair per repair per repair costs 1 
(months) peryear ' 
I 
CPUinPLC 3 12 1 90.00 2.40E-06 3 4000.00 4090.00 257.96! 
! 
TOTAL 90.00 257.96 
Table A.7.10.3A- Case 3 - Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the CPU System (c) 
~ 
CIEH CIMV CIIC 
Component Price Number 01 Number Component Price per total 
of Cost loop 
Loops 
Output 1442.40 1 1442.40 576.96 
device 
Valve 6271.31 1 1 6271.31 1567.83 1216.1 1216.1 
Total 
Table A.7.11- Costs related to the Actuation (Valve) System (v) - Case 1 
(*) Includes: output canI- binary -627,13 pounds plus rack -815,27 pounds that makes a total of 1442,40 pounds 
Maximum recommended number points for each input card: 32 
Rate (May,98): I pound - 1.828645 RS and IUS - 1.1468 RS 
Note 1: All values in pounds 
Component Number Test Man-boon Test costs Failure ratl Manhours IOther costs 
of Period pertest per year per 10'hr per repair per repair 
component (moatbs) 
OuiPutcan I 12 I 30.00 9.00E-07 2 1442.40 
Valve I 12 0.5 15.00 1.60E-05 2 6271.31 
Total 45.00 
CIMC CIKS 
No of Price 
504.84 1 1442.40 
2263.81 1 6271.31 
Total cost Repair costs 
per repair per year 
1502.40 11.84 
6331.31 887.40 
899.24 
Table A.7.11A- Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Actuation (Valve) System (v) - Case 1 
CIRT TOTAL 
300.00 4266.60 
1458.27 19048.63 
23315.23 
~ 
SplU'ious N "",ber of LUC~ar WC Test costs Repair cost CYCtesnng CYCrrpair 
Case CSU Trip Rate purious trip~ ( Note··) per year per year 
Number (STR) per year (pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) 
Casel 1.01260E-02 8.45000E-06 0.0740220 351.83 2202.24 45.00 899.24 281.67 5628.65 
Case2 1.84109E-03 1.53636E-05 0.1345855 639.70 4004.07 90.00 1798.48 563.34 11257.30 
Case3 4.55670E-03 3.80250E-06 0.0333099 158.32 991.01 135.00 2697.72 845.01 16885.95 
Case(; 5.06300E-04 2.1 1 250E-05 0.1850550 879.58 5505.59 135.00 2697.72 845.01 16885.95 
Case 5 1.84109E-02 1.53636E-06 0.0134585 63.97 400.41 90.00 1798.48 563.34 11257.30 
Tabela A.7.Il.B - Costs related to the Actuation (Valve) System (v) - Case 1 
Case Critical Critical Average 
Number Safe, Safey Societal 
U IUIVGiJabiIity A vtIilability Risk 
(CSA) (CM) (ASR) 
CaseO 1.0000E+OO O.OOOOE+OO 9.00193E-03 
Casel 1.0l26OE-02 9.89874E-Ol 5.87905E-03 
Casel 1.84109E-03 9.98159E-Ol 5.85291E-03 
Case3 4.55670E-03 9.95443E-Ol 5.861 48E-03 
Case(; 5.063OOE-04 9.99494E-Ol 5.84870E-03 
Case 5 1.84109E-02 9.81589E-Ol 5.90519E-03 
Tabela A.7.11.C - Critical Safety Unavailabnity I Availability Values and Average Societal Risk 
Values (fatalitieslyear) Calculated for Different Cases related to the Actuation (Valve) System (v) 
CYCtoUIl LCA+CIR LCA+CIR 
+CYCtotal 
(pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
5910.32 23315.23 29225.551 
11820.64 37158.48 48979.12 
17730.95 51001.73 68732.68 
17730.95 51001.73 68732.68 
11820.64 37158.48 48979.12 
LCA+CIR+ WC 
CYCtot. 
(Pounds) (Pounds) 
29225.55 2202.24· 
48979.12 4004.07 
68732.68 991.01 
68732.68 5505.59 
48979.12 400.41 
Table A.7.11.E- Case I-Costs involved in the Actuation (Valve) System (v) 
N'ofDeatbs Value of Loss Lives Benefit in Loss Total Benejil CSU RELyelll' Benejil Total Benejil Total Benejil LCe 
per year Life per year Lives/year Loss Lives RELyelll'- RELoss 
(LLyear) U REL 
~ (Pounds) (pounds (Pounds) (Pounds) (pounds) (pounds) (pounds) (pounds) (Pounds) 
-o 5.87905E-03 3.0000E-+{)6 17637.15 9368.63 58641.38 1.01 2600E-02 13493.05 1319021.80 8256192.70 8314834.08 -8283406.29 
5.8529 1 E-03 3.0000E-+{)6 17558.74 9447.05 S91lU8 1.84109IE-03 2453.28 1330061.56 8325294.23 8384426.41 -8331443.23 
5.86148E-03 3.0000E-+{)6 17584.44 9421.35 58971.31 4.556700E-03 6071.87 1331840.19 8336427.25 839S398.S6 -8325674.87 
5.84870E-03 3.0000E-+{)6 17546.10 9459.68 59211.26 5.063000E-04 674.65 1331840.19 8336427.25 8395638.51 -8321400.24 
5.90519E-03 3.0000E-+{)6 1771556 9290.22 58150.57 1.841 09 1 E-02 24532.81 1307982.03 8187091.17 8245241.74 -8195861.22 
9.001 93E-03 3.0000E-+{)6 27005.78 I.OOOOOOE+OO 1332514.84 
Table A.7.11.F - Case 1 - Life Cycle Cost Calculated for the Actuation System ( v ) 
~ 
-
CD 
~ -8260000.00 
o ~ -8280000.00 
:J -8300000.00 
Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Actuation System (v) 
Availability of the Actuation System ( v ) 
• 3.9695791693360S00E.08 
~9085094531036300E-01 
Figure A.7.11.- Life Cycle Cost versus Critical Availability - Actuation (Valve) System (v) 
Case Numher CSU CSA LCC 
Casel 1.01260E-02 9.898740E-01 -8283406.29 
Case2 1.84109E-03 9.981589E-Ol -8331443.23 
Case3 4.55670E-03 9.954433E-Ol -8325674.87 
Case4 5.06300E-04 9.994937E-Ol -8321400.24 
CaseS 1.84109E-02 9.815891E-Ol -8195862.22 
- ---
_. 
Table A.7.1l.G - Life Cycle Values (LCC ) Obtained for Different Cases Related to the Actuation (Valve) 
System (v) 
CIEH CIMV CUC CIMC CIKS CIRT TOTAL 
Component Price Number 01 Number Componen Price per total No of Price 
of Cost loop 
Loops 
Output carel 1442.40 2 2884.80 1153.92 1009.68 1 1442.40 300.00 6790.81 
Valve 6271.31 2 2 12542.62 3135.66 1216.10 2432.20 4527.62 1 6271.31 1458.27 30367.671 
Total 37158.48 
Table A.7.1l.2 - Case 2 - Costs related to the Actuation (Valve) System (v) 
Rille (May,98): lpound - 1,828645 RS and IUS - 1,1468 RS 
Note I: All values in pounds 
~ 
-N 
Test Man-boun Test costs lFailure rat4 Manhours Pthercosts Total cost Repair costs 
Component Number 0 Period pertest per year per IO'br per repair per repair per repair per year 
(months) 
Output can 2 12 1 60.00 9.00E-07 2 1442.40 1502.40 23.69 
Valve 2 12 0.5 30.00 1.60E-OS 2 6271.31 6331.31 1774.79 
Total 90.00 1798.48 
Table A.7.1l.2A- Case 2 - Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Actuation (Valve) System ( v) 
"" -IJJ 
CIEH CIMV CIIC CIMC CIKS 
Component Price Number 01 Number Componen Price per total No or Price 
or Cost loop 
Loops 
Output card 1442.4C 3 4327.2C 1730.8I! 1514.52 1 1442.4Cl 
Valve 6271.31 3 3 18813.93 4703.4B 1216.10 3648.3 6791.~ 1 6271.31 
Total 
Table A.7.11.3 - Case 3 - Costs related to the Actuation (Valve) System (v) 
Rale(May.98): lpound- 1.828645RS and IUS- 1.I468RS 
Note I: All values in pounds 
Test Man-boon Test costs lFailure rall Manhours ~thercosts TotaIcost Repair costs 
Component Number 01 Period pertest per lO'hr per repair per repair per repair per year , per year 
(months) 
Outputcanl ~ 12 1 9O.OC: 9.00E-01 
--" 
1442.4< 1502.4C 35.53 
Valve 1~ 0.5 45.OC 1.6OE-O!i ~ 6271.31 6331.31 2682.19 
Total 1~~ __ 2fWT.72 
----
Table A.7.11.3A- Case 3 - Maintenance, Test and Repair Costs related to the Actuation (Valve) System (v) 
CIRT TOTAL I 
I 
300.00 9315.01 
1458.27 41686.72 
51001.73 
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ASSUMPT10NS 
Minimum Alractivity Rale 
Royalties (Oil): 
Royanies (Gas): 
Income taxes: 
Social Contribution Parcel: 
Operalion Beginning Date: 
Basic Date : 
Mon, Ve dor Cone. in first year: 
Price levels : 
SinUaliono.tr. 
~ 
-
IINEST'IIIIEHT 
NOMINAL I/pdotod 
~ 111l1li 267.90 2&4.60 
1_ 
2000 7.00 52 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2006 
200II 
2007 
2008 
2001 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
201. 
2017 
201. 
201. 
2l12li 
2IXn 
2OZ2 
274!1O :mur::I 
. . 
15.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
25.0% 
8.0% 
Sep-97 
Jun-98 
Jul-98 
Feb-98 
17..Jun.1III 
OPERAllOHAl.. COST 
-
ROYALnES 
2.26 7.10 
7.32 18.96 
16.63 14.44 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 1162 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11.82 
20.74 1162 
20.74 11.82 
20.74 11 .62 
20.74 11 .62 
20.74 11.112 
20.74 11.112 
20.74 11.82 
2074 11.82 
20.74 11 .112 
20.74 11.82 
20.74 11.82 
20.74 11112 
20.74 I1l12 
20.74 IIl12 
42D.1t 211.27 
. . .- -. 
-
UNIT COST 
T. (U_ 
9.26 
22.58 
2323 
21.03 
18.26 
15.90 
13.83 
12.(l2 
10.45 
9 .00 
7.90 
6.87 
5.96 
5.211 
452 
3.93 
342 
287 
~ 
I.II! 
IT( 
2M.II 
PILOT PROJECT - January 1998 
-------------------------------------------, 
Financial Indicators 
NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV) (MMUS$) = 227.01 NPV/uPDT. INVESTM •• T. (USSlUSS) = 0 .84 
NPV/uPDT. EXPENSES .T. (USSlUSS) = 0 .35 
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN (per yr., = 37.43% 
FINANTIAL EXPOSITION (MMUSS,. -210.n TIME OF RETURN from lhe project beglnnlng= 4a. 4m. 
NET UNIT PROFIT (USSIBOE, = 4.11 
investment- 4 .90 TIME OF RETURN from the opentlon beglnntng= 4a. 8m. 
(USSIBOE) operalional - 3.00 
taxes- 0.96 
-- - --
NP(MUBOEJ- 35.110 
production • 8.87 Ezpec:ted Production. 0.22 
RESIDUAL VALUE 8OCIAI.O. _T ... EXPENSES INCOME CASH flOW 
IIOMIHAL T_ (Updat.." _INAL NOMINAL NOMINAL Updoted NOMINAL Updotod NOMINAL Updated 
1.49 4.66 283.41 280.13 70.17 69.36 ·21324 ·210.71 
10.85 33.91 71.04 61 .00 187.01 160.73 115.97 99.61 
6.86 21 .44 66.31 49.60 142.60 100.56 7623 56.91 
4.53 14.15 51.04 33.17 114.74 7457 63.71 41.41: 
4.52 14.11 50.99 28.81 114.59 84.76 63.61 35.95 
4.51 14.09 50.95 25.04 114.46 5626 63.53 3122 
4.51 14.09 50.95 21.n 114.46 46.92 6353 27.15 
4.51 14.09 50.95 18.93 114.46 42.54 63.53 23.61 
4.53 1415 51.04 16.49 114.74 37.08 63.71 20.59 
4.53 14.15 51.04 14.34 114.74 3224 63.71 17.90 
654 2042 59.31 14.49 114.74 28.03 55.43 13.54 
6.54 2042 59.31 12.60 114.74 24.J1! 5.5.43 11 .78 
6.59 20.60 59.54 11 .00 114.74 212C 55.20 1020 
6.59 20.60 59.54 957 114.74 1843 55.20 8.87 
6.59 20.60 59.54 8.32 114.74 16.03 55.20 7.71 
6.59 2060 59.54 723 114.74 13.94 ~ 6.71 8.59 :; 59.54 6~ 114.74 12.12 5.83 B.5!i 59.54 547 114.74 10.54 55.20 S.07 
~ 206C 59.54 HE 114.74 9.16 55.20 4.41 206C 59.54 414 11474 7$7 5.5.20 3..83 
658 20.6C 59.54 36C 11474 :-: ~ 3.33 658 2O.&C 5954 3.1 11474 2.90 
· 18.81 ~.II!I 18111 ~ ·IUI .(1.85 
·1&.11 
-
129.11 405..65 t,510.42 140.1'1 2,.578.95 117.11 1.068.53 mAl 
DAILY POTEN11AL PRODUCTION Oper. Factor= 1000/.) 
OIL GAS GLP LGNlC5+ OTHERS 
(m3ld) (Mm3Id) (m3/d) (m3/d) (m3/d) 
1998 2074.3 164.0 
1999 5683.0 4n.O 
2000 4207.0 345.0 
2001 3284.0 271.0 
2002 3284.0 271.0 
2003 3284.0 271.0 
2004 3284.0 271.0 
2005 3284.0 271.0 
2008 3284.0 271.0 
2007 3284.0 271.0 
2008 3284.0 271.0 
2009 3284.0 271.0 
~ 
-
2010 3284.0 271.0 
VI 2011 3284.0 271.0 
2012 3284.0 271.0 
2013 3284.0 271.0 
2014 3284.0 271.0 
2015 3284.0 271.0 
2018 3284.0 271.0 
2017 3284.0 271.0 
2018 3284.0 271.0 
2019 3284.0 271.0 
2020 
17.Jun.98 
Maximum[ 206561 2711 
Framework A.B.l.A • Maximum Daily Potential Production 
NON DEPRECIABLE INVESTMENTS DEPRECIABLE INVESTMENTS DEPRECIATION TOTAL 
Exploralion Drilling X-tree Others TOTAL 1 E&P E&P E&P Others Unes TOTAL 2 INVESTM. 
Investment Unit Mooring PRE-OP 
1998 17.10 17.10 171.00 79.80 250.8(] 25.08 267.90 
1999 , 25.08 
2000 7.00 25.78 7.00 
2001 25.78 
2002 25.78 
2003 25.78 
2004 - 25.78 
2005 .. 25.78 
~ 
~ 
2006 , 25.78 
I. '. 
0\ 2007 , .. 25.78 
, 
2008 0.70 
2009 , 
: 0.70 
2010 
., 
2011 , 
2012 
2013 
2014 . 
2015 
201E 
2017 
2018 
2019 -
202() 
2021 
2022 
TOTA.L 17.10 17.10 171.00 79·80 257.8Cl 257.8(] 274.901 
. ) 
""" 
-..J 
Equipment life time in years: 20\ NPV\ 227.01\ 
Equipment ~~~] Year of Installation Year of decommissionin 
Unit 84.10 1998 2020 
Lines 84.00 1998 2020 
X-trees 18.00 1998 2020 
Framework A.S.l.e - Residual Value - Before na Accident's Occurrence (in US Millions) . 
.;.. 
00 
(ASSUMPTIONS 
-.." AlraclNiIy Rale 
Royalties (Oil): 
Royalties (Gas): 
Income taxes: 
Social Contribution Parcef: 
Operalion Beginning Dale: 
BasiC Date: 
PriCe Levels : 
SlmuIdonOalo' 
~ 
-.NAL ~od 
1998 26229 259.25 ,_ 
68.68 59.01 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2008 
2007 
2008 
200II 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
201e 
2017 
2018 
2018 
2020 
2021 
2022 
330.95 311.27 
----- ---
15.0'1'0 
10.0'1'0 
10.0'1'0 
25.0'1'0 
8.0'1'0 
Sep-99 
Jun-98 
Feb-98 
17-Jun.1I8 
OPERAlIONAt. COST 
Oponodon ROYALTIES 
226 6.89 
7.32 19.54 
16.83 14.68 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11 .62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11 .62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11 .62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11 .62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11.62 
399.45 250.46 
Financial Indicators 
NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV) (MMUSS) = 
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN (pet yr.) = 
FINANTIAL EXPOSITION (MMUSS) . 
NET UNIT PROFIT (US$'80E) • 
I Investment. UNIT COST (US$'80E): operational = taxes= 
--",-odudion • 
RESIDUAl VALUE eoctAI.c. 
T. (Updoled) NOMINAL T. (Updo1ed) NOMINAL 
0.03 
7.87 2.20 
20.011 10.77 
20.48 6.72 
1828 4.07 
15.90 4.05 
13.83 4.05 
12.02 4.06 
10.45 4.08 
9.09 4.08 
7.90 6.04 
6.87 6.59 
5.98 8.59 
5.2(J 6.59 
4.52 6.59 
3.9J 6.59 
3.42 6.59 
2.97 6.59 
2.58 8.59 
225 6.59 
1.95 659 
1.7e 6.59 
.22.62 -1 .04 
1T7oD 
-22.82 -1.04 122.68 
PILOT PROJECT - January 1998 
158.37 NPV/uPDT. INVIISTM •• T. (US$'IJSS) = 0.50 
NPV/uPDT. EXPENSES,T. (US$l\.JS$) = 0.25 
26.49'110 
-234.40 TIME OF RETURN lrom the ptOjecI beglnnlng= err.7m. 
3.32 
6.69 TIME OF RETURN lrom the -",Ion beglnnlng= .. '1,.11 m. 
3.24 
1.33 Producllon voIu_ tw.kwen NP(MM1lOE) • 44.85 
11.26 
_1001"' __ 
0.29 
-..oTx. EXPENSES INCOMe CASH FLOW 
NOMINAL NOMINAL Updolod NOMINAL Updo1od NOMINAL Updolod 
0.11 262.43 259.39 42.05 41.56 -220.38 -217.83 
6.87 66.89 74.68 68.03 58.47 -18.66 -16.21 
33.66 71.29 5328 192.88 144.15 121.59 90.87 
21.01 59.25 38.50 146.94 95.SC 87.70 57.00 
12.71 49.14 27.77 114.59 64.76 85.46 36.99 
12.68 49.10 24.13 114.48 5626 85.38 32.13 
12.68 49.10 20.98 114.48 48.92 85.38 27.94 
12.68 49.10 1824 114.48 42.54 65.38 2429 
12.75 49.19 15.89 114.74 37.08 85.56 21.18 
12.75 49.19 13.62 114.74 3224 85.56 18.42 
18.68 5728 13.99 114.74 26.03 57.47 14.04 
20.60 59.54 12.85 114.74 24.38 5520 11 .73 
20.60 59.54 11 .00 114.74 21.2C 5520 10.20 
20.60 59.54 9.57 114.74 18.43 5520 8.87 
20.60 59.54 8.32 114.74 16.03 5520 7.71 
20.60 59.54 723 114.74 13.94 5520 6.71 
20.60 59.54 629 114.74 12.12 5520 5.83 
20.60 59.54 5.47 114.74 10.54 5520 5.07 
20.60 59.54 4.76 114.74 9.16 5520 4.41 
20.60 59.54 4.14 114.74 7.97 5520 3.83 
20.60 59.54 3.60 114.74 6.93 5520 3.33 
20.60 59.54 3.13 114.74 6.03 5520 2.90 
22.82 1.04 -22.62 -1 .04 
383.37 1,509.12 131.86 2,514.33 TK23 1,004.61 158.37 
--
Framework A.S.2 - Net Present Value (NPV) after a Severe Damage Occurrence in year 1 (in US Millions) 
I NON DEPRECIABLE INVESTMENTS DEPRECIABLE INVESTMENTS DEPRECIATIOt< TOTAL Exploration Drilling X-tree Others TOTAL 1 E&P E&P E&P Others Unes TOTAL 2 INVESTM. 
Investment Unit Moorinq PRE- OP 
1998 17.10 17.10 113.67 3.17 48.55 79.80 245.19 24.52 262.29 
1999 61.83 6.83 68.66 31 .39 68.66 
2000 31 .39 
2001 31.39 
2002 31.39 
2003 31 .39 
2004 31.39 
2005 31 .39 
~ 2006 
, 31 .39 
-\0 2007 31 .39 
2008 , 6.87 
2009 
2010 , t 
2011 
2012 ~ . 
, 
2013 , 
. , 
2014 I' 
2015 , 
2016 
; 
2017 .. 
2018 
2019 .. -
2020 
" 
2021 , 
2022 
TOTAL 17.10 17.10 175.50 10.00 48.55 79.80 313.85 313.85 330.95 
Framework A.S.2.A- Investments - After a Severe Damage Occurrence in year 1 (in US Millions) 17-Jun-98 
Equipment life time in years: I 201 NPV[-158.371 
Equipment ' " .. " .. talK,' _ "(USlMM) Year of Installation Year of decommissioninQ 'Residual value (US$M"" ,.-, 
Unit 84.10 1998 2020 -8.41 
Lines 84.00 1998 2020 -8.40 
X-trees 18.00 1998 2020 -1.80 
Unit 42.50 1998 2020 -4.21 
i 
~ 
o 
! 
I 
. ..., 
.0.:::1 
Framework A.S.2.B - Residual Value - After a Severe Damage Occurrence in year 1 (in U$ Millions) 
t 
(ASSUMPTIONS-----
Minimum Atractivily Rate 
Royalties (Oil): 
Royalties (Gas): 
Income taxes: 
SoOaJ Contribution Parcel: 
Operation Beginning Date: 
Basic Date : 
Mon. Ve ctor Cone. in first year: 
Price Levels : 
Simulation date' 
lNVES'IMENT 
NOMINAL Updotod 
llH18 155.64 153.84 
1_ 156.86 134.82 
2000 75.00 56.05 
:1001 
2002 
lIOO3 
2004 
2005 
2001 
:1007 
2008 
~ 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2018 
2017 
2018 
2011 
2020 
2021 
2022 
381.50 344.71 
PILOT PROJECT - January 1998 
r-------- Financial Indicators . J 
15.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
25.0% 
8.0% 
Sep-OO 
Jun-98 
Jul-98 
Feb-98 
17.Jw>.98 
OP£RATIONALCOST 
Operodon ROYAlTIeS 
226 7.10 
7.32 20.13 
16.63 14.88 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11 .62 
20.74 11 .62 
20.74 11 .62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11 .82 
20.74 11 .62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11 .82 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11 .62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11 .62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11.62 
20.74 11.62 
378.72 239.64 
UNIT COST 
T. (IJpdotod) 
7.OC 
17.84 
17.81 
15.9< 
13.63 
12.02 
10.4! 
9.0! 
7.g( 
6.87 
5.91 
5.2l 
4.52 
3.9 
3.42 
2.97 
2.51 
22! 
I .!!! 
1.71 
153,Z 
NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV) (MMUS$) = 
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN (pet' yr.) = 
FINANTIAL EXPOSITION (MMUSS) -
NET UNIT PROFIT (USSIBOE) = 
(USSIBOE) 
R£SIOUAI. VALUE 
investment. 
operational -
taxes-
"production • 
~c. 
NOMIHAl To1ool (IJpdotod) -..u.l 
425 
1.9< 
10.74 
6.26 
3.61 
3.61 
3.61 
3.63 
3.63 
3.63 
3.63 
6.59 
6.59 
6.59 
6.59 
6.59 
6.59 
6.59 
6.!;! 
6.!;! 
6.!;! 
·25.15 . 1.1! 
· 25.1 5 -1.1 114.39 
109.74 
22.53% 
· 239.34 
2.87 
8 .41 
3,48 
1,88 
13,76 
_Tl<. 
NOMINAL 
1329 
5.94 
33.56 
19.55 
1127 
1127 
1127 
11.34 
11.34 
11.34 
11.34 
20.6< 
20.6< 
20.6< 
20.6< 
20.6< 
20.6< 
20.6< 
2O.S( 
20.6< 
20.6< 
357.48 
NPV/uPDT. 
NPV/uPOT. 
INVESTM. ,T. (USSlUSS) = 
EXPENSES.T. (USSlUSS) = 
nME OF RETURN from the project beglm lng= 
nME OF RETURN from the --'ion beglnnlng= 
--
voturM brMk even NP(UM8OE) • 
EJq>OCtod Produc1lon. 
0 .32 
0.17 
8a.llm. 
e.. 3m. 
54.00 
0.36 
EXP£HSES INCOME CASH FlOW 
NOMINAL Updotod NOMINAL Updolod NOMINAL Updolod 
173.18 171.17 84.10 83.1 ~9.06 ~.05 
156.86 134.82 ' 156.86 -134.82 
92.21 68.92 70.17 52.44 -22.04 · 16.47 
71.75 46.63 198.75 129.1 126.99 82.53 
57.32 32.39 146.75 82.9 89.44 SO.54 
47.23 2321 11 4.48 56.2E 6725 33.05 
4723 20.18 lf4.48 48.92 6725 28.74 
4723 17.5! 114.48 42.54 6725 24.99 
47.32 15.29 114.74 37.01: 67.42 21.79 
47.32 13.a< 114.74 322~ 67.42 18.94 
47.32 11.56 114.74 26.IX 67.42 16.47 
47.32 10.05 114.74 24.31 67.42 14,32 
59.54 I1.OC 114.74 2121 5520 10.20 
59.54 9.57 114.74 18.4: 5520 8 .8~ 
59.54 8.32 114.74 16.IX 55.20 7.71 , 
59.54 72 114.74 13.9< 5520 6.71 
59.54 6.2! 114.74 12.1 55.20 5.83 
59.54 5.47 114.74 10.S< 55.20 5'01 
59.54 4.71 114.74 9.11 55.20 4.41 j 
59.54 4.1' 114.74 7.97 55.20 3·83 
59.54 3.S( 114.74 8.9: 55.20 3.33 
59.54 3.1 114.74 6.1X 55.2(1 2.9d 
25_15 1.1' ·25.15 ·1.1 5 
1,502.87 _. 821.n 2,449.61 73L~ 946.74 1011.74 
Framework A.8.J - Net Present Value (NPV) - After a Total Damage Occurrence in year 1 (with insurance) (in U$ Millions) 
NON DEPRECIABLE INVESTMENTS DEPRECIABLE INVESTMENTS DEPRECIATION TOTAL 
Exploration Drilling X-tree Others TOTAL 1 E&P E&P E&P Others Unes TOTAL 2 INVESTM. 
Investment Unit Mooring PRE-OP 
1998 17.10 17.10 16.74 1.86 40.14 79.80 138.54 13.85 155.64 
1999 95.76 10.64 50.46 156.86 156.86 
2000 67.50 7.50 75.00 37.04 75.00 
2001 37.04 
2002 , 37.04 
2003 37.04 
2004 37.04 
, I 37.04 2005 
~ 
IV 
2006 37.04 
2007 
c, 
37.04 I 
! I 37.04 2008 
2009 .' i . 37.04 
201C , " 
". 
; , 
2011 I I . 
2012 ~ oJ ; .. 
2013 
1 " 
. . 
' .
2014 , , ~ 
2015 , " 
2016 •. i , , 
'"" 
1 
'. 2017 , i 
" 
2018 , -. 
2019 I 
202iI 
2021 
2022 
TOTAL 17.10 17.10 180.00 20.00 90.60 79.8(J 370·010 384.25 387.50 
Framework A.8.3.B - Investments - After a Total Damage Occurrence in year 1 (in U$ Millions) 17·Jun-98 
t3 
w 
Equipment 
Unit 
Lines 
X-trees 
Unit 
Equipment life time in years: 
~ .. -. ! r:'r.' 
201 NPvl 109.74] 
Year of Installation IYear of decommission in es.dual value 
1998 2020 
1998 2020 
1998 2020 
1998 2020 
Framework A.S.3.C - Residual Value - After a Total Damage Occurrence in year 1 (U$ MiJlions) 
Appendix 9 
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-7400000.00 
Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Turret Gas Detection System (xg1) 
9.00 9.1000EoOl 9.2000E-01 9.3000E-01 9.4000E-01 9.5000E-01 9.6000Eo01 9.7000E-ol 9.8000E-01 9.9000Eo01 1.0000E+OO 1.01otJE+00 
-7500000.00 
-7600000.00 
-7700000.00 
~ in N 8 -7800000.00 ~ 
y = 1.91848589807610E+07x2· 4.43657760170634E+07x + 1.69768118588331E+CI7 
~ = 9.94042907888613E-G1 
Q) 
u 
>-
0 
Q) -7900000.00 
-~ 
-8000000.00 
-8100000.00 
-82DOOOO. DO 
-83DOOOO. DO 
Availability of the Turret Gas Detection System 
Figure A.91A -Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Turret Gas Detection System (xgl) 
~ 
Vl 
Life Cycle Cost X Availability of theTurret Fire Detection System (xfl) 
-~.OO rl------~------~------~------~~------~---------------
o 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1. 
-5700000.00 I ~:----------------------------f 
-5800000.00 
-5900000.00 I ,-------------------~ 
-1/1 o 
~ I ~ ~.1.478e453831178OOOOE+07 .. - 3.388i278758887toooE+07X + 1.28042592357970000E+07 
~ -6000000.00 A'< · ·-·~883e10334t~oooE-01 
o 
Q) 
-::::i 
-6100000.001 '- . 
-6200000.00 I . , 
-630oooo.00+1--~----------------------------~----~--------------~ 
-6400000.oo~I----------------------------------------------------~ 
Availability of Turret Detection System 
Figure A.9.1.B - Life Cycle Cost X Availability of theTurret Fire Detection System (xn) 
~ 
tv 
'" 
-en o 
o 
G) 
Life Cycle Cost x Availability of the Process Plant Gas Detection System (xg2) 
-7~.00 ~I------------~----------~------------~------------~----------~------------~------------~-----------' Q 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 l.D2 
-7200000.00 ~ .~ 
-7400000.00 I .......... 
"[ -7600000.00 I ~ 
o 
G) 
-~ 
y = 1.3221678004S738E+07r· 3.24844546738S07E+07x + 1.11059408825188(+07 
. ~ = 9.94218641669917E-G1 
-7800000.00 I ~ 
-8000000.00 I . ~ ', I 
-8200000.00~------------------------------------------------------------------~--------------------------~~~ 
Availability of Process Plant Gas Detection System 
Figure A.9.2A - Life Cycle Cost x A vailbility of the Process Plant Gas Detection System (xg2) 
Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Process Plant Fire Detection System (xf2) 
-5200000.00 
o·r 0.86 0.88 
"-
0.9 0.92 0.94 0.98 0.96 1.02 
-5300000.00 
-5400000.00 ~-
-5500000.00 
~\ in -5600000.00 0 0 
Q) l -5700000.00 
y = 1.4292658969440SOOOE+07x2 • 3.20499973319804000E+07x + 1.16378938732207000E-I07 
,r = 9.76356145670798000E"()1 
0 
Q) 
-::i -5800000.00 
-5900000.00 
-6000000.00 
-6100000.00 
-6200000.00 
Availability of the Process Plant Detection System · 
Figure A.9.2.B • Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Process Plant Fire Detection System (xf2) 
Life Cycle Coat X Availability of the Pump Room Gas Detection System (xg3) 
--~----- , 
0.05 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.p1 
\ 
y. 3 ..... 3&0442I527IEtO'7i - 7.1510731t47_2£+071 + 3.2410113041~77E...o 
\ 
a •• 
, 
. I 
... -.~ ...... -- -~. --.. -~~ ----. ~'--F;gure -'(9.3A '~'Avallabiili}i ofihipiimp Room -Gas DetectiOn Sysiem'-'~' _____ ·h_A --•••.. ~.--••• - , •• -~ 
~ 
I-..) 
10 
'in 
Life Cycle Cost X Availabilityof the Pump Room Fire Detection System (xf3) 
-5900000.00 b 
0. 3 0.94 
-5950000.00 I >:c: 
0.95 
-6000000.00 I ...... 
0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 1 1.D1 
-g -6050000.00 I "" 
::J 
o 
~ 
-~ ~1~OO I - ~ . , ." • ~~ .- - W ... 1..--..."..·1..... 2333316000£.07 .. 3.45333158960021000". 
~ . ,..,,' R' = 8.797 34694n6000E-01 
o • ' . ' 
.! -6150000.00 ~ 
~ 
-6200000.00 I ' 5°,'.. ""- '" 
-6250000.00 I .. ,,-, ' ... "'...0.: ' I 
-630oooo.00L'--~-----------2--------________________________ ~ ____________________ ~ 
Availability of the Pump Room Fire Detection System 
Figure A.9.3.B -Life Cycle Cost X Availabilityof the Pump Room Fire Detection System (xfJ) 
_. JOOOO().OO 
or 
-7.0000000 
-7500000.00 
-7600000.00 
~ I Wi -7700000.00 8 
e 
~ -7800000.00 
0 
e 
-:J -7900000.00 
-8000000.00 
-8100000.00 
-8200000.00 
-8300000.00 
0.90 O~ 
~ 
Life Cycle Cost X Critical Availability -
Machine Room Gas Detection System (xg4) 
0.98 1.00 
_-.,-----....,...-........ -------~ "I.:.1.66189601301602£+01x2 -.U3111831f279142E+07x + 1.45044328610787E+07 
R2 .9.94114102055364E-01 
Availability of the Machine Room Gas Detection System 
Figure A.9.4A - Life Cycle Cost X Critical Availability-
Machine Room Gas Detection System (xg4) 
~ 
-
Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Machine Room Fire Detection System (xf4) 
-5400000.00 I 
o. 0.88 
-5500000.00 I '-:: 
-5600000.00 , '" 
0.90 
-5700000.00 I , 
. 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.96 1.00 1. 
i 
• ~ -5800000.00 I """" y -1.76722379722176000E+07I- 3.8I"919t~+07X + 1.5046773042579100oe+o 
'ii ~. ,.a1~-01 (; 
.! -5900000.00 I . • "" 
:J 
-6000000.00 J " • 
-6100000.00 I """'-= 
~~.00~1------------------------------------------------------------------~~ 
, 
i 
I -63OOOOO.oo.L-----~-·-------.--MilniDl1llY-(;rUie1l8Chlne'Roomt=lieoerearoirsyitein--- .... --.-----.-.. --
Figure A.9.4B -Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Machine Room Fire Detection System (xf4) 
t 
N 
Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Pressure Sensor Systems (p) 
-8200000.00 J J 
0. 75 0.98 0.985 0.99 0.995 1 1.005 
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.! 
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-8400000.00 I ..........., . 
-8450000.oo ~'----------------------------------------~~----------------~~------------~ 
Availability of The Pressure Sensor System 
Figure A.9.S - Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Pressure Sensor Systems (p) 
~ 
I.H 
I.H 
Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the CPU System 
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• o CJ 
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-' 
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Agure A.9.6 - Availability of the CPU System 
-
II) 
~ 0 
I.U 0 
~ GI 
-8180000.00 ~ 
0. 8 0.98 0.98 
Life Cycle Cost X Availability of the Actuation System (v) 
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
-8200000.00 +-1 -~~r-----:----.!.-------------:----------I 
-8220000.00 I '" 
-8240000.00 I "" 
o -8260000.00 I . " >. ~ ... 
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Availability of the Actuation System (v) 
Figure A.9.7 - Life Cycle Cost x Availability of the Actuation System (v) 
Appendix 10 
435 
~ 
w 
a.. 
EI-H.t.3 3.03214E-DS c.v2 
-3.03214E-DS c.v2.xf1 
-3.03214E-DS c.v2.p2 
3.03214E-DS c.v2.p2.xf1 
EI-t2.t.t 6.68174E-o& c.v4.p4 
EI-t2.1.2 1.20000E-07 c.v4.xf1 
-1.20000E-07 c.v4.p4 __ xf1 I 
! 
EI-12.1.3 1.00000E-11 c.v4 
-1.00000E-11 c.v4.xf1 
-1.00000E-11 c.v4.p4 
1.00000E-11 c.v4.p4~xf1 
EI-13.1.1 1.59819E-05 c.v1.xf1 
EI-13.1.2 2.37179E-04 c.v1 
-2.37179E-04 c.v1.xf1 
EI-14.1.1 1.59819E-05 c.v1.xf1 
EI-14.1.2 2.37179E-04 c.v1 
-2.37179E-04 c.v1.xf1 
EI-2S.I.2 4.98047E-DS c.v2.xf2 
Framework A.IO.t - Frequency of Impaiment to TSR and Escape Routes Expressions in Terms of Availability Variables 
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-..J 
-2.47000E-08 c.v1.p1.xa4. xt4 
3.57000E-08 c.v1 
EI-9.1.1 1.59600E-05 c.v4.p4 
EI-9.1.2 1.56776E-04 c.v4.xt1 
-1.56n6E-04 c.v4.p4.xf1 . .. ., .1 • 
EI-9.1.3 2.36666E-03 c.v4 
-2.36666E-03 c.v4.xf1 
-2.36666E..()3 c.v4.p4 
2.36666E-03 c.v4.p4.xf1 
EI-IO.I.2 1.94193E-04 c.v1.xf1 I 
-1.94193E-04 c.v1.p1.xf1 
EI-IO.1.3 2.78929E-03 c.v1 
-2.78929E..()3 c.v1.xf1 
-2.78929E..()3 c.v1.p1 
2.78929E..()3 c.v1.p1.xf1 
EI-ll.1.1 1.80306E-05 c.v.p2 
EI-ll.I.2 1.05759E-05 c.v2.xf1 
-1.05759E-05 C.v2.p2.xf1 
----- -
Framework A.IO.I - Frequency of Impaiment to TSR and Escape Routes Expressions in Terms of Availability Variables 
.... 
w 
00 
The followll1lg eventsL e~JJ"ssed In tenns of avallbility variables, Impact the TSR : 
EI-2.3. 1. I 1.92000E..(J5 c.v1.p1 
! 
EI-2.3.1.2. 9.78000E~7 c.v1.xg4 
-9.78OOOE-07 c.v1.p1.xg4 
EI-2.3.1.3 1.10000E-08 c.v1.xf4 
-1.10000E-08 c.v1.xa4.xf4 
-1.10000E-08 c.v1.p1.xf4 
1.10000E-08 c.v1.p1.xg4. xf4 
EI-23.1.4 3.57000E-08 c.v1 
-3.57000E-08 c.v1.xf4 
-3.57000E-08 c.v1.xg4 
3.57000E-08 c.v1.xg4.xf4 
-3.57000E-08 c.v1.p1 
3.57000E-08 c.v1.p1.xf4 
3.57000E-08 c.v1.p1.xg4 
-3.57000E-08 c.v1.p1.xg4. xf4 
Thatgiwes an expression for the Frequency of Impairment to the TSR in terms of a.ailability .ariab1es, composed by the sum of the following terms : 
1.91643E..(J5 c.v1.p1 
9.42300E-07 c.v1.xg4 
-9.423OOE-07 c.v1.p1.xg4 
-2.47000E-08 c.v1.xf4 
2.47000E-08 c. v1.xg4.xf4 
2.47000E-08 c.v1.p1.xf4 
__ L 
--
~ ---
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-4.98047E-05 c.v2.xg2.xt2 
EI-44.1.2 1.27427E.Q4 c.v2.xg2 
-1.27427E.Q4 c.v2.p2.xg2 
TIuIt gil'eB an expression for the Frequency of Impairment to tlte Escape Routes terms of al'ailability Mriables , composed by the sum of the following terms : 
-2.34401E~ c.v4.p4 
-2.20976E~ c.v4.xf1 
2.20976E~ c.v4.p4.xf1 
2.36666E~ c.v4 
-3.03750E~ c.v1.xf1 
2.59510E~ c.v1.p1.xf1 
3.26365E~ c.v1 
-2.78929E~ c.v1.p1 
~ 
\0 
-1.22908E-05 c.v2~2 
-1.97456E-05 c.v2.xf1 
1.97456E-05 c.v2.p2.xf1 
3.03214E-OS c.v2 
4.98047E-05 c.v2.xt2 
-4.98047E-05 c.v2.xg2.xf2 
1.27427E.Q4 c.v2.xg2 I 
-1.27427E.Q4 c.v2.p2.xg2 
The Frequency of Impairment to the Structure is efJual to the following value which refer to events that present no safety ]J!'otection: 
7.S7E-07 J 
7.S7E-07 I 
7.S7E-07 
7.S7E-07 
7.S7E-07 
7.S7E-07 
_ .. _----
- - ----
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7.S7E-07 
7.S7E-07 
7.S7E-071 
7.S7E-071 
7.S7E-07 
7.S7E-071 
7.S7E-07 
9.841E-06 
~ 
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Final AIR Expression Cost Expression Impact to TSR Expression Ifmpact to ER Expression 
(AIR - gil1en by tlteSlUllOf) (FCOST- gillen by tlu! sum of) (ITSR- gillen by the sum of) (fER- giNn by the sum of) 
3.9679E-03 1.479645393117900E+<:I1 xf1z 1. 1 OOOOE-O~ c.v1.xf4 -2.20976E-03 c.v4..xf1 
-5.1538E-10 c.vl.pl -3.388927675698790E+<:I7 xf1 -1.10000E-OS c. v1.xg4.xf4 2.20976E-03 c.v4.p4.xf1 
2. 1290E-03 c.vl.pl.xfl 1.280425923579700E+<:I1 -1.10000E-OS c.v1.p1.xf4 2.36666E-03 c.v4 
2.9730E-04 c.yl.pl.xfl 1.429265896944050E+<:I1 xrr 1.10000E-08 c.v1.p1.xg4.xf4 -3.03750E-03 c.v1.xf1 
1.1596E-05 c.yl.pl.xf3 -3.204999733198040E+<:I7 xf2 2.59510E-03 c.v1.p1.xf1 
1.3058E-05 c.vl.pI.xf4 1 .163789387322070E+<:I7 3.26365E-03 c.v1 
1.7308E-10 c.v~l.ql 3.742880304neoooE+<:I1 xd -2.78929E-03 c.v1.p1 
3.7039E-04 c.Y1.pl.q2 -7.823694323333160E+<:I1 xf3 ·1.22908E-05 c.v2.p2 
-2.9730E-04 c.Y1.pl.q2.xfl 3.453337589600210E+<:Il -1.97456E-O!i c.v2.xf1 
1.1596E-05 c.Y1.pl.q3 1.767223797221760E+<:I7 xf~ 1.97456E-O!i c. v2.p2.xf1 
-1.1596E-05 c.v .... l~.xf3 -3.889691936503540E+<:I xf4 3.03214E-05 c.v2 
4.0000E-10 c.v1-lJl.q4 1.5046n304257910E+<:I 4.98047E-05 c.v2.xf2 
-1.3058E-05 c.vl.pl.q4.xf4 1.918485898075100E+<:I xg12 -4.98047E-05 c.v2.xg2.xf2 
-2.2162E-03 c.yl.xfl -4.4365n601706340E+<:I xg1 1.27427E-04 c.v2.xg2 
-2.9730E-04 c.v1.xfl 1.6975811S5883310E+<:I -1.27427E-04 c.v2.p2.xgZ 
-1.1596E-05 c.vl.xf3 1.322167800457380E+<:I xgr 
-1.3058E-05 c.yl.xf4 -3.248445467365070E+<:I xgZ 
-1.730SE-10 c.Yl.ql 1.110594088251880E+<:I 
-3.7039E-04 c.v1.xgl 3.484350442852780E+<:I xgr 
2.9730E-04 c.v1.xgl.xfl -7.558073894742920E+O xl' 
-1.1596E-05 c.Y1.q3 3.248016304170nOE+<:I 
1.1596E-05 c.Y1.q3.xf3 1.66789601307602QE+<:I x~ 
-4.0000E-10 c.v1oX14 -3.93711831279142OE+<:I xg4 
1.3058E-05 c.Y1-X14.xf4 1.450443286107S70E+<:I 
-3. 1475E-06 c.Yl.pl 3.835992259680180E+<:I p12 
1.6161E-04 c. vl.pl.sf1 -8. 39768506028648OE+<:I7 p1 
--- --- -. 
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Final AIR Expression Cost Expresswn Iml!act to TSR Expresswn Impact to ER Expression 
(AIR - gi.e" by the sum of) (FeOST- gi.en by the sum of) (ITSR- gi.en by the sum of) (IER- gi.en by the sum of) 
2.9222E-05 c.d.pl.xll 3.718528455917930E+o 
-4. 1883E-06 c..l.p2.ql 3.835992259680180E+o pr 
-2.9222E-05 c.d.p2.x~ -8.397685060286480E+01 p2 
-1.5848E-04 c..l.xf1 3.718528455917930E+o 
-4.3929E-05 c..1.dl 3.835992259680180E+O .,r 
4. 1883E-06 c.d.X&l -8.397685060286480E+o p3 
4.3929E-05 c...1 _ ....... 3.718528455917930E+O 
6.7900E-05 c..~3.xfl 3.835992259680180E+o I p42 
4.2619E-06 c.d.p3.ql -8.397685060286480E+07 p4 
-6.7900E-05 c..'''' ........ 3.718528455917930E+01 
-6.79OOE-05 c..3.ldl 4.055331099575200E+08 v1 2 
-4.2619E-06 c.Y_~ -8.108186173397590E+08 v1 
6.7900E-05 c. .... ..., .n 3.9695791693360SOE+08 
-7.7692E-09 c. • ....,.. 4.055331099575200E+08 vr 
4. 1 004E-04 c..~ -8.108186173397590E+08 v2 
9.4597E-05 c..4.p4.xfl 3.969519169336050E+08 
7.5310E-05 c..~ 4.0553310995752OOE+08 -d 
-9.4597E-05 c. ........ ..,.,.,., -8.108186173397590E+08 v3 
-4.1004E-04 c..4.ldl 3.96957916933605OE+08 
-9.4597E-05 c..4.dl 4.055331099575200E+08 v42 
-7.5310E-05 c..4.x&l -8.108186173397590E+08 v4 
9.4597E-05 c. ... ..,.n 3.969579169336050E+08 
5.3011E-05 c.xt.z 5.3374497 44039940E+ 16 c' 
4.5042E-04 e.q2 -2. 13262086378715OE+17 c3 
-4.5042E-04 coX2l 3.195395746456260E+17 c2 
-5.3011E-05 atl -2.127908798041SSOE+17 c 
Framework A.tO.2 - Final Expressions for Average Individual Risk (AIR), for Costs (FCOST) and for the Frequencies of 
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Final AIR Expression Cost Expression Impact to TSR Expression Impact to ER Expression 
(AIR - gipen by the sum of) (FCOST- giNn by the sum of) (ITSR- giNn by the sum of) (IER- gipell by the sum of) 
-2.8213E-03 Ipl 5.313889408848230E+ 16 
2.9730E-04 Ipl.ql 3.742880304n6OOOE+01 xd 
1.3058E-05 pl.q4 -7.82369432333316OE+01 xf3 
-1.8351E-04 p1 3.45333758960021 OE+O I 
2.9222E-05 Ipl.ql 1.767223797221760E+o xf-f .. ,. 
.'" . 
-7.2162E-05 p3 -3.889691936503540E+01 xf4 
6.7900E-05 ip3.ql 1.5046n304257910E+o 
-5.7995E-04 1p4 1.918485898075100E+o xg12 
9.4597E-05 ~- -4.4365n60170634OE+01 xg1 
-1.3242E-05 vl.pl.xg4.xf4 1.697581185883310E+o 
1.3242E-05 vl.pl.xg4.xf4 1.322167800457380E+o xgr 
-9. 1204E-05 Yl.xf1 -3.248445467365070E+o xg2 
9. 1204E-05 vlxf1 1.110594088251880E+o 
4.5042E-04 ixgl 3.484350442852780E+o xgr 
-9.5415E-04 ill&l -7.558073894742920E+01 xg3 
-1.3058E-05 Ixg4 3.248016304170nOE+O 
8.2651E-o& 1 .667896013076020E+o xg.f 
-3.937118312791420E+01 x~ 
1.450443286107870E+o 
3.835992259680180E+O p12 
-8.39768506028648OE+01 Ip1 
3.718528455917930E+O~ 
3.835992259680180E+01 pr 
-8.397685060286480E+OI iP2 
3. 718528455917930E+O I 
3.835992259680180E+O r"r 
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-8.397685060286480E+O-, lP! 
3. 718528455917930E+O~ 
3.835992259680180E+o p42 
-8.397685060286480E+O~ ~ 
3.718528455917930E+o 
4.055331099575200E+08 v12 
-8.108186173397590E+08 v1 
3.969579169336050E+08 
4.055331099575200E+08 vr 
-8.108186173397590E+08 v2 
3.969579169336050E+08 
4.055331099575200E+08 vr 
-8.108186173397590E+08 v3 
3.969579169336050E+08 
4.055331099575200E+08 v42 
-8.108186173397590E+08 v4 
3.969579169336050E+08 
5.337449744039940E+16 c· 
-2.132620863787150E+ 17 c3 
3.195395746456260E+ 17 c2 
-2.127908798041550E+ 17 c 
5.313889408848230E+ 16 
-
Framework A.tO.2 - Final Expressions for Average Individual Risk (AIR), for Costs (FCOST) and for the Frequencies of 
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Appendix 11 
445 
£ 
Solver R AIR < 3.798-04 I IER < 10-4 
MlnimiselFCOST ITSR <10-4 10.999 < x < 0.9999 SIL 3 
Report: 710919816:10:53 
_.---. ---- ,- - -.- --- - --- -::, 
Cell Name Final Value Constraints 
$H$23 FCOST -£ 133,072,928.00 
$F$23 AIR 2. 173323E-04 $F$23<::O.000379 
$J$23 IER 7.270096E-05 $J$23<=O.0001 
$1$23 ITSR 1.099493E-16 $1$23<=0.0001 
$J$53 xf1 9.9990ooE-01 $J$53<=0.9999 $J$53>=O.999 
$J$54 xf2 9.9990ooE-01 $J$54<=O.9999 $J$54>=O.999 
$J$55 xf3 9.9990ooE-01 $J$55<=O.9999 $J$55>=O.999 
$J$56 xf4 9.9990ooE-01 $J$56<=O.9999 $J$56>=O.999 
$J$57 xg1 9.9990ooE-01 $J$57 <=0.9999 $J$57>=0.999 
$J$58 xg2 9.9990ooE-01 $J$58<=0.9999 $J$58>=0.999 
$J$59 xg3 9.9990ooE-01 $J$59<=0.9999 $J$59>=0.999 
$J$60 x~ 9.9990ooE-01 $J$60<=0.9999 $J$60>=0.999 
$J$61 Ip1 9.999000E-01 $J$61 <=0.9999 $J$61 >=0.999 
$J$62 Ip2 9.9990ooE-01 $J$62<=0.9999 $J$62>=0.999 
$J$63 Ip3 9.9990ooE-01 $J$63<=0.9999 $J$63>=0.999 
$J$64 ip4 9.9990ooE-01 $J$64<=0.9999 $J$64>=0.999 
$J$65 v1 9.9990ooE-01 $J$65=O.9999 $J$65::O.9999 
$J$66 v2 9.999000E-01 $J$66=O.9999 $J$66=0.9999 
$J$67 v3 9.999000E-01 $J$67 =0.9999 $J$67=0.9999 
$J$68 v4 9.999000E-01 $J$68::O.9999 $J$68=0.9999 
$J$69 c 9.997393E-01 $J$69<=0.9999 $J$69>=0.999 
------_._-
Table A.ll.1 - Solver Report 1 - Results Obtained for FCOST, AIR, 
1ER, ITSR and for Availability Values of the Studied Safety Systems, 
Regarding the ~tablished Constraints and Minimization of FCOST 
£ 
AIR < 3.798-04 IER < 10-4 
0.99 < x < 0.999 Sil 2 
----- - -_. ,-------------
Cen Name Final Value Constraints 
$H$23 FCOST -£ 133,057,504.00 
$F$23 AIR 2.176586E-04 $F$23<::O.OOO379 
$J$23 IER 7.335401 E-05 $J$23<=0.0001 
$1$23 ITSR 1.095505E-14 $1$23<=0.0001 
$J$65 v1 9.990000E-01 $J$65=O.999 
$J$66 v2 9.990000E-01 $J$66=O.999 
$J$67 v3 9.990000E-01 $J$67=O.999 
$J$68 v4 9.990000E-01 $J$68=O.999 
$J$53 xf1 9.990000E-01 $J$53>=0.99 $J$53<=0.999 
$J$54 xf2 9.990000E-01 $J$54>=0.99 $J$54<=0.999 
$J$55 xf3 9.990000E-01 $J$55>=0.99 $J$55<=0.999 
$J$56 xf4 9.990000E-01 $J$56>=0.99 $J$56<=0.999 
$J$57 xg1 9.990000E-01 $J$57>=0.99 $J$57 <=0.999 
$J$58 xg2 9.990000E-01 $J$58>=0.99 $J$58<=0.999 
$J$59 xg3 9.990000E-01 $J$59>=0.99 $J$59<=0.999 
$J$60 xg4 9.990000E-01 $J$60>=0.99 $J$60<=0.999 
$J$61 IP1 9.990000E-01 $J$61 >=0.99 $J$61 <=0.999 
$J$62 ip2 9.990000E-01 $J$62>=0.99 $J$62<=0.999 
$J$63 ,P3 9.990000E-01 $J$63>=0.99 $J$63<=0.999 
$J$64 1p4 9.990000E-01 $J$64>=0.99 $J$64<=0.999 
$J$69 c 9.979083E-01 $J$69>=0.99 $J$69<=0.999 
Table A.ll.2 - Solver Report 2 - Results Obtained for FCOST, AIR, 
IER, ITSR and for Availability Values of tile Studied Safety Systems, 
Regarding tile Established Constraints and Minimization of FCOST 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ 
www.bl,uk 
PAGE MISSING IN 
ORIGINAL 
£ 
AIR < 3.798-04 I IER < 1G-4 
ITSR <1G-4 I 0.90 < x < 0.99 SIL 1 
Relat6rio crlado: 710919816:47:50 
Cell Name Final Value Constraints 
$H$23 FCOST £ 194,525,696.00 
$F$23 AIR 2.207949E-04 $F$23<=0.OOO379 
$J$23 IER 8.086512E-OS $J$23<=0.OOO1 
$1$23 ITSR 1.067329E-12 $1$23<=0.0001 
$J$53 xf1 9.900000E-01 $J$53<=0.99 $J$53>=0.9 
$J$54 xf2 9.9000ooE-01 $J$54<=0.99 $J$54>=0.9 
$J$55 xf3 9.900000E-01 $J$55<=0.99 $J$55>=0.9 
$J$56 xf4 9.900000E-01 $J$56<=0.99 $J$56>=0.9 
$J$57 xg1 9.900000E-01 $J$57<=0.99 $J$57>=0.9 
$J$58 xg2 9.900000E-01 $J$58<=0.99 $J$58>=0.9 
$J$59 xg3 9.900000E-01 $J$59<=0.99 $J$59>=0.9 
$J$60 xg4 9.900000E-01 $J$60<=O.99 $J$60>=0.9 
$J$61 ~1 9.900000E-01 $J$61 <=0.99 $J$61>=0.9 
$J$62 p2 9.900000E-01 $J$62<=0.99 $J$62>=0.9 
$J$63 p3 9.900000E-01 $J$63<=0.99 $J$63>=0.9 
$J$64 p4 9. 900000E-0 1 $J$64<=0.99 $J$64>=0.9 
$J$65 v1 9.900000E-01 $J$65=O.99 $J$65=0.99 
$J$66 v2 9.900000E-01 $J$66=0.99 $J$66=0.99 
$J$67 v3 9.900000E-01 $J$67=O.99 $J$67=O.99 
$J$68 v4 9.900000E-01 $J$68=O.99 $J$68=O.99 
$J$69 c 9.900000E-01 $J$69<=0.99 $J$69>=0.9 
Table A.U.3 - Solver Report 3 - Results Obtained for FCOST, AIR, 
IER, ITSR and for Availability Values of the Studied Safety Systems, 
Regarding the Established Constraints and Minimization of FCOST 
I 
! 
~ 
o 
l Solver Report 4 AIR < 3.798-04 IER < 10-4 
lMinimise I FCOST AIR> 2.21 e-04 
ITSR <10-4 0.90 < x < 0.99 SIL 1 
Goalee" (minimise) 
Cell Name Final Value Constraints 
$H$23 FCOST £ 194,895,200.00 
$F$23 AIR 2.263829E-04 $F$23<::O .000379 
$J$23 IER 1 .000043E-04 $J$23<=0.OOO1 
$1$23 ITSR 3.368321E-1~ $1$23<::0.0001 
$F$23 AIR 2.263829E-04 $F$23>::O.OOO221 
$J$53 xf1 9.649899E-01 $J$53<=0.99 $J$53>=0.9 
$J$54 xf2 9.899445E-01 $J$54<=0.99 $J$54>=0.9 
$J$55 xf3 9.899997E-01 $J$55<=0.99 $J$55>=0.9 
$J$56 xf4 9.900000E-01 $J$56<=0.99 $J$56>=0.9 
$J$57 xg1 9.900000E-01 $J$57 <=0.99 $J$57>=0.9 
$J$58 x~ 9.885686E-01 $J$58<=0.99 $J$58>=0.9 
$J$59 xg3 9.899997E-01 $J$59<=0.99 $J$59>=0.9 
$J$60 xg4 9.899989E-01 $J$60<=0.99 $J$60>=0.9 
$J$61 p1 9.684451E-01 $J$61 <=0.99 $J$61>=0.9 
$J$62 p2 9.886592E-01 $J$62<=0.99 $J$62>=0.9 
$J$63 p3 9.899576E-01 $J$63<=0.99 $J$63>=0.9 
$J$64 p4 9.858222E-01 $J$64<=0.99 $J$64>=0.9 
$J$65 v1 9.900000E-01 $J$65::O.99 $J$65=0.99 
$J$66 v2 9.900000E-01 $J$66::O.99 $J$66=0.99 
$J$67 v3 9.900000E-01 $J$67::O.99 $J$67::O.99 
$J$68 v4 9.900000E-01 $J$68::O.99 $J$68::O.99 
$J$69 c 9.900000E-01 $J$69<=0.99 $J$69>=0.9 
Table A.1l.4 - Solver Report 4 - Results Obtained for FCOST, AIR, 
IER, ITSR and for Availability Values of the Studied Safety Systems, 
Regarding the Established Comtraints and Minimization of FCOST 
~ 
-
I Solver Report 5 AIR < 3.798-04 IER < 10-4 
IMinimise I FeOST AIR> 2.198-04 
ITSR <10-4 0.99 < x < 0.999 SIL2 
- - ---
~ ~ 
Cell Name Final Value Constraints 
$H$23 FCOST -£ 132,951,680.00 
$F$23 AIR 2.193722E-04 $F$23<::O.000379 
$J$23 IER 7.767994E-05 $J$23<=0.OOO1 
$1$23 ITSR 4.394308E-14 $1$23<::0.0001 
$F$23 AIR 2.193722E-04 $F$23>::O.000219 
$J$53 xf1 9.902971 E-01 $J$53<=0.999 $J$53>=0.99 
$J$54 xf2 9.989985E-01 $J$54<=0.999 $J$54>=0.99 
$J$55 xf3 9.990000E-01 $J$55<=0.999 $J$55>=0.99 
$J$56 xf4 9.990000E-01 $J$56<=0.999 $J$56>=0.99 
$J$57 xg1 9.990000E-01 $J$57 <=0.999 $J$57>=0.99 
$J$58 xg2 9.989368E-01 $J$58<=0.999 $J$58>=0.99 
$J$59 xg3 9.990000E-01 $J$59<=0.999 $J$59>=0.99 
$J$60 xg4 9.990000E-01 $J$60<=0.999 $J$60>=0.99 
$J$61 ip1 9.959523E-01 $J$61 <=0.999 $J$61 >=0.99 
$J$62 iP2 9.988125E-01 $J$62<=0.999 $J$62>=0.99 
$J$63 iP3 9.989947E-01 $J$63<=0.999 $J$63>=0.99 
$J$64 lR4 9.984114E-01 $J$64<=0.999 $J$64>=0.99 
$J$65 v1 9.900020E-01 $J$65<=0.999 $J$65>=0.99 
$J$66 v2 9.989811 E-01 $J$66<=0.999 $J$66>=0.99 
$J$67 v3 9.989996E-01 $J$67 <=0.999 $J$67>=0.99 
$J$68 v4 9.989505E-01 $J$68<=0.999 $J$68>=0.99 
$J$69 c 9.978750E-01 $J$69<=0.999 $J$69>=0.99 
Table A.II.S - Solver Report S - Results Obtained for FCOST, AIR, 
IER, ITSR and for Availability Values of the Studied Safety Systems, 
Regarding the Established Constraints and Minimization of FCOST 
~ 
t-.) 
I Solver Aeport 6 AlA < 3.798-04 lEA < 10-4 
LMinimise I FCOST AlA = 2.1758-04 
ITSA <10-4 0.999 < x < 0.9999 SIl3 I 
Goal Cell (minimise) 
Cell Name Final Value Constraints 
$H$23 FCOST -£ 133,051,744.00 
$F$23 AIR 2.17521603E-04 $F$23<::O.OOO379 
$J$23 IER 7.29439760E-05 $J$23<=0.OOO1 
$1$23 ITSR 1.20508484E-1El $1$23<::0.0001 
$F$23 AIR 2.17521603E-04 $F$23=0.OOO2175 
$J$53 xf1 9.99187656E-01 $J$53<=0.9999 $J$53>=0.999 
$J$54 xt2 9.99899988E-01 $J$54<=0.9999 $J$54>=0.999 
$J$55 xf3 9.99900000E-01 $J$55<=0.9999 $J$55>=0.999 
$J$56 xf4 9.99900000E-01 $J$56<=0.9999 $J$56>=0.999 
$J$57 xg1 9.99900000E-01 $J$57 <=0.9999 $J$57>=0.999 
$J$58 xa2 9.99899566E-01 $J$58<=0.9999 $J$58>=0.999 
$J$59 xg3 9.99900000E-01 $J$59<=0.9999 $J$59>=0.999 
$J$60 xg4 9.99900000E-01 $J$60<=0.9999 $J$60>=0.999 
$J$61 11)1 9. 99890234E-01 $J$61 <=0.9999 $J$61 >=0.999 
$J$62 Ip2 9.99899261 E-01 $J$62<=0.9999 $J$62>=0.999 
$J$63 11)3 9.99899983E-01 $J$63<=0.9999 $J$63>=0.999 I 
$J$64 lpot 9.99896292E-01 $J$64<=0.9999 $J$64>=0.999 ! 
$J$65 v1 9.99161370E-01 $J$65::O.9999 $J$65>=0.999 
$J$66 v2 9.99899718E-01 $J$66::O.9999 $J$66>=0.999 
$J$67 v3 9.99899996E-01 $J$67::O.9999 $J$67>=0.999 
$J$68 v4 9.99899525E-01 $J$68::O.9999 $J$68>=0.999 
$J$69 c 9.99OO0018E-01 $J$69<=0.9999 $J$69>=0.999 
Table A.1l.6 - Solver Report 6 - Results Obtained for FCOST, AIR, 
IER, ITSR and for Availability Values of the Studied Safety Systems, 
Regarding the Es.tablished Constraints and Minimization of FCOST 
~ 
w 
I Solver Report 7 AIR < or = 3.7ge-04 IER < 10-4 
IMlnimise I FCOST AIR> or = 2.1758-04 
ITSR <10-4 0.999 < x < 0.9999 SIL3 
Goal Cell I minimiseJ 
Cell Name Final Value Constraints 
I$H$23 FCOST -£ 133,086,304.00 
$F$23 AIR 2.175217E-04 $F$23<::O.000379 
$J$23 IER 7.254659E-OS $J$23<=0.OOO1 
$1$23 ITSR 1.097114E-16 $1$23<::0.0001 
$F$23 AIR 2.175217E-04 $F$23>::O.OOO2175 
$J$53 xf1 9.99900000E-01 $J$53::O .9999 $J$53=0.9999 
$J$54 xf2 9.99900000E-01 $J$54::O.9999 $J$54::O.9999 
$J$55 xf3 9.99900000E-01 $J$55::O .9999 $J$55=0.9999 
$J$56 xf4 9.99900000E-01 $J$56::O.9999 $J$56::O.9999 
$J$57 xg1 9.99900000E-01 $J$57::O.9999 $J$57=O.9999 
$J$58 xg2 9.99900000E-01 $J$58=0.9999 $J$58=0 .9999 
$J$59 xg3 9.99900000E-01 $J$59=0.9999 $J$59=O.9999 
$J$60 xg4 9.99900000E-01 $J$60::O .9999 $J$60=O.9999 
$J$61 IP1 9.99900000E-01 $J$61 ::0.9999 $J$61 ::0.9999 
$J$62 p2 9.99900000E-01 $J$62::O.9999 $J$62::O.9999 
$J$63 ~3 9.99900000E-01 $J$63::O.9999 $J$63::O.9999 
$J$64 ip4 9.99900000E-01 $J$64=O.9999 $J$64::O.9999 
$J$65 v1 9.99900000E-01 $J$65=O.9999 $J$65=O.9999: 
$J$66 v2 9.99900000E-01 $J$66=O.9999 $J$66=O.9999 
$J$67 va 9.99900000E-01 $J$67=O.9999 $J$67=O.9999 
$J$68 v4 9.99900000E-01 $J$68=O.9999 $J$68=O.9999 
$J$69 c 9.97575426E-01 $J$69<=0.9999 $J$69>=0.999 
Table A.ll.7 - Solver Report 7 - Results Obtained for FCOST, AIR, 
IER, ITSR and for Availability Values of the Studied Safety Systems, 
Regarding the Established Constraints and Minimization of FCOST 
~ 
~ 
I Solver Report 8 AIR < or = 3.7ge-04 IER < 10-4 I 
IMinimise I FCOST AIR> or = 2.1768-04 
ITSR <10-4 0.999 < x < 0.9999 SIL3 
Goal Cell (minimise) 
Cen Name Final Value Constraints 
$H$23 FCOST -£ 132,276,064.00 
$F$23 AIR 2.176000E-~ $F$23<::O.000379 
$J$23 IER 7.248158E-05 $J$23<=0.OOO1 
$1$23 ITSR 1.096130E-16 $1$23<::0.0001 
$F$23 AIR 2.176000E-04 $F$23>::O.0002176 
$J$53 xf1 9.999000E-01 $J$53::O.9999 $J$53::O.9999 
$J$54 xf2 9.999000E-01 $J$54::O.9999 $J$54::O.9999 
$J$55 xf3 9.999000E-01 $J$55::O .9999 $J$55::O.9999 
$J$56 xf4 9.999000E-01 $J$56::O.9999 $J$56=O.9999 
$J$57 xg1 9.999000E-01 $J$57::O.9999 $J$57=O.9999 
$J$58 xg2 9.999000E-01 $J$58::O.9999 $J$58=O.9999 
$J$59 xg3 9.999000E-01 $J$59=0.9999 $J$59=O.9999 
$J$60 xg4 9.999000E-01 $J$60::O .9999 $J$60=O.9999 
$J$61 ip1 9.999000E-01 $J$61 ::0.9999 $J$61 ::0.9999 
$J$62 1P2 9.999000E-01 $J$62::O.9999 $J$62::O.9999 
$J$63 IP3 9,999000E-01 $J$63::O.9999 $J$63=O.9999 
$J$64 1p4 9.999000E-01 $J$64::O.9999 $J$64=O.9999 
$J$65 v1 9.999000E-01 $J$65::O.9999 $J$65=O.9999 
$J$66 v2 9.999000E-01 $J$66::O.9999 $J$66::O.9999 
$J$67 v3 9.999000E-01 $J$67::O.9999 $J$67 ::0.9999 
$J$68 v4 9.999000E-01 $J$68::O.9999 $J$68::O.9999 I 
$J$69 c 9.966814E-01 $J$69<=0.9999 $J$69>=0.999 I 
Table A.lI.8 - Solver Report 8 - Results Obtained for FCOST, AIR, 
IER, ITSR and for Availability Valoes of the Studied Safety Systems, 
Regarding the Established Constraints and Minimization of FCOST 
~ 
VI 
I Solver Report 9 AIR < or = 3.7ge-04 I IER < 10-4 
IMinimlse I FeOST SIL 3 for c ITSR <10-4 
0.999 < x < 0.9999, SIL3 for fire detection 
Goal Cell (minimise) 
Cell Name Final Value Constraints 
~H~3 FCOST -£ 133,024,320.00 
$F$23 AIR 2.174166E-Q.4 $F$23<::O.000379 
$J$23 IER 7.308563E-05 $J$23<=0.OOO1 
$1$23 ITSR 1.098488E-14 $1$23<::0.0001 
$J$53 xf1 9.999000E-01 $J$53>=0.999 $J$53<=0.9999 
~$54' xf2 9.999000E-01 $J$54>=0.999 $J$54<=0.9999 
$J$55 xf3 9.999000E-01 $J$55>=0.999 $J$55<=0.9999 
$1$56" xf4 9.999000E-01 $J$56>=0.999 $J$56<=0.9999 
$J$57 xg1 9.990000E-01 $J$57>=0.99 $J$57<=0.999 
$J$58 xg2 9.990000E-01 $J$58>=0.99 $J$58<=0.999 
$J$59 xg3 9.990000E-01 $J$59>=0.99 $J$59<=0.999 
$J$60 xa4 9.990000E-01 $J$60>=0.99 $J$60<=0.999 
$J$61 Ip1 9.990000E-01 $J$61 >=0.99 $J$61 <=0.999 
$J$62 p2 9.990000E-01 $J$62>=O.99 $J$62<=0.999 
$J$63 p3 9.990000E-01 $J$63>=0.99 $J$63<=0.999 
$J$64 p4 9.990000E-01 $J$64>=0.99 $J$64<=0.999 
$J$65 v1 9.990000E-01 $J$65>=0.99 $J$65<=0.999 
$J$66 v2 9.990000E-01 $J$66>=0.99 $J$66<=0.999 
$J$67 v3 9.990000E-01 $J$67>=0.99 $J$67 <=0.999 
$J$68 v4 9.990000E-01 $J$68>=O.99 $J$68<=0.999 
$J$69 c 9.997252E-01 $J$69>=0.999 $J$69<=0.9999 
Table A.II.9 - Solver Report 9 - Results Obtained for FCOST, AIR, 
IER, ITSR and for Availability Values of the Studied Safety Systems, 
Regarding the Established Constraints and Minimization of FCOST 
0.99 < x < 0.999, SIL 2 for ga8 detection, 
PSL and actuation 
~ 
0\ 
I Solver Repcif 10 AIR < or = 3.7h-04 I IER < 10-4 
IMlnlmlH I FeOST C = 0.9999 ITSR <10-4 
0.999 < x < 0.9999, SIl3 for fire detection 
Goal Cell (minimise) 
eell Name Final Value Constraints 
~H$23 FeOST -£ 133,029,936.00 
$F$23 AIR 2.174009E-04 $ F$23< =(), 000379 
$J$23 IER 7.309841 E-05 $J$23<=0.OOO1 
$1$23 ITSR 1.098680E-14 $1$23<=0.0001 
$J$53 xf1 9.999000E-01 $J$53>=0.999 $J$53<=0.9999 
$J$54 xt2 9.999000E-01 $J$54>=0.999 $J$54<=0.9999 
$J$55 xf3 9.999000E-01 $J$55>=0.999 $J$55<=0.9999 
$J$56 xf4 9.999000E-01 $J$56>=0.999 $J$56<=0.9999 
$J$57 xa1 9.990000E-01 $J$57>=0.99 $J$57 <=0.999 
$J$58 xg2 9.990000E-01 $J$58>=0.99 $J$58<=0.999 
$J$59 xa3 9.990000E-01 $J$59>=0.99 $J$59<=0.999 
$J$60 xa4 9.990000E-01 $J$60>=0.99 $J$60<=0.999 
$J$61 Ip1 9.990000E-01 $J$61 >=0.99 $J$61 <=0.999 
$J$62 Ip2 9.990000E-01 $J$62>=0.99 $J$62<=0.999 
$J$63 Ip3 9.990000E-01 $J$63>=0.99 $J$63<=0.999 
$J$64 1D4 9.990000E-01 $J$64>=0.99 $J$64<=0.999 
$J$65 v1 9.990000E-01 $J$65>=0.99 $J$65<=0.999 
$J$66 v2 9.990000E-01 $J$66>=0.99 $J$66<=0.999 
$J$67 v3 9.990000E-01 $J$67>=0.99 $J$67 <=0.999 
$J$68 v4 9.990000E-01 $J$68>=0.99 $J$68<=0.999 
$J$69 C 9.999000E-01 $J$69=O.9999 $J$69=O.9999 
Table A.H.IO - Solver Report 10 - Results Obtained for FCOST, AIR, 
1ER, ITSR and for A vailabiUty Values of the Studied Safety Systems, 
Regarding the Established Constraints and Minimization of FCOST 
0.99 < x < 0.999, Sil 2 for gas detection, 
PSl and actuation 
